State v. Ambriz

• Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina
• Decided: November 1, 2022
• Docket: 21-674
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCCOA-711

No. COA21-674

Filed 1 November 2022

Guilford County, Nos. 16CRS67908; 16CRS67909

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

GERARDO AMBRIZ, Defendant.

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 28 May 2021 by Judge Alyson A.

Grine in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 March

2022.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Caden William Hayes, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Kathryn L. VandenBerg, for defendant.

STROUD, Chief Judge.

¶1 Gerardo Ambriz (“Defendant”) appeals from a judgment entered upon jury

verdicts finding him guilty of one count of trafficking in methamphetamine by

possession, one count of trafficking in methamphetamine by transportation, and one

count of conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine by possession. Defendant argues

the State’s evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that he was denied

the speedy trial as guaranteed under our state and federal Constitutions. Because STATE V. AMBRIZ

Opinion of the Court

the State presented sufficient evidence to submit Defendant’s charges to the jury, and

because the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s speedy trial motions, we

conclude the trial court committed no error.

I. Background

¶2 The State presented evidence from two law enforcement officers and one of

Defendant’s co-defendants, who pled guilty and agreed to testify in exchange for a

possibly reduced sentence. The State’s evidence tended to show that on 6 February

2016, a drug deal involving a trafficking quantity of methamphetamine was

scheduled to take place in Greensboro, North Carolina. This deal was prearranged

between Mr. Gomez, a police informant, and Mr. Gomez-Macedo, whose street name

was “Paco.” Paco was connected “to the Atlanta, Georgia, area, [and] knew people in

that area that could bring drugs” to Greensboro; he was to provide nearly five

kilograms of methamphetamine. On 6 February 2016, the informant and Paco met

at a La Fiesta Restaurant in Greensboro. At the restaurant, the informant contacted

his handlers with the Greensboro Police Department and worked with Detective

Monge, who posed as the buyer, to show Paco $150,000 in “flash cash” to facilitate the

deal. “Flash cash” is money managed by individual police departments for the

purposes of facilitating these types of transactions, because sellers in transactions of

this magnitude often want to observe the money before providing drugs. Detective

Monge drove the money to the La Fiesta Restaurant, where the informant and Paco STATE V. AMBRIZ

observed the money. Shortly afterward, the informant and Paco learned the narcotics

had been delayed in Alabama. The evidence indicated the vehicle transporting the

narcotics was “broken down” or was experiencing “mechanical issues[,]” but also that

the driver was stopping to rest. After it became apparent the deal would not occur

that day, the informant and Paco left the La Fiesta Restaurant.

¶3 Detective Williams with the Greensboro Police Department testified at trial

regarding communications between Defendant and Mr. Reyes, another participant in

this deal with connections to the driver, the informant, and Paco. Detective Williams

also testified regarding the circumstances of the deal. On 6 February, Mr. Reyes sent

Defendant a file with the driver’s contact information. Defendant responded and told

Mr. Reyes, “cousin, tell them they’re going to call him on behalf of Pitufo.”12 Later

that evening, Mr. Reyes asked Defendant “Are you coming here, cousin?” He then

sent a text message to Defendant at 2:17 a.m. the morning of 7 February and told

Defendant “he is here in Alabama, cousin. He’s going to stop there and rest.”

Defendant responded to this message: “It is good, cousin.” Defendant then sent Mr.

Reyes a Georgia address later in the morning, and Detective Williams did not testify

1 The text messages the State’s witnesses testified about were originally in Spanish. The text messages were translated as part of the State’s investigation. We discuss the text messages as translated and testified to by the State’s witnesses. 2 The Greensboro Police Department did not identify anyone as “Pitufo” during their

investigation. STATE V. AMBRIZ

about any other text messages of note.

¶4 Later on 7 February, when officers began arriving at the La Fiesta in

Greensboro, they noted the informant had already arrived. Shortly after arriving,

Detective Williams “observed [the] informant, along with [Paco] and two other

unidentified Hispanic males” exit the La Fiesta Restaurant. These two individuals

were later identified as Mr. Reyes and Defendant. The group left La Fiesta and

shortly afterward the driver arrived in a “gray Toyota Prius” registered in Georgia.

When the Prius arrived, Defendant and Mr. Reyes got into the Prius while the

informant and Paco got into the informant’s rental vehicle, a “gold or tan Chevrolet

Suburban.” These two vehicles then “traveled in tandem or one behind the other, the

Suburban leading the way[,]” until they arrived at a “public storage facility”

approximately five minutes from the La Fiesta Restaurant where the informant had

rented a unit.

¶5 The driver testified about the events inside the storage facility. Upon arriving

at the storage unit, the driver “backed up the car inside so the cameras wouldn’t see,

and Leo [Reyes] told the young man, ‘Get out and get the drugs out.’” The driver

identified the “young man” as Defendant. But Defendant was unable to exit the Prius

because the driver “had activated the child locks, and because [Defendant] couldn’t

get out and [the driver] wanted it to be fast, [the driver] was the one that took the

drugs out.” After dropping the drugs off at the storage unit, the driver, Reyes, and STATE V. AMBRIZ

Defendant left and drove to a nearby gas station.

¶6 Reyes and Defendant rode to the gas station with the driver inside the Prius.

The driver of the Suburban waited at the storage facility for “approximately ten

minutes” then drove to the gas station where Reyes and Defendant got into the

Suburban. Both vehicles then left the gas station separately, and officers followed

the Suburban to another nearby restaurant. While at that restaurant, the informant

called the officers, pretending to arrange delivery of the money. Eventually, the

driver of the Suburban returned to the storage unit where Defendant and the other

participants in the drug deal were arrested.

¶7 Defendant was indicted for one count of trafficking in methamphetamine by

possession, one count of trafficking in methamphetamine by transport, and one count

of conspiracy to traffic in methamphetamine by possession. Defendant was tried

three times for these offenses. The first two trials from 3 April 2018 to 6 April 2018

and 19 August 2019 to 26 August 2019 ended in deadlocked juries. Defendant’s third

trial began on 24 May 2021 and a jury found Defendant guilty on all charges on 28

May 2021. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court, and a judgment was

entered the same day.

¶8 The procedural history of this case for purposes of Defendant’s speedy trial

claim is laid out separately below.

II. Analysis STATE V. AMBRIZ

¶9 Defendant makes two arguments on appeal. First, he contends the trial court

erred by denying his motion to dismiss because there was insufficient evidence to

support his convictions. Next, he argues the trial court erred by denying his motions

to dismiss based upon violations of his right to a speedy trial.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 10 Defendant first argues the State presented insufficient evidence to show he

participated in the methamphetamine deal. Defendant made a general motion to

dismiss at the close of State’s evidence, and therefore we address each of defendant’s

convictions. See State v. Glisson, 251 N.C. App. 844, 847, 796 S.E.2d 124, 127 (2017)

(This Court has “precedent holding that a general motion to dismiss for insufficiency

of the evidence preserves all issues regarding the insufficiency of the evidence, even

those issues not specifically argued before the trial court[,]” and a general “motion to

dismiss require[s] the trial court to consider whether the evidence was sufficient to

support each element of each charged offense.”).

¶ 11 In ruling on a motion to dismiss:

the trial court must determine whether the State has presented substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and substantial evidence that the defendant is the perpetrator. If substantial evidence of each element is presented, the motion for dismissal is properly denied. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is immaterial whether the substantial evidence is circumstantial or direct, or both. STATE V. AMBRIZ

Circumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence. The evidence need only give rise to a reasonable inference of guilt in order for it to be properly submitted to the jury.

State v. Shelman, 159 N.C. App. 300, 304-05, 584 S.E.2d 88, 92 (2003) (quotations,

citations, and alterations omitted).

¶ 12 “In determining whether the State has presented sufficient evidence to support

a conviction, ‘the trial court is required to view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, making all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of

the State.’” Id. at 305, 584 S.E.2d at 92 (quoting State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446,

473, 573 S.E.2d 870, 889 (2002)). Any “[c]ontradictions and discrepancies must be

resolved in favor of the State . . . .” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v.

Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 160, 322 S.E.2d 370, 388 (1984)). “However, ‘[i]f the evidence

is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the

offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it, the motion should be

allowed.’” State v. Loftis, 185 N.C. App. 190, 196, 649 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2007) (alteration

in original) (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)). On

appeal, “[w]hether the State presented substantial evidence of each essential element

of the offense is a question of law; therefore, we review the denial of a motion to

dismiss de novo.” State v. Crockett, 368 N.C. 717, 720, 782 S.E.2d 878, 881 (2016)

(italics added). STATE V. AMBRIZ

1. Trafficking by Possession

¶ 13 Defendant moved to dismiss the offense of trafficking in methamphetamine by

possession of 400 grams or more of methamphetamine. Defendant argues “[t]he State

did not present substantial evidence that [Defendant] possessed the drugs.” He also

argues the State conceded Defendant never actually possessed the drugs, and “[t]he

State failed to establish [Defendant] had constructive possession” of the drugs. The

State argues theories of constructive possession and acting in concert for this offense.

