State v. Azofeifa-Ramirez

• Court: Superior Court of Delaware
• Decided: March 10, 2026
• Docket: 2502006448
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) ID No. 2502006448 ) BRYAN AZOFEIFA-RAMIREZ, ) ) Defendant. )

Submitted: February 4, 2026 Decided: March 10, 2026

OPINION

Upon Defendant’s Motion to Suppress: GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.

Cassandra M. Balascak, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the State of Delaware.

Alicia Ann Porter, Esquire, Benton & Shockley Law, PA, Dover, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant.

1 I. Introduction

An individual’s right to privacy is fundamental.1 Delawareans enjoy broad

constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures by the

government.2 These protections, however, only extend so far.3 There are

government intrusions into privacy that are justified in circumstance and made in a

legally permissible manner.4

When government intrusion is justified and legally permissible, an

individual’s interest in privacy harmonizes with the public interest of law

enforcement.5 When government intrusion is unconstitutional, privacy interests and

1 State v. Holden, 54 A.3d 1123, 1128 (Del. Super. 2010) (“An examination of Delaware Constitutional history and Delaware statutory law demonstrates paramount concern for the protection of individual privacy. The first search and seizure protections for Delaware citizens were contained in the Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State.”) 2 U.S. Const. amend. IV; Del. Const. Art. I § 6. See Dorsey v. State, 761 A.2d 807, 817 (Del. 2000) (“In Jones, this Court concluded that the history of the search and seizure provisions in the Delaware Constitution reflected different and broader protections than those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”) (emphasis in original). 3 Maryland. v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 446-47 (2013) (“The Fourth Amendment’s proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.”) (cleaned up). 4 Id. 5 “The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)). “Katz posits a two-part inquiry: first, has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?” Id. (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). 2 interests in law enforcement often move directly into conflict.6 Courts then face the

difficult task of balancing these interests together.7

The Court faces such a challenge in this case. The State obtained a general

warrant to search certain categories of data on Defendant Bryan Azofeifa-Ramirez’s

smartphone.8 After the Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence extracted

pursuant to the general warrant,9 the State obtained a more limited warrant to search

only some categories of data listed in the first warrant.10 All evidence extracted from

the second warrant was evidence already extracted from the first warrant.11

The State now argues that any evidence extracted pursuant to the second

warrant should not be suppressed because it was obtained through an independent

source—the second warrant.12 The important constitutional question before the

Court is whether the independent source doctrine can be used to avoid suppression

of evidence previously discovered pursuant to a general warrant.

The Court holds that when the independent source doctrine applies, evidence

obtained pursuant to a general warrant is not disqualified from use at trial.

6 Id. 7 “[T]he permissibility of a particular law-enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1350 (Del. 1991) (quoting Goldsmith v. State, 405 A.2d 109, 111 (Del. 1979)). 8 D.I. 17 Ex. A [“First Warrant”]. 9 D.I. 17. 10 D.I. 25 Ex. 1 [“Second Warrant”] 11 See First Warrant; Second Warrant. 12 D.I. 21; D.I. 25 at 2-3; D.I. 27 at 6-10; D.I. 35. 3 Nevertheless, because the State obtained a second warrant that was overbroad, the

Court will suppress portions of the evidence obtained under the second warrant.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. New Castle County Police are dispatched to the victim’s residence.

On January 9, 2025, New Castle County Police Officer Barton was dispatched

to the victim’s residence.13 According to the victim, she was experiencing issues

with the water temperature in her master bedroom shower and attempted to fix it

herself.14 During this process, the victim discovered a hidden camera in the

shower.15 The camera was found in the shower handle with a wire leading from the

hatch in the victim’s closet.16 The victim also noticed there was a hole in the closet

floor that led to the basement bathroom.17

The victim told Officer Barton that her ex-husband—Bryan Azofeifa-Ramirez

(the “Defendant”)—installed the shower in 2017.18 The victim also communicated

13 D.I. 27 at 1. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id. at 1-2. 17 Id. at 2. 18 Id. Based on the facts provided by the parties, it appears to the Court that the victim and the Defendant previously lived together at the victim’s residence until November 2021. First Warrant at 4. In November 2021, the victim moved out of the residence pending a divorce from the Defendant. Id. The victim then returned to the residence in August 2022, after she kept the home in divorce proceedings. Id. During this period of the victim’s absence, the Defendant continued living at the residence. Id. While it remains unclear exactly when the Defendant permanently moved out of the residence, Defendant did obtain his own residence sometime after the victim returned in August 2022. Id. After moving out, however, the Defendant maintained access to the victim’s residence and made visits. Id. 4 that the Defendant was the only person who went to the basement, and when he was

over, he would spend most of his time down there.19 Following Officer Barton’s

interview of the victim, Detective Feliciano took over the investigation.20

B. The State obtains a warrant to search the Defendant’s smartphone.

Based on the type of camera discovered, Detective Feliciano knew the camera

contents could only be viewed once the camera was plugged into an electronic

device.21 The electronic device would also require a downloaded application that

could access the camera’s recordings.22 On February 4, 2025, the State obtained a

search warrant for the Defendant’s residence.23 The warrant sought to obtain the

Defendant’s electronic devices.24 Officers executed the search warrant and located

an Apple iPhone in the Defendant’s pocket during the execution of the search.25

On February 6, 2025, the State obtained a warrant to search the contents of

the iPhone found on the Defendant (the “First Warrant”).26 The contents sought

included: (1) the device’s identifying information; (2) saved digital images and

19 D.I. 27 at 2. 20 Id. 21 Id. 22 Id. Detective Feliciano would later identify the required application as USEE PLUS. First Warrant at 5. 23 D.I. 27 at 2. 24 Id. 25 Id. The Apple iPhone was gray and in a black Pelican case. First Warrant at 1. 26 D.I. 27 at 2. The First Warrant included language that allowed a forensic examination of “the digital contents of any and all attached storage devices” for the Defendant’s iPhone. First Warrant at 1. 5 videos; (3) emails, device notifications, device events, and/or device timeline; (4)

internet history; and (5) applications.27 Extraction of the iPhone under the First

Warrant produced “videos and photos, search history, emails, web bookmarks,

device info, and applications usage logs.”28

C. The Defendant files a Motion to Suppress all evidence obtained under the First Warrant.

On December 23, 2025, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress (the

“Motion”) all evidence obtained under the First Warrant.29 Before the Court could

rule on the First Warrant, the State obtained a more limited warrant to search the

