State v. Baker

Supreme Court of South Carolina

State v. Baker

424 S.E.2d 492, 309 S.C. 436, 1992 S.C. LEXIS 235

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina

DecidedNovember 30, 1992

Docket23745

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 424 S.E.2d 492 (State v. Baker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State v. Baker, 424 S.E.2d 492, 309 S.C. 436, 1992 S.C. LEXIS 235 (S.C. 1992).

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Opinion

Moore, Justice:

Appellant was convicted in magistrate’s court of driving under the influence. His conviction was affirmed on appeal by the circuit court. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial judge erred in defining reasonable doubt in his jury charge. We reverse.

In charging the jury, the trial judge stated:

I must at this time charge you with what is a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt for which you can assign a reason. It is a doubt arising from the evidence presented or lack of evidence that created a strong uncertainty in your minds as to the defendant’s guilty [sic]. (Emphasis added.)

Appellant contends that this language violated his due process rights. We agree. In State v. Manning, 305 S.C. 413, 409 S.E. (2d) 372 (1991) (applying Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed. (2d) 339 (1990)), this Court held that a reasonable doubt charge is erroneous if it could cause a reasonable juror to interpret the charge to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the due process clause. We hold that this charge is erroneous. Accordingly, the order of the circuit court is

Reversed.

Harwell, C.J., and Chandler, Finney and Toal, JJ., concur.

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Moore, Justice:

Appellant was convicted in magistrate’s court of driving under the influence. His conviction was affirmed on appeal by the circuit court. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial judge erred in defining reasonable doubt in his jury charge. We reverse.

In charging the jury, the trial judge stated:

I must at this time charge you with what is a reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt for which you can assign a reason. It is a doubt arising from the evidence presented or lack of evidence that created a strong uncertainty in your minds as to the defendant’s guilty [sic]. (Emphasis added.)

Appellant contends that this language violated his due process rights. We agree. In State v. Manning, 305 S.C. 413, 409 S.E. (2d) 372 (1991) (applying Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed. (2d) 339 (1990)), this Court held that a reasonable doubt charge is erroneous if it could cause a reasonable juror to interpret the charge to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the due process clause. We hold that this charge is erroneous. Accordingly, the order of the circuit court is

Reversed.

Harwell, C.J., and Chandler, Finney and Toal, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

424 S.E.2d 492, 309 S.C. 436, 1992 S.C. LEXIS 235, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-baker-sc-1992.

Opinion

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