The State contends Defendant’s proximity to the drugs combined with his attempted

exit from the car to put the drugs in the storage locker constituted constructive

possession of the drugs. The State also argues Defendant, the driver, and various

middlemen in this case “all acted in concert to transport, possess, and sell the

methamphetamine.” Because there was substantial evidence to show that Defendant

was acting in concert with the other participants of this methamphetamine deal, the

trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

¶ 14 The State was required to present “substantial evidence of each essential

element” of trafficking in methamphetamine by possession. Shelman, 159 N.C. App.

at 304, 584 S.E.2d at 92. “To convict a defendant of [trafficking in methamphetamine

by possession], the State must prove the [D]efendant (1) knowingly possessed . . .

methamphetamine, and (2) that the amount possessed was greater than 28 grams.”

Id. at 305, 584 S.E.2d at 93; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(3b) (2016). “The ‘knowing STATE V. AMBRIZ

possession’ element of the offense of trafficking by possession may be established by

a showing that . . . (2) the defendant had constructive possession, or (3) the defendant

acted in concert with another to commit the crime.” See State v. Reid, 151 N.C. App.

420, 428, 566 S.E.2d 186, 192 (2002) (quotation omitted) (applying North Carolina

General Statute § 90-95(h)(3) in a cocaine trafficking case). “Constructive possession

[of a controlled substance] occurs when a person lacks actual physical possession, but

nonetheless has the intent and power to maintain control over the disposition and

use of the [controlled] substance.” State v. Alston, 193 N.C. App. 712, 715, 668 S.E.2d

383, 386 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Wilder, 124 N.C. App. 136,

139-40, 476 S.E.2d 394, 397 (1996)). “As to the [State’s acting in concert theory], [a]

defendant acts in concert with another to commit a crime when he acts in harmony

or in conjunction . . . with another pursuant to a common criminal plan or purpose.”

Reid, 151 N.C. App. at 429, 566 S.E.2d at 192 (second alteration and ellipsis in

original) (internal quotations omitted).

¶ 15 Because the State presented “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion” that Defendant knowingly possessed

the methamphetamine under an acting in concert theory, Shelman, 159 N.C. App. at

304, 584 S.E.2d at 92, we do not need to address Defendant’s constructive possession

argument. Viewed “in the light most favorable to the State,” id. at 305, 584 S.E.2d

at 92, the State’s evidence tended to show Defendant was acting in concert with the STATE V. AMBRIZ

other methamphetamine deal participants. State’s evidence showed the following

sequence of events: (1) Reyes, an apparent middleman, notified Defendant early in

the morning on 7 February, the day of the deal, that the driver bringing the drugs

was stopping to rest in Alabama; (2) as testified to by Detective Williams this message

was consistent with the 6 February meeting between the informant, and the Atlanta

connection, Paco; (3) later that day Defendant met with Reyes and the driver at the

La Fiesta Restaurant in Greensboro; (4) Defendant rode together with Reyes and the

driver to the storage unit to drop off the methamphetamine; (5) Reyes instructed

Defendant to transfer the methamphetamine from the car to the storage unit but

Defendant was stopped by the child locks on the driver’s vehicle; (6) Defendant left

the storage unit with Reyes and the driver for a nearby gas station where Defendant

and Reyes transferred to another vehicle, a Suburban driven by the informant, in

which they travelled to a nearby restaurant with the informant and Paco to wait for

the money; and (7) then Defendant travelled with the group back to the storage unit

where they were apprehended by police. Viewed “in the light most favorable to the

State,” a “reasonable inference[]” drawn from this evidence is that the group,

including Defendant, was working together to sell the methamphetamine. Shelman,

159 N.C. App. at 305, 584 S.E.2d at 92. Defendant, the driver, and the various

middlemen were working together “pursuant to a common criminal plan or purpose”

to sell nearly five kilograms, well over 28 grams, of methamphetamine. Reid, 151 STATE V. AMBRIZ

N.C. App. at 429, 566 S.E.2d at 192. There was substantial evidence to show, as

argued by the State, “that Defendant was an active participant in the drug trafficking

and sale.” Both the “knowing possession” and possession amount elements of

trafficking by possession are supported by substantial evidence.

¶ 16 Because there was substantial evidence of each essential element of the

trafficking by possession offense, the trial court committed no error in denying

Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to this offense.

2. Trafficking by Transport

¶ 17 Defendant was also tried for and moved to dismiss the offense of trafficking in

methamphetamine by transport of 400 grams or more of methamphetamine.

Defendant’s argument here is similar to his argument as to the trafficking by

possession offense. Defendant argues “[t]he State did not present substantial

evidence that [Defendant] acted together with others with a common purpose to

transport the drugs” and the State argues there was substantial evidence to support

an acting in concert theory for trafficking by transportation. Defendant also argues

the State “relied on speculation and ambiguous facts” to show Defendant was merely

present at the transaction and nothing more than a “passive observer” of the

methamphetamine deal. Because the same substantial evidence supporting the

trafficking by possession offense also supports this trafficking by transport offense,

the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. STATE V. AMBRIZ

¶ 18 The elements of this offense are similar to trafficking by possession. “To convict

a defendant of [trafficking in methamphetamine by transportation], the State must

prove the [D]efendant (1) knowingly . . . transported methamphetamine, and (2) that

the amount possessed was greater than 28 grams.” Shelman, 159 N.C. App. at 305,

584 S.E.2d at 93; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(3b). The “knowing possession element

of” trafficking by transport can be proved by an acting in concert theory, and “[a]

defendant acts in concert with another to commit a crime when he acts ‘in harmony

or in conjunction . . . with another pursuant to a common criminal plan or purpose.’”

Reid, 151 N.C. App. at 428-29, 566 S.E.2d at 192 (citation omitted).

¶ 19 The same evidence above, considered “in the light most favorable to the State,”

constitutes “evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

[the] conclusion” that Defendant knowingly transported methamphetamine in

connection with this drug deal. Shelman, 159 N.C. App. at 304-05, 584 S.E.2d at 92.

The evidence indicated Defendant was engaged in regular communication with one

of the middlemen while the driver was on his way to North Carolina with the

methamphetamine, and Defendant was present with the driver and middlemen while

the methamphetamine was being exchanged for the $150,000. If not for the child

locks on the driver’s vehicle, Defendant, instead of the driver, would have taken the

methamphetamine from the trunk and placed it in the storage unit. A “reasonable

inference[]” drawn from all the State’s evidence is that the group, including STATE V. AMBRIZ

Defendant, was working together to transport and sell the methamphetamine.

Shelman, 159 N.C. App. at 305, 584 S.E.2d at 92.

¶ 20 For the same reasons as above, the trial court committed no error in denying

3. Conspiracy to Traffic by Possession

¶ 21 The third offense Defendant was tried for and moved to dismiss was conspiracy

to traffic in methamphetamine by possession. Defendant argues the State’s

circumstantial evidence, and any related inferences, are insufficient to support a

conviction. The State argues the sum of the evidence “point[s] unerringly to the

existence of a conspiracy.” We again disagree with Defendant. The trial court did

not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

¶ 22 This Court in State v. Glisson summarized the State’s burden to show a

criminal conspiracy well:

“A criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act in an unlawful way.” State v. Bell, 311 N.C. 131, 141, 316 S.E.2d 611, 617 (1984) (citation omitted). To prove the crime of conspiracy, “the State need not prove an express agreement;” rather, “evidence tending to show a mutual, implied understanding will suffice.” State v. Morgan, 329 N.C. 654, 658, 406 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1991) (citation omitted). “The existence of a conspiracy may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence, although it is generally established by a number of indefinite acts, each of which, standing alone, might have little weight, but, taken collectively, they point unerringly to the STATE V. AMBRIZ

existence of a conspiracy.” State v. Worthington, 84 N.C. App. 150, 162, 352 S.E.2d 695, 703 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “In ‘borderline’ or close cases, our courts have consistently expressed a preference for submitting issues to the jury, both in reliance on the common sense and fairness of the twelve and to avoid unnecessary appeals.” State v. Hamilton, 77 N.C. App. 506, 512, 335 S.E.2d 506, 510 (1985) (citations omitted).

Glisson, 251 N.C. App. at 848, 796 S.E.2d at 128 (addressing the sufficiency of

evidence to support a conviction for felonious conspiracy to traffic opium).

¶ 23 Here, as in Glisson, “the State presented evidence of indefinite acts amounting

to substantial evidence that Defendant conspired with” the other participants of this

deal to traffic methamphetamine. Id. The State’s evidence showed Defendant and

Reyes, a middleman, were texting each other the morning of the methamphetamine

deal and these texts refer to the delivery being delayed in Alabama. Defendant then

met Reyes and the driver at the La Fiesta in Greensboro before travelling together to

the public storage facility. At the public storage facility, Defendant attempted to take

part in dropping off the methamphetamine but was unable to do so because he was

locked in the back seat. Defendant continued to travel with Reyes to a nearby gas

station where he transferred to another vehicle in which he rode together with the

informant, Reyes, and Paco to a nearby restaurant to wait for the money to arrive.

