State v. Bailey

140 S.W.3d 260, 2004 Mo. App. LEXIS 1102, 2004 WL 1607700
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJuly 20, 2004
DocketNo. 25692
StatusPublished

This text of 140 S.W.3d 260 (State v. Bailey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Bailey, 140 S.W.3d 260, 2004 Mo. App. LEXIS 1102, 2004 WL 1607700 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

JAMES K. PREWITT, Judge.

Following jury trial, David L. Bailey (“Defendant”) was convicted of driving while intoxicated, in violation of § 577.010, RSMo 2000, and driving while [license] revoked, in violation of § 302.321, RSMo 2000. He was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment on the first count and six months on the second, with the sentences to be served concurrently. Defendant raises one point on appeal, and contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to certain statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument and in refusing to instruct the jury in the manner requested by Defendant.

Facts

Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the following evidence was adduced at trial. Shortly after noon on March 23, 2001, the Shannon County Sheriffs Department received a phone call “concerning a reported drunk driver on an ATV [all terrain vehicle] .... [near] Tyler’s Garage in West Eminence[.]” Jack Triplett (“Deputy”), then Chief Deputy of the department, investigated the call.

Deputy encountered an ATV being driven on West Eminence Road, a public road in Shannon County. Deputy did not chase the ATV, but “turned the lights on” his police vehicle, and Defendant stopped the ATV when he reached Deputy’s vehicle. At that point, Deputy recognized Defendant as the driver. Deputy was aware that Defendant’s driver’s license had been revoked. When asked by Deputy whether he had a driver’s license, Defendant verified that he did not.

Deputy detected a “strong odor of alcohol on [Defendant.]” In response to Deputy’s question as to whether he had been drinking, Defendant indicated that he had been drinking for three days. Regarding what alcohol Defendant had consumed on March 23, Defendant admitted to drinking “a couple of beers and a couple of shots.”

Deputy asked Defendant “if he would take some field sobriety tests,” and Defendant told Deputy that he “could not perform any of the balance tests” due to a head injury. Deputy then placed Defendant under arrest, and informed Defendant that Deputy “was going to take him to the sheriffs office and do a breath analysis test on him for alcohol.” When Defendant said “that he was not going to [262]*262take the test[,]” Deputy told Defendant that they would discuss that when they arrived at the sheriffs department.

Once at the department, Deputy gave Defendant his Miranda rights and proceeded to ask Defendant questions specified on the Alcohol Influence Report. In the observation section of that report, Deputy noted Defendant had a strong odor of alcohol; bloodshot eyes; dilated pupils; slurred speech; and walking, turning, and balance that was fair. Deputy again asked Defendant if he had been drinking, to which Defendant responded “yes,” indicating that he had consumed three or four beers at his mother’s house since 9:00 a.m. Defendant also noted that he was taking medication, including Prozac, Celebrex, and Amitriptyline, and had taken the last dose of each at approximately 9:30 a.m.

Deputy read Defendant the implied consent portion of the report and explained to Defendant that if he refused to take a requested test, Defendant’s driver’s license would be revoked for one year and that evidence of a refusal could be used against Defendant in court. Deputy then asked Defendant to submit to a breathalyzer test, and Defendant refused to take the test, telling Deputy that “he wouldn’t pass it.”

Deputy could not recall if Defendant asked to take a blood test, but acknowledged that Defendant may have because “it sounds familiar.” Deputy noted, however, that it was department policy to not offer any other test once a person refused to submit to a breathalyzer test.

At trial, which was held in Howell County pursuant to the grant of Defendant’s request for a change of venue, in addition to Deputy’s testimony on behalf of the State, Dr. Greg Shoofs was the one witness called on Defendant’s behalf. Dr. Shoofs, who practiced in the fields of general medicine as well as ophthalmology, reviewed Defendant’s medical records and also personally examined Defendant. According to Dr. Shoofs, Defendant suffered damage to his middle ear due to a skull fracture, which resulted in a loss of balance, difficulty walking, and loss of hearing in his left ear. Dr. Shoofs also noted that Defendant “has a very particular type of abnormality of the pupil called anisocoria, where one pupil is a significantly different size, and more dilated than the other.”

The jury found Defendant guilty of driving while intoxicated, in violation of § 577.010, RSMo 2000, and driving while [license] revoked, in violation of § 302.321, RSMo 2000. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent terms of four years’ imprisonment for driving while intoxicated, and six months for driving while revoked, respectively. The trial court overruled Defendant’s motion for new trial and this appeal followed.

Discussion

Defendant raises one point on appeal in which he contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to statements made by the State during the rebuttal portion of its closing argument and in refusing to instruct the jury in the manner requested by Defendant. According to Defendant, the prosecutor’s comments indicated to the jury that it was Defendant’s burden to obtain a blood test to measure his blood alcohol level, which shifted the burden of proof, in violation of Defendant’s federal and state constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court should have sustained the objection and instructed the jury that it was not Defendant’s burden to have obtained an independent blood test to prove that he was not intoxicated.

[263]*263Although the allegedly improper comments occurred during the rebuttal portion of the State’s closing argument, we find it helpful to consider statements made by both the prosecutor and defense counsel during earlier portions of closing argument. The following statements were made during the State’s initial closing argument.

If you find that the state has proven its burden of proof, that he was intoxicated while driving [the ATV], and he did not have a license to drive it, then we’re asking that you find him guilty.
Now, a lot of people start saying, Well, the state has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. How can you ever reach it? One witness. How can you ever get beyond a reasonable doubt?
Well, the judge just told you what beyond reasonable doubt means. It’s Instruction Number 4, and you’ll have a copy of this in your jury room. It’s— proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the proof that leaves you firmly convinced of defendant’s guilt.
If you think, after listening to the evidence here today, that he is guilty of driving while intoxicated, and driving without a license, then the state has met its burden of proof. We’ve proved beyond a reasonable doubt because, as the judge as [sic] said, it leaves you firmly convinced of defendant’s guilt.
[[Image here]]
[Defendant] was given the opportunity to blow into that machine and prove that he wasn’t intoxicated. What did he do? Before he even made it to the sheriffs department, right out on West Eminence Road, when he said, You’re under arrest, we’re taking you into [sic] blow on the breathalyzer. First thing he said, I’m not blowing.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

State v. Johnson
22 S.W.3d 183 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2000)
State v. Gilbert
103 S.W.3d 743 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2003)
State v. Parker
886 S.W.2d 908 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1994)
State v. Davis
126 S.W.3d 398 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2004)
Moody v. Director of Revenue
14 S.W.3d 729 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2000)
State v. Wright
941 S.W.2d 877 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1997)
State v. Pope
50 S.W.3d 916 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2001)
State v. Matchett
69 S.W.3d 493 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2001)
State v. Delaney
973 S.W.2d 152 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1998)
State v. Crump
875 S.W.2d 241 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1994)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
140 S.W.3d 260, 2004 Mo. App. LEXIS 1102, 2004 WL 1607700, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-bailey-moctapp-2004.