Defendant’s iPhone (the “Second Warrant”).30 The State argued the Defendant’s

Motion was moot because the State had obtained the Second Warrant and would “not

be utilizing contents of the cell phone obtained pursuant to the original search

warrant.”31 The Defendant disagreed the Motion was moot, and both parties filed

responses on the issue.32

27 D.I. 27 at 2-3. The search also contained a temporal limitation between November 21, 2021, at 0000 EST hours to January 9, 2025, at 1235 hours EST. First Warrant at 1. 28 Id. at 3. 29 D.I. 17. The Defendant’s Motion to Suppress was pursuant to alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution. Id. at 1. The Defendant’s position was that the First Warrant was an unconstitutional general warrant requiring suppression of all evidence discovered pursuant to it. Id. 30 D.I. 27 at 3; Second Warrant. 31 D.I. 21. 32 D.I. 24; D.I. 25. 6 The Defendant argued the Motion was not moot because the First Warrant was

a general warrant.33 The Defendant asserted that while overbroad warrants may be

subject to severance or independent-source analysis, the only remedy for a general

warrant is suppression of all evidence obtained pursuant to it.34 The Defendant

contended that if the First Warrant was found to be a general warrant, the State could

not introduce evidence obtained pursuant to the Second Warrant that was also

obtained via the First Warrant.35

The State argued that the Motion was moot because the First Warrant was at

most overly broad.36 The State also argued that even if the First Warrant was found

to be a general warrant, it did not plan to use any evidence obtained pursuant to the

First Warrant.37 The State would instead use evidence obtained pursuant to the

Second Warrant, which was an independent source.38 In other words, the State’s

position was that the independent source doctrine applied to general warrants.

D. The Court finds the First Warrant to be general and orders additional briefing from the Parties.

The Court scheduled a status conference on January 13, 2026.39 During the

status conference, the Court held that the First Warrant was a general warrant. Based

33 D.I. 24. 34 Id. 35 Id. at 2-3. 36 D.I. 25 at 1-2. 37 D.I. 25 at 2-3. 38 Id. 39 D.I. 26. 7 on the facts presented in the four corners of the affidavit, the Court found nearly

every category of data to be searched lacked sufficient particularity that was easily

includable in the description.40 In the Court’s view, the lack of sufficient

particularity was so extreme that it authorized an “exploratory rummaging” through

the vast majority of the Defendant’s smartphone.41

After declaring the First Warrant to be a general warrant, the Court requested

further briefing on two issues: (1) whether there is a difference in the application of

the independent source doctrine in cases involving general versus overbroad

warrants; and (2) whether the Second Warrant is a general or overbroad warrant.42

This opinion follows the Parties’ completed briefing.

40 First, the warrant authorized an indiscriminate search of all “saved digital images and video[s]” on the Defendant’s phone. First Warrant at 1. No further specificity limited the search of this data category. Id. Second, the warrant authorized an indiscriminate search of all “emails, device notifications, device events, and/or device timeline[s].” Id. The search was not limited to emails with attachments, nor was it limited to emails or notifications regarding the USEE PLUS application. Id. Third, the warrant authorized an indiscriminate search of all “internet history.” Id. The search was not limited to searches of the USEE PLUS application, which are the only searches that could “aid in determining if [USEE PLUS] was used to access the camera.” Id. at 5. Finally, and most dispositive for the Court, the warrant authorized an indiscriminate search of “Applications.” Id. at 1. Despite the affidavit identifying only one application—USEE PLUS— necessary for viewing the hidden camera’s recordings, the warrant failed to limit the search to this single application. Id. The term “applications” could refer to nearly every part of an iPhone and implicates far more categories of data than those listed on the warrant. 41 The warrant also compounded the lack sufficient particularity by employing “any and all” language. Id. The warrant authorized the search of “any and all attached storage devices” for each data category listed in the application. Id. Given that the Supreme Court of Delaware has instructed courts to exercise “heightened vigilance” with warrants for digital and electronic devices, the Court determined that the extreme levels of insufficient particularity and “any and all” language justified finding that the warrant was general. Wheeler v. State, 135 A.3d 282, 307 (Del. 2016). The Court was not convinced that the temporal period alone could remedy these deficiencies. 42 D.I. 27 at 3-4. 8 III. Legal Analysis

“It is axiomatic that the United States and Delaware Constitutions provide

protections to those whose property is subject to an investigatory police search.”43

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (the “Fourth Amendment”)

provides protections against unreasonable searches and seizures:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.44

Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution (“Article I, § 6”) reflects similar but

“different and broader protections than those guaranteed by the Fourth

Amendment.”45 Article I, § 6 provides:

The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as particularly as may be; nor then, unless there be probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.46

Both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 6 “require that a warrant be

supported by probable cause and describe the places and things to be searched with

43 Terreros v. State, 312 A.3d 651, 661 (Del. 2024). 44 U.S. Const. amend. IV. 45 Garnett v. State, 308 A.3d 625, 645 (Del. 2023) (quoting Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 866 (Del. 1999) (emphasis in original)). 46 Del. Const. Art. I § 6. 9 particularity.”47 A warrant that is insufficiently particular is unconstitutional and will

fall into one of two categories: general or overbroad.48 A general warrant is the more

constitutionally offensive of the two categories.49

A general warrant allows law enforcement “to conduct an indiscriminate

search”50 and is invalid because “it vests the executing officers with unbridled

discretion to conduct an exploratory rummaging through [the defendant’s] [effects]

in search of criminal evidence[.]”51 The “fruits of a general warrant must be

suppressed in their entirety,”52 meaning there “is no room . . . for limited suppression

of evidence seized under a general warrant.”53

An overbroad warrant “describe[s] in both specific and inclusive general

terms what is to be seized but authorizes the seizure of items as to which there is no

probable cause.”54 Because a portion of an overbroad warrant satisfies constitutional

requirements, an overbroad warrant “can be redacted to strike out those portions of

the warrant that are invalid for lack of probable cause.”55

47 Terreros, 312 A.3d at 662 (cleaned up). 48 Id. at 662-63. 49 Id. at 663. 50 Id. at 662-63. 51 Taylor v. State, 260 A.3d 602, 617 (Del. 2021) (quoting United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 393 n.19 (3d. Cir. 2006)). 52 Terreros, 312 A.3d at 663. 53 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 617. 54 Id. (quoting Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 393 n.19). 55 Id. 10 The exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction of evidence obtained through

a violation of the Fourth Amendment.56 The sole purpose of the exclusionary rule

is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations, not to redress the injury occasioned

by an unconstitutional search.57 The rule removes the incentive for law enforcement

to obtain evidence through unlawful means by disqualifying unlawfully obtained

evidence from use at trial.58

Not all evidence discovered through an illegal search, however, automatically

becomes “sacred and inaccessible.”59 The Supreme Court of the United States has

recognized that the deterrence benefits of the exclusionary rule must be weighed

against the rule’s substantial social costs.60 Over time, attempts to balance

deterrence and avoid social costs have created multiple exceptions to the

exclusionary rule—including the independent source doctrine.