Defendant ultimately returned to the storage unit with the group before being

apprehended by the police. STATE V. AMBRIZ

¶ 24 Defendant argues his “presence alone does not support a conspiracy,” and the

text messages are too “unrelated to this deal” to evidence an agreement between him

and any other participant in the methamphetamine deal. “[T]he trial court is

required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, making all

reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the State.” Shelman, 159 N.C.

App. at 305, 584 S.E.2d at 92 (quoting Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. at 473, 573 S.E.2d at

889). Each of these acts “might have little weight, but, taken collectively, they point

unerringly to the existence of a conspiracy.” Glisson, 251 N.C. App. at 848, 796 S.E.2d

at 128 (quoting Worthington, 84 N.C. App. at 162, 352 S.E.2d at 703). The State

presented sufficient “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support [the] conclusion” that the drug deal participants, including

Defendant, had “a mutual, implied understanding” to traffic the methamphetamine.

Shelman, 159 N.C. App. at 304, 584 S.E.2d at 92 (first quote); Glisson, 251 N.C. App.

at 848, 796 S.E.2d at 128 (second quote). The State’s evidence “[gave] rise to a

reasonable inference of guilt” and was “properly submitted to the jury[.]” Shelman,

159 N.C. App. at 305, 584 S.E.2d at 92 (second alteration in original) (quotation

omitted).

¶ 25 The State presented substantial evidence to show Defendant was part of a

criminal conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine. The trial court did not err in

denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss. STATE V. AMBRIZ

B. Speedy Trial Motions

¶ 26 Defendant argues both his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy

trial were violated. He argues “the trial court committed constitutional error in

failing to dismiss” his case based upon each of his four speedy trial motions.

(Capitalization altered). The State argues no speedy trial violation occurred and

proposes a novel rule for measuring the time periods of delays to determine whether

a violation has occurred.

We review an alleged violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial de novo. State v. Wilkerson, 257 N.C. App. 927, 929, 810 S.E.2d 389, 391 (2018). In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation, “[w]e review the superior court’s order to determine whether the trial judge’s underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the conclusions of law, we “consider the matter anew and substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” State v. Johnson, 251 N.C. App. 260, 265, 795 S.E.2d 126, 131 (2016) (citation omitted).

State v. Spinks, 277 N.C. App. 554, 561, 2021-NCCOA-218, ¶ 20. “Competent

evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the

finding[s].” State v. Newborn, 279 N.C. App. 42, 49, 2021-NCCOA-426, ¶ 24

(quotation omitted).

¶ 27 The timeline for this case is complex, with several distinct periods of time for STATE V. AMBRIZ

consideration based upon Defendant’s arrest, his speedy trial motions, the two

declared mistrials, and the ultimate trial in which Defendant was convicted. The

State’s arguments rely on these separate time periods. The dates of note for purposes

of this analysis are as follows:

 7 February 2016: Defendant was arrested in connection with the methamphetamine deal. He was later indicted on 2 May 2016.

 6 July 2017: The trial court held Defendant’s first “status hearing.” Defendant rejected the State’s first plea offer and asserted his right to a jury trial at this hearing.

 13 November 2017: The trial court held Defendant’s second “status hearing.” Defendant rejected a second plea offer and reasserted his right to a jury trial at this hearing.

 30 January 2018: Defendant was represented by counsel but filed a pro se motion asserting his right to a speedy trial.

 12 February 2018: Defendant filed his first speedy trial motion through counsel asserting violations of his right to a speedy trial under both our state and federal Constitutions. This motion was heard before the trial court 6 March 2018. The trial court entered an order without findings of fact on or about the same day denying Defendant’s motion.

 3 April 2018 through 6 April 2018: On 3 April 2018 Defendant’s counsel filed another written motion “renew[ing] and maintain[ing]” his first speedy trial motion. Our record and transcripts do not show if or when the renewed motion was heard by the trial court. Defendant’s first trial was held. Defendant’s first trial ended in a mistrial on 6 April 2018 due to a hung jury. The trial court entered an order 27 April 2018 declaring the mistrial.

 October 2018: Defendant, again acting pro se, sent an undated letter to the court and reasserted his right to a speedy trial. The court responded 31 October 2018 and informed Defendant as to the proper procedure for filing motions. STATE V. AMBRIZ

 Approximately 23 April 2019:3 Defendant filed his second speedy trial motion through counsel. This motion was heard 6 May 2019. The court then entered a written order denying the motion without findings on 7 May 2019.

 7 August 2019: Defendant filed a third speedy trial motion through counsel. The trial court denied the third motion by an order entered 23 August 2019. This order included findings of fact.

 19 August 2019 through 26 August 2019: Defendant’s second trial started on 19 August 2019 and ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury on 26 August 2019. The court entered an order the same day declaring the mistrial.

 March 2020 through Fall 2020: The Covid-19 pandemic shut down many court proceedings, including jury trials, and caused significant delays in trial court proceedings.4

 8 January 2021: Defendant filed his fourth and final speedy trial motion through counsel. This motion was denied by a written order entered 16 February 2021. The order did not include findings of fact.

 24 May 2021: Defendant’s third and final trial begins.

 28 May 2021: Defendant was convicted during his third jury trial and a judgment was entered as addressed above.

¶ 28 The parties agree on the framework for a speedy trial analysis and the

3 The file stamp on Defendant’s second speedy trial motion is illegible. 4 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina first issued emergency directives postponing proceedings and limiting district and superior court proceedings to remote proceedings on 13 March 2020. Order of the Chief Justice Emergency Directives 1 to 2 (13 March 2020). Proceedings were repeatedly postponed through 2020. See, e.g., Order of the Chief Justice Emergency Directives 1 to 7 Postponing Court Proceedings until June 1 (2 April 2020); Order of the Chief Justice Emergency Directives 9 to 16 (21 May 2020); Order of the Chief Justice Extending Emergency Directives 9-15, 20-22 (15 August 2020). Several of the emergency directives were extended well into 2021. See, e.g., Order of the Chief Justice Extending Emergency Directives 3, 5 (4 June 2021). STATE V. AMBRIZ

standard of review but dispute how to weigh the factors in the analysis.

[T]he United States Supreme Court identified four factors “which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right” to a speedy trial under the federal Constitution. These factors are: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether the defendant has suffered prejudice as a result of the delay.

State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1, 27, 489 S.E.2d 391, 406 (1997) (quoting Barker v. Wingo,

407 U.S. 514, 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 117 (1972)). Our appellate courts follow the

Supreme Court of the United States’s analysis in Barker v. Wingo when reviewing

speedy trial claims under both our state and federal Constitutions. See id. (citing

State v. Webster, 337 N.C. 674, 678, 447 S.E.2d 349, 351 (1994) (“We follow the same

analysis when reviewing such claims under Article I, Section 18 of the North Carolina

Constitution.”)).

The right to a speedy trial is different from other constitutional rights in that, among other things, deprivation of a speedy trial does not per se prejudice the ability of the accused to defend himself; it is impossible to determine precisely when the right has been denied; it cannot be said precisely how long a delay is too long; there is no fixed point when the accused is put to a choice of either exercising or waiving his right to a speedy trial; and dismissal of the charges is the only possible remedy for denial of the right to a speedy trial.

State v. McKoy, 294 N.C. 134, 140, 240 S.E.2d 383, 388 (1978) (citing Barker, 407 U.S.

514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101). STATE V. AMBRIZ

No single factor is regarded as either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial. “Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process. But, because we are dealing with a fundamental right of the accused, this process must be carried out with full recognition that the accused’s interest in a speedy trial is specifically affirmed in [both] Constitution[s].”

Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101).

¶ 29 Here, Defendant filed two pro se motions and four motions through counsel to

dismiss based upon a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The first two orders

denied his first and second motions without findings of fact, the third order denied

his third motion with findings of fact, and the fourth order denied his fourth motion

without findings of fact. Defendant argues “[t]he failure of the trial courts in both

the first and second speedy trial hearings to make any findings or conduct any

analysis would normally require remand.” But Defendant also argues no remand is

needed because “the State has already had ample opportunity to explain the delays

at multiple hearings . . . [and] asks this Court to find his right to [a] speedy trial was

violated without resorting to remand.” The State argues remand is unnecessary

because we “review[] speedy trial motions de novo, substituting [our] judgment for

the trial court[,]” and all four Barker factors “clearly favor the State.”

