An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-707
Filed 17 June 2026
Wake County, No. 23CR348972-910
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
WILLIAM JAMESON REECE ATKINS, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 31 January 2025 by Judge
Vinston M. Rozier in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
11 March 2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Special Deputy Attorney General Stephanie Brennan and Matthew Tulchin, for the State.
Janine Fodor for Defendant.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
Defendant William Jameson Reece Atkins appeals from a judgment entered
after a jury found him guilty of second-degree murder. Defendant argues the trial
court erred by (1) instructing the jury on the aggressor exception to self-defense, (2)
permitting the prosecutor to misstate the law on malice during closing argument, (3)
overruling Defendant’s objection to the prosecutor’s improper argument that STATE V. ATKINS
Opinion of the Court
Defendant lied to the 9-1-1 operator, and (4) substituting a juror during deliberations.
We hold the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the aggressor exception to self-
defense and this error prejudiced Defendant. We grant Defendant a new trial.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from Defendant’s conviction of second-degree murder.
Defendant’s testimony is the basis for many of the factual details to follow.
Defendant and Eric Matthew Laird both served in the United States Army and
became friends. After receiving an honorable discharge from service in 2021,
Defendant returned to Cary, North Carolina. On or about 1 July 2023, Laird traveled
to North Carolina to visit Defendant for the weekend. Defendant picked up Laird
from the airport, and they drove to Defendant’s apartment. When they arrived at the
apartment, the two men began drinking heavily. While drinking and talking,
Defendant showed Laird his firearms and ammunition in anticipation for their
planned target shooting that weekend.
When Defendant was starting to get ready to go to bed, he and Laird took
Defendant’s dog outside one more time to use the bathroom. Defendant and Laird
took the dog to the wooded area near a creek next to Defendant’s apartment complex.
Due to his intoxicated state, Laird fell into the creek. Defendant slid down the bank
to make sure Laird was okay and helped him get out. They both got wet from this
fall. The two men returned to the apartment and changed out of their wet clothes.
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Defendant put his phone in a bowl of rice to dry it out. It was around 5:00 a.m. at
this point in time.
Defendant went to the bathroom in preparation to go to bed. When he emerged
from the bathroom, Defendant saw Laird talking to himself and armed with an AR-
15 rifle. Apparently, Laird thought there was a third man outside and seemed
paranoid. Defendant tried to deescalate the situation, but Laird was getting more
frustrated because Defendant didn’t believe there was a man outside. Laird pointed
the gun at Defendant multiple times and said he’d shoot Defendant. Defendant tried
to grab the gun out of Laird’s hands, but they both struggled over it. Defendant pried
the gun from Laird’s grasp. As Defendant backed away from Laird, Laird threw a
candle at Defendant. The candle cut Defendant’s arm.
At approximately 6:54 AM on 2 July 2023, Defendant called Cary emergency
services using Laird’s phone, since his own was still drying out. On this phone call,
Laird was recorded saying, “Reece, listen. Atkins, listen.” When Defendant was
giving the 9-1-1 operator his address, Laird allegedly charged Defendant. In
response, while still on the phone with the 9-1-1 operator, Defendant shot at Laird
five times. The operator instructed Defendant to put the gun on the kitchen counter.
Defendant responded he was “scared to take the gun off the person on the floor.” The
operator asked Defendant whether Laird had a gun, and Defendant answered he did
not. Defendant told the operator he had cleared the rifle and put it on the counter.
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Cary Police Department Officer Harper Spell arrived at the scene. She placed
Defendant in handcuffs while she secured the area. After securing the area, Officer
Spell transported Defendant to the police station.
On 25 July 2023, a grand jury indicted Defendant for first-degree murder. At
trial and at the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant elected to testify. Defendant
admitted to shooting and killing Laird, but claimed the act was committed in self-
defense. At the close of all evidence, the trial court stated during the charge
conference that it would not instruct the jury of Defendant being an aggressor under
North Carolina Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction (“PJI”) 206.10. The trial court also
stated that it would instruct on Defendant not being an aggressor under PJI 308.10,
which concerns self-defense and retreat. Ultimately, the trial court instructed the
jury as to first-degree murder, second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and
self-defense. The trial court gave an additional instruction that jurors should not
contact any courthouse staff.
After the jury recessed for deliberation, two jury conflicts arose. First, Juror
Number Six’s child was taken to the emergency room and the trial court approved of
Juror Number Six joining their child. Second, Juror Number Seven found and
returned an identification badge belonging to an employee of the Wake County
District Attorney’s Office. Juror Number Seven contacted the employee to inform
them that the badge was at the security desk and later sent a text message to the
employee to confirm receipt of the badge. After learning of this, the trial court
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reinstructed the jurors that they should have no contact with any courthouse staff
during deliberation. The trial court excused all jurors except Juror Number Seven.
