State v. Allison

• Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
• Decided: December 12, 2025
• Docket: 103PA24
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 103PA24

Filed 12 December 2025

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. GEORGE LEE ALLISON

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous,

unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, No. COA23-635 (N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 19,

2024), finding no error after appeal from a judgment entered on 28 October 2022 by

Judge Jacqueline D. Grant in Superior Court, Burke County. Heard in the Supreme

Court on 22 April 2025.

Jeff Jackson, Attorney General, by Michael T. Henry, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellee.

Craig M. Cooley for defendant-appellant.

BERGER, Justice.

It is undisputed that defendant shot and killed Brandon Adams on 13

December 2020 while Adams was standing in the doorway outside of defendant’s

residence. The question presented here is whether the jury was properly instructed

on the castle doctrine as established by the legislature in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A Burke County jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder, and he was STATE V. ALLISON

Opinion of the Court

sentenced to 144 to 185 months in prison. The evidence at trial tended to show the

following.1

On the day he was killed, Adams and his girlfriend, Pamela Rodgers, got into

an argument. Adams told Rodgers he was going to defendant’s home, but when he

returned, Rodgers accused Adams of cheating on her. Adams told Rodgers to go to

defendant’s home to verify that he had in fact been there.

Rodgers drove to defendant’s home, and defendant confirmed that Adams had

been at his home. Thereafter, Rodgers and defendant began drinking bourbon, and

Rodgers told defendant that Adams was mean to her and physically abusive.

Defendant told Rodgers that she needed to leave and “go somewhere away from

[Adams] if that’s the case.”

Later, Adams arrived at defendant’s home, and defendant invited him inside.

When Adams entered the home, he “started pointing at” Rodgers, and “[e]very time

he would point, she would flinch” and “physically would draw back.” After a few

minutes, defendant asked Adams to leave. When Adams walked to the door, he

rammed his shoulder into defendant’s shoulder. Defendant testified that when he

looked at Adams, he “did not see the person that [he] knew in those eyes.”

Rodgers stayed in defendant’s home and continued drinking after Adams left.

1 As this case requires us to determine whether defendant was entitled to certain jury

instructions, we recite the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant. See State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 348 (1988) (“When determining whether the evidence is sufficient to entitle a defendant to jury instructions on a defense or mitigating factor, courts must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant.”).

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Over the course of approximately two hours, Adams texted Rodgers multiple times,

and Rodgers read the texts to defendant. In two texts sent at 8:41 p.m., Adams stated,

“If I come down there I’m telling you it’s going to get bad,” and “I will drag him outside

and beat the fuck out of him.”

Eventually, Rodgers told defendant she was going to return to Adams’ home

but needed defendant to drive her because she was intoxicated. Defendant asked

Rodgers to wait in his home while he went to the grocery store to pick up items for

his mother, who suffered from Alzheimer’s and lived with defendant. Defendant

drove to the grocery store, but he returned home upon realizing that he had left his

wallet. Defendant then went to withdraw cash from an ATM, but then he decided

not to go to the grocery store.

Defendant’s route home traveled past Adams’ home, and when Adams saw

defendant drive past, he pulled his vehicle in behind defendant, got “right on

[defendant’s] tail” and “slid in” behind defendant when he parked. Adams and

defendant both exited their vehicles, and Adams told defendant, “You are going to

have to kill me to keep me from dragging that fucking bitch out of your house.”

Defendant ran to his home, quickly opened the door, and Adams “stuck his hand and

his foot” inside the door, preventing defendant from closing it.

Defendant pushed to close the door, Adams pushed back, and defendant

realized he “wasn’t winning this one” because Adams “had more strength than

[defendant] did.” Defendant let go of the door, retrieved a shotgun, and returned to

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the front door. He “presented the weapon” to Adams, who remained on the home’s

front porch directly outside the front door, and defendant “begged” Adams to “please

just go home, don’t come back, just go home” because Rodgers was “going to be leaving

[t]here in a minute.” Defendant asked Adams to let him lock the door and help his

mother go to bed so that he could then allow Adams to come in and talk to Rodgers.