1. Appellate Review STATE V. AMBRIZ

¶ 30 Because three of the four orders denying Defendant’s motions were made

without findings of fact, we first must determine whether we may review all four of

Defendant’s motions or if we are required to remand for additional findings. See State

v. Sheridan, 263 N.C. App. 697, 705, 824 S.E.2d 146, 152 (2019) (remanding for “a

proper Barker v. Wingo analysis and appropriate findings” where the “record on

appeal [was] insufficiently developed” for review by this Court); State v. Wilkerson,

257 N.C. App. 927, 937, 810 S.E.2d 389, 396 (2018) (“A full evidentiary hearing is

required in order for the superior court to hear and make an appropriate assessment

of Defendant’s arguments.”); State v. Howell, 211 N.C. App. 613, 711 S.E.2d 445

(2011) (remanding because the trial court “reached its Sixth Amendment ruling

under a misapprehension of the law and without conducting a complete analysis,

including consideration of all the relevant facts and law in [the] case”).

¶ 31 Trial courts are not always required to enter written findings when analyzing

speedy trial motions:

In ruling on a motion for a speedy trial the trial court is not always required to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of facts and conclusions of law. See State v. Dietz, 289 N.C. 488, 495, 223 S.E.2d 357, 362 (1976). In those instances, however, when the motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial is based on allegations not “conjectural and conclusory [in] nature,” an evidentiary hearing is required and the trial court must enter findings to resolve any factual disputes and make conclusions in support of its order. Id. When there is no objection, evidence at the hearing may consist of oral statements by STATE V. AMBRIZ

the attorneys in open court in support and in opposition to the motion to dismiss. See State v. Pippin, 72 N.C. App. 387, 397–98, 324 S.E.2d 900, 907 (findings properly based on oral arguments of attorney where opposing party did not object to procedure), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 609, 330 S.E.2d 615 (1985).

State v. Chaplin, 122 N.C. App. 659, 663, 471 S.E.2d 653, 656 (1996).

¶ 32 Here, Defendant only challenges the lack of findings in the orders from the

first speedy trial hearing on 6 March 2018 and second speedy trial hearing on 6 May

2019. He challenges findings and conclusions in the trial court’s written order

addressing his third speedy trial motion, and he simply describes the trial court’s 16

February 2021 order denying his fourth motion.

a. First Speedy Trial Motion

¶ 33 Defendant’s first motion was filed on 30 January 2018. Although he was

represented by counsel, he filed a handwritten, pro se motion asserting his right to a

speedy trial. He filed his first speedy trial motion by counsel on 12 February 2018,

which was appropriately filed and served upon the State. The trial court heard the

motion filed by counsel on 6 March 2018 and entered an order denying the motion on

or about the same day. We first note that a defendant is not permitted to proceed

both pro se and by counsel, so defendant’s initial pro se motion was subject to

dismissal for this reason alone. But even if we consider the initial pro se motion as a

properly filed motion, these motions simply recount the fact that Defendant had been STATE V. AMBRIZ

arrested, was incarcerated, and “his lengthy pretrial confinement is oppressive and

prejudicial in that he has been deprived of his freedom for approximately two years

without trial.” In his first motion filed by counsel, Defendant then quotes State v.

Johnson, 3 N.C. App. 420 (1969), and State v. Chaplin, 122 N.C. App. 659 (1996), yet

fails to articulate why these cases apply to the circumstances surrounding his

incarceration at the time either motion was made. He fails to allege “factual

allegations necessary to support his contentions of unnecessary and deliberate delay

on the part of the prosecution, or of actual prejudice[,]” State v. Goldman, 311 N.C.

338, 346, 317 S.E.2d 361, 366 (1984), and his motion is “conjectural and conclusory

[in] nature[.]” Chaplin, 122 N.C. App. at 663, 471 S.E.2d at 656. Thus, the trial court

did not err by denying the first speedy trial motions without making findings of fact.

¶ 34 Defendant then renewed his first speedy trial motion filed through counsel by

another written motion filed the first day of his first trial, 3 April 2018. The record

is unclear if, when, and how this motion was denied. Defendant’s trial proceeded and

ended in a mistrial due to a hung jury 6 April 2018. The trial court entered an order

27 April 2018 declaring the mistrial.

b. Second Speedy Trial Motion

¶ 35 After his first mistrial, in October 2018 Defendant sent an undated letter

addressed to Judge Lindsay Davis Jr. to the Guildford County Courthouse and

reasserted his right to a speedy trial. The court responded 31 October 2018 by letter STATE V. AMBRIZ

informing Defendant that the addressee of his letter, Judge Davis, had retired and

that “[f]uture communications with the Court must be in the form of motions or other

appropriate pleadings filed with the Clerk of Court and served on the District

Attorney.” The court also informed Defendant, “[i]t is inappropriate to write ex parte

letters to any individual presiding judge. No judge is allowed to speak with you about

your case except in open court.” The letter also gave Defendant information on how

to dismiss his court-appointed attorney and information on how to file a motion.

¶ 36 Defendant then filed his second speedy trial motion through counsel on or

about 23 April 2019. This motion again asserted his right to a speedy trial, quoted

Johnson and Chaplin, and failed to allege “factual allegations necessary to support

his contentions of unnecessary and deliberate delay on the part of the prosecution, or

of actual prejudice.” Goldman, 311 N.C. at 346, 317 S.E.2d at 366. Defendant’s

motion simply stated he had been arrested and imprisoned, that he had filed speedy

trial motions, that he had been tried, and that he continued to maintain his

innocence. He again quoted Johnson and Chaplin, asserted his “lengthy pretrial

confinement is oppressive and prejudicial in that he has been deprived of his freedom

for three years and two months without resolution[,]” but failed to allege any

deliberate delay by the prosecution or actual prejudice as required by Johnson or

Chaplin.

¶ 37 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and then entered an order on 7 May STATE V. AMBRIZ

2019 denying Defendant’s motion “without prejudice at this time.” This order did not

include findings of fact, but it stated that “the Defense may refile the Motion after

August 15, 2019.” The trial court also continued trial to 22 July 2019.

¶ 38 Upon a review of the record, disregarding Defendant’s pro se motions, we find

Defendant’s second speedy trial motion filed by counsel was “conjectural and

conclusory [in] nature,” and the trial court was not required to make findings of fact.

Chaplin, 122 N.C. App. at 663, 471 S.E.2d at 656 (quoting Dietz, 289 N.C. at 495, 223

S.E.2d at 362); Goldman, 311 N.C. at 346, 317 S.E.2d at 366. The motions filed by

counsel recounted a simple history of Defendant’s arrest and imprisonment, made a

bare assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and lacked factual allegations sufficient

to show a violation of his speedy trial right. Even so, for each motion the trial court

held evidentiary hearings and Defendant received the opportunity to present

arguments and provide evidence in the form of oral statements by his attorney. We

find no error by the trial court in failing to enter findings of fact and conclusions of

law as to the first and second speedy trial motions.

c. Third Speedy Trial Motion

¶ 39 After hearing Defendant’s third speedy trial motion, the trial court entered an

order with findings of fact and conclusions of law. The initial four findings addressed

the dates of Defendant’s arrest and the charges against him, as addressed above. The

trial court then found and concluded: STATE V. AMBRIZ

4. Defendant was one of four co-defendants.

5. Up through May, 2017, the state was preparing for the trial of one of the co-defendants, which included a lengthy process by the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts of transcribing recorded contact between certain of the co- defendants and an informant, with the process of transcription taking, as it was described to the State at the hearing on this motion, taking up to one hour for every minute of the recording transcribed.

6. The co-defendant’s case came on for trial on May 8, 2017, and the co-defendant pled guilty during the trial.

7. The Defendant rejected a plea offer on or about July 6, 2017, and the State began efforts to schedule a trial, which required coordination of witnesses from numerous jurisdictions and several law enforcement agencies. These witnesses included a witness from the Drug Enforcement Administration and an expert witness from the DEA forensic lab in Miami, Florida.

8. Defendant was presented with a second plea offer, which he rejected on or about November 13, 2017.

9. Defendant filed his first speedy trial motion on February 12, 2018.

10. Defendant’s trial commenced on April 3, 2018, and ended in a mistrial on April 6, 2018.

11. Transcripts of the trial proceedings were requested, and, through no delay attributable to the District [A]ttorney’s [O]ffice, these transcripts took eight months to prepare, and were obtained at the end of 2018. STATE V. AMBRIZ

12. Defendant filed his second speedy trial motion on or about April 23, 2019, which was heard and denied, without prejudice to refile at a later time, by the Honorable William Wood.

13. During the intervening time period, the State was awaiting the resolution of a motion for appropriate relief filed in a co-defendant’s matter, to determine whether a trial proceeding against defendant should be joined with those matters in the event the motion for appropriate relief was granted.

14. The State is now indicating that it is ready to proceed with trial during this session of Court.

15. The delays in these matters being reached for trial are not purposeful or oppressive, are not owing to any neglect of the District Attorney, and are not intended to hamper the defense or gain a tactical advantage in these matters.

