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Electronically Filed Supreme Court SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX 28-JUN-2024 09:28 AM Dkt. 21 OP
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALEXANDER AQUINO, Respondent/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 3CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)
JUNE 28, 2024
RECKTENWALD, C.J., McKENNA, EDDINS, AND DEVENS, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE SOMERVILLE, IN PLACE OF GINOZA, J., RECUSED
OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.
I. The Office of the Prosecuting Attorney County of Hawaiʻi
(State) alleged that Alexander Aquino wrapped a chain around his
minor stepson’s neck and chained him nightly for over a year to
the family’s elevated outside porch. By information, it charged *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***
Aquino as a principal or accomplice with unlawful imprisonment
in the first degree, Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-
721(1)(a) (2014).
In a jury-waived trial, the Circuit Court of the Third
Circuit convicted Aquino.
The Intermediate Court of Appeals vacated the conviction
and remanded for a dismissal with prejudice. Because the
charging document omitted a definition of “restrain” relating to
consent – an attendant circumstances element, in its view - the
ICA ruled that the information was defective. The ICA also held
that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Aquino
restrained the minor and knowingly subjected him to the risk of
serious bodily injury.
We hold that the information contained the elements of the
charged offense and satisfactorily described the nature and
cause of the accusation. We also hold that the State presented
sufficient evidence to convict Aquino.
II.
In September 2021, the State charged Alexander Aquino
(Aquino) by information with unlawful imprisonment in the first
degree, HRS § 707-721(1)(a). The charge reads:
On or about the August 1, 2020 through August 21, 2021, in Kona, County and State of Hawaiʻi, ALEXANDER AQUINO, as a principle [sic] or accomplice, knowingly restrained another person, L.R., a minor born in June of 2007, under circumstances which exposed L.R. to the risk of serious bodily injury, thereby committing the offense of Unlawful
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Imprisonment in the First Degree, in violation of Section 707-721(1)(a), Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes, as amended.
In a separate information, the State charged Amy Aquino,
L.R.’s biological mother and Aquino’s wife, with the same crime;
also as a “principle [sic] or accomplice.” Aquino is L.R.’s
stepfather and L.R. calls him “dad.” The cases were not
consolidated. Per a plea agreement, Amy Aquino pled no contest
to unlawful imprisonment in the first degree.
Before trial, Aquino moved to dismiss for “failure to
charge offense.” He argued that the information omitted an
element of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree. Since
L.R. was under eighteen years old, Aquino believed the charging
document needed to embed consent language from HRS § 707-700’s
definition of “restrain.” Aquino says the State should’ve told
him that it had to prove the absence of “consent of the
relative, parent, or institution having lawful custody” of the
person.
Circuit Court Judge Wendy DeWeese denied Aquino’s motion.
Fourteen year old L.R. testified at the trial. During the
charged crime’s time frame, he lived with his mom and
stepfather. At night L.R. slept outside on an elevated back
porch. (The record uses porch and lanai interchangeably.)
There were no stairs. At 17 feet high, the porch stood nearly
two stories off the ground. The only way off it - aside from
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going into the house, something L.R. wasn’t allowed to do
without permission - was to climb over a railing and scale down
the home’s poles. If L.R. entered the house without asking,
Aquino would yell at him and his mother. Sometimes Aquino
slapped L.R. to keep him in line. Other times, Aquino hit him
with a two-by-four.
At night, L.R. recounted, Aquino and his mother would chain
him up; it was Aquino’s idea. They wrapped a 12-16 inch metal
chain around his neck and locked it with a padlock. The chain
connected to a ring on the porch’s floor. At first, Aquino or
L.R’s mother leashed him. Later, they made him self-restrain.
So he often looped the chain around his neck and locked himself
up. When he was restrained, L.R. only had about 6 or 7 inches
of movement. He could not sit up. L.R. slept on a towel on top
of a plastic bag. He was allowed a comforter blanket, but no
pillow. Aquino or L.R.’s mother kept the padlock’s key.