Adams “wasn’t having it” and was “staying right there,” and defendant told

him, “I am going to countdown, and then you leave.” Adams did not leave, so

defendant counted down from seven to zero, then five to zero, and finally three to

zero. At that point, defendant turned to look at his mother, who was sitting inside

the home, and when he turned back, he saw Adams make a forward movement.

Defendant testified that when he saw Adams make this movement, he “could have

swore there was a bolt of light[ning] that ran through [his] body,” and he “just

reacted” by pulling the trigger and shooting Adams.

Rodgers called 911, and though Adams was alive when law enforcement

arrived at the scene, he later died from the gunshot wound. Defendant was arrested,

and he was subsequently indicted for first-degree murder.

Defendant’s matter came on for trial on 24 October 2022, and he presented a

castle doctrine defense under N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2. Rodgers testified for the State that

when defendant and Adams arrived at the home, defendant entered and told Adams

not to cross the threshold. Adams, who was neither aggressive nor violent, replied

that he would not enter the home and, according to Rodgers, never attempted to do

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so. Defendant immediately retrieved his shotgun. According to Rodgers, defendant

returned, pointed the gun at Adams, and counted down three times before pulling the

trigger. The State argued that defendant was not entitled to the castle doctrine

defense because Adams did not physically enter defendant’s home. The trial court

denied defendant’s motion to dismiss but granted his request to provide the pattern

jury instruction for defense of habitation under the statute.

The relevant portion of the trial court’s instruction to the jury on this issue was

as follows:

If the defendant killed the victim to prevent a forcible entry into the defendant’s home, or to terminate the intruder’s unlawful entry, the defendant’s actions are excused and the defendant is not guilty. The State has the burden of proving from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in the lawful defense of the defendant’s home.

The defendant was justified in using deadly force if such force was being used to prevent a forcible entry or terminate the intruder’s unlawful entry into the defendant’s home, the defendant reasonably believed that the [intruder] would kill or inflict serious bodily harm to the defendant or others in the home, and the defendant reasonably believed that the degree of force the defendant used was necessary to prevent a forcible entry or terminate the intruder’s unlawful entry into the defendant’s home.

A lawful occupant within a home does not have a duty to retreat from an intruder in these circumstances. Furthermore, a person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person’s home is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence. In addition, absent evidence to the contrary, the lawful occupant of a home is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious

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bodily harm to himself or another when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to another if both of the following apply:

The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered a home, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person’s will from the home; and second, that the person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred. It is for you, the jury, to determine the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief from the circumstances as they appeared to the defendant at the time.

....

If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed the victim, you may return a verdict of guilty only if the State has satisfied you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in the lawful defense of the defendant’s home; that is, that the defendant did not use such force to prevent a forcible entry or terminate the intruder[’]s unlawful entry into the defendant’s home, that the defendant did not reasonably believe the intruder would kill or inflict serious bodily harm to the defendant or others in his home, and that the defendant did not reasonably believe that the degree of force the defendant used was necessary to prevent a forcible entry or terminate the intruder’s unlawful entry into the defendant’s home.

The trial court did not instruct the jury that the curtilage of a home constitutes part

of the home for defense of habitation purposes. See N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(a)(1) (2023).

Based on these instructions, the jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder,

and the trial court sentenced defendant to 144 to 185 months incarceration.

Defendant appealed.

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At the Court of Appeals, defendant argued the trial court erred in denying his

motion to dismiss and plainly erred in providing the jury with a deficient instruction

on the castle doctrine. State v. Allison, No. COA23-635, 2024 WL 1173544, at *1–2

(N.C. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2024). The Court of Appeals held the trial court did not err

in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss because the State “presented substantial

evidence to rebut the presumption created by the castle doctrine.” Id. In addition,

relying on its own precedent in State v. Austin, 279 N.C. App. 377 (2021), the Court

of Appeals rejected defendant’s jury instruction argument because “the State

presented substantial evidence that [d]efendant did not have a reasonable fear of

imminent death or bodily harm, thus overcoming the reasonableness presumption

and creating a question of fact for the jury to decide.” Allison, 2024 WL 1173544, at

*2.