The trial court then made conclusions of law, addressing each of the Barker factors,

and denied Defendant’s motion.

¶ 40 “In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss for a speedy-trial violation, ‘[w]e

review the superior court’s order to determine whether the trial judge’s underlying

findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether those factual

findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.’” Spinks, ¶ 20

(quoting Wilkerson, 257 N.C. App. at 929, 810 S.E.2d at 391). “Competent evidence

is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the

finding[s].” Newborn, ¶ 24. Competent evidence for purposes of a speedy trial motion

“may consist of oral statements by the attorneys in open court in support and in STATE V. AMBRIZ

opposition to the motion to dismiss.” Chaplin, 122 N.C. App. at 663, 471 S.E.2d at

656 (citing Pippin, 72 N.C. App. at 397–98, 324 S.E.2d at 907 (summarizing

discussion from Pippin as “findings properly based on oral arguments of attorney

where opposing party did not object to procedure”)).

¶ 41 Although Defendant’s brief states he challenges some of the trial court’s

findings of fact as unsupported by the evidence, his entire argument challenging the

findings is that Findings 5 through 7 are “partially unsupported and incomplete;”

Finding 11 is “unsupported and inapposite;” Finding 13 is “incorrect and based on

misstatements of the prosecutor;” and Finding 15 is “unsupported and incorrect.”

Defendant does not address how the trial court’s findings were incomplete,

unsupported, or incorrect. Since he has made no substantive argument regarding

these findings, he has waived any challenge to these findings and we will consider

them as binding on appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (“An appellant’s brief shall

contain . . . An argument, to contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to

each issue presented. Issues not presented in a party’s brief, or in support of which

no reason or argument is stated, will be taken as abandoned.”) See Yeun-Hee Juhnn

v. Do-Bum Juhnn, 242 N.C. App. 58, 62-63, 775 S.E.2d 310, 313-14 (2015) (“However,

defendant fails to set forth any specific challenges to the findings of fact and instead

presents a broad argument which merely contends that ‘the evidence at trial [did] not

support a finding that [defendant] acted in bad faith, warranting the imputation of STATE V. AMBRIZ

income to [defendant.]’ It is well established by this Court that where a trial court’s

findings of fact are not challenged on appeal, they are deemed to be supported by

competent evidence and are binding on appeal. . . . As defendant has failed to

articulate challenges to these specific findings of fact, we find these findings to be not

only binding on appeal, but also supported by competent evidence demonstrating that

defendant did indeed act in bad faith regarding his income.” (internal citation

omitted)).

¶ 42 Defendant also contends that the trial court’s conclusions of law do not

properly address the Barker factors and the trial court erred by denying his motion.

We will discuss the trial court’s conclusions of law in our de novo review of the trial

court’s order ruling on the third speedy trial motion below.

d. Fourth Speedy Trial Motion

¶ 43 As discussed above, the trial court had entered an order addressing

Defendant’s third speedy trial motion in August 2019; Defendant filed his fourth

motion on 8 January 2021. This motion recites the history of the case, including the

prior motions to dismiss and the trial court’s rulings upon those motions, and alleges

that “a transcript of the witness testimony from the second trial [in August 2019] has

been ordered by Judge Stuart Albright.” This motion alleged additional delay since

the mistrial in August 2019; that his motion to unsecure his bond “so that he may

begin his federal sentence while the third trial is pending” was denied in October STATE V. AMBRIZ

2019; and repeated general allegations of prejudice and anxiety from the continued

pretrial confinement. We also note Defendant did not make any allegations as to any

delay in 2020 based upon the suspension of some trial court proceedings, including

jury trials, due to the emergency directives from the Covid-19 pandemic.

¶ 44 The trial court held a hearing on 16 February 2021 and entered an order

denying Defendant’s fourth motion without making findings of fact. In his brief

Defendant simply notes “[t]here were no written findings[,]” before again arguing the

Barker factors cut in his favor. Additionally, there were no disputed facts at the

fourth speedy trial hearing and the court did not need to “resolve any factual disputes

and make conclusions in support of its order.” Chaplin, 122 N.C. App. at 663, 471

S.E.2d at 656. At the hearing, Defendant’s counsel introduced his motion and the

Barker analysis, then State’s counsel recounted the procedural history of this case

and the cases of the co-defendants. Defendant did not object to the procedure used

by the trial court, nor did he argue that the State’s proffered reasons for delay were

incorrect or false. Even when the prosecutor stated, as to State’s preferential order

of prosecuting the four co-defendants, that “[Defendant’s Counsel] and his client,

[Defendant,] certainly tacitly consented to the approach on the State’s part[,]”

Defense counsel did not object. The trial court did not err in failing to enter findings

of fact or conclusions of law as to Defendant’s fourth motion.

¶ 45 Because the trial court did not err by holding four hearings to consider STATE V. AMBRIZ

Defendant’s motions, or by failing to make written findings after the first, second,

and fourth hearings, we find no error as to the procedures used by the trial court to

hear Defendant’s speedy trial motions. Findings were not required in the first,

second, and fourth orders, and the order entered upon the third motion adequately

addressed any disputed facts. We will now address Defendant’s challenges to the

trial court’s conclusions of law in the order entered after hearing of the third speedy

trial motion as well as the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s fourth and last speedy

trial motion.

2. Substantive Review of Denial of Defendant’s Speedy Trial Motions

¶ 46 Because Defendant’s motions were “conjectural and conclusory [in] nature,”

and because “[t]he information before the trial court is not in dispute” as to the first,

second, and fourth hearings, “the failure of the trial court to making findings of fact

does not prevent review by this Court” and we now turn to the Barker factors.

Chaplin, 122 N.C. App. at 663-64, 471 S.E.2d at 656 (citing Harris v. North Carolina

Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 91 N.C. App. 147, 150, 370 S.E.2d 700, 702 (1988));

Harris, 91 N.C. App. at 150, 370 S.E.2d at 702 (“[R]emand to the trial court is not

necessary if the facts are not in dispute and if only one inference can be drawn from

the undisputed facts.”). Defendant argues throughout his brief that all four Barker

factors weighed in his favor at the time each motion was made, and these factors

weighed progressively more heavily in his favor as time passed. STATE V. AMBRIZ

a. Length of the Delay

¶ 47 “The United States Supreme Court has found post-accusation delay

‘presumptively prejudicial’ as it approaches one year.” Flowers, 347 N.C. at 27, 489

S.E.2d at 406 (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n. 1, 120 L. Ed. 2d

520, 528 n. 1 (1992)). “However, presumptive prejudice ‘does not necessarily indicate

a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem

the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry.’” Id.; Barker, 407 U.S.

at 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d 117 (“The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering

mechanism. Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no

necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.”).

¶ 48 In the trial court’s order denying Defendant’s third motion, the conclusions of

law begin by noting the Barker factors. The trial court did not make a specific

conclusion of law as to the first factor, the length of the delay, but clearly the trial

court concluded that the length of the delay was sufficient to trigger the Barker

inquiry, as the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law specifically

addressing the second, third, and fourth Barker factors.

¶ 49 In most cases, the length of the delay is the most straightforward factor and it

is generally not in dispute. Here, the situation is different because of the various

motions and the two trials ending in mistrial. The parties’ interpretations of our case

law diverge as to how we should consider the length of the delay. Defendant contends STATE V. AMBRIZ

the clock continues to run from his initial arrest until his final trial; the State

contends the speedy trial clock should “reset” upon each mistrial. The State argues

the protection afforded a criminal defendant by his right to a speedy trial “is for a

speedy trial not a speedy adjudication.” (Emphasis in original.) In the State’s

interpretation of this factor, the lengths of delay are then: (1) 24 months between

Defendant’s arrest in February 2016 and his first speedy trial motion in February

2018; (2) 12 months between Defendant’s first mistrial in April 2018 and his second

speedy trial motion in April 2019; (3) 16 months between Defendant’s first mistrial

in April 2018 and third speedy trial motion in August 2019; and (4) 17 months

between his second mistrial in August 2019 and final speedy trial motion in January

2021.

¶ 50 In response to State’s proposed “reset upon mistrial” rule Defendant “contends

the most fair approach is to calculate the length of delay from arrest to final

judgment, and to consider mistrials or other similar interruptions under the ‘reason

for delay’ factor.” He argues such an approach “prevents the absurd result of a person

being retried to mistrial every eleven months, never reaching a final verdict, and

never qualifying for a presumptive speedy trial violation.” He also argues, “[e]ven

using the State’s approach . . . the time period before each of the three trials was

presumptively prejudicial[.]” Under Defendant’s interpretation of this factor, the

total delay from his arrest in February 2016 until the final adjudication of his case in STATE V. AMBRIZ

May 2021 was 63 months (five years, three months), during which he filed four speedy

trial motions and his first two trials were declared mistrials.

b. State v. Carvalho

¶ 51 Both parties cite our decision in State v. Carvalho. 243 N.C. App. 394, 777

S.E.2d 78 (2015) cert. denied sub nom. Carvalho v. North Carolina, — U.S. —, 199 L.