Sleeping on the porch while chained started as early as
2017, when L.R. was 10 years old. L.R. told Aquino and his
mother that he did not like being chained up. He recalled how
Aquino and his mother made sure he spent the nights locked up.
Other than his birthday, when they allowed him to sleep in the
house, L.R. slept outside with the chain around his neck.
L.R. tried to run away in 2020. But as he climbed down the
porch, he slipped. The fall fractured his back. He said he
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almost broke his neck. L.R. couldn’t stand for a couple of days
and experienced long-lasting back pain. Yet, he received no
medical treatment. Neither his mother nor Aquino took him to a
doctor. Since L.R. was in so much pain, at first, the Aquinos
didn’t chain him. But about a month later, they resumed
chaining L.R. by the neck on the porch.
In August 2021, L.R. fled. That night, L.R. put the chain
around his neck, but he only pretended to close the lock. While
his mom slept and Aquino was at work, L.R. climbed over the
lanai’s railing and down the poles. He hitched a ride into
Kailua-Kona town and came into contact with a woman who worked
for Child & Family Service. Upon hearing about his
maltreatment, she called the Child & Family Service crisis line.
Soon the police arrived and initiated an investigation. Two
days later, the Aquinos were arrested and charged.
The State also called L.R.’s maternal grandmother. Aquino
had told her that “they” (meaning her daughter too) chained L.R.
up when they left the house. Neither wanted him to “escape.”
The grandmother described her grandson’s gait. He walked
“crooked” and “hunched.” And his normal movements were labored,
such that he required many breaks on a simple ten minute walk.
A county detective testified. The detective discussed his
interview with L.R. L.R. was “visibly trembly,” and walked
“hunched over” and “like an old man.” L.R.’s gait was
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“consistent with someone who has back issues or something like
that,” and “both legs weren’t making the same motion.” The
detective said L.R. “was walking very, very obviously abnormal.”
He authenticated a photo taken of L.R.’s discolored neck.
The State also called a medical doctor. Qualified as an
expert, the doctor said that he had treated L.R. from August –
December 2021. The doctor testified that L.R. and his aunt came
to his office for a wellness check. L.R. appeared “very
nervous” and told the doctor that he had back pain from falling
off a balcony the year before. After that, he had trouble
walking long distances. The doctor observed a “large bony bump”
and a “softer bump” on L.R.’s back. X-rays showed a
“compression fracture of his third lumbar.” The doctor said
spinal injuries exceeded his area of expertise, so he referred
L.R. to an orthopedic doctor.
The defense did not present a case.
Judge DeWeese found Aquino guilty of unlawful imprisonment
in the first degree.
The circuit court made extensive findings of fact and
conclusions of law. It found that L.R. credibly testified. The
chaining was Aquino’s idea and occurred for years. The court
pointed to L.R.’s testimony that “he was being chained up and
padlocked at the time of his fall from the lanai in 2020 and
that thereafter he was consistently being chained up by
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Defendant and/or his mother.” The court found that Aquino would
decide whether or not to let L.R. into the house to use the
bathroom, and that Aquino and L.R.’s mother controlled the
padlock’s key. The court concluded there was proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that Aquino “as a principal, or accomplice,
knowingly restrained L.R. between August 1, 2020 and August 21,
2021.”
Next, the court framed the case’s key trial issue: “[t]he
main issue in the case is whether the chaining of L.R. exposed
L.R. to the risk of serious bodily injury and whether Defendant
knew this.” The court spotlighted the failed escape when L.R.
fell and broke his back. Aquino “clearly knew” about the event
and the resulting injury. The court observed that it happened
while he restrained L.R. daily. Aquino knew L.R. might try to
flee again and could be seriously injured if he continued to
chain him. Thus, the court concluded: “The credible evidence
shows beyond a reasonable [doubt] Defendant knew that he was
exposing L.R. to the risk of serious bodily injury when he
continued to restrain L.R. on the lanai between August 1, 2020
and August 21, 2021.”
Aquino appealed.
In a summary disposition order, the ICA sided with Aquino.
The ICA ruled that the information overlooked an element.
That element, the ICA said, requires the absence of consent.