The trial court then conducted an inquiry of Juror Number Seven. During the
examination, Juror Number Seven explained he did not believe the employee whose
badge he found was associated with the case and thought he could contact the
employee despite her status as an employee of the District Attorney’s Office. After
the trial court’s questioning, Defendant’s counsel examined Juror Number Seven,
which revealed this juror sent a LinkedIn request to the employee. The juror
explained he sent the invite as a way to procure the employee’s phone number. Juror
Number Seven was then excused from the courtroom. A subsequent review of the
employee’s LinkedIn profile revealed the employee specifically listed their
employment with the Wake County District Attorney.
Defendant’s counsel informed the trial court that Defendant would be willing
to waive his constitutional right to deliberation by a jury of twelve. Accordingly, the
trial court began a waiver colloquy. During the colloquy, Defendant confirmed that
he had conferred with counsel about the consequences of excusing Juror Number
Seven and confirmed his desire to waive his constitutional right to a deliberation by
a jury of twelve. Juror Number Seven was then excused from further jury service.
Alternate Juror Number One was brought into the courtroom and examined
by the trial court. The trial court concluded that Alternate Juror Number One was
fit to serve as a fair and impartial replacement juror for Juror Number Seven. The
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trial court reinstructed the jury that it must restart deliberations and disregard
anything offered by Juror Number Seven. The jury then recessed to begin
deliberating once again.
The jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder. The trial court
sentenced Defendant to between 216 and 272 months in prison. Defendant orally
appealed.
II. Analysis
Defendant claims the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the first
aggressor exception to self-defense after deciding against the instruction during the
charge conference and announcing this decision to both parties.
Normally, to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must have timely requested,
objected, or motioned to the issue, stating the specific grounds, unless the grounds
were clear from context. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). Nevertheless, when “a trial court
agrees to give a requested pattern instruction, an erroneous deviation from that
instruction is preserved for appellate review without further request or objection.”
State v. Lee, 370 N.C. 671, 676, 811 S.E.2d 563, 567 (2018) (explaining that where a
trial court agreed to instruct the jury on self-defense, but omitted part of such pattern
language in the jury’s instruction and failed to give the parties notice of such
omission, this substantive deviation preserved this issue for appellate review despite
the defendant’s lack of objection).
[A] request for an instruction at the charge conference is
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sufficient compliance with the rule to warrant our full review on appeal where the requested instruction is subsequently promised but not given, notwithstanding any failure to bring the error to the trial judge's attention at the end of the instructions.
Id. (citing State v. Ross, 322 N.C. 261, 265, 367 S.E.2d 889, 891 (1988)).
Here, Defendant failed to object to the trial court’s instructions on the
aggressor theory at trial. However, at the charge conference, the trial court told both
parties of its decision to refrain from giving a first aggressor instruction and to leave
out such instruction. Neither party objected to the trial court’s omission of the
aggressor doctrine, so the instructions were agreed upon by both parties.
Nevertheless, at trial, the court did not fully excise references to the first aggressor
doctrine from its instructions:
If [Defendant] was not the aggressor and [Defendant] was in [Defendant’s] own home . . . [Defendant] could stand [Defendant’s] ground and repel force with force regardless of the character of the assault being made upon [Defendant].
Therefore, in order for you to find [Defendant] guilty of first-degree murder or second degree murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Defendant] did not act in self-defense, or failing in this, that [Defendant] was the aggressor with the intent to kill or inflict serious bodily harm upon the deceased.
If the State fails to prove that [Defendant] . . . was the aggressor with intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm, you may not convict [Defendant] of either first- degree or second-degree murder.
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Such language gave the jury the option to find Defendant guilty if it believed
Defendant was the initial aggressor. These references to the first aggressor doctrine
substantively deviated from the trial court’s agreed-upon instructions. Even though
Defendant did not object to the instructions in the trial, the issue is preserved because
the trial court promised to omit the aggressor doctrine language, but kept part of it
in the instructions given to the jury.
“‘The jury charge is one of the most critical parts of a criminal trial.’” Id. at
674, 811 S.E.2d at 565−66 (citation omitted). When a party presents competent
evidence of self-defense at trial, a defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction,
since it is an essential feature of the case. State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 643, 340
S.E.2d 84, 95 (1986) (citations omitted). Additionally, in such circumstances, a trial
court must give such instruction, even absent a defendant’s specific request for it. Id.
(citations omitted).
“[A] person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to
retreat” if he “reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent
death or great bodily harm to himself.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a) (2023). However,
this justification is not applicable when the person “[i]nitially provokes the use of
force against himself.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.4(2) (2023). This is known as the
aggressor doctrine. State v. Hicks, 385 N.C. 52, 60, 891 S.E.2d 235, 241 (2023). In
other words, an aggressor may be someone who “‘aggressively and willingly enter[s]
into a fight without legal excuse or provocation.’” Id. (citation omitted).