Ed. 2d 19 (2017). Defendant argues that “[a] mistrial does not reset the speedy trial

clock.”5 The State argues “the Carvalho [C]ourt’s implicit decision to not reset the

timer upon both mistrials was, at most, dicta, and does not preclude this Court from

fully addressing the issue now.” (Original emphasis.)

¶ 52 The facts of the underlying offenses in Carvalho are not pertinent to this

appeal, but the procedural history of that case is. In Carvalho, the defendant was

arrested on 16 November 2004 and indicted for two separate murders on 3 January

2005. Carvalho, 243 N.C. App. at 395, 777 S.E.2d at 80-81. The defendant was tried

for the second of these murders in 2009, and the trial court declared a mistrial due to

a deadlocked jury. Id. at 395, 777 S.E.2d at 81. The defendant was retried in 2010

and a second mistrial was declared due to a deadlocked jury. Id. The defendant then

5 At this point, it is important to note that Defendant introduces this Carvalho-based argument in a footnote. The State argues Defendant’s argument should therefore be considered abandoned pursuant to Rule 28. Because Defendant addressed Carvalho both in this footnote in his primary brief and again at oral argument, and because we find Carvalho useful to our discussion regarding the case at bar and to State’s proposed rule regarding the resetting of “the speedy trial clock,” we will address Defendant’s argument. STATE V. AMBRIZ

“filed a motion to dismiss the charges based upon a speedy trial violation on 3

December 2012 . . . .” Id. at 397, 777 S.E.2d at 82. Similar to the case at bar,

“Defendant asserted he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial due to

the overall length of his imprisonment, as well as a lack of evidence sufficient to

obtain a conviction due to [a State witness]’s unwillingness to testify.” Id. “On 6 June

2013, the trial court held a hearing on Defendant’s motion to dismiss and entered an

order denying Defendant’s motion on 2 January 2014.” Id. at 398, 777 S.E.2d at 82.

¶ 53 The defendant was then tried for the first of the two murders and robbery with

a firearm on 7 October 2013. Id. at 399, 777 S.E.2d at 83. “The trial court declared

a mistrial after the jury deadlocked. Six months later, Defendant was tried a second

time for the murder . . . and robbery with a firearm on 1 April 2014.” Id. “Defendant

moved to dismiss the charges at the close of the State’s evidence, and again at the

close of all of the evidence. The trial court denied Defendant’s motions.” Id. The

defendant was ultimately found guilty of both offenses 7 April 2014. Id. “[A]lmost

nine years elapsed between the time the State indicted Defendant in 2004 and the

time of the June 2013 hearing on his motion to dismiss [based upon a speedy trial

violation.]” Id. at 401, 777 S.E.2d at 84.

¶ 54 The State asserts the Court in Carvalho did not discuss in great detail how the

issue of this nine-year delay impacts the Barker analysis. In Carvalho, this Court

noted the one-year “presumptively prejudicial” rule as to post-accusation delay and STATE V. AMBRIZ

then determined the nine-year “delay clearly passes the demarcation into

presumptively prejudicial territory and triggers the Barker analysis.” Id. at 401, 777

S.E.2d at 84 (citing Flowers, 347 N.C. at 27, 489 S.E.2d at 406). The Court then

immediately concluded its analysis of this factor with: “The almost nine-year delay .

. . ‘is not per se determinative of whether a speedy trial violation has occurred,’ and

requires careful analysis of the remaining factors.” Id. (quoting Webster, 337 N.C. at

678-79, 447 S.E.2d at 351). As argued by the State, “the Carvalho [C]ourt’s implicit

decision to not reset the timer upon both mistrials . . . does not preclude this Court

from fully addressing the issue now.” (Original emphasis.)

¶ 55 Additionally, the 9-year timeline in Carvalho as to speedy trial motions and

mistrials is distinguishable from the timeline in the present case. In the present case,

Defendant was arrested on 7 February 2016 and filed a speedy trial motion 24 months

later. Defendant renewed this motion on 3 April 2018 and the first mistrial was

declared on 27 April 2018 after a jury deadlock. After the first mistrial Defendant

filed two more speedy trial motions; his second motion was filed on or about 23 April

2019, his third motion on 7 August 2019. Then, Defendant’s second trial ended in a

mistrial because “the jury is hopelessly deadlocked . . . .” Defendant’s fourth and final

“Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Speedy Trial Right” was filed 8 January 2021

before he was ultimately convicted in his third jury trial and a judgment was entered

28 May 2021. (Capitalization altered.) STATE V. AMBRIZ

¶ 56 In Carvalho, the defendant did not file his “motion to dismiss the charges based

upon a speedy trial violation [until] 3 December 2012[.]” Id. at 397, 777 S.E.2d at 82.

The defendant did not file his motion to dismiss until after both mistrials were

declared as to the second murder, and before his trial for the first murder and robbery

had even began. See id. at 395-99, 777 S.E.2d at 81-83. The defendant did not assert

his right until 2012, over eight years after his initial arrest in connection with the

first murder and over two years after the two mistrials in connection with the second

murder. See id. at 402-403, 777 S.E.2d at 85. Defendant notes the Court in Carvalho

“count[ed the] full nine-year interval between indictment and final trial, which

included two mistrials, when analyzing [the] speedy trial claim.” But Defendant does

not note, as discussed above, that most of this delay was due to the fact the defendant

waited years to assert his right to a speedy trial.

¶ 57 Whether we use the State’s “reset” rule or not, the delay was sufficient to

trigger a speedy trial inquiry. As Defendant noted, and as in Carvalho, “the time

period before each of the three trials was presumptively prejudicial[.]” We decline to

adopt State’s proposed “reset” rule. Whether we consider the delay as 12, 16, 17, 24,

or even 63 months, the “post-accusation delay [is] ‘presumptively prejudicial’”

because each of these time periods is at least one year. See Carvalho, 243 N.C. App.

at 401, 777 S.E.2d at 84 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n. 1, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 528 n.

1). STATE V. AMBRIZ

¶ 58 As discussed below, the reasons for each delay are more significant than merely

the fact that a mistrial occurred, so we will consider the substance of the State’s

contentions under the second Barker factor. Regardless of whether we follow the

State’s or Defendant’s approach to measuring time for the purpose of a Barker

analysis, the analysis was triggered, and the prejudicial effect of the delay(s) is

addressed in more detail below. See id. at 400-401, 777 S.E.2d at 84.

c. Reason for the Delay

¶ 59 The trial court concluded “As to the second Barker factor, the reasons for the

passage of time in this case between indictment and trial is not due to any negligence

or willfulness of the State. The defendant does not allege in his motion nor provide

any evidence of any willfulness or intentional delay by the State.”

¶ 60 The trial court’s conclusion as to the reasons for the delay is supported by the

evidence and findings of fact. On de novo review, we agree the second Barker factor

does not particularly favor either party. At best, it slightly favors the defendant, but

there was also no showing of any deliberate delay by the State.

Generally, the defendant “bears the burden of showing the delay was the result of neglect or willfulness of the prosecution.” Wilkerson, 257 N.C. App. at 930, 810 S.E.2d at 392 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, a “particularly lengthy” delay “creates a prima facie showing that the delay was caused by the negligence of the prosecutor.” State v. Strickland, 153 N.C. App. 581, 586, 570 S.E.2d 898, 902 (2002), cert. denied, 357 N.C. 65, 578 S.E.2d 594 (2003). STATE V. AMBRIZ

Spinks, ¶ 26 (emphasis in original). “Upon a prima facie showing of prosecutorial

neglect by a lengthy delay, ‘the burden shifts to the State to rebut and offer

explanations for the delay.’” Id. ¶ 27 (quoting Wilkerson, 257 N.C. App. at 930, 810

S.E.2d at 392). “Once the State offers a valid reason ‘for the lengthy delay of [the]

defendant’s trial, the burden of proof shifts back to the defendant to show neglect or

willfulness by the prosecutor.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 153

N.C. App. at 586, 570 S.E.2d at 902). “The State is allowed good-faith delays which

are reasonably necessary for the State to prepare and present its case, but is

proscribed from purposeful or oppressive delays and those which the prosecution

could have avoided by reasonable effort.” Id. ¶ 28 (quoting Wilkerson, 257 N.C. App.

at 930-31, 810 S.E.2d at 393).

¶ 61 Defendant argues that this factor cuts in his favor at the time he made each

motion. As addressed above, if we take Defendant’s measure of 63 months for a

speedy trial delay then Defendant undoubtably shows a “particularly lengthy delay.”