Defendant filed a notice of appeal based upon a constitutional question and a

petition for discretionary review with this Court. On 13 December 2024, this Court

dismissed defendant’s notice of appeal ex mero motu and allowed his petition for

discretionary review to address a single issue:

When the General Assembly enacted the castle doctrine statute, particularly N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c)—which identifies five circumstances where the presumption of reasonableness can be rebutted, whether § 14-51.2(c) contains an unwritten sixth exception that states the reasonableness presumption can also be rebutted if:

The State presents substantial evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that a defendant did not have a reasonable fear of

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imminent death or serious bodily harm, the State can overcome the presumption and create a fact question for the jury.

II. Standard of Review

“We examine de novo whether a jury instruction correctly explains the law.”

State v. Copley, 386 N.C. 111, 119 (2024) (cleaned up). As defendant failed to object

to the trial court’s instructions, we review for plain error and examine whether

defendant has demonstrated that: (1) a fundamental error occurred at trial, (2) such

error had a probable impact on the outcome, and (3) the error is an exceptional case

warranting plain error review. See State v. Reber, 386 N.C. 153, 158 (2024).

III. Discussion

A. The Castle Doctrine

In 2011, the General Assembly enacted a detailed statutory scheme “that

expanded and clarified use of force protections” and prioritized the rights of lawful

occupants of homes, automobiles, and businesses. State v. Phillips, 386 N.C. 513, 520

(2024) (citing An Act to Provide When a Person May Use Defensive Force and to

Amend Various Laws Regarding the Right to Own, Possess, or Carry a Firearm in

North Carolina, S.L. 2011-268, § 2, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1002, 1004). The castle

doctrine in North Carolina recognizes that unlawful intruders create an inherently

dangerous situation in certain specified circumstances, and lawful occupants are thus

given the benefit of the doubt in qualifying use of force scenarios.

Under these statutes, “a person is justified in the use of deadly force and does

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not have a duty to retreat in any place he or she has the lawful right to be if,”

applicable here, N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2 is satisfied. N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3(a) (2023). Under

that provision, lawful occupants of homes, vehicles, and workplaces may use force,

including deadly force, against unlawful intruders. Id. The statute specifically

defines a “home” as a “building or conveyance of any kind, to include its curtilage,

whether the building or conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile,

which has a roof over it, including a tent, and is designed as a temporary or

permanent residence.” N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(a)(1). The doctrine functions as follows:

First, any person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a home is presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence, and this presumption is non-rebuttable. Second, a lawful occupant of a home who knows or has reason to believe such unlawful entry or attempted entry occurred or is occurring, and who uses force against the intruder that is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily, is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm and has no duty to retreat from the intruder. Finally, if a lawful occupant of a home uses deadly force as permitted by this statute, he or she is immune from civil or criminal liability for the use of such force, subject only to a narrow exception not relevant here.

Phillips, 386 N.C. at 524 (cleaned up).

Thus, although the common law and the stand your ground statute in

subsection 14-51.3(a)(1) generally require individuals who use deadly force against

another to demonstrate his or her reasonable belief that such force was necessary to

prevent imminent death or great bodily harm, the castle doctrine does not require a

lawful occupant of a home to make such a showing. N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2;

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see also N.C.G.S. § 14-51.3(a)(2). Instead, when the specific statutory criteria of

section 14-51.2 are met, the General Assembly has plainly stated that such individual

is “presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm

to himself or herself or another.” N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b) (2023).

This presumption, however, is rebuttable and does not apply if at least one of

the following scenarios is applicable:

(1) The person against whom the defensive force is used has the right to be in or is a lawful resident of the home, motor vehicle, or workplace, such as an owner or lessee, and there is not an injunction for protection from domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against that person.

