State v. Bagnall, Unpublished Decision (2-24-2006)

2006 Ohio 870
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 24, 2006
DocketNo. 2005-L-029.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 2006 Ohio 870 (State v. Bagnall, Unpublished Decision (2-24-2006)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Bagnall, Unpublished Decision (2-24-2006), 2006 Ohio 870 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

OPINION
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, George L. Bagnall, appeals the decision of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas classifying him as a "sexual predator" pursuant to R.C. 2950.09. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the court below.

{¶ 2} On December 1, 1998, Bagnall was indicted on five counts of rape, a first degree felony in violation of R.C.2907.02, and two counts of gross sexual imposition, a fourth degree felony in violation of R.C. 2907.05. The factual basis for the charges was Bagnall's molestation of his adopted step-daughter between September 1997 and June 1998.

{¶ 3} On February 18, 1999, Bagnall pled guilty to three counts of rape by way of an Alford plea. A sentencing hearing was held on March 16, 1999. Bagnall was sentenced to concurrent eight-year prison terms on each count and was classified as a sexual predator. This court reversed Bagnall's sexual predator classification on the grounds that the trial court failed to provide Bagnall with notice of the sexual offender classification hearing as required by R.C. 2950.09(B)(1). See State v.Bagnall, 11th Dist. No. 99-L-062, 2001-Ohio-8785, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5452.

{¶ 4} On December 16, 2004, the trial court held another sexual offender classification hearing. On January 10, 2005, the trial court entered judgment classifying Bagnall as a sexual predator.

{¶ 5} Bagnall timely appeals and raises the following assignment of error: "The trial court committed reversible error when it labeled defendant-appellant a sexual predator against the manifest weight of the evidence."

{¶ 6} Any "person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to * * * a sexually oriented offense may be classified as a sexual predator." R.C. 2950.09(A). Rape is a sexually oriented offense. R.C. 2950.01(D)(1)(a). A "sexual predator" is defined as a "person [who] has been convicted of or pled guilty to committing a sexually oriented offense that is not a registration-exempt sexually oriented offense and is likely to engage in the future in one or more sexually oriented offenses." R.C. 2950.01(E)(1).

{¶ 7} Rape is not a "registration-exempt sexually oriented offense." R.C. 2950.01(Q)(1) and (P)(1).

{¶ 8} "In making a determination * * * as to whether an offender * * * is a sexual predator, the judge shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, all of the following: (a) The offender's age * * *; (b) The offender's * * * prior criminal * * * record * * *; (c) The age of the victim * * *; (d) Whether the sexually oriented offense * * * involved multiple victims; (e) Whether the offender * * * used drugs or alcohol to impair the victim * * * or to prevent the victim from resisting; (f) If the offender * * * has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to * * * a criminal offense, whether the offender * * * completed any sentence or dispositional order imposed for the prior offense or act * * *; (g) Any mental illness or mental disability of the offender * * *; (h) The nature of the offender's * * * sexual conduct * * * and whether the sexual conduct * * * was part of a demonstrated pattern of abuse; (i) Whether the offender * * * during the commission of the sexually oriented offense * * * displayed cruelty or made one or more threats of cruelty; (j) Any additional behavioral characteristics that contribute to the offender's * * * conduct." R.C.2950.09(B)(3).

{¶ 9} "A trial court may find an offender to be a sexual predator `even if only one or two statutory factors arepresent, so long as the totality of the relevant circumstances provides clear and convincing evidence that the offender is likely to commit a future sexually-oriented offense.'" State v.Randall (2001), 141 Ohio App.3d 160, 166 (emphasis sic), citingState v. Clutter (Jan. 28, 2000), 4th Dist. No. 99CA19, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 371, at *7.

{¶ 10} The trial court "shall determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the subject offender * * * is a sexual predator." R.C. 2950.09(B)(4). "Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere `preponderance of the evidence,' but not to the extent of such certainty as is required `beyond a reasonable doubt' in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established." Cross v. Ledford (1954), 161 Ohio St. 469, paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶ 11} When reviewing a sexual predator classification, the court of appeal applies the manifest weight of the evidence standard. State v. Arnold, 11th Dist. No. 2002-L-026, 2003-Ohio-1976, at ¶ 26, citing State v. Cook,83 Ohio St.3d 404, 426, 1998-Ohio-291. Weight of the evidence involves "the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence." Statev. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52 (emphasis sic) (citation omitted). Although the weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses is primarily for the trier of fact to determine, State v. Thomas (1982),70 Ohio St.2d 79, at syllabus, when reviewing a manifest weight challenge, the appellate court sits as the "thirteenth juror."Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. The reviewing court must consider all the evidence in the record, the reasonable inferences, the credibility of the witnesses, and whether, "in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed * * *." Id., quoting Statev. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175. The reviewing court may only exercise its discretionary power to reverse a judgment as being against the manifest weight of the evidence in exceptional cases. Id.

{¶ 12} In the present case, the trial court made the following findings in support of its determination that Bagnall is a sexual predator: "The defendant was thirty-four (34) years of age at the time of the sexual[ly] oriented offenses [R.C.2950.09(B)(3)(a)]; [t]he defendant has a prior criminal record, including a domestic violence conviction [R.C.2950.09(B)(3)(b)];1 [t]he victim of the sexually oriented offense * * * was twelve (12) years of age at the time of the crimes [R.C. 2950.09(B)(3)(c)]; [t]he sexually oriented offenses * * * involved one (1) victim [R.C. 2950.09(B)(3)(d)]; [t]he defendant did not use drugs or alcohol to impair the victim or to prevent the victim from resisting [R.C. 2950.09

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Bluebook (online)
2006 Ohio 870, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-bagnall-unpublished-decision-2-24-2006-ohioctapp-2006.