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Per the ICA, an attendant circumstance element surfaces when the
victim of restraint is under eighteen years old. HRS § 707-700
(2014) defines “restrain” and says that the restraint must be
“without the consent of the relative, person, or institution
having lawful custody of the person.” Because “[t]his attendant
circumstances element was not set forth in Aquino’s charge,” the
ICA held that the information’s unlawful imprisonment in the
first degree charge was defective.
Regarding the State’s evidence, the ICA again agreed with
Aquino. “[T]he record does not contain sufficient evidence to
support Aquino’s Unlawful Imprisonment conviction.” The ICA
believed that five findings of fact were unsupported and
therefore clearly erroneous. It did not find a causal link
between the chaining and the risk of serious bodily injury.
Because L.R.’s fall and back injury didn’t happen while L.R. was
actually chained, there was no risk of serious bodily injury.
The ICA pointed to the chain’s short length – it did not extend
to the porch’s end. “L.R. did not, indeed could not (because of
the length of the chain and its location on the porch), have
climbed down from the porch while chained.” Therefore, “[t]he
record evidence does not support a reasonable and rational
inference that Aquino’s act of chaining L.R. was ‘under
circumstances’ that ‘exposed’ L.R. to ‘the risk of serious
bodily injury.’”
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The ICA vacated the circuit court’s judgment of conviction
and sentence. It remanded the case to the third circuit for
dismissal with prejudice.
The State applied for cert, and we accepted.
III.
First, we examine the charging document challenge. We hold
that the information provided sufficient notice to Aquino. It
did not need to define “restrain” to allege that Aquino acted
without the consent of L.R.’s lawful custodian (that is, Aquino
himself or his separately-charged wife). There was no attendant
circumstances element here.
Then we discuss the sufficiency of the evidence to convict
Aquino of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree. We hold
that the evidence supports a finding that Aquino knowingly
restrained L.R. by force or threat and knowingly exposed L.R. to
the risk of serious bodily injury.
The conviction stands.
A. The charging document
A charging document’s purpose is “to safeguard an accused’s
fundamental right to know what they must defend against to avoid
conviction.” State v. Van Blyenburg, 152 Hawaiʻi 66, 74, 520
P.3d 264, 272 (2022). A defendant has a constitutional right to
present a complete defense. State v. David, 149 Hawaiʻi 469,
481, 494 P.3d 1202, 1214 (2021). To prepare and present a
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defense, an accused must be informed of the “nature and cause”
of the charge and each element. See State v. Garcia, 152 Hawaiʻi
3, 6, 518 P.3d 1153, 1156 (2022).
Article I, sections 5 and 14 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution
“inspire the criteria we use to measure the adequacy of a
charge: charging documents must include the elements of an
offense and sufficiently describe the nature and cause of the
accusation.” Id.
The County of Hawaiʻi charged Aquino as a principal or
accomplice with unlawful imprisonment in the first degree:
On or about the August 1, 2020 through August 21, 2021, in Kona, County and State of Hawaiʻi, ALEXANDER AQUINO, as a principle [sic] or accomplice, knowingly restrained another person, L.R., a minor born in June of 2007, under circumstances which exposed L.R. to the risk of serious bodily injury, thereby committing the offense of Unlawful Imprisonment in the First Degree, in violation of Section 707-721(1)(a), Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes, as amended.
Aquino maintains that he did not receive proper notice
about the meaning of the restrain element. Since he allegedly
restrained a minor, Aquino says the information had to inform
him about an absence of consent: “If the person is under the age
of eighteen or incompetent, without the consent of the relative,
person, or institution having lawful custody of the person.”
HRS § 707-700. Aquino insists those words create an element
when a putative victim is not an adult. Because the information
omitted those words, Aquino’s argument goes, the State
overlooked an element, and the charge gets dismissed.
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The ICA found Aquino’s position persuasive. It concluded
that an attendant circumstances element emerges when an
offense’s conduct element includes “restrain” and the person
restrained is a minor:
If the subject of the restraint is under the age of eighteen (as was L.R. in this case), the statutory definition of “restrain” potentially adds an attendant circumstances element to the offense: “without the consent of the relative, person, or institution having lawful custody of the person.” This attendant circumstances element was not set forth in Aquino’s charge. Accordingly, the charge was insufficient, and should have been dismissed.