(2) The person sought to be removed from the home, motor vehicle, or workplace is a child or grandchild or is otherwise in the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of the person against whom the defensive force is used.

(3) The person who uses defensive force is engaged in, attempting to escape from, or using the home, motor vehicle, or workplace to further any criminal offense that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.

(4) The person against whom the defensive force is used is a law enforcement officer or bail bondsman who enters or attempts to enter a home, motor vehicle, or workplace in the lawful performance of his or her official duties, and the officer or bail bondsman identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law or the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person entering or attempting to enter was a law enforcement officer or bail bondsman in the lawful performance of his or her official duties.

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(5) The person against whom the defensive force is used (i) has discontinued all efforts to unlawfully and forcefully enter the home, motor vehicle, or workplace and (ii) has exited the home, motor vehicle, or workplace.

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c).

This Court recently took “the opportunity to clarify the castle doctrine as

established by the legislature.” Phillips, 386 N.C. at 514. We expressly held that

“the castle doctrine’s statutory presumption of reasonable fear may only be rebutted

by the circumstances contained in section 14-51.2(c).” Id. at 525. We also held that

excessive force is a legal impossibility unless that presumption had been rebutted and

provided an outline of the proper decision tree to be applied when presented with a

castle doctrine defense.

[W]hen a defendant asserts the castle doctrine defense at trial, the jury must first determine whether the defendant is entitled to the presumption [of reasonable fear] as set forth in section 14-51.2(b). If the jury finds that the defendant is not entitled to the presumption, the castle doctrine statute does not apply and the jury must determine the defendant’s culpability under section 14- 51.3, the general self-defense statute.

Alternatively, if the jury finds that the defendant is entitled to the presumption, it must then determine whether the State has rebutted the presumption by proving any of the circumstances set forth in section 14- 51.2(c). If the jury finds that the State has rebutted the presumption, the jury must determine whether the defendant’s use of force was proportional. However, if the jury finds that the State failed to rebut the presumption, the defendant must be acquitted in accordance with section 14-51.2(e).

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Id.

Here, defendant’s trial and the Court of Appeals’ opinion predated our decision

in Phillips. The Court of Appeals therefore relied on its erroneous precedent to reject

defendant’s argument that the trial court plainly erred by instructing the jury that it

could consider evidence concerning the presumption of reasonable fear and the

reasonableness of force used. See Allison, 2024 WL 1173544, at *1–2.

The State now argues that the Court of Appeals’ reasoning survives Phillips

because this Court did not explicitly overrule the Court of Appeals’ precedent when

we held “that the castle doctrine’s statutory presumption of reasonable fear may only

be rebutted by the circumstances contained in section 14-51.2(c).” Phillips, 386 N.C.

at 525 (emphasis added). According to the State, this Court’s “discussion of section

14-51.2(c) in Phillips is non-binding dicta” because it was unnecessary to the

resolution of the issue presented in that case.

But the question in Phillips was whether “the castle doctrine statute preserves

the common law’s prohibition on excessive force.” Id. at 517. This Court clearly

stated, “[t]o resolve this case, we must therefore examine what is permitted under

the castle doctrine.” Id. at 521. We ultimately concluded that excessive force was not

a proper consideration where “a lawful occupant of a home is cloaked with the

protections afforded by the castle doctrine and the State fails to rebut the statutory

presumption that the lawful occupant had reasonable fear.” Id. at 527. In other

words, whether the jury could consider the proportionality of a defendant’s use of

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force turns on whether “the jury finds that the State has rebutted the presumption.”

Id. at 525. Determining the scope of the State’s ability to rebut the statutory

presumption of reasonable fear, that is, interpreting subsection 14-51.2(c), was

therefore at the heart of resolving whether “the castle doctrine statute preserves the

common law’s prohibition on excessive force.” Id. at 517.

