IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 278PA21
Filed 15 December 2023
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. FERNANDO ALVAREZ
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous,
unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, No. COA20-611 (N.C. Ct. App. July 20,
2021), affirming an order entered on 2 December 2019 by Judge Anna Mills Wagoner
in Superior Court, Rowan County. Heard in the Supreme Court on
20 September 2023.
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Zachary K. Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Kathryn L. VandenBerg, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.
BARRINGER, Justice.
In this case, we are tasked with determining whether the Court of Appeals
erred in refusing to address whether officers possessed reasonable suspicion to stop
defendant’s vehicle. We are further tasked with determining whether the Court of
Appeals erred in concluding that the traffic checkpoint did not comply with the
Fourth Amendment.
For the following reasons, we hold that the officers had independent reasonable STATE V. ALVAREZ
Opinion of the Court
suspicion and, therefore, did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Since
the officers had independent reasonable suspicion, we do not reach the
constitutionality of the checkpoint. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the motion
to suppress and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s order. We
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court for further
remand to the trial court for appropriate proceedings.
I. Background
On 6 June 2018, the Rowan County Sheriff’s Office set up a checkpoint at the
intersection of Stone and Rainey Roads in Salisbury, North Carolina, from 12:00 a.m.
to 2:00 a.m. The checkpoint was in response to a fatal traffic accident in that location.
At approximately 1:45 a.m., defendant came into view of the checkpoint.
Deputy Nolan Shue testified, and the trial court found as fact, that defendant’s
passenger side wheels came off the road and onto the grass before coming to a stop at
the checkpoint. Deputy Shue further testified that this observation led him to believe
that defendant might be driving while impaired, and that defendant appeared “very
nervous and overly talkative,” could not stop smiling, and had “glassy eyes.”
Based on defendant’s driving, demeanor, and appearance, officers initiated a
search of defendant’s vehicle. During the search, officers discovered cocaine,
buprenorphine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, for which defendant was later
indicted for possessing. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence against him on
grounds that it was collected at an unconstitutional checkpoint.
-2- STATE V. ALVAREZ
The trial court concluded that the State failed to provide a valid primary
programmatic purpose for the checkpoint. Therefore, the State violated the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the North
Carolina Constitution. Accordingly, the trial court granted defendant’s motion and
suppressed all evidence collected at the checkpoint. The trial court did not address
whether the officers had independent reasonable suspicion to stop defendant, despite
having heard arguments on independent reasonable suspicion.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the
checkpoint was unconstitutional because the State failed to establish “a valid primary
programmatic purpose” for its implementation. State v. Alvarez, No. COA20-611, slip
op. at 2 (N.C. Ct. App. July 20, 2021) (unpublished). In a brief concurrence, Judges
Dietz and Murphy opined that the Court of Appeals should have addressed whether
officers had independent reasonable suspicion. Id. at 18. However, the Court of
Appeals reasoned, “it is unnecessary to address whether officers possessed
independent reasonable articulable suspicion.” Id. at 16. We disagree.
II. Standard of Review
In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, this Court examines whether the
trial court’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether those
findings support the conclusions of law. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134 (1982).
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168 (2011).
-3- STATE V. ALVAREZ
III. Analysis
“When an officer observes conduct which leads him reasonably to believe that
criminal conduct may be afoot, he may stop the suspicious person to make reasonable
inquiries.” State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272, 275 (1998). The officer “must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” State v. Thompson, 296 N.C.
703, 706 (1979) (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
Reasonable suspicion is an issue independent of the constitutionality of the
checkpoint. State v. Griffin, 366 N.C. 473, 477 (2013).
Reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding standard than probable cause and
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989)).
Only some minimal level of objective justification is required. This Court has determined that the reasonable suspicion standard requires that the stop be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.
State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 (2008) (cleaned up).
Here, officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. Deputy Shue
articulated in his testimony that defendant’s failure to maintain lane control made
him “believe that there might be possibly some impaired driving,” in violation of
-4- STATE V. ALVAREZ
N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1. Further, consistent with the trial court’s finding of fact, three
officers testified that they observed defendant’s vehicle veer out of its lane and
“basically run off the road.” Thus, officers had reasonable suspicion that defendant’s
actions constituted a traffic violation under N.C.G.S. § 20-146(d)(1), which requires
drivers to remain “within a single lane” and not depart from that lane unless it can
be departed safely. See N.C.G.S. § 20-146(d)(1) (2021).
Although the trial court found that “[t]he location of the checkpoint played a
role in the vehicle’s alleged ‘failure to maintain lane control,’ ” this finding appears to
be based on Deputy Shue’s testimony on the hypothetical use of checkpoints as speed
enforcement. Neither Deputy Shue’s testimony, nor that of any other witness,
supports the inference that placement of the checkpoint contributed to defendant’s
failure to maintain lane control. Moreover, in closing argument, defendant’s counsel
conceded that “[w]e have no testimony as to whether or not the checking station might
have caused him to look down or something as he was approaching and run off the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 278PA21
Filed 15 December 2023
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. FERNANDO ALVAREZ
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous,
unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, No. COA20-611 (N.C. Ct. App. July 20,
2021), affirming an order entered on 2 December 2019 by Judge Anna Mills Wagoner
in Superior Court, Rowan County. Heard in the Supreme Court on
20 September 2023.
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Zachary K. Dunn, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
Glenn Gerding, Appellate Defender, by Kathryn L. VandenBerg, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee.
