Speziale, C. J.
The defendant, Francis Arpin, was charged by information with possession of marihuana with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 19-480a (b), with possession of marihuana in violation of General Statutes § 19-481 (c), and with illegal cultivation of marihuana in violation of General Statutes § 19-453 (a). The defendant moved to suppress the use as evidence of marihuana and other material seized pursuant to a search warrant from or near his and Lorraine Arpin’s residence located on Goshen Boad in the Moosup section of Plainfield. As grounds for suppression the defendant alleged that the affidavit in support of the application for the search warrant did not establish probable cause on which the warrant properly could issue. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. Thereafter, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges against him was granted. From that judgment the state, with the permission of the trial court as required by General Statutes § 54-96, has appealed.
On appeal, the state claims that it was error to suppress the evidence seized under the challenged warrant because the supporting affidavit contained sufficient information to establish probable cause. The state concedes that the supporting affidavit eon-
tained some information which was obtained in an unconstitutional manner, which information, therefore, could not be used as a basis upon which the warrant could be issued. The state maintains, however, that there was sufficient other information in the affidavit to establish probable cause independently of the tainted information.
In the application for the search and seizure warrant, the affidavit
of the state police disclosed, inter alia, the following facts: On October 15, 1979,
one of the affiants, Trooper Kerry B. Bntler, was informed by a special agent of the Hartford office of the federal drug enforcement agency (DEA) that, according to information received from a special agent in the Chicago office of the DEA, six boxes containing marihuana were en route to the Arpin residence in Moosup via United Parcel Service (U.P.S.). These parcels were being allowed to proceed to the U.P.S. terminal in Hartford where they would be held for affiant Butler. Also on October 15, 1979, Butler and the other affiant, Trooper Mike Meehan, observed the residence to which the boxes were reported to be addressed and
corroborated through motor vehicle registrations and utility records that Francis and Lorraine Arpin resided at that location.
On October 23, 1979, affiant Butler and two DEA agents went to the Hartford U.P.S. terminal and Butler took into possession six cardboard boxes marked Royal Crown Apples and addressed to Lorraine Arpin at the address on Goshen Road. Butler marked each address label with his initials and badge number. At this time Butler noted a strong odor coming from the boxes which he knew from four years of experience in drug enforcement to be the odor of marihuana. At some later point affiant
Meehan opened one of the boxes, observed green plant material and performed a field test which confirmed the presence of marihuana.
The boxes were delivered to the Goshen Road address. Lorraine Arpin accepted delivery and signed a receipt. As related to the affiants by a DEA agent present at the time, the defendant remarked that the delivery was late and that he was about ready to put a tracer on the shipment because it was only supposed to have taken two or three days.
On the basis of the above facts, a search and seizure warrant was issued on October 23, 1979, by a judge of the Superior Court,
E delb erg, J.,
for the seizure of the six boxes marked Royal Crown Apples and containing Butler’s identifying marks. This warrant was executed the same day and the boxes were found outside the back door of the Arpin residence. Other materials which were in plain view, such as plastic bags containing marihuana residue and numerous marihuana plants growing on the property, were also seized. Because the boxes were found outside the Arpin residence, a second warrant was sought and obtained from the court,
Goldberg, J.,
to search the house; and further materials from the house, including various plastic bags containing marihuana residue and a scale, were seized.
The state concedes that opening one of the boxes in order to conduct a field test on its contents was unconstitutional and that the resulting information, which was contained in paragraph nine of the supporting affidavit, could not be used to support a finding of probable cause. The state maintains, however, that there was sufficient other information in the supporting affidavit to find probable cause independently of the taint of the information in paragraph nine. The state contends, therefore, that the trial court,
Conway, J.,
erred in granting the defendant’s motions to suppress and to dismiss.
The rule upon which the state relies is commonly referred to as the independent source rule. In often quoted language, Justice Powell has explained that “[t]he independent-source rule has as much vitality in the context of a search warrant as in any other. . . . The obvious and well-established corollary is that the inclusion in an affidavit of indisputably tainted allegations does not necessarily render the resulting warrant invalid. The ultimate inquiry on a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant is not whether the underlying affidavit contained allegations based on illegally obtained evidence, but whether, putting aside all tainted allegations, the independent and lawful information stated in the affidavit suffices to show probable cause.”
