State v. Baker

10 S.E. 639, 33 W. Va. 319, 1889 W. Va. LEXIS 40
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 18, 1889
StatusPublished
Cited by55 cases

This text of 10 S.E. 639 (State v. Baker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Baker, 10 S.E. 639, 33 W. Va. 319, 1889 W. Va. LEXIS 40 (W. Va. 1889).

Opinion

BRannon., Judge :

Van B. Baker was indicted in June, 1887, in the Circuit Court of Hancock county, for the murder of Mrs. Drusilla McWha. He demui’red to the indictment, and his demurrer was overruled. He tendered a plea in abatement, which was rejected by the court. He then pleaded not guilty. After a trial in Hancock, and a new trial granted, the case was removed to Brooke county. When his trial came on there he objected to certain jurors for ineompeteney, whom the court accepted as competent. His trial resulted in a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, and finding that he be confined in the penitentiary. He moved the court to set aside the verdict and grant him a new trial, on the ground that it was contrary to the evidence, and the admission and rejection of certain evidence, and erroneous instructions. Ho instructions appear in the record, and no assignment is made as to them. The court overruled the motion for a new trial, and on the 27th of December, 1888, rendered judgment that the prisoner be confined in the penitentiary during his life; and to that judgment he obtained a writ of error.

[321]*321Did the court err in rejecting the ■plea in abatement ? It avers that the prosecuting attorney, of his own motion, without authority of law, went into the grand-jury room while the grand-jury was in session, and there, in the presence of the grand jury, examined certain witnesses, upon whose testimony the indictment was found, and there talked in the presence of the grand-jury about said testimony of said witnesses, and thus unlawfully conspired against the defendant to have said grand-jury find said indictment. Will the presence of the prosecuting attorney before a grand-jury vitiate an indictment ? Our Code of 1868 (chapter 120, § 5) provided that “it shall be the duty of every prosecuting attorney in this State to go before the grand-jury whenever, in his opinion, the public interest will be promoted thereby, or when called upon by the foreman to do so, to aid them with his advice and assistance in the discharge of their official duties. But he shall not be present when any vote is taken upon the finding of an indictment or presentment.” This statute has been repealed, and for that reason it is claimed the legislature did not intend prosecuting attorneys to go before grand-juries. In the first place, this section made it the duty of prosecuting attorneys to do so, whereas before it was not imperative; and, secondly, though the legislature may have so intended, it could only express its intent by enactment. This repeal left the subject as it was at common law. How is it at common law ?

The judges of England, in 1660, in the proceedings against the regicides of King Charles I., (5 State Tr. 947) resolved that any of the king’s counsel might privately manage the evidence before the grand inquest, in order to the finding of the bill of indictment. So in the case against Hardy and others (24 State Tr. 199) for treason, in 1794, the solicitor for the crown went before the grand-jury. According to Sir John Hawles, in Colledges’ Case, in 1681, the practice had long prevailed. 8 State Tr. 723. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 260, states that it is not unusual, except in the king’s bench, where the clerk of the grand-jury attends, to permit the prosecutor to be present during the sitting of the grand-jury, to conduct the evidence on the part of the crown. So on indictment for treason, where the sovereign is immediately [322]*322interested, any of the king’s counsel may attend for the same purpose, as he can not prosecute in person. 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. § 861, says the practice is not uniform in all the states, but in the greater number the state’s attorney is with the grand-jury, when not deliberating on their finding, assisting in examining witnesses,'and advising on questions of law. In 9 Amer. & Eng. Cyclop. Law, 16, tit. “Grand Juries,” the rule is laid down that “during the taking of the testimony no one besides the witnesses is permitted to be present, except the prosecuting attorney or his assistants. During the deliberations and vote of the grand-jury, no person not a member of the grand-jury may be present. An indictment may be set aside if the rule is violated.”

Mr. Justice Eelson, in U. S. v. Reed, 2 Blatchf. 435, said : “It is the uniform practice in the Eederal and State Courts for the clerk and assistant of the district attorney to attend the grand-jury, and assist in investigating the accusations presented before it. That has been the practice, to my knowledge, without question, ever since I have had any connection with the administration of criminal justice. * * * We can not at this late day overturn a uniform practice, that has been settled for so long a time. * * * But, if any abuse has been committed by him, or by any other person, it is a proper subject for investigation by the court.”

In Justice' Eield’s formal charge as to the powers and duties of grand-juries, in 2 Sawy. 678, he says : “The district attorney has the right to be present at the taking of testimony before you, for the purpose of giving' information or advice touching any matter cognizable by you, and may interrogate witnesses before you; but he has no r-ight to be present pending your deliberations on the evidence. When your vote is taken upon the question whether an indictment shall'be found, or a presentment made, no person besides yourselves should be present.”

In State v. Whitney, 7 Or. 386, an assistant attorney was before the grand-jury; and this was held not a cause for setting aside the indictment, or reversing' the judgment. In Shattuck v. State, 11 Ind. 473, it was held that the prosecuting attorney may attend the grand-jury, examine witnesses, and advise the jury of matters of law. See, also, Thomp. & M. [323]*323Juries, §§ 630, 632, and Ex parte Crittenden, Hemp. 176, and Whart. Crim. Law, §§ 404, 495.

Davis, in his Criminal Law, says : “The practice in Massachusetts is for the prosecuting officer to open the case, commence the examination of each witness, and meet any question as to thelawof the case that may begiven him; butduringthe discussion of the question it is his duty to remain perfectly silent, unless his advice or opinion in a matter of law is requested. The least attempt to influence the grand-jury in the decision upon the effect of the evidence is an unjustifiable interference, and no fair and honorable officer will ever be guilty of it. It is very common, however, for some one of the grand-jury to request the opinion of the public prosecutor as to the propriety of finding the bill; but it is his duty to decline giving it, or even any intimation on the subject, but in all cases to leave the grand-jury to decide, indepeudently, for themselves.”

Undoubtedly, this power is, in many cases of complication, important for the public interest, and, when exercised by conscientious prosecutors, according to these principles, can not hurt the accused, but when improperly exercised is a weapon of danger. How, this plea in abatement 4does not aver at what stage of the grand-jury proceedings the attorney was present: or that he was present during deliberation or vote ; or that he made any comment on the credit or-effect of the evidence, or even on the law; or that he urged the finding of the indictment. ' It does say that he “talked in the presence of said grand-jury about the testimony of said witness.’ This may be so, and yet not improper.

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Bluebook (online)
10 S.E. 639, 33 W. Va. 319, 1889 W. Va. LEXIS 40, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-baker-wva-1889.