(Footnotes omitted.)
We disagree.
Unlawful imprisonment in the first degree is
straightforward. The crime occurs when a “person knowingly
restrains another person under circumstances which expose the
person to the risk of serious bodily injury.” HRS § 707-721.
Restrain is a conduct element of unlawful imprisonment in
the first degree. Kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment in the
second degree, too. HRS § 707-720 (2014); HRS § 707-722 (2014 &
Supp. 2015); State v. Sheffield, 146 Hawaiʻi 49, 57, 456 P.3d
122, 130 (2020).
HRS § 707-700 defines restrain two separate ways:
“Restrain” means to restrict a person’s movement in such a manner as to interfere substantially with the person’s liberty:
(1) By means of force, threat, or deception; or
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(2) If the person is under the age of eighteen or incompetent, without the consent of the relative, person, or institution having lawful custody of the person.
Here, the State’s information alleged the conduct element.
It did not also need to define it. Further, the statutory
definition created no attendant circumstances element.
First, there are alternative ways for the State to prove
restrain. The “or” in HRS § 707-700’s definition of “restrain”
is disjunctive, not exclusive. See State v. Kalani, 108 Hawaiʻi
279, 284, 118 P.3d 1222, 1227 (2005). Restrain means
restricting a person’s movement “[b]y means of force, threat or
deception; or” if the person is under the age of eighteen,
having lawful custody of the person.” HRS § 707-700 (emphasis
added).
Oftentimes there are alternative paths to prosecution.
Indeed, the ICA recognized that the prosecution may charge a
defendant under either HRS § 707-700 definition of restrain.
“Where the subject of the alleged restraint is a minor or
incompetent, the State can potentially charge the defendant
pursuant to either or both definitions of restrain.”
Per Aquino and the ICA, for those over 18 years old,
restraint requires restriction “by means of force, threat, or
deception.” In contrast, for those under 18, restraint must
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occur “without the consent of the relative, person, or
institution having lawful custody of the person.”
We conclude that the consent definition of “restrain” is
not automatically invoked when the person being restrained is a
minor. HRS § 707-700 does not create two unlawful imprisonment
or two kidnapping offenses, one with a no consent attendant
circumstances element, one without the added element. Rather,
the second definition concerns a person who does not have
“lawful custody” of a minor and who may or may not use force,
threat, or deception to restrain the minor. On the flip side, a
person who acts with the permission of a parent is not guilty of
unlawful imprisonment in the first degree unless the person uses
force, threat, or deception to restrain the minor and exposes
them to the risk of serious bodily injury. See State v.
Froland, 936 A.2d 947, 953 (N.J. 2007).
If the accused uses force or threats, like here – and we
suspect most prosecuted “restraint” cases – then the person gets
charged under that theory.
Other states with nearly identical statutes agree on the
“parental consent” definition’s purpose. It gives no legal
cover to parents or lawful custodians who harm their children.
No attendant circumstances element materializes when those
adults restrain a minor by using force or threat and expose that
child or teen to the risk of serious injury. For instance, New
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Hampshire Revised Statutes § 633:2 reads: “The meaning of
‘confines another unlawfully’ . . . includes but is not limited
to confinement accomplished by force, threat or deception or, in
the case of a person who is under the age of 16 or incompetent,
if it is accomplished without the consent of [their] parent or
guardian.” The New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that “the
statute does not provide parents with an unqualified lawful
right either to confine their children or to consent that others
confine them.” State v. Bruce, 566 A.2d 1144, 1148 (N.H. 1989).
Parents get no free pass to harm their children and expose
them to the risk of serious bodily injury, because they have
given themselves permission. HRS § 707-700 does not afford
parents (or their accomplices) immunity to unlawfully restrain
their children. The Arkansas Supreme Court found that parents
chaining their child to a bedframe with a padlock constituted
unlawful imprisonment. See Dick v. State, 217 S.W.3d 778, 782
(Ark. 2005) (“There is no merit to [defendant’s] argument on
appeal that as a parent she could not be held liable for
criminal conduct committed against [victim] because she had the
lawful authority to consent to restraint of her child.”).