United States
v.
Giordano,
416
U.S. 505, 554-55, 94 S. Ct. 1820, 40 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring- in part and dissenting in part).
The rule was recognized by the federal courts prior to
Giordano;
see
United States
v.
Giordano,
supra, 555;
United States
v.
McHale,
495 F.2d 15, 17 (7th Cir. 1974);
United States
v.
Koonce,
485 F.2d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Tarrant,
460 F.2d 701, 703-704 (5th Cir. 1972);
United States
v.
DePugh,
452 F.2d 915, 921 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 920, 92 S. Ct. 2452, 32 L. Ed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Speziale, C. J.
The defendant, Francis Arpin, was charged by information with possession of marihuana with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes § 19-480a (b), with possession of marihuana in violation of General Statutes § 19-481 (c), and with illegal cultivation of marihuana in violation of General Statutes § 19-453 (a). The defendant moved to suppress the use as evidence of marihuana and other material seized pursuant to a search warrant from or near his and Lorraine Arpin’s residence located on Goshen Boad in the Moosup section of Plainfield. As grounds for suppression the defendant alleged that the affidavit in support of the application for the search warrant did not establish probable cause on which the warrant properly could issue. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress. Thereafter, the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges against him was granted. From that judgment the state, with the permission of the trial court as required by General Statutes § 54-96, has appealed.
On appeal, the state claims that it was error to suppress the evidence seized under the challenged warrant because the supporting affidavit contained sufficient information to establish probable cause. The state concedes that the supporting affidavit eon-
tained some information which was obtained in an unconstitutional manner, which information, therefore, could not be used as a basis upon which the warrant could be issued. The state maintains, however, that there was sufficient other information in the affidavit to establish probable cause independently of the tainted information.
In the application for the search and seizure warrant, the affidavit
of the state police disclosed, inter alia, the following facts: On October 15, 1979,
one of the affiants, Trooper Kerry B. Bntler, was informed by a special agent of the Hartford office of the federal drug enforcement agency (DEA) that, according to information received from a special agent in the Chicago office of the DEA, six boxes containing marihuana were en route to the Arpin residence in Moosup via United Parcel Service (U.P.S.). These parcels were being allowed to proceed to the U.P.S. terminal in Hartford where they would be held for affiant Butler. Also on October 15, 1979, Butler and the other affiant, Trooper Mike Meehan, observed the residence to which the boxes were reported to be addressed and
corroborated through motor vehicle registrations and utility records that Francis and Lorraine Arpin resided at that location.
On October 23, 1979, affiant Butler and two DEA agents went to the Hartford U.P.S. terminal and Butler took into possession six cardboard boxes marked Royal Crown Apples and addressed to Lorraine Arpin at the address on Goshen Road. Butler marked each address label with his initials and badge number. At this time Butler noted a strong odor coming from the boxes which he knew from four years of experience in drug enforcement to be the odor of marihuana. At some later point affiant
Meehan opened one of the boxes, observed green plant material and performed a field test which confirmed the presence of marihuana.
The boxes were delivered to the Goshen Road address. Lorraine Arpin accepted delivery and signed a receipt. As related to the affiants by a DEA agent present at the time, the defendant remarked that the delivery was late and that he was about ready to put a tracer on the shipment because it was only supposed to have taken two or three days.
On the basis of the above facts, a search and seizure warrant was issued on October 23, 1979, by a judge of the Superior Court,
E delb erg, J.,
for the seizure of the six boxes marked Royal Crown Apples and containing Butler’s identifying marks. This warrant was executed the same day and the boxes were found outside the back door of the Arpin residence. Other materials which were in plain view, such as plastic bags containing marihuana residue and numerous marihuana plants growing on the property, were also seized. Because the boxes were found outside the Arpin residence, a second warrant was sought and obtained from the court,
Goldberg, J.,
to search the house; and further materials from the house, including various plastic bags containing marihuana residue and a scale, were seized.