In addition to misapprehending subsection 14-51.2(c)’s necessity to our

decision in Phillips, the State’s contention that the Court of Appeals’ precedent to the

contrary survived that decision belies fundamental principles of jurisprudence.

When this Court, which has the final say on matters of state law, announces a rule

of law or an interpretation of a statute, it is controlling, and any contrary holding of

a lower court is superseded. See State v. Tirado, 387 N.C. 104, 112 (2025) (only the

Supreme Court of North Carolina may answer “questions [of state law] with

finality[.]”); Hart v. State, 368 N.C. 122, 130 (2015) (“As the court of last resort in this

state, we answer with finality issues concerning the proper construction and

application of North Carolina laws and the Constitution of North Carolina.” (cleaned

up)).

Under the backdrop of our decision in Phillips, the question presented here,

whether the presumption of reasonable fear can be rebutted by evidence of

circumstances beyond the five circumstances listed in subsection 14-51.2(c), was

resolved unanimously by this Court: the presumption “may only be rebutted by the

circumstances contained in section 14-51.2(c).” See Phillips, 386 N.C. at 525; id. at

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531 (Earls, J., with Riggs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concurring

as to the Court’s interpretation of section 14-51.2 and only “part[ing] ways with the

majority on” this Court’s decision to remand the question of prejudice to the Court of

Appeals).

B. Jury Instructions

“It is fundamental that a jury must be properly instructed on the law.”

Phillips, 386 N.C. at 525 (majority opinion). “A defendant entitled to any self-defense

instruction is entitled to a complete self-defense instruction . . . .” State v. Coley, 375

N.C. 156, 159–60 (2020) (cleaned up). “Instructions that provide jurors with a clear

decision tree are critical for a jury to be able to accurately determine whether the

presumptions provided by § 14-51.2 have been rebutted. A jury must intentionally

and methodically determine whether that presumption has been rebutted.” Copley,

386 N.C. at 126–27 (Barringer, J., concurring).

Here, the jury instructions on the castle doctrine, which were crafted prior to

Phillips, failed to properly inform the jury of the applicable law in several ways.2

Specifically, the jury was instructed that defendant would be justified in using deadly

2 Defendant was tried and convicted in October 2022, almost two years before this

Court’s opinion in Phillips was issued on 23 August 2024. Thus, there is no way the trial court’s instructions below could have complied with the decision tree we laid out in Phillips. This will be true for a number of cases in the appellate pipeline. But to be clear, we understand that the very capable members of the Pattern Jury Instruction Committee read our opinions and take seriously their obligation to ensure the instructions align with the law. These things take time, and it is more important that the committee gets it right rather than simply getting it done.

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force only if: (1) he reasonably believed Adams would kill or inflict serious bodily harm

to defendant or others in the home, and (2) he reasonably believed such force was

necessary to prevent or terminate Adams’ unlawful entry into the home. Though the

jury was instructed defendant was presumed to have held a reasonable fear of

imminent death or serious bodily harm, it was also instructed that such presumption

could be rebutted by any evidence to the contrary and that it was ultimately the jury’s

responsibility to determine the reasonableness of defendant’s belief. In addition, the

jury was not instructed that a home’s curtilage is a protected location under the

express language of section 14-51.2. These portions of the jury instructions, as we

stated in Phillips, are fundamentally incompatible with the statute and therefore fail

to accurately instruct on the law.3

First, when an intruder “unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter”

a person’s home or its curtilage, the General Assembly has expressly removed from

the province of the jury questions regarding the reasonableness of a lawful occupant’s

belief that such intruder intends “to commit an unlawful act involving force or

violence.” N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(d). No jury instruction on the castle doctrine should

3 The State argues defendant cannot now complain of these instructions as he requested the pattern jury instructions on defense of habitation. However, because the State did not raise this argument at the Court of Appeals, it is not preserved for our consideration. See Falls Sales Co. v. Bd. of Transp., 292 N.C. 437, 443 (1977) (“The potential scope of our review is limited by the questions properly presented for first review in the Court of Appeals. The attempt to smuggle in new questions is not approved.” (cleaned up)). Defendant’s argument regarding a pretrial determination of immunity suffers from the same defect, and we decline to consider both arguments.