States that have looked at similar provisions, such as the
Revised Code of Washington § 9A.40.010 (which partially defines
restraint as restricting a person’s movements without consent by
“any means including acquiescence of the victim, if [they are] a
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child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and
if the parent, guardian, or other person or institution having
lawful control or custody of [them] has not acquiesced”), have
been clear – parents and other lawful custodians cannot consent
to their own unlawful conduct. See State v. Kinchen, 963 P.2d
928, 929 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (“Parents can be guilty of
unlawful imprisonment of their own children in circumstances
where the restrictions on the children’s movements, viewed
objectively, are excessive, immoderate, or unreasonable.”);
Bruce, 566 A.2d at 1148 (affirming conviction for parent who
unlawfully restrained child by tying them to a ceiling beam);
Smith v. State, 703 S.E.2d 629 (Ga. 2010) (defendant was found
guilty of unlawful imprisonment when she confined her son to a
small room).
Here, in separate cases, the State charged both Aquino and
L.R.’s mother with unlawful imprisonment in the first degree.
If an age-related attendant circumstances element sprouted from
HRS § 707-700, and L.R.’s mother consented to the restraint,
then neither she nor Aquino could be lawfully convicted of
unlawful imprisonment. (An open factual question that is
unnecessary to our holding is whether “stepfather” Aquino was “a
person having lawful custody of [L.R.].” If he was, he could
not consent to his own unlawful imprisonment of L.R.)
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We decline to read HRS § 707-700’s second definition of
“restrain” as creating an attendant circumstance element that
gives some adults immunity because they either consented to
their own or to others’ unlawful acts. Courts presume the
legislature does not intend absurd outcomes, so courts interpret
laws to avoid unsound, incongruous, or irrational results.
State v. Haugen, 104 Hawaiʻi 71, 76, 85 P.3d 178, 183 (2004)
We find State v. Johnson, 325 P.3d 135 (Wash. 2014) (en
banc) sensible. The Washington Supreme Court validated an
information that omitted a statutory definition of “restrain”
(one analogous to HRS § 707-700) for an “Unlawful Imprisonment—
Domestic Violence” charge. Id. at 137-38. The court reasoned
that “the definition of ‘restrain’ defines and limits the scope
of the essential elements . . . [t]hat does not make the
definition itself an essential element.” Id.
Likewise, HRS § 707-700’s definition of “restrain” defines
and limits the scope of §§ 707-720, 707-721, and 707-222’s
conduct element. It is not itself an element. We conclude that
“restrain” alone provides sufficient notice to Aquino.
Notice plays the central role in evaluating challenges to
an indictment, information, and complaint. Van Blyenburg, 152
Hawaiʻi at 74, 520 P.3d at 272. We repeat that charging
documents are meant to provide notice, “not to facilitate obtuse
technical arguments about what is and what is not an element of
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a crime, or about what complex statutory definitions should or
should not be included in a charging document.” Id.
We hold that Aquino received constitutionally-sound notice
about the accusation. He knew what he had to defend against.
The County of Hawaiʻi charged him as a principal or accomplice,
tracked the language of unlawful imprisonment in the first
degree, and identified the time frame, restrained person, and
Hawaiʻi Penal Code provision.
B. The Evidence
The ICA held there was insufficient evidence to convict
Aquino. Because the ICA believed that several of the trial
court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous, it ruled that
the trial court’s key conclusion - Aquino knowingly exposed L.R.
to the risk of serious bodily injury - was unsupported.
The ICA concluded “that FOFs 15, 16, 17, 26, and 27, and
Aquino’s conviction for Unlawful Imprisonment, are not supported
by sufficient evidence.” The ICA vacated these FOFs:
15. The Defendant clearly knew of [L.R.’s] fall and that an injury had resulted. And, while L.R. testified he does not know why he decided to climb off the porch and that it was a random impulse, the fact remains the escape attempt and fall resulting in injury occurred while L.R. was being chained up by both parents in the same manner as he was between August 1, 2020 and August 21, 2021.