Id. ¶ 26. Even taking the more State-friendly measurement of 24 months between

arrest and Defendant’s first speedy trial motion we find a “prima facie showing that

the delay was caused by the negligence of the prosecutor.” Id. ¶ 26 (quoting

Strickland, 153 N.C. App. at 583, 570 S.E.2d at 902). The State does not make

arguments specifically rebutting whether the initial delay “create[d] a prima facie

showing that the delay was caused by the negligence of the prosecutor[,]” id., and STATE V. AMBRIZ

instead cites State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 119, 579 S.E.2d 251, 255 (2003), to argue

“[o]nly after the defendant has carried [t]his burden of proof . . . must the State offer

evidence fully explaining the reasons for the delay and sufficient to rebut the prima

facie evidence.” The trial court’s uncontested findings of fact address the reasons for

each delay, and none indicated negligence or willful delay by the State.

¶ 62 The trial court’s findings establish Defendant was arrested and charged on 7

February 2016 and was later indicted on 2 May 2016. “Defendant was one of four co-

defendants[,]” and through May 2017 “the state was preparing for the trial of one of

the co-defendants, which included a lengthy process . . . of transcribing recorded

contact between certain of the co-defendants and an informant,” and this

transcription took approximately “one hour for every minute of the recording

transcribed.” On 8 May 2017 the co-defendant pled guilty during his trial, and on 6

July 2017 Defendant rejected his first plea offer. The State began scheduling

Defendant’s trial, “which required coordination of witnesses from numerous

jurisdictions and several law enforcement agencies . . . includ[ing] a witness from the

Drug Enforcement Administration and an expert witness from the DEA forensic lab

in Miami, Florida.” Defendant rejected a second plea offer around 13 November 2017,

then filed his first speedy trial motion on 12 February 2018.

¶ 63 “Neither a defendant nor the State can be protected from prejudice which is

an incident of ordinary or reasonably necessary delay[,]” State v. Armistead, 256 N.C. STATE V. AMBRIZ

App. 233, 239, 807 S.E.2d 664, 669 (2017) (quoting Johnson, 275 N.C. at 273, 167

S.E.2d at 280), and Defendant waited 24 months after his arrest before filing his

speedy trial motion. Some amount of this delay was “incident of ordinary” trial

preparation, because it simply takes time for a case to progress from indictment to

trial. As the State notes, and as the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact in its

third order establish, Defendant’s charges arose out of a complex investigation

involving several law enforcement agencies which resulted in prosecution of several

defendants. Defendant was also offered two plea deals, and over half of the delay was

caused by the prosecution of the co-defendant and the transcription of recorded

contact between the participants of the drug deal.

¶ 64 While the 24-month period between Defendant’s arrest and first motion may

be “presumptively prejudicial,” the State made a sufficient showing to rebut the

Defendant’s initial showing. The burden then shifted back to Defendant “to show

neglect or willfulness by the prosecutor.” Strickland, 153 N.C. App. at 586, 570

S.E.2d at 902-03 (emphasis added). As to the delay between Defendant’s arrest and

first speedy trial motion, he has failed to make this showing.6 Spinks, ¶ 26 (quoting

6 Defendant also argues that prosecutorial preference in the order in which coconspirators are tried is not a legitimate and valid reason for the delay between his arrest and trial and fault can be attributed to the prosecutor. But, “[t]his court has also recognized that there may be selectivity in prosecutions and that the exercise of this prosecutorial prerogative does not reach constitutional proportion unless there be a STATE V. AMBRIZ

Wilkerson, 257 N.C. App. at 930, 810 S.E.2d at 392); Spivey, 357 N.C. at 117, 579

S.E.2d at 254 (quotation omitted) (“[I]n assessing defendant’s speedy trial claim, we

see no indication that court resources were either negligently or purposefully

underutilized.”). There is no evidence the State intentionally delayed Defendant’s

trial; there is ample evidence the State was preparing to prosecute Defendant. The

State has “fully explain[ed] the reason for the delay.” Farmer, 376 N.C. at 415, 852

S.E.2d at 341.

¶ 65 The delay between Defendant’s first mistrial and second speedy trial motion is

also “an incident of ordinary or reasonably necessary delay.” Armistead, 256 N.C.

App. at 239, 807 S.E.2d at 669. The trial court’s unchallenged findings establish,

after Defendant’s first trial, “[t]ranscripts of the trial proceedings were requested,

and, through no delay attributable to the District [A]ttorney’s [O]ffice, these

transcripts took eight months to prepare, and were obtained at the end of 2018.”

Defendant then filed his second speedy trial motion in April 2019. Between his

second and third speedy trial motion in August 2019, “the State was awaiting the

resolution of a motion for appropriate relief filed in a co-defendant’s matter, to

determine whether a trial proceeding against defendant should be joined with those

showing that the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.” Spivey, 357 N.C. at 121, 579 S.E.2d at 256 (discussing prosecutorial preference in trying a backlog of murder cases in the speedy trial context) (quotations omitted). STATE V. AMBRIZ

matters in the event the motion for appropriate relief was granted.” Ultimately, the

trial court found “[t]he delays in these matters being reached for trial are not

purposeful or oppressive, are not owing to any neglect of the District Attorney, and

are not intended to hamper the defense or gain a tactical advantage in these matters.”

The record also indicates the case was continued from February to April 2019 at the

agreement of both parties.

¶ 66 For 10 of the 12 months between Defendant’s first trial and second speedy trial

motion, and 10 of the 16 months between Defendant’s first trial and third speedy trial

motion, the State could not calendar Defendant’s case. If we were to follow

Defendant’s rule for calculating speedy trial delays, the delay between his arrest and

second motion is 38 months and the delay between his arrest and third motion is 42

months. We have already determined the delay leading to the first trial did not

violate Defendant’s speedy trial rights, and during the delay leading to the second

trial 8 months were occupied waiting on transcripts, “through no delay attributable

to the District attorney’s office”; the proceedings were continued for two months; and

between Defendant’s second and third motion the State “was awaiting the resolution

of a motion for appropriate relief . . . to determine whether a trial proceeding against

defendant should be joined” with a co-defendant’s matter. Defendant again fails to

show “the delay was the result of neglect or willfulness of the prosecution.” Spinks,

¶ 26 (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). Defendant was then tried again at the STATE V. AMBRIZ

42-month mark of his incarceration, resulting in the second mistrial.

¶ 67 The delay between the second and third trials is justified largely by truly

neutral factors. The delays prior to the first and second trial may still be considered

here. But the second trial took place in August 2019. The third trial occurred in May

2021. During a large portion of 2020, most of the time period between these two trial

dates, the Covid-19 pandemic caused significant shutdowns and backlogs in our

judicial system. These shutdowns were required by Executive Orders issued by the

Governor of North Carolina and by Emergency Directives issued by the Chief Justice

of the Supreme Court of North Carolina.7

¶ 68 A lengthy delay alone will not weigh against the State, but Defendant is

required to show “purposeful” delays or “those which the prosecution could have

avoided by reasonable effort.” Spinks, ¶ 28; Spivey, 357 N.C. at 121, 579 S.E.2d at

7 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina issued multiple orders postponing proceedings, including jury trials, by thirty days in response to the Governor’s declaration of a state of emergency due to Covid-19. See Order of the Chief Justice Emergency Directives 1 to 2 (13 March 2020); Order of the Chief Justice Emergency Directives 9 to 16 (21 May 2020); Order of the Chief Justice Extending Emergency Directives 9 to 16 (20 June 2020); Order of the Chief Justice Extending Emergency Directives 9-15, 20 (20 July 2020); Order of the Chief Justice Extending Emergency Directives 9-15, 20-22 (15 August 2020); Order of the Chief Justice Extending Emergency Directives 2-6, 8-15, 18, and 20-22 (15 September 2020); Order of the Chief Justice Extending Emergency Directives 2-5, 8-15, 18, and 20-22 (14 December 2020). These orders may be found on the North Carolina Judicial Branch’s website at: https://www.nccourts.gov/covid-19. In early 2021 the Chief Justice allowed proceedings to resume on a county-by-county basis depending upon the current state of Covid-19 cases in that county. See Order of the Chief Justice Extending Emergency Directives 2, 3, 5, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 21 (14 January 2021). STATE V. AMBRIZ

256 (“Indeed, defendant relies solely on the length of delay and ignores the balancing

of other factors. In light of these reasons, we conclude that the delay was caused by

neutral factors and that defendant failed to carry his burden to show delay caused by

the State’s neglect or willfulness.”). Defendant did not make any allegations of delay

based upon Covid-19 shutdowns and did not demonstrate the prosecutor here could

have avoided any delay caused by the pandemic, and this delay will not weigh against

the State. Cf. Farmer, 376 N.C. at 416, 852 S.E.2d at 341-42 (discussing how some

neutral factors, like crowded criminal case dockets, weigh against the State because

the State has a “more authoritative role in the delay”). Additionally, the record

indicates approximately two months of the final delay between Defendant’s second

and third trials was due in part due to a medical issue suffered by Defendant’s own

counsel.