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“When deciding whether to include the aggressor doctrine in jury instructions,
‘the relevant issue is simply whether the record contains evidence from which the
jury could infer that the defendant was acting as an “aggressor” at the time that he
or she allegedly acted in self-defense.’” Id. at 60–61, 891 S.E.2d at 241 (quoting State
v. Mumma, 372 N.C. 226, 239 n.2, 827 S.E.2d 288, 297 n.2 (2019)). Although all
evidence must be considered, it must be viewed “‘in the light most favorable to the
State.’” Id. at 61, 891 S.E.2d at 241 (citation omitted). Therefore, the “‘State must
be given the benefit of every reasonable inference’” and any contradictions in the
evidence must be resolved in the State’s favor. Id. (citation omitted).
In State v. Tann, even though the defendant had armed himself in anticipation
of a confrontation, the record evidence did not reveal that the defendant started the
fight; therefore, the defendant was not the aggressor and was entitled to a self-
defense instruction. 57 N.C. App. 527, 531, 291 S.E.2d 824, 827 (1982) (citation
omitted). However, that trial court instructed the jury that the defendant “‘used
excessive force or was the aggressor.’” Id. (citation omitted). Our Court cannot
assume the jury is more discriminating than the judge in that the jury “‘ignored the
erroneous instruction while applying the correct one.’” Id. (citation omitted). Thus,
in Tann, our Court held the jury instruction error regarding aggression was
prejudicial. Id. (citation omitted); accord State v. Ward, 26 N.C. App. 159, 163, 215
S.E.2d 394, 396–97 (1975).
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In State v. Vaughn, the decedent assaulted the defendant, and the defendant
returned to her car and armed herself with a knife. 227 N.C. App. 198, 199–200, 742
S.E.2d 276, 276−77 (2013). The defendant got out of the car again and the unarmed
decedent charged at the defendant; the defendant used the knife to stab and kill the
decedent. Id. at 200, 742 S.E.2d at 277. Our Supreme Court held it was plain error
to instruct the jury on the aggressor doctrine, which effectively deprived the
defendant of her self-defense claim. Id. at 204, 742 S.E.2d at 280.
“When the trial court delivers an aggressor instruction ‘without supporting
evidence, a new trial is required.’” Hicks, 385 N.C. at 61, 891 S.E.2d at 242 (quoting
Vaughn, 227 N.C. App. at 202, 742 S.E.2d at 278); see also State v. Juarez, 369 N.C.
351, 358, 794 S.E.2d 293, 300 (2016) (“When there is no evidence that a defendant
was the initial aggressor, it is reversible error for the trial court to instruct the jury
on the aggressor doctrine of self-defense.” (citation omitted)). In analyzing whether
an erroneous instruction was prejudicial, this Court determines whether there was a
reasonable possibility of a different result. See Lee, 370 N.C. at 676, 811 S.E.2d at
567 (citing State v. Ramos, 363 N.C. 352, 355–56, 678 S.E.2d 224, 227 (2009)); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2023). The burden of demonstrating such prejudice is on
the defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a).
Here, the record lacks evidence demonstrating Defendant was the initial
aggressor, even in the light most favorable to the State. Laird had control of an AR-
15 rifle for a period, during which he pointed the weapon at and threatened
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Defendant. Defendant was able to wrestle away the gun from Laird’s grasp.
Defendant then called 9-1-1. While Defendant was on the phone with the 9-1-1
operator, Laird charged at Defendant and Defendant, scared for his life, shot Laird.
Defendant acknowledges one part of the record evidence could have been
inconsistent with his testimony. Towards the end of the phone call with the 9-1-1
operator, Defendant stated, “He didn’t know I had a firearm around the corner.”
Defendant testified he made this statement in shock and wasn’t thinking clearly; he
testified he meant he, Defendant, did not know Laird had a firearm when he came
out of the bathroom and walked around the corner into the living room. We
acknowledge this presents an inconsistency. However, even in the light most
favorable to the State, this comment still doesn’t indicate Defendant was the initial
aggressor. Simple possession of a weapon does not make someone an initial
aggressor. Also, in the literal sense of Defendant’s alleged unintentional statement,
if Laird didn’t think Defendant was armed with a weapon, Laird would have felt safer
to charge at Defendant. This rationale supports that Defendant was not the initial
aggressor.
Here, neither party requested the trial court to include the aggressor language
in the jury instructions. Nevertheless, at the charge conference, the trial court told
the parties he would use PJI 206.10. PJI 206.10 are the pattern instructions for first-
degree murder where a deadly weapon is used, which also covers all lesser included
homicide offenses and self-defense. The trial court noted these jury instructions gave
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“an opportunity to include language where it concerns someone being the aggressor.”