The independent source doctrine provides that “unlawfully obtained evidence

is admissible if the government also obtains that evidence through an independent

legal source.”61 While the policy behind the exclusionary rule is that “the

56 Herring v. U.S., 555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009). 57 Davis v. U.S., 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 (2011). 58 Garnett, 308 A.3d at 642. 59 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). 60 Herring, 555 U.S. at 141. These social costs include “letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free” and the “toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives.” Id. 61 United States v. Beck, 2023 WL 5016614, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 7, 2023) (citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 (1984)). 11 government should not profit from illegal activity,”62 the policy behind the

independent source doctrine is that the State “should not be put in a worse position

‘simply because of some earlier police error or misconduct.’”63 Thus, “the

exclusionary rule has no application [where] the [g]overnment learned of the

evidence from an independent source.”64

As the Supreme Court of Delaware has held, “official misconduct should not

fatally taint evidence.”65 Thus, so long as an exception to the exclusionary rule such

as the independent source doctrine applies, evidence will not remain tainted.66 To

determine the applicability of the independent source doctrine, courts deploy the

two-part test established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Murray.67

Courts first ask whether the police would have applied for the warrant without the

material tainted by the illegal search.68 Courts then ask whether the subsequent

warrant was supported by probable cause independent of information acquired

during the illegal search.69

62 Garnett, 308 A.3d at 643 (Del. 2023) (citing Murray, 487 U.S. at 542). 63 Id; State v. Carter, 2022 WL 1561537 at *5 (Del. Super. May 17, 2022) (citing State v. Blackwood, 2020 WL 975465, at *7 (Del. Super. Feb. 27, 2020). See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). 64 Segura, 468 U.S. at 805 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963); Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392). 65 Lopez-Vazquez v. State, 956 A.2d 1280, 1292 n. 40 (Del. 2008) (citing Jones, 745 A.2d at 873). 66 State v. Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103, at *4 (Del. Super. Dec. 2, 2024). 67 Murray, 487 U.S. 533. 68 Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103 at *3 (citing United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 281 (3d Cir. 2009)). 69 Id. 12 A. Evidence obtained pursuant to a general warrant is not disqualified from use at trial when the independent source doctrine exception to the exclusionary rule is applicable. Whether the independent source doctrine applies to evidence obtained

pursuant to a general warrant is a constitutional question that places an individual’s

interest in privacy directly in conflict with the public interest of law enforcement. A

general warrant can authorize such a deep invasion into an individual’s privacy that

nothing is off limits for law enforcement to search.70 The exclusionary rule therefore

plays an important function in removing any incentive law enforcement has in

seeking such authorization.71

But a pure application of the exclusionary rule in relation to a general warrant

creates harsh consequences with impactful social costs. “The principal cost of

applying the rule is . . . letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free—

something that offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system.”72 The

exclusionary rule “deprives juries of probative evidence of a crime; and by depriving

juries of probative evidence, the exclusionary rule often works at odds with society’s

interest in prosecuting and punishing criminals.”73 These high social costs could

cause a victim to never receive the justice they deserve through no fault of their own.

70 Terreros, 312 A.3d at 663. 71 Garnett, 308 A.3d at 642. 72 Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984) (internal quotations omitted). 73 State v. Upshur, 2011 WL 1465527, at *23 (Del. Super. April 13, 2011) (quoting United States v. May, 214 F.3d 900, 905-6 (7th Cir. 2000)). 13 As the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized, nothing about

balancing these interests is easy.74 Even when properly balanced, both the public

and private individuals sacrifice portions of their interests to the benefit of one

another. In recognition of this dichotomy, the Court carefully analyzes whether the

independent source doctrine should apply to evidence obtained pursuant to a general

warrant.75

After a thorough review of caselaw provided by the Parties and procured

through the Court’s own research, the Court finds three supporting reasons why the

independent source doctrine applies to evidence obtained pursuant to a general

warrant. Each of these reasons are discussed below.

1. A finding that the independent source doctrine is inapplicable to evidence obtained pursuant to a general warrant would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court of Delaware’s past recognition of exclusionary rule exceptions. The Supreme Court of Delaware has long-recognized exceptions to

Delaware’s state exclusionary rule.76 In some instances, Delaware has even adopted

exceptions before they entered federal jurisprudence.77 To date, the Supreme Court

74 Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6 (acknowledging that any “rule of evidence that denies the jury access to clearly probative evidence and reliable evidence must bear a heavy burden of justification, and must be carefully limited to the circumstances in which it will pay its way by deterring official unlawlessness.” (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, at 257-58 (1983)) (emphasis added). 75 Id. 76 The Supreme Court of Delaware has recognized the exigent circumstances doctrine since 1967. Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486 (Del. 1967). Next year also marks 50 years since the inevitable discovery doctrine was recognized in Cook in 1977. Cook v. State, 374 A.2d 264 (Del. 1977). 77 For example, the Supreme Court of the United States did not recognize the inevitable discovery doctrine in Nix until 1984. Nix, 467 U.S. 431. 14 of Delaware has recognized the following exceptions to the exclusionary rule: the

independent source doctrine;78 the inevitable discovery doctrine;79 the attenuation

doctrine;80 the exigent circumstances doctrine;81 and the emergency doctrine.82

These exceptions have each been applied to constitutional violations that vary

significantly from one another. Because the Supreme Court has not yet discussed

the independent source doctrine in the context of a general warrant—or in the context

of Fourth Amendment violations—the Supreme Court’s application of exclusionary

rule exceptions to other constitutional violations is particularly instructive.