The state concedes that opening one of the boxes in order to conduct a field test on its contents was unconstitutional and that the resulting information, which was contained in paragraph nine of the supporting affidavit, could not be used to support a finding of probable cause. The state maintains, however, that there was sufficient other information in the supporting affidavit to find probable cause independently of the taint of the information in paragraph nine. The state contends, therefore, that the trial court,
Conway, J.,
erred in granting the defendant’s motions to suppress and to dismiss.
The rule upon which the state relies is commonly referred to as the independent source rule. In often quoted language, Justice Powell has explained that “[t]he independent-source rule has as much vitality in the context of a search warrant as in any other. . . . The obvious and well-established corollary is that the inclusion in an affidavit of indisputably tainted allegations does not necessarily render the resulting warrant invalid. The ultimate inquiry on a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrant is not whether the underlying affidavit contained allegations based on illegally obtained evidence, but whether, putting aside all tainted allegations, the independent and lawful information stated in the affidavit suffices to show probable cause.”
United States
v.
Giordano,
416
U.S. 505, 554-55, 94 S. Ct. 1820, 40 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring- in part and dissenting in part).
The rule was recognized by the federal courts prior to
Giordano;
see
United States
v.
Giordano,
supra, 555;
United States
v.
McHale,
495 F.2d 15, 17 (7th Cir. 1974);
United States
v.
Koonce,
485 F.2d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Tarrant,
460 F.2d 701, 703-704 (5th Cir. 1972);
United States
v.
DePugh,
452 F.2d 915, 921 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 920, 92 S. Ct. 2452, 32 L. Ed. 2d 805, reh. denied, 409 U.S. 898, 93 S. Ct. 101, 34 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1972);
Howell
v.
Cupp,
427 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1970);
James
v.
United States,
418 F.2d 1150, 1151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
United States
v.
Sterling,
369 F.2d 799, 802 (3d Cir. 1966) ;
Anderson
v.
United States,
344 F.2d 792, 794 (10th Cir. 1965);
United States
v.
Paroutian,
319 F.2d 661, 663 (2d Cir. 1963);
Chin Kay
v.
United States,
311 F.2d 317, 321-22 (9th Cir. 1962);
Parts Mfg. Corporation
v.
Lynch,
129 F.2d 841, 842-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 674, 63 S. Ct. 79, 87 L. Ed. 541 (1942);
United States
v.
Epstein,
240 F. Sup. 80, 82-83 (S.D. N.Y. 1965); and remains widely accepted at this time. See
United States
v.
Tucker,
638 F.2d 1292, 1298-99 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833, 102 S. Ct. 132, 70 L. Ed. 2d 111 (1981);
United States
v.
Agapito,
620 F.2d 324, 338 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834, 101 S. Ct. 107, 66 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1980);
United States
v.
Korman,
614 F.2d 541, 547 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952, 100 S. Ct. 2918, 64 L. Ed. 2d 808 (1980);
United States
v.
Saitta,
612 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 910, 100 S. Ct. 1838, 64 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1980);
United States
v.
Williams,
594 F.2d 86, 95-96 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127,
101 S. Ct. 946, 67 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1981);
United States
v.
Romero,
585 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935, 99 S. Ct. 1278, 59 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1979);
United States
v.
Marchand,
564 F.2d 983, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015, 98 S. Ct. 732, 54 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1978);
United States
v.
Watts,
540 F.2d 1093, 1095 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
United States
v.
DiMuro,
540 F.2d 503, 515 (1st Cir. 1976);
United States
v.
Hunt,
496 F.2d 888, 894-95 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States
v.
Adames,
485 F. Snp. 965, 970-71 (E.D.N.Y. 1980);
United States
v.
Cognato,
408 F. Sup. 1000, 1005-1006 (D. Conn.), aff’d, 539 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1603, 51 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1977). Moreover, although the United States Supreme Court has never expressly adopted the rule, virtually the same procedure was employed in
Franks
v.
Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978), to evaluate the consequences of a false statement in an affidavit. See
United States
v.
Strini,
658 F.2d 593, 597 (8th Cir. 1981);
United States
v.
Whitney,
633 F.2d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1004, 101 S. Ct. 1717, 68 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1981);
United States
v.