BARRINGER, Justice.
In this case, we are tasked with determining whether the Court of Appeals
erred in refusing to address whether officers possessed reasonable suspicion to stop
defendant’s vehicle. We are further tasked with determining whether the Court of
Appeals erred in concluding that the traffic checkpoint did not comply with the
Fourth Amendment.
For the following reasons, we hold that the officers had independent reasonable STATE V. ALVAREZ
Opinion of the Court
suspicion and, therefore, did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Since
the officers had independent reasonable suspicion, we do not reach the
constitutionality of the checkpoint. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the motion
to suppress and the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s order. We
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to that court for further
remand to the trial court for appropriate proceedings.
I. Background
On 6 June 2018, the Rowan County Sheriff’s Office set up a checkpoint at the
intersection of Stone and Rainey Roads in Salisbury, North Carolina, from 12:00 a.m.
to 2:00 a.m. The checkpoint was in response to a fatal traffic accident in that location.
At approximately 1:45 a.m., defendant came into view of the checkpoint.
Deputy Nolan Shue testified, and the trial court found as fact, that defendant’s
passenger side wheels came off the road and onto the grass before coming to a stop at
the checkpoint. Deputy Shue further testified that this observation led him to believe
that defendant might be driving while impaired, and that defendant appeared “very
nervous and overly talkative,” could not stop smiling, and had “glassy eyes.”
Based on defendant’s driving, demeanor, and appearance, officers initiated a
search of defendant’s vehicle. During the search, officers discovered cocaine,
buprenorphine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia, for which defendant was later
indicted for possessing. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence against him on
grounds that it was collected at an unconstitutional checkpoint.
-2- STATE V. ALVAREZ
The trial court concluded that the State failed to provide a valid primary
programmatic purpose for the checkpoint. Therefore, the State violated the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 19 of the North
Carolina Constitution. Accordingly, the trial court granted defendant’s motion and
suppressed all evidence collected at the checkpoint. The trial court did not address
whether the officers had independent reasonable suspicion to stop defendant, despite
having heard arguments on independent reasonable suspicion.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the
checkpoint was unconstitutional because the State failed to establish “a valid primary
programmatic purpose” for its implementation. State v. Alvarez, No. COA20-611, slip
op. at 2 (N.C. Ct. App. July 20, 2021) (unpublished). In a brief concurrence, Judges
Dietz and Murphy opined that the Court of Appeals should have addressed whether
officers had independent reasonable suspicion. Id. at 18. However, the Court of
Appeals reasoned, “it is unnecessary to address whether officers possessed
independent reasonable articulable suspicion.” Id. at 16. We disagree.
II. Standard of Review
In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, this Court examines whether the
trial court’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether those
findings support the conclusions of law. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134 (1982).
Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168 (2011).
-3- STATE V. ALVAREZ
III. Analysis
“When an officer observes conduct which leads him reasonably to believe that
criminal conduct may be afoot, he may stop the suspicious person to make reasonable
inquiries.” State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272, 275 (1998). The officer “must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.” State v. Thompson, 296 N.C.
703, 706 (1979) (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
Reasonable suspicion is an issue independent of the constitutionality of the
checkpoint. State v. Griffin, 366 N.C. 473, 477 (2013).
Reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding standard than probable cause and
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7
(1989)).
Only some minimal level of objective justification is required. This Court has determined that the reasonable suspicion standard requires that the stop be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.
State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 (2008) (cleaned up).
Here, officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. Deputy Shue
articulated in his testimony that defendant’s failure to maintain lane control made
him “believe that there might be possibly some impaired driving,” in violation of
-4- STATE V. ALVAREZ
N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1. Further, consistent with the trial court’s finding of fact, three
officers testified that they observed defendant’s vehicle veer out of its lane and
“basically run off the road.” Thus, officers had reasonable suspicion that defendant’s
actions constituted a traffic violation under N.C.G.S. § 20-146(d)(1), which requires
drivers to remain “within a single lane” and not depart from that lane unless it can
be departed safely. See N.C.G.S. § 20-146(d)(1) (2021).
Although the trial court found that “[t]he location of the checkpoint played a
role in the vehicle’s alleged ‘failure to maintain lane control,’ ” this finding appears to
be based on Deputy Shue’s testimony on the hypothetical use of checkpoints as speed
enforcement. Neither Deputy Shue’s testimony, nor that of any other witness,
supports the inference that placement of the checkpoint contributed to defendant’s
failure to maintain lane control. Moreover, in closing argument, defendant’s counsel
conceded that “[w]e have no testimony as to whether or not the checking station might
have caused him to look down or something as he was approaching and run off the
road.”
Officers’ observation of defendant as he approached the checkpoint gave them
reasonable suspicion based on defendant’s failure to maintain lane control and
possible impaired driving. The officers had reasonable suspicion to justify stopping
defendant. Thus, the officers did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Since we hold that the officers had independent reasonable suspicion to stop
defendant, we decline to address whether the traffic checkpoint was constitutional.
-5- STATE V. ALVAREZ
We disavow the Court of Appeals’ broad statements on traffic stop constitutionality.
IV. Conclusion
The officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant independent of the
traffic checkpoint. Thus, stopping defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress and the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the trial court. We reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remand to that court for further remand to the trial court for appropriate
proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Justice DIETZ did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
-6-