These type of violations, or alleged violations in some cases, include invalid

Terry stops,83 out-of-state tracking,84 illegal entry of a residence without a warrant,85

78 See Norman v. State, 976 A.2d 843 (Del. 2009) (applying the independent source doctrine to evidence obtained in violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights). See also Lopez- Vazquez, 956 A.2d at 1291-92 (acknowledging that “taint may be purged” from evidence pursuant to the independent source doctrine). 79 See Cook, 374 A.2d 264 (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to possibly tainted evidence). 80 See Garnett, 308 A.3d 625 (applying the attenuation doctrine to tainted evidence). 81 See Patrick, 227 A.2d 486 (applying the exigent circumstances doctrine to tainted evidence). 82 See Guererri v. State, 922 A.2d 403 (Del. 2007) (applying the emergency doctrine to tainted evidence). 83 See, e.g., Cook, 374 A.2d 264 (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to evidence discovered during a frisk that potentially exceeded reasonableness of finding weapons); Thomas v. State, 8 A.3d 1195 (Del. 2010) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to evidence discovered pursuant to a valid Terry stop); Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d 1280 (applying the attenuation doctrine to evidence obtained pursuant to an illegal Terry stop). 84 See, e.g., Ways v. State, 199 A.3d 101 (Del. 2018) (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to evidence discovered independently from unconstitutional out-of-state tracking). 85 See, e.g., Garnett, 308 A.3d 625 (applying the inevitable discovery doctrine to evidence obtained from illegal entry into a residence); Patrick, 227 A.2d 486 (applying the exigent circumstances doctrine to evidence obtained from an illegal entry into a residence); Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242 (Del. 1987) (applying the exigent circumstances doctrine analysis to an illegal entry into a residence); Guererri, 922 A.2d 403 (applying the emergency doctrine to a warrantless search of a 15 and even deprivation of right to counsel.86 These constitutional violations vary in

type and degree of government intrusion.

This variety makes sense. The Supreme Court has never based applications

of exclusionary rule exceptions on specific types of constitutional violations or

levels of privacy that are violated.87 The Supreme Court has rather focused primarily

on the circumstances surrounding an alleged constitutional violation, and whether

an exclusionary rule comports with the Delaware Constitution.88 The Court

therefore finds barring the independent source doctrine from applying to general

warrants—strictly based on the type of constitutional violation and degree of privacy

violated—would be inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.

2. The Superior Court of Delaware has recognized the independent source doctrine to apply in the context of both general and overbroad warrants. While the Supreme Court of Delaware has yet to directly address the

applicability of the independent source doctrine to evidence obtained pursuant to an

residence; Blake v. State, 954 A.2d 315 (Del. 2008) (applying the emergency doctrine to a warrantless entry and search of a residence). 86 See, e.g., Norman, 976 A.2d 843 (applying the independent source doctrine to evidence obtained in violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel). 87 None of the cited cases above demonstrate the Supreme Court applying or rejecting application of an exclusionary rule exception based upon the type of constitutional violation committed or the degree of government intrusion into an individual’s privacy. This practice aligns with the Supreme Court of the United States’ guidance that the “exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). Because injury to privacy is not being redressed, the degree of injury should not matter for exclusionary rule analysis. What matters for the exclusionary rule is simply that a constitutional violation occurred. 88 For example, in Dorsey, the Supreme Court refused to adopt the good faith exception for Delaware’s state exclusionary rule because the Delaware Constitution requires probable cause to be present in a warrant. 761 A.2d at 820. 16 unconstitutional warrant, the Superior Court of Delaware has done so multiple

times.89 The Superior Court has applied the independent source doctrine to evidence

obtained under both general90 and overbroad warrants,91 with these cases often

sharing similar facts to those at issue in this case.

The Superior Court has recognized that it ought not to disturb its prior

decisions “except for urgent reasons and upon clear manifestation of error.”92 This

practice avoids confusion, promotes stability in the law, and recognizes the Supreme

Court of Delaware as the tribunal of last resort in this state.93 After reviewing the

Superior Court’s prior decisions concerning the independent source doctrine and

unconstitutional warrants, the Court finds no urgent reason or clear manifestation of

error to justify disturbing our past precedents.

89 See, e.g., Carter, 2022 WL 1561537; State v. Clark, 2024 WL 4025008 (Del. Super. Aug. 29, 2024); Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103. The Defendant has also suggested that the Court’s decision in State v. Robinson dealt with similar and relevant issues. ID. No. 1706003315, Suppression Decision Hrg. Tr. In Robinson, the State obtained four general warrants to search the defendant’s smartphone. Id. at 2. The State then obtained a fifth warrant, which the State conceded was overbroad. Id. at 3. The court suppressed the fifth warrant because it was nearly identical to three of the previously obtained general warrants, which the State had previously admitted were general warrants. Id. at 2, 7. Robinson never conducted independent source doctrine analysis, making Robinson distinct from this case. The Court therefore will not discuss Robinson in its analysis. 90 See Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103 (finding the independent source doctrine applying the evidence first obtained pursuant to a general warrant). 91 See Carter, 2022 WL 1561537; Clark, 2024 WL 4025008 (finding the independent source doctrine applying the evidence first obtained pursuant to an overbroad warrant). 92 Wilson v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 7 A.2d 906, 908 (Del. Super. 1939) (citing Ajax Rubber Co. v. Gam, 151 A. 831 (Del. Super. 1924); Hackett v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 165 A. 332 (Del. Super 1933)). 93 Id; Wilmington Amusement Co. v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 21 A.2d 194, 196 (Del. Super. 1941). 17 i. Carter and Clark applied the independent source doctrine to subsequent warrants obtained after overbroad warrants.

The Superior Court first addressed the independent source doctrine’s

applicability to evidence obtained pursuant to an overbroad warrant in State v.

Carter.94 After recovering the defendant’s smartphone during his arrest, a detective

obtained a warrant to search information on the smartphone.95 The defendant filed

a motion to suppress the evidence extracted from the warrant and cited three

supporting reasons: 1) the warrant lacked specificity; 2) the temporal period of the

search was too expansive; and 3) the warrant did not establish probable cause that

evidence of alleged criminal activity would be found on the smartphone.96

The State acknowledged that the temporal period was overbroad and that

portions of the data sought were not supported by probable cause.97 The State’s

position was that because the warrant was overbroad, evidence supported by

probable cause should be identified and avoid suppression.98 The State, in response

to the motion to suppress, also represented that it anticipated the detective obtaining

a second warrant to search the smartphone data, and that nothing obtained by the

first warrant would be used to obtain the second warrant.99

94 Carter, 2022 WL 1561537. 95 Carter, 2022 WL 1561537, at *1. 96 Id. 97 Id. 98 Id. 99 Id. 18 The detective eventually obtained the second warrant.100 The second warrant

outlined a stricter temporal limitation and limited the types of data to be searched.101