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invite the jury to address this question. Rather, the instruction should simply ask

the jury whether the intruder had unlawfully and by force entered or attempted to

enter the protected location and whether the defendant was a lawful occupant of such

location at the time of the unlawful entry. If the jury answers these questions in the

affirmative, then the non-rebuttable presumption that the victim intended to commit

an unlawful act involving force or violence applies and the jury may not be instructed

to the contrary.

Second, if an unlawful and forceful entry or attempted entry occurred, and if

the lawful occupant knew or had reason to believe that such entry or attempted entry

occurred, the lawful occupant “is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of

imminent death or serious bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using

defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to

another.” N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b). The jury may consider whether that presumption

has been rebutted if, and only if, the State presents evidence tending to establish one

of the five circumstances listed in subsections 14-51.2(c)(1)–(5). In that case, the jury

must be specifically instructed that it may only consider the reasonableness of the

defendant’s belief if it affirmatively finds that the State has proven the circumstance

or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. If instead, as in this case, the State fails

to present any evidence tending to establish one of those five circumstances, then the

General Assembly has expressly removed from the province of the jury any question

regarding the reasonableness of, or even the existence of, the defendant’s fear of

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imminent death or serious bodily harm.

Third, a natural consequence of the presumption of fear of imminent death or

serious bodily harm is that unless such presumption is rebutted, “excessive force is

impossible” under the castle doctrine. Phillips, 386 N.C. at 527 (cleaned up). In other

words, if, as in this case, the State fails to present any evidence establishing one of

the five circumstances in subsection (c), the jury may not consider whether the

defendant reasonably believed the degree of force used was necessary to prevent a

forcible entry or to terminate such unlawful entry.

Finally, the castle doctrine statute specifically affords protection to a lawful

occupant of a home, motor vehicle, or workplace. The statute defines a “home” as a

“building or conveyance of any kind, to include its curtilage, whether the building or

conveyance is temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it,

including a tent, and is designed as a temporary or permanent residence.” N.C.G.S.

§ 14-51.2(a)(1). The State argued at trial that the defense does not apply to the

curtilage, but the plain language of the statute extends the castle doctrine’s

protections beyond a home’s four walls.

However, because defendant failed to object to these instructions at trial, to

receive relief he must demonstrate plain error. In reviewing for plain error, we

examine whether defendant has shown that: (1) a fundamental error occurred at trial,

(2) such error had a probable impact on the outcome, and (3) the error is an

exceptional case warranting plain error review. Reber, 386 N.C. at 158.

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Here, the instructional errors discussed above deprived defendant of his

entitlement to “a complete self-defense instruction.” See Coley, 375 N.C. at 159–60

(cleaned up). The “jury instructions [were] infected with legal error,” Copley, 386 N.C.

at 125, and rise to the level of fundamental error, i.e., a “grave error which amounts

to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused,” Reber, 386 N.C. at 158 (cleaned

up).

The castle doctrine provides immunity from criminal and civil liability for

qualifying occupants, and the erroneous instructions here foreclosed defendant’s

ability to argue, or that the jury could consider, that his actions were legally protected

under the statute. Unlike many instructional errors, the failure to properly instruct

the jury on the castle doctrine wholly eliminated consideration of lawful conduct.

This amounts to the denial of a fundamental right.

The second prong of plain error, the prejudice prong, requires us to determine

whether defendant has shown this fundamental error had a probable impact on the

trial’s outcome. “[T]his standard—showing that a jury probably would have reached

a different result—requires a showing that the outcome is significantly more likely

than not.” Id. at 159. “[A]n event will ‘probably’ occur if it is ‘almost certainly’ the

expected outcome; it is treated as synonymous with words such as ‘presumably’ and

‘doubtless.’ ” Id. (first quoting Probably, New Oxford American Dictionary (3d ed.