16. Also, L.R. testified that he repeatedly told both Defendant and his mother he did not like being chained up. Yet despite this Defendant and [mother] continued to chain up L.R., even after his fall in 2020.
17. Thus, the evidence shows Defendant knew the risk of harm associated with continuing to chain up L.R. after the 2020 escape and fall, namely that L.R. might attempt to
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escape again by climbing off the lanai and hurt himself.
. . . .
26. Further, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knew L.R. was exposed to the risk of another fall off of the lanai as had happened in 2020. The circumstances that existed at the time of the 2020 fall continued to exist between August 1, 2020 and August 21, 2021. Defendant was still requiring L.R. to be chained. L.R. was still prohibited from being in the house without Defendant[’]s permission. L.R. was still subjected to yelling and discipline by Defendant. The only exit off the lanai still was only through the house, where L.R. was not allowed to be without Defendant[’]s permission. L.R. had repeatedly told Defendant he did not like being chained up. And, L.R. had in fact fallen off the lanai while trying to escape once before, resulting in serious bodily injury.
27. The credible evidence shows beyond a reasonable [sic] Defendant knew that he was exposing L.R. to the risk of serious bodily injury when he continued to restrain L.R. on the lanai between August 1, 2020 and August 21, 2021.
To reach its outcome, the ICA found the five FOFs clearly
erroneous. But it meaningfully discussed only one, FOF 15,
concluding, “L.R. did not, indeed could not (because of the
length of the chain and its location on the porch), have climbed
down from the porch while chained.” This (correct)
understanding about the impossibility of escape while chained,
prompted the ICA’s holding that “[t]he record evidence does not
support a reasonable and rational inference that Aquino’s act of
chaining L.R. was ‘under circumstances’ that ‘exposed’ L.R. to
‘the risk of serious bodily injury.’”
We conclude that the ICA misunderstood the courtroom events
and the trial court’s ruling. And it too narrowly approached
the expose-to-risk-of-serious-bodily-injury element.
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First, the ICA appears to read FOF 15 to mean that the
trial court thought L.R. was literally chained when he fell and
broke his back. But the trial court did not see the evidence
that way. The logical, contextual take on FOF 15 is not that
Judge DeWeese misjudged the evidence, finding that L.R. fell
while actually chained. Rather, the court found that L.R. was
chained during the time period that he tried to escape and fell.
The court ruled that L.R.’s fall from the lanai “occurred while
L.R. was being chained up by both parents in the same manner as
he was between August 1, 2020 and August 21, 2021.” (Emphasis
added.)
The record supports this view. L.R. testified that he was
“also being chained up” around the time he fell from the lanai.
L.R. said his mom and Aquino briefly “let [him] up” after dinner
and that this event preceded his failed escape attempt and
injuries. Clearly, L.R. was not chained at the moment he fell
from the lanai. As the ICA figured, that was impossible.
Instead, the Aquinos regularly chained L.R. during the back-
breaking fall’s time frame, even earlier that day. FOF 15 is
clear. When L.R. fell, the Aquinos were chaining him up “in the
same manner as” the August 2020 to August 2021 time frame
alleged in the information. The circuit court did not
erroneously find that L.R. was chained when he fell. Thus, the
ICA’s key reason to upset the trial court’s fact-finding - “L.R.
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did not, indeed could not (because of the length of the chain
and its location on the porch), have climbed down from the porch
while chained” – was unsound.
FOF 13 adds context to the court’s finding and countermands
the ICA’s belief about what the trial court meant by FOF 15.
FOF 13 reads: “At the time of L.R.’s fall from the lanai in
2020, L.R. had temporarily been let off the chain for dinner
when he tried to climb off the lanai and fell.” This finding
shows that the circuit court understood the evidence that
unfolded before it. The court did not think L.R. was chained at
the exact moment he fell from the lanai.