No information from the first warrant was used to obtain the second warrant, and the

State maintained its position that there was probable cause to believe evidence of the

defendant’s alleged crimes may be found on the smartphone.102

The court held that the first warrant obtained by the detective was an

overbroad warrant.103 The court found that the temporal period exceeded probable

cause, but that probable cause existed for the categories of data to be searched.104

The court also held that the second warrant was validly executed because it was

adequately supported by probable cause and was stated with sufficient

particularity.105

The court’s analysis did not end there. The court explained that “regardless

of whether Warrant 1 is a general or overly broad warrant, because the State sought

and obtained Warrant 2, the issue becomes whether Warrant 2 survives in lieu of

Warrant 1’s partial invalidity.”106 The court held the second warrant did survive due

to the independent source doctrine.107

100 Carter, 2022 WL 1561537, at *2. 101 Id. 102 Id. 103 Carter, 2022 WL 1561537, at *3. 104 Carter, 2022 WL 1561537, at *3-4. 105 Carter, 2022 WL 1561537, at *4. 106 Carter, 2022 WL 1561537, at *5 (emphasis added). 107 Carter, 2022 WL 1561537, at *6. 19 The court held that the independent source doctrine applied to the second

warrant for several reasons. First, the court asserted that if it “were to suppress all

evidence obtained by the warrants at issue, the State would be put in a worse position

than prior to the police misconduct.”108 Such a result would, in the court’s view,

“run afoul of the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule and wholly disregard

[prior Superior Court] and United States Supreme Court decisions which . . .

[propose] the State should not be put in a worse position simply because of some

earlier police error or misconduct[.]”109

Second, the court pointed out that the defendant cited no cases “which stand

for the proposition that a subsequent warrant obtained by the same information used

to obtain a prior warrant invalidates the former.”110 The court explained it had

addressed a similar situation in State v. Blackwood, where the independent source

doctrine applied to evidence obtained pursuant to an overbroad warrant because the

defendant gave valid consent for his smartphone to be searched.111

Third, the court found that the second warrant was “separate and apart” from

the first warrant.112 All of the information the detective used to obtain the second

warrant was known to him prior to discovering any evidence from the first

108 Id. (emphasis added). 109 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). 110 Id. (emphasis in original). 111 Id; Blackwood, 2020 WL 975465. 112 Carter, 2022 WL 1561537, at *6. 20 warrant.113 The court noted that the information used to apply for both warrants was

nearly identical, except that the second warrant application was stated with more

particularity and used a shorter temporal limitation.114 The court therefore found any

evidence obtained pursuant to the second warrant admissible through the

independent source doctrine.

A few years later, the Superior Court heard an extremely similar case in State

v. Clark.115 In Clark, a detective obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s

smartphone.116 After obtaining the warrant, the Supreme Court of Delaware issued

its opinion in Terreros.117 The detective then obtained a revised warrant in response

to the Terreros decision.118

The defendant filed motions to suppress the first and second warrant.119 The

defendant argued the first warrant was either overbroad or general, with either type

of unconstitutional warrant requiring a subsequent warrant to be deemed fruits of the

poisonous tree.120 The State conceded that the first warrant was overbroad, but

113 Id. 114 Id. 115 Clark, 2024 WL 4025008. 116 Clark, 2024 WL 4025008, at *1. 117 Id. 118 Id. 119 Id. 120 Clark, 2024 WL 4025008, at *2. 21 denied it was a general warrant.121 The State also argued that the second warrant

was permissible through the independent source doctrine.122

The court held the first warrant to be overbroad123 and the second warrant to

be permissible.124 Finding Carter instructive, the court drew similarities between

the facts in both cases.125 The court highlighted that the first warrants obtained in

both cases were found to be overbroad and applications for subsequent warrants in

each case used information known independently from the first warrants.126

The court ultimately found that the independent source doctrine permitted

evidence obtained from the second warrant to be admissible.127 The court reasoned

that the independent source doctrine applied because nothing from the first warrant

was used to obtain the second warrant.128 The court did, however, narrow the

reasoning from Carter slightly: “It logically flows that where an original warrant [is

overbroad] . . . and where the Court could properly excise the overbroad portions of

the warrant, the [e]xclusionary [r]ule would not bar obtaining a subsequent,

constitutionally complaint warrant.”129

121 Id. 122 Clark, 2024 WL 4025008, at *4. 123 Id. 124 Clark, 2024 WL 4025008, at *4-5. 125 Id. 126 Id. 127 Clark, 2024 WL 4025008, at *5. 128 Id. 129 Id. 22 ii. Taylor and Matthews applied the independent source doctrine to a subsequent warrant obtained after general warrants. The Superior Court first addressed the independent source doctrine’s

applicability to evidence obtained pursuant to a general warrant in State v. Taylor.130

As discussed herein, the court in Taylor subsequently withdrew and vacated its

opinion. The Court therefore addresses the facts and legal analysis in Taylor solely

because the court in Matthews relies upon Taylor’s analysis in its decision and to

place the Matthews decision in context. The Court does not rely on Taylor for any

other purpose.

In Taylor, law enforcement found two smartphones while arresting the

defendant.131 An officer applied for a warrant to search the contents of the two

phones.132 The defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence obtained pursuant

to that warrant, alleging the warrant was an unconstitutional general warrant.133

The trial court denied the defendants motion and the defendant was convicted

at trial.134 Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware vacated the defendant’s

conviction and remanded for a new trial.135 The Supreme Court found the warrant

authorizing the search of the defendant’s smartphones to be an unconstitutional

130 Taylor, 2023 WL 8234469. 131 Taylor, 2023 WL 8234469, at *1. 132 Id. 133 Id. 134 Id. 135 Taylor, 2023 WL 8234469, at *2. 23 general warrant.136 The Supreme Court therefore ordered full suppression of the

evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant.137

Following the Supreme Court’s decision, and in anticipation of retrial, the

State obtained a second, more limited warrant to search the defendant’s

smartphones.138 The affidavit for the second warrant specifically averred that no

evidence obtained from the first warrant was used to apply for the second warrant.139

