State v. Anthony Parker

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
• Decided: December 1, 2010
• Docket: 02C01-9605-CR-00146
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON FILED MAY SESSION, 1997 October 1, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk

ANTHONY DEWAYNE PARKER, ) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9605-CR-00146 ) Appe llant, ) ) SHELBY COUNTY ) V. ) ) HON. JOSEPH B. DAILEY, JUDGE STATE OF TE NNE SSE E, ) ) Appellee. ) (POST-C ONVIC TION)

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

ANTHONY DEWAYNE PARKER JOHN KNOX WALKUP Reg. #13620-076 Attorney General & Reporter F.C.I., M emp his P.O. Box 34550 Memphis, TN 38103 M. ALLISON THOMPSON Assistant Attorney General 425 Fifth Avenue North 2nd Floor, Cordell Hull Building Nashville, TN 37243

JOH N W. P IERO TTI District Attorney General

JAME S MO RTO N LAM MEY , JR. Assistant District Attorney General 201 Poplar Avenue, Suite 301 Memphis, TN 38103-1947

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED

THOMAS T. WOODALL, JUDGE

OPINION The Petitioner, Anthony Dewayne Parker, appeals the order of the Shelby

Coun ty Criminal Court dismissing his pro se petition for p ost-con viction relief.

In this appe al, Petitioner raises numerous issues which can collectively be

summarized as challenging the trial court’s ruling that the petition for post-

conviction relief is time-barred. The Petitioner’s primary argument is that the

Post- Con viction Procedure Act th at bec ame effective May 1 0, 199 5, gives him

a new o ne-ye ar time period in which to file a Petition for Post-C onviction R elief.

After a review of the record, we affirm the lower court’s denial of post-conviction

relief.

Petitioner pled guilty and was convicted of the following offenses on the

following dates : Shoo ting a M issile Calculated to Produce Bodily Harm or Death,

convicted on March 6, 1986; Ro bbery with a Deadly Weapon, convicted on

August 7, 1989; Unlawful Possession of a Sawed-Off Shotgun, convicted on

August 7, 1989 ; Assau lt with Intent to Commit Robbery with a Deadly Weapon,

convicted on August 7, 1989; and Assault to Murder in the First Degree,

convicted on August 7, 1989. On March 5, 1996, Petitioner filed a Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief an d Certiora ri on Direc t Review . The trial court

subs eque ntly dismissed the petition as being barred by the three-year statute of

limitations.

The record supports the trial court’s finding that the petition is time- barred.

In July 1986, the Tennessee Legislature enacted a three-year statute of

limitations on post-conviction petitions. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed

1995); see also Passa rella v. State , 891 S.W.2d 619, 624 (Ten n. Crim. App .),

-2- perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Nov. 28, 1994). Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences were e ffective o n Mar ch 6, 1 986 a nd Au gust 7 , 1989 , and h e did not

appeal any of the convictions. Under the 1986 statute, Petitioner had 3 years

from July 1, 198 6, to file a cognizable claim for post-conviction relief of the 1986

conviction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102 (repealed 1995). Furthermore, since

Petitioner did not appeal the 1989 convictions, he had three years from August

7, 1989 to petition for pos t-conviction relief. See Wa rren v. State , 833 S.W.2d

101, 102 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). The three-year period ended on August 7,

1992. Petitioner did not file his petition for both the 1986 and 1989 convictions

until March 5, 1996, well past the three-year statute of limitations. Thus, the

Petitioner is barred from seeking post-conviction relief for the 1986 and 1989

convictions.

Petitioner argues that the new Post-Con viction Procedu re Act, effective

May 10, 1995, grants an additional one-year period, until May 10, 1996, for him

to file a post-co nviction pe tition. Howeve r, in Arnold C arter v. State , our supreme

court held: “petitioners for whom the statute of limitations expired prior to the

effective date of the new Ac t, i.e., May 10, 199 5, do not have an additional year

in which to file petitions for post-conviction relief.” ____ S.W.2d _____, No. 03-S-

01-961 2-CR -00117 , slip op. at 2 (T enn., at K noxville, Se pt. 8, 1997 ).

According ly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and hold that the

Petition er’s petition for post-conviction relief is time- barre d by the applic able

three-yea r statute of lim itations.

____________________________________

-3- THOMAS T. W OODALL, Judge

CONCUR:

___________________________________ GARY R. WA DE, Judge

___________________________________ JOHN H. PEAY, Judge

-4-