Next, the ICA suggests that the 17-foot fall and the
restraint were mutually exclusive. That is, if L.R. was
chained, then he couldn’t fall. So there was no risk of serious
bodily injury. But this misses the overall context of the
trial.
L.R. testified that he was chained almost every night since
2017, when he was 10 years old. To instill obedience, L.R.
recounted that Aquino would sometimes “whack” him with his hands
or even with a two-by-four. His mother and stepfather chained
L.R. by the neck to a lanai 17 feet off the ground, about a two-
story drop. Aquino forbid him from entering the house. The
only way to change his horrific plight was to risk serious
bodily injury by climbing down the lanai. And that’s what he
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did one day. But L.R. fractured his back. “I almost broke my
neck,” he said. L.R. sustained lingering injuries that have
caused him to walk “hunched over” “like an old man” and unable
to walk for more than ten minutes without frequently stopping.
The circuit court marched through the evidence and issued
40 findings of fact. The court found that L.R. credibly
testified that the restraint was Aquino’s idea. The court also
credited L.R.’s testimony that Aquino and his mother continually
chained him up at the time of his 2020 fall. And it found that
L.R. was only allowed into the house if his mom or Aquino said
so. Thus, L.R. had only one way off the elevated lanai to evade
his confinement. And that exposed L.R. to a risk of serious
bodily injury. The 2020 fall merely provided further, concrete
evidence to support the reasonable inference that under the
circumstances, L.R.’s restraint involved conduct that presented
a very dangerous threat to his safety. (We do not decide
whether restraining a person with a chain over a prolonged time
period itself exposes that person to a risk of serious bodily
injury.)
We stress that the method of restraint does not have to be
the source of danger. Most restraints are by definition
restrictive. We believe that restraining someone under
circumstances where the only path to escape involves a dangerous
endeavor may create a risk of serious bodily injury. The
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situation that produces the risk matters, not just the method of
restraint. The Wyoming Supreme Court rejected an argument “that
the mechanism of the restraint must also be the risk.” See
Hurley v. State, 401 P.3d 827, 833 (Wyo. 2017). It found that
the source of restraint (locking someone in a motel room) does
not need to be the same as the risk of serious bodily injury
(the threat to beat someone up if they attempted escape). Id.
Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that tying an
elderly woman’s hands on a couch risked serious bodily injury
because she could potentially attempt to get up and lose her
balance. State v. Burke, 33 A.3d 1194, 1197 (N.H. 2011).
Likewise, if L.R. attempted to escape (again), he risked
seriously injuring himself. We believe it’s not only the
restraint, it’s the circumstances surrounding the restraint,
that demand scrutiny. Here, it was improper to look at the
restraint in isolation to determine the risk of serious bodily
injury.
What about Aquino’s state of mind? The circuit court
concluded that L.R.’s fall directly informed Aquino to the risk
of danger. L.R. fractured his back. Indisputably, the court
found that “L.R. suffered a serious bodily injury.” Yet, Aquino
soon started chaining him again anyway. Neither he nor his wife
took L.R. to a doctor. Restraining L.R. in a place where his
only potential escape was 17 feet off the ground exposed him to
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the risk of serious bodily injury. And Aquino knew it. The
record supports the circuit court’s conclusion that the
“evidence shows beyond a reasonable [doubt Aquino] knew that he
was exposing L.R. to the risk of serious bodily injury when he
continued to restrain L.R. on the lanai between August 1, 2020,
The circuit court made well-reasoned findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The evidence supports the court’s finding
that Aquino knew he was exposing L.R. to the risk of serious
bodily injury when he continued to restrain L.R. with a chain on
the lanai between August 1, 2020 and August 21, 2021. The
record supports all elements of unlawful imprisonment in the
first degree.
IV.
We vacate the ICA’s judgment on appeal and affirm the
judgment of conviction and sentence of the Circuit Court of the
Third Circuit.
Charles E. Murray III /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald for petitioner /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna R. Hermann Heimgartner /s/ Todd W. Eddins for respondent /s/ Vladimir P. Devens /s/ Rowena A. Somerville