The defendant later moved to suppress evidence obtained from his smartphones.140

The defendant’s motion advanced three arguments, among others: 1) the

Supreme Court’s finding that the first warrant was a general warrant meant the

defendant was to be retried without tainted evidence obtained pursuant to the first

warrant; 2) application of the independent source doctrine was contrary to the search

and seizure jurisprudence regarding electronic devices; and 3) the second warrant

did not meet particularity requirements.141

The State argued in response that the second warrant passed constitutional

muster under the independent source doctrine.142 The State also argued that the

Supreme Court’s decision was focused on the first warrant and did not prohibit

136 Id. 137 Id. 138 Id. 139 Id. 140 Id. 141 Taylor, 2023 WL 8234469, at *3. 142 Id. 24 attempts to obtain subsequent warrants.143 The State finally argued that the second

warrant met particularity requirements.144

The court first held that the second warrant had been purged of the afflictions

present in the first, unconstitutional general warrant.145 The court then held that

evidence obtained under the second warrant was admissible under independent

source doctrine.146 In determining the applicability of the independent source

doctrine, the court employed the two-part test established in Murray.147

The court first found that law enforcement would have applied for a warrant

to search the defendant’s smartphones even if information obtained under the first

warrant was never seen.148 The court reasoned that because law enforcement applied

for a warrant to search the smartphones pre-illegal search, that first warrant served

as proof that the first step in Murray had been met.149 The court then found that the

probable cause articulated for the second warrant was independent of probable cause

originating from the first warrant.150

The court also found that admitting evidence obtained under the second

warrant did not conflict with the Supreme Court’s prior ruling as the Supreme Court

143 Id. 144 Id. 145 Taylor, 2023 WL 8234469, at *6-7. 146 Taylor, 2023 WL 8234469, at *7-10. 147 Taylor, 2023 WL 8234469, at *8-10. 148 Taylor, 2023 WL 8234469, at *9. 149 Id. 150 Id. 25 “included no blanket prohibition on a second search warrant.”151 The court viewed

only evidence obtained under the first warrant tainted, not evidence obtained under

the second warrant.152 The court explained that it would only violate the Supreme

Court’s order if it admitted evidence pursuant to the first warrant.153

In the court’s view, the Supreme Court had not declared all evidence obtained

under the first warrant “forever forbidden.”154 This evidence could still be admitted

if it was admitted in a constitutionally permissible manner—like pursuant to the

legally appropriate second warrant.155 The court reasoned there was nothing gained

from excluding such evidence when the evidence was admissible through an

independent, legally appropriate manner.156

The Taylor opinion was later vacated,157 but its reasoning was still adopted in

Matthews,158 an opinion issued shortly after. In Matthews, a warrant was obtained

to search the contents of the defendant’s smartphone.159 The defendant was

subsequently convicted at trial, and after the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction,

the defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief.160

151 Taylor, 2023 WL 8234469, at *10. 152 Id. 153 Id. 154 Id. 155 Id. 156 Id. 157 State v. Taylor, 2024 WL 1134119 (Del. Super. 2024). 158 Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103. 159 Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103, at *1. 160 Id. 26 In Matthews, the Superior Court denied the motion, finding that even though

the warrant was a general warrant, the defendant had provided his consent to search

the phone.161 Upon appeal, the Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion for

post-conviction relief.162 The Supreme Court found the defendant did not give valid

consent to search his phone, and therefore the evidence obtained pursuant to the

general warrant should have been suppressed in full.163 The defendant was ordered

a new trial.164

The State obtained a second warrant to search the defendant’s smartphone,

and the defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained under the second

warrant.165 The defendant argued allowing such evidence into admission would

undermine the Supreme Court’s decision finding the first warrant to be general.166

The State argued that the independent source doctrine allowed the State to obtain a

second warrant, and that the doctrine applied because the facts used to obtain the

second warrant came from a source independent of the first warrant’s taint.167

The court held that the evidence obtained pursuant to the second warrant was

admissible under the independent source doctrine.168 The court reasoned that:

161 Id. 162 Id; Matthews v. State, 319 A.3d 891 (Del. 2024). 163 Id. at 905-06. 164 Id. at 908. 165 Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103, at *2. 166 Id. 167 Id. 168 Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103, at *4. 27 All Delaware Superior Court cases addressing the instant issue support the proposition that a second warrant for a cellphone obtained after a general or overly broad warrant is valid if the information supporting probable cause was discovered independently from the prior general or overly broad warrant.169

Highlighting the reasoning presented in Carter, Clark, and Taylor,170 the court

emphasized that the information used to obtain the second Matthews warrant was

independent and without any basis from evidence obtained in the first warrant.171

The court therefore found the independent source doctrine applied to the second

warrant.

iii. The Superior Court cases that have discussed warrants and the independent source doctrine all use reasoning that transcends the distinction between general and overbroad warrants. The Defendant’s case before the Court shares the same core facts and legal

issues as those present in Carter, Clark, and Matthews. An unconstitutional warrant

was obtained to search the defendant’s smartphone.172 Evidence was then extracted

pursuant to the unconstitutional warrant.173 The State then obtained a second, more

limited warrant to search data previously extracted under the first warrant.174

The question posed in each of these cases, including the Defendant’s, is not

what remedy is required for the unconstitutional warrant. The Supreme Court has

169 Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103, at *3. 170 Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103, at *3-5. 171 Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103, at *5. 172 First Warrant. 173 D.I. 27 at 3. 174 Second Warrant. 28 answered that question clearly and continuously.175 The remedy for an

unconstitutional warrant—under the exclusionary rule—is either full or limited

suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant.176

The question posed to this Court presently, and to the courts in Carter, Clark,

and Matthews, is whether an exception to the exclusionary rule—the independent

source doctrine—permits evidence suppressed under an unconstitutional warrant to

be admitted under a second, constitutional warrant. These separate questions appear

to have been blurred by defendants, particularly in the general warrant context.

The Defendant, as the defendant in Matthews did, argues that full suppression

means full suppression.177 In other words, once a piece of evidence is tainted by a

general warrant and deemed suppressed, the evidence is forbidden and without the

possibility of cure. Under this argument, admitting that same evidence under the

independent source doctrine would constitute limited, not full suppression of

evidence obtained pursuant to a general warrant.

That assertion may be true practically, but it is not so legally. If an exception

to the exclusionary rule applies to tainted evidence, that evidence is “purged of the

taint.”178 When evidence is “purged of the taint,” the exclusionary rule does not bar

175 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 617; Terreros, 312 A.3d at 663. 176 Taylor, 260 A.3d at 617; Terreros, 312 A.3d at 663. 177 D.I. 24 at 1-2; D.I. 28 at 1-2. 178 Lopez-Vazquez, 956 A.2d at 1292. 29 the evidence from being admitted at trial. The exclusionary rule—and remedies like

full and limited suppression—no longer apply to the cured evidence.