¶ 69 While the time periods between Defendant’s arrest and trials is lengthy enough

to shift the burden to the State, “the State offers a valid reason ‘for the lengthy delay

of [the] defendant’s trial, [and] the burden of proof shift[ed] back to the defendant to

show neglect or willfulness by the prosecutor.’” Spinks, ¶ 27 (quotation omitted).

With respect to each motion, Defendant has not shown any actual neglect or

willfulness by the prosecutor in any of the delays between his arrest, trials, and

motions. Although there are some reasons for the delay that weigh slightly against

the State, the State offered valid reasons for the delay, including delays incident to STATE V. AMBRIZ

normal trial procedure and delays due to the effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on our

court system in 2020. This factor does not particularly favor either party, and at best

it might slightly favor Defendant, at least prior to 2020.

d. Defendant’s Assertion of the Right

¶ 70 As to the third Barker factor, the trial court concluded, “The defendant has

first asserted the right to a speedy trial by motion on February 12, 2018, after the

matter had been pending for two years, and after acquiescing to the State’s approach

during the prior two years of addressing the matters of the other co-defendants prior

to trying the defendant’s cases.”

¶ 71 The third Barker factor favors Defendant. As the trial court noted, Defendant

waited about two years to assert his right to a speedy trial, but at that point, he

asserted his right to a speedy trial repeatedly. The State concedes as much.

“A criminal defendant who vigorously asserts his right to a speedy trial will be considered in a more favorable light than a defendant who does not.” Strickland, 153 N.C. App. at 587, 570 S.E.2d at 903. A failure to assert the right, or a failure to assert the right early in the process, weighs against a defendant’s contention that his right has been violated. [State v.] Grooms, 353 N.C. [50,] 63, 540 S.E.2d [713,] 722 [(2000)].

Spinks, ¶ 33.

¶ 72 Defendant first asserted his right to a speedy trial by a pro se motion and letter

filed 30 January 2018. His first motion filed through counsel was filed 12 February

2018. Defendant filed three additional speedy trial motions: the second motion on or STATE V. AMBRIZ

about 23 April 2019, after his first mistrial; the third motion on 7 August 2019; and

the fourth and final motion on 8 January 2021, between the second mistrial in August

2019 and his third trial in March 2021. Defendant also sent an undated letter to a

retired judge, presumably at some point in October 2018, as we can estimate by the

trial court’s response. Even accepting the State’s argument, citing Spivey, 357 N.C.

at 121, 579 S.E.2d at 256, that “a represented defendant ‘cannot also file motions on

his own behalf or attempt to represent himself[,]’” Defendant’s four motions filed

through counsel unequivocally establish he “vigorously assert[ed] his right to a

speedy trial . . . .” Id.

e. Prejudice to the Defendant Resulting from the Delay

¶ 73 “As to the fourth Barker factor,” the trial court concluded, “the alleged delay

has not caused any significant prejudice to defendant, and the defendant has not

alleged specific prejudice, such as any alleged unavailability of witnesses given the

passage of time, in his motion.”

¶ 74 We agree that the final factor favors the State:

Prejudice “should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118. The identified interests the constitutional right to a speedy trial protects are: (1) avoiding prolonged imprisonment; (2) reducing anxiety of the accused; and (3) creating the opportunity for the accused to assert and exercise their presumption of innocence. See id. The last of these interests is the most important aspect to the STATE V. AMBRIZ

speedy trial right, “because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” Id.

Carvalho, 243 N.C. App. at 403, 777 S.E.2d at 85. “A defendant must show actual,

substantial prejudice.” Spivey, 357 N.C. at 122, 579 S.E.2d at 257.

¶ 75 Defendant has not shown “actual, substantial prejudice.” Id. The first two

interests protected by the right to a speedy trial are evident in nearly all

incarcerations. Defendant was imprisoned for several years awaiting trial for the

offenses he was ultimately convicted upon, and this imprisonment undoubtably

caused significant “anxiety of the accused.” Carvalho, 243 N.C. App. at 403, 777

S.E.2d at 85. But from arrest through conviction Defendant received three

opportunities “to assert and exercise [his] presumption of innocence.” Id.

¶ 76 Defendant admits his defense was not prejudiced by any delay, “because he did

not call witnesses; he instead relied on the fact that the State had no evidence of his

participation.” Defendant argues he “should not be punished due to the arbitrary

factor that his defense was not damaged by the passage of time.” Additionally,

Defendant argues he was prejudiced because he was “unjustly locked away, unable

to work and see and support his family.” The State cites Farmer and argues

“Defendant only cite[s] generalized concerns surrounding detention” and “[t]hese are

the exact arguments our Supreme Court already said were not sufficient.”

¶ 77 As to Defendant’s argument that his incarceration was prejudicial because he STATE V. AMBRIZ

was “unjustly locked away, unable to work and see and support his family[,]”

Defendant is required to allege more than simple separation from his family, or the

type of separation inherent to pretrial detention. See Spinks, ¶ 38 (discussing State

v. Washington, 192 N.C. App. 277, 292, 665 S.E.2d 799, 809 (2008)). Defendant has

not alleged any reason why separation from his family was particularly prejudicial

as a result of the delays before his trial. He has not argued how that separation

affects any of the interests protected by the right to a speedy trial above the prejudice

inherent in every pretrial incarceration. Defendant instead makes a bare assertion

that separation from his family was “unjust . . . given the weakness of the State’s case

. . . .” This argument falls short of “actual, substantial prejudice.” Spivey, 357 N.C.

at 122, 579 S.E.2d at 257.

¶ 78 Defendant also argues that he is prejudiced because none of his time spent in

State jail will count against his future federal sentence. Defendant does not expand

upon this argument. We find this argument unpersuasive. It is not uncommon for a

criminal defendant to serve consecutive sentences for multiple offenses or for a

defendant to be prosecuted by both State and Federal authorities. And, as we

discussed above, the State’s evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant on all three

charges. Although “[t]he fact a defendant is already incarcerated while awaiting trial

‘does not mitigate against his right to a speedy and impartial trial[,]’” Wilkerson, 257

N.C. App. at 934, 810 S.E.2d at 395 (quotation omitted), Defendant does not explain STATE V. AMBRIZ

how this future sentence constitutes prejudice protected against by his right to a

speedy trial. He does not allege the possibility of a concurrent sentence being lost, or

an increase in his present imprisonment, or any worsening of the conditions of his

imprisonment due to the “pendency of another criminal charge outstanding against

him.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378, 21 L. Ed. 2d 607, 611 (1969)).

The fact that Defendant will have to serve a federal sentence in addition to his state

sentence does not constitute “actual, substantial prejudice” as Defendant presents it

to us. Spivey, 357 N.C. at 122, 579 S.E.2d at 257.

¶ 79 As to Defendant’s argument that he “should not be punished due to the

arbitrary factor that his defense was not damaged by the passage of time[,]” we do

not find that Defendant is being punished because this case took several years and

multiple trials to resolve or because he did not present evidence in his defense.

Defendant has failed to show any prejudice that is not inherent to all pretrial

detentions, and ultimately the only showing of prejudice is Defendant’s lengthy

incarceration alone. While we acknowledge the oppressive and anxiety-inducing

nature of pretrial incarceration, it is not enough by itself to show “actual, substantial

prejudice.” This factor weighs in favor of the State.

f. Weighing the Factors

¶ 80 The reasons for the delay were not solely the fault of the State. Defendant has

not presented evidence to show the delay was due to “neglect or willfulness by the STATE V. AMBRIZ

prosecutor.” Spinks, ¶ 27 (quotation omitted). While Farmer indicates the State

bears some burden for the exercise of prosecutorial preference in the order Defendant

and co-defendants were tried, see Farmer, 376 N.C. at 416, 852 S.E.2d at 342, “[t]his

Court has also recognized that there may be selectivity in prosecutions and that the

exercise of this prosecutorial prerogative does not reach constitutional proportion

unless there be a showing that the selection was deliberately based upon an

unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”

Spivey, 357 N.C. at 121, 579 S.E.2d at 256 (quotations omitted) (discussing the effect

of prosecutorial preference in trying capital versus noncapital murder cases).

¶ 81 “No one factor is determinative of a speedy-trial violation; ‘they must all be

weighed and considered together[.]’” Spinks, ¶ 41 (alteration in original) (quotation

omitted). Here, the balance of the factors weighs in favor of the State. Defendant

has failed to show purposeful, neglectful, or willful delay by the prosecutor.

Defendant has also failed to show “actual, substantial prejudice” as a result of any

delay. Spivey, 357 N.C. at 122, 579 S.E.2d at 257. Upon de novo review, we hold the

trial court did not err in balancing the Barker factors as to any of Defendant’s motions

and denying his motions to dismiss based upon denial of his right to a speedy trial.

III. Conclusion

¶ 82 We conclude the State presented sufficient evidence to convict Defendant on

each charge and the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motions to dismiss STATE V. AMBRIZ

based upon his assertion of a denial of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court

committed no error.

NO ERROR.

Judges TYSON and HAMPSON concur.