Yet, the trial court noted that “[b]ased on what [it] read and the guidance that [it’s]
given, [it had] not included that,” in reference to instructional paragraphs concerning
someone being an aggressor. The trial court indicated it would instruct the jury on
self-defense without the aggressor doctrine.
In the instructions given to the jury, the trial court excluded one of the optional
paragraphs from PJI 206.10 which explained the aggressor doctrine. However, the
trial court left three references to the aggressor doctrine in the instructions. The
following three paragraphs of the instructions include such references:
If [Defendant] was not the aggressor and [Defendant] was in [Defendant’s] own home . . . [Defendant] could stand [Defendant’s] ground and repel force with force regardless of the character of the assault being made upon [Defendant]. . . . .
Therefore, in order for you to find [Defendant] guilty of first-degree murder or second degree murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things, that [Defendant] did not act in self-defense, or failing in this, that [Defendant] was the aggressor with the intent to kill or inflict serious bodily harm upon the deceased.
If the State fails to prove that [Defendant] . . . was the aggressor with intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm, you may not convict [Defendant] of either first- degree or second-degree murder.
(Emphasis added). PJI 206.10 itself includes the following note:
Instructions on aggressors and provocation should only be used if there is some evidence presented that defendant
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provoked the confrontation. . . If no such evidence is presented, . . . reference to the aggressor throughout this instruction would not be given. In addition, the remainder of the instruction, including the mandate, would need to be edited accordingly to remove references to the aggressor. It is reversible error to instruct the jury on the aggressor doctrine if the record lacks evidence from which the jury could infer that the defendant was an aggressor at the time the defendant allegedly acted in self-defense.
(Emphasis added).
Here, the trial court did indeed make references to “aggressor” in the jury
instructions. Despite the trial court’s intention to remove aggressor language, as it
stated, it left in multiple references to the doctrine. The note from PJI 206.10
indicates, in bolded writing, that it is error “to instruct the jury on the aggressor
doctrine if the record lacks evidence from which the jury could infer that [Defendant]
was an aggressor at the time [Defendant] allegedly acted in self-defense.” While the
trial court did omit an optional paragraph concerning the aggressor doctrine, it failed
to remove all references to the doctrine. This was error.
Defendant argues the lack of a definition for “aggressor” prejudiced him. He
claims a broad interpretation of “aggressor,” without definitional constraints, could
have allowed the jury to conclude Defendant was the aggressor because Defendant
was armed with a weapon at the time of the shooting, even though that is not how
the aggressor doctrine is applied. See Vaughn, 227 N.C. at 199–200, 742 S.E.2d at
276−77. Rather, an aggressor is someone who aggressively and willingly enters into
a fight without legal excuse or provocation. Hicks, 385 N.C. at 60, 891 S.E.2d at 241.
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The record does not demonstrate Defendant was the initial person who aggressively
and willingly entered into such fight with Laird. Nevertheless, the jury could have
seen Defendant as the aggressor because he was the one holding the weapon when
Laird charged. Id.; see Tann, 57 N.C. App. at 531, 291 S.E.2d at 827. Without such
aggressor doctrine language, there is a reasonable possibility the jury could have
come to a different verdict.
Defendant also claims the inclusion of such references allowed the jury to reject
Defendant’s self-defense claim and find Defendant guilty if it determined Defendant
was the aggressor. Like in Tann, the trial court improperly added phrases
contemplating whether Defendant was the aggressor: “If [Defendant] was not the
aggressor;” “that [Defendant] did not act in self-defense, or failing in this, that
[Defendant] was the aggressor with the intent to kill or inflict serious bodily harm
upon the deceased;” and “If the State fails to prove that [Defendant] . . . was the
aggressor with intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm.”
As this Court has previously held, we cannot assume the jury is more
discriminating than the judge. The inclusion of the options to find Defendant as the
initial aggressor prejudiced his self-defense claim. Since the self-defense instructions
were phrased in such a way as to provide an either-or option to the jury, the jury
could have otherwise found Defendant not guilty of first-degree or second-degree
murder, but selected guilty because it determined Defendant was the aggressor.
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If the instructions did not include references to the aggressor doctrine, there is
a reasonable possibility the jury would have decided on a different result. We hold
the error was prejudicial. Defendant is entitled to a new trial. As we have decided
Defendant is entitled to a new trial, we need not address the additional issues on
appeal.
III. Conclusion
The trial court erred in referencing the aggressor doctrine in the instructions
given to the jury and Defendant demonstrated he was prejudiced by this.
NEW TRIAL.
Judges HAMPSON and STADING concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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