Under this framework, the Court agrees with the Superior Court’s prior

holdings that the independent source doctrine is applicable to evidence obtained

under both general and overbroad warrants. Carter, Clark, and Matthews all used

similar reasoning to conclude that that evidence obtained through a second warrant

was admissible after an unconstitutional warrant was obtained.

Each decision found the independent source doctrine applicable because no

tainted evidence from a first warrant was used to procure a second warrant.179 The

second warrants were “separate and apart” or completely independent from the first

warrants. These cases also recognized the limited deterrence achieved by fully

suppressing evidence under these circumstances,180 and that the purpose of the

exclusionary rule was not to place the State in a worse position then if misconduct

had not taken place.181

The Court agrees with and adopts these considerations, which transcend the

distinction between general and overbroad warrants, as displayed in Carter, Clark,

and Matthews. The independent source doctrine, if applicable, removes evidence

179 Carter, 2022 WL 1561537, at *6; Clark, 2024 WL 4025008, at *5; Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103, at *4. 180 Carter, 2022 WL 1561537, at *6; Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103, at *4. 181 Carter, 2022 WL 1561537, at *6; Matthews, 2024 WL 5200103, at *4. 30 from subjection to the exclusionary rule, including either full or limited suppression.

The critical distinction between general and overbroad warrants is therefore

inapplicable under the independent source doctrine, justifying its use for either type

of unconstitutional warrant.

3. The exclusionary rule’s sole purpose of deterrence remains preserved if the independent source doctrine is applied to evidence obtained through a general warrant. The exclusionary rule plays a singular but vital purpose—deterring future

Fourth Amendment violations.182 Any carveout, or the expansion of a carveout to

the exclusionary rule, could weaken the rule’s deterrent effect.183 The Court has

therefore considered whether the exclusionary rule will be weakened significantly if

the independent source doctrine applies to evidence obtained under a general

warrant. For the reasons stated below, it is not.

i. The two-part test determining whether the independent source doctrine applies ensures law enforcement does not profit from unconstitutional searches. Before the independent source doctrine can purge tainted evidence, a court

must first find that the independent source doctrine applies.184 The United States

Supreme Court in Murray provided the test for independent source doctrine

182 Davis 564 U.S. at 236-37 (citations omitted). 183 Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6. 184 Murray, 487 U.S. at 541. 31 applicability,185 and the test serves as a protection against the independent source

doctrine being used as a mechanism to profit from illegal searches.

Under the Murray test, the first hurdle law enforcement must clear is that they

would have applied for a warrant had misconduct not occurred.186 This step protects

against what the Court will term a “tip-off” for law enforcement. An illegal search

may reveal something of which law enforcement was previously unaware and be the

only source that leads law enforcement to pursue it. The Murray test accounts for

this potential profit by law enforcement by only allowing the independent source

doctrine to apply if a warrant would be sought before the illegal search.187

The second hurdle law enforcement must clear under the Murray test is that

there must be probable cause for a second warrant that was independent from an

illegal search.188 This step protects against law enforcement using unlawfully

obtained evidence or information to create an otherwise valid warrant. The Murray

test accounts for this potential profit by not allowing the independent source doctrine

to apply when independence from tainted evidence is not present.189

The Murray test anticipates law enforcement workarounds and isolates the

independent source doctrine from profits to law enforcement via illegal searches.

185 Id. 186 Id. 187 Id. 188 Id. 189 Id. 32 Because absence of profit from illegal searches is a prerequisite to applying the

independent source doctrine,190 any profit from illegal searches the independent

source doctrine could enable is screened out by the Murray test. The independent

source doctrine therefore does not weaken the exclusionary rule because it offers no

additional incentives for law enforcement to conduct illegal searches.

ii. The judiciary serves as an extra layer of protection against incentives to apply for general warrants.

General warrants authorize deep intrusions into privacy, especially if

authorized searches are for something as revealing as a smartphone.191 But that

search would still be based on a warrant that, albeit wrongfully, was reviewed and

approved by a member of our judiciary.192 This differs from a constitutional

violation like illegal entry without a warrant, where a law enforcement officer

authorizes him- or herself to enter and search an individual’s home. Similar

reasoning could be applied to Terry stops as well.

The warrant process therefore provides an additional safeguard against any

incentive the independent source doctrine could provide law enforcement to seek

general warrants—general warrants would remain subject to judiciary approval.193

190 Id. 191 The Supreme Court of Delaware has adopted the view from Riley v. California that a smartphone search “typically expose[s] to the government far more than the most exhaustive search in a house.” Taylor, 260 A.3d at 613 (citing Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396 (2014)). 192 11 Del. C. 2307(a). 193 Id. 33 Human error and the evolution of law do not make the judiciary a full-proof

protection against general warrants, but the judiciary is a strong protection

nonetheless. Delaware statutory law requires approval of a warrant by a judiciary

member;194 therefore most illegal searches pursuant to a general warrant would be

curtailed before they ever even begin.

B. The independent source doctrine applies to evidence obtained under the Second Warrant. Now that the Court has determined that the independent source doctrine can

apply to evidence obtained under a general warrant, the Court must determine

whether the independent source doctrine applies to evidence obtained pursuant to

the Second Warrant. Upon reviewing the record and deploying the two-part test

outlined in Murray, the Court finds that it does.

1. The State would have applied for a warrant without the material obtained under the Second Warrant. The Court finds the State would have applied for a warrant to search the

Defendant’s smartphone without the material obtained under the First Warrant. The

Court needs to look no further than the First Warrant, which was sought pre-illegal

search.195 The First Warrant sought to search the same categories of data that the

Second Warrant sought to search.196 The application for the First Warrant also used

194 Id. 195 First Warrant. 196 First Warrant; Second Warrant. 34 the same facts as those used to obtain the Second Warrant.197 The First Warrant is

therefore evidence that the first step in the Murray test is satisfied.

2. The Second Warrant was supported by probable cause independent of the evidence and information acquired through the First Warrant. The Court finds the Second Warrant was supported by probable cause

independent of the material obtained through the First Warrant. The Second

Warrant’s affidavit asserts that nothing obtained under the First Warrant was used to

apply for the Second Warrant,198 and no part of the record suggests otherwise. The

facts used to obtain the Second Warrant are identical to those from the First Warrant,

and no new information or evidence was included.199 The second step in the Murray

test is therefore satisfied.