Federbush,
625 F.2d 246, 252 (9th Cir. 1980);
Chin
v.
United States,
622 F.2d 1090, 1092 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923, 101 S. Ct. 1375, 67 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1981). The independent source rule has been noticed previously by this court;
Dotson
v.
Warden,
175 Conn. 614, 623-24, 402 A.2d 790 (1978); and we follow the rule in this case.
Employing the independent source rule in this case entails determining whether probable cause is established by the supporting affidavit excised of the illegally obtained information contained in paragraph nine. The question is not whether the
issuing judge actually found probable cause independently of the illegal information, but rather whether the affidavit, with the illegal information excised, is sufficient to support the finding of probable cause necessary for the warrant. The test employed, therefore, is objective, not subjective.
“In reviewing an affidavit for a search and seizure warrant we must ascertain whether the facts in the affidavit are sufficient to justify an independent determination by a neutral and detached issuing judge that the necessary probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant.
State
v.
Williams,
169 Conn. 322, 326, 363 A.2d 72 (1975);
State
v.
Rose,
168 Conn. 623, 627-28, 362 A.2d 813 (1975);
State
v.
Allen,
155 Conn. 385, 391, 232 A.2d 315 (1967).”
State
v.
DeChamplain,
179 Conn. 522, 527-28, 427 A.2d 1338 (1980). In
State
v.
DeChamplain,
supra, 528-29, we stated that “[pjrobable cause to search exists if: (1) there is probable cause to believe that the particular items sought to be seized are connected with criminal activity or will assist in a particular apprehension or conviction; . . .
and
(2) there is probable cause to believe that the items sought to be seized will be found in the place to be searched.” See
State
v.
Ferguson,
185 Conn. 104, 111, 440 A.2d 841 (1981).
In this case, the dispositive consideration is whether the affidavit, with paragraph nine excised, establishes probable cause to believe that the boxes to be seized at the Arpin residence contained marihuana."
The affidavit
contains two pieces of information which would contribute to such a finding of
probable cause. The first, contained in paragraph two of the affidavit, is the report by a Chicago DEA agent, as relayed to the affiants by a Hartford DEA agent, that six boxes containing marihuana were in transit to the Arpin residence via U.P.S. The second piece of information, contained in paragraph eight of the affidavit, is affiant Butler’s detection of the odor of marihuana coming from one of the boxes at the U.P.S. terminal. We conclude that this information, in the context of the whole affidavit, does establish the requisite probable cause.
The information in paragraph two of the affidavit, that according to a Chicago DEA agent six boxes of marihuana were en route to the Arpin residence, by itself is merely conclusory and does not provide the issuing judge with any of the underlying circumstances from which the DEA agent concluded that there was marihuana in the boxes;
however, the information contained in paragraph eight, that affiant Butler detected the odor of marihuana from
one of the boxes to which he had been directed by the DEA report, does provide sufficient information from which the issuing judge could find probable cause to believe that there was marihuana in the boxes to be searched.
It is well established that the detection of the odor of an illegal substance alone may be sufficient to establish probable cause so long as the affiant is qualified to know the odor and the odor of the illegal substance is sufficiently distinctive to be identified. See
Johnson
v.
United States,
333 U.S. 10, 13, 68 S. Ct. 367, 92 L. Ed. 436 (1948). The affidavit in this case sets out the essential element that affiant Butler, who was assigned to the statewide narcotics taskforce east and had four years of experience in drug enforcement, is qualified to know the odor of marihuana.
Furthermore, it is generally recognized that marihuana does have a distinctive odor by which it may be identified.
United States
v.
Bronstein,
521 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 918, 96 S. Ct. 1121, 47 L. Ed. 2d 324 (1976); see generally annot., 5 A.L.R.4th 681.
Paragraph eight of the affidavit, therefore, in the context of the whole affidavit (minus paragraph
nine) establishes probable canse to believe that marihuana was contained within the boxes for which the warrant was issued. In view of this conclusion, it was error for the trial court to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress and his subsequent motion to dismiss.
There is error, the judgment dismissing the information is set aside, and the case is remanded with direction that the defendant’s motion to suppress be denied and for further proceedings.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.