C. The Second Warrant obtained by the State is an overbroad warrant. While the independent source doctrine applies to evidence obtained under the

Second Warrant, all evidence obtained under the Second Warrant is not

automatically admissible. The Second Warrant must still be assessed for the

probable cause and particularity requirements demanded under Delaware law.200

After conducting this assessment, the Court finds the Second Warrant to be an

unconstitutional overbroad warrant.

197 First Warrant; Second Warrant. 198 Second Warrant. 199 First Warrant; Second Warrant. 200 11 Del. C. 2307(a). 35 1. There was probable cause to search all categories of data applied for in the Second Warrant. All three categories of data to be searched in the Second Warrant were

supported by probable cause.201 The Second Warrant first requested to search

“[d]evice information, including IMEI, [s]erial number, and phone number.”202 The

Second Warrant’s affidavit explained that this information would be used to identify

the owner of the smartphone found on the Defendant’s person on February 6,

2025.203 The facts forming probable cause to search this information are numerous.

A camera was found in the victim’s shower, and the camera was attached to

wiring leading to the victim’s basement.204 The Defendant installed the shower and

had exclusive access to the house at one point.205 When the Defendant was over, he

spent almost all his time in the basement, where the victim once found an old iPhone

charging.206 An iPhone was later found on the Defendant’s person.207 The camera

recordings were only accessible through another electronic device, like an iPhone.208

201 “To establish probable cause, the police are only required to present facts which suggest, when those facts are viewed under the totality of the circumstances, that there is a fair probability that the defendant has committed a crime.” McKinney v. State, 107 A.3d 1045, 1047 (Del. 2014) (quoting State v. Maxwell, 624 A.2d 926, 930 (Del. 1993)). 202 Second Warrant at 1. 203 Id. at 5-6. 204 Id. at 3-4. 205 Id. at 4. 206 Id. 207 Id. at 5. 208 Id. at 4-5. 36 These facts form a reasonable belief that the smartphone found on the Defendant

belonged to him and evidence of the alleged offense would be found on the iPhone.

The Second Warrant next requested to search “[s]aved digital images and

video.”209 The Second Warrant’s affidavit explains that this category of data is where

“videos, photographs, and still shots . . . of the victim showering” would be found.210

The same set of facts listed above form a reasonable belief that the smartphone found

on the Defendant would contain evidence of the alleged offense.

The Second Warrant finally requested to search the “USEE PLUS

[a]pplication.”211 Based on the type of camera discovered in the victim’s shower,

law enforcement knew the USEE PLUS application was required to access the

camera’s recordings.212 Law enforcement was also aware USEE PLUS could be

downloaded on an iPhone.213 These facts, along with those potentially connecting

the Defendant to the camera, form a reasonable belief that the USEE PLUS

application was located on the smartphone to be searched and would show evidence

of the alleged offense.

209 Id. at 1. 210 Id. at 6. 211 Id. at 1. 212 Id. at 4, 6. 213 Id. at 6. 37 2. The temporal period prescribed for the search exceeded probable cause for the search of the Defendant’s smartphone. The Second Warrant limited the search of data on the smartphone found on

the Defendant to a timeframe starting on November 21, 2021, at 0000 hours and

ending on January 9, 2025, at 1235 hours eastern standard time.214 According to the

Second Warrant’s affidavit, this timeframe spans “the date the victim moved out of

the home . . . during which time [the Defendant] had full access to the residence” to

“when the camera was located and removed.”215

The Court finds that this timeframe far exceeds the probable cause to search

the smartphone. When the Court conducts a four corners review of the affidavit,

none of the facts support the camera being installed between the time the victim left

her residence in November 2021 and when she returned in August 2022. The State

simply makes an inference that the camera was installed during this period.

The affidavit does, however, contain a key fact that provides probable cause

to search the Defendant’s smartphone starting “several months” before the camera

was found.216 The affidavit recounts that “[t]he victim stated that several months

ago she went to the basement to use the bathroom . . . While in the bathroom the

victim advised that she noticed an old iPhone charging[.]”217

214 Id. at 6. 215 Id. 216 Id. at 4. 217 Id. (emphasis added). 38 Finding an iPhone in the same bathroom that wiring from the camera led

amounts to probable cause that the camera was installed and operating at that time.

The Court therefore finds that the temporal limitation in the Second Warrant was

overbroad. The search of the smartphone should be limited to the “several months”

before the camera was discovered. Because “several” is not defined, the Court finds

that four months prior to the discovery of the camera is the appropriate timeframe

for the search.218 No other facts in the Second Warrant’s affidavit provide probable

cause for an alternative temporal limitation.

3. The categories of data to be searched under the Second Warrant were stated with sufficient particularity with exception of the “saved digital images and videos” category. The Second Warrant states with sufficient particularity two of the three

categories of data to be searched on the smartphone found on the Defendant.219 The

type of “device information” sought from the smartphone are listed and limited in

the Second Warrant.220 The data category “Applications” is limited to a singular

application—USEE PLUS.221

218 Several is defined as “more than two but fewer than many.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/several (last visited Mar. 5, 2026). “Many” is defined as “a large number of persons or things.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/many (last visited Mar. 5, 2026). 219 Id. at 1. 220 Id. 221 Id. 39 The “saved digital images and video” category, however, could have been

stated with more particularity.222 The Second Warrant affidavit properly identifies

the “Photos” application on an iPhone as a place to be searched with this category

of data but then suggests “there are other applications that can be downloaded where

videos, photographs, and still shots can be stored.”223

The Second Waarant could have identified these “other applications” in the

list of applications to be searched, or at the very least described in more detail the

type of applications where evidence was anticipated to be found. Instead, the Second

Warrant purports to only seek a search of one application while suggesting it can

also search others.224 The Court finds the Second Warrant states with sufficient

particularity two applications to be searched: the Photos application and USEE

PLUS. Without more particularity, no other applications are searchable.

D. Conclusion The Court first holds the independent source doctrine applies to evidence

obtained pursuant to a general warrant. The Court next holds the independent source

doctrine can be used to admit evidence obtained under the Second Warrant. The

Court finally holds that the Second Warrant is an unconstitutional overbroad warrant,

and that the temporal limitation for the search of the smartphone must be shortened

222 Id. 223 Id. at 6. 224 Id. at 1, 6. 40 to match probable cause. The State’s search of the smartphone is also limited to the

applications specifically identified in the Second Warrant. The Motion is therefore

GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.

IT IS SO ORDERED.