2010); and then quoting Probably, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed.

2007)).

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Here, the jury was improperly instructed that it could only find defendant

acted lawfully under the castle doctrine if defendant reasonably believed that:

(1) Adams would kill or inflict serious bodily harm to defendant or others, and (2) the

degree of force he used was reasonably necessary to prevent or terminate an unlawful

entry. Under the facts of this case and our precedent in Phillips, neither of these

questions were proper.

The State argues that because “the jury’s verdict [of second-degree murder]

strongly suggests it credited [Rodger’s] account, wherein no forcible entry occurred,”

the failure to properly instruct on the castle doctrine’s presumptions and scope could

not “probably” have affected the outcome at trial. Although Rodgers testified that

Adams never entered defendant’s home and she never heard defendant ask Adams to

leave the porch, she also testified that defendant warned Adams not to cross the

threshold and counted down to zero multiple times before shooting him. Thus, even

if the jury entirely credited Rodger’s testimony over defendant’s, her testimony alone

provides some evidence that Adams unlawfully entered the curtilage of defendant’s

home and that he had not ceased such entry prior to defendant’s use of force.

Though the enactment of the castle doctrine statute abrogated the common

law, it did not alter the principle that the “burden is upon the State to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense when there is some

evidence in the case that he did.” State v. Herbin, 298 N.C. 441, 445 (1979); see also

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(g) (providing that the castle doctrine statute “is not intended to

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repeal or limit any other defense that may exist under the common law”). The record

demonstrates that there was some evidence of an unlawful and forceful entry, or an

unlawful and forceful attempted entry, upon the premises by Adams. But there is no

information in the record that the jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that

no such entry or attempted entry occurred. Considering the instructional error in

this case, including the failure to inform the jury of the curtilage’s protected status,

we reject the State’s invitation to impute this finding to an otherwise silent verdict

sheet.

If a properly instructed jury found that Adams unlawfully and forcibly entered

or attempted to enter the home’s curtilage and that defendant knew or had reason to

believe such entry or attempted entry occurred, then the castle doctrine’s mandatory

presumptions would apply. The jury would therefore not consider whether defendant

reasonably believed Adams entered the curtilage with the “intent to commit an

unlawful act involving force or violence.” See N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(d). Nor would it

consider whether defendant “held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious

bodily harm to himself . . . or another when using defensive force that is intended or

likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to another,” see N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b),

because the State failed to prove any of the circumstances rebutting this presumption

beyond a reasonable doubt. Such a properly instructed jury would not only probably

return a different verdict, it would almost certainly return a different verdict because

an individual who uses deadly force under these circumstances “is justified in using

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such force and is immune from civil or criminal liability for the use of such force,”

subject to but one exception not relevant here. See N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(e).

Having concluded that defendant has established both that a fundamental

error occurred at trial and that the error had a probable impact on the trial’s outcome,

we must now determine whether defendant has shown that this is the “exceptional

case that . . . seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” See Reber, 386 N.C. at 158 (cleaned up). We agree with defendant that

the erroneous instructions here probably led the jury to base its second-degree

murder verdict “on conduct the General Assembly deemed justifiable and legal.”

Because such criminal convictions based on lawful conduct are abhorrent to the

principles of fairness inherent in our judicial system, we are satisfied that defendant’s

matter is the exceptional case irreparably tainted by plain error. Accordingly, we

reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand this matter for a new trial.

IV. Conclusion

Where there is evidence supporting a jury instruction on the castle doctrine, a

defendant is entitled to receive the full benefit of that instruction. When a jury is

improperly instructed on this defense, the defendant faces the intolerable prospect of

conviction based on conduct our General Assembly has deemed lawful and justified.

Because the erroneous instructions in this case probably resulted in defendant’s

conviction rather than acquittal, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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Riggs, J., dissenting

Justice RIGGS dissenting.

At the core of the question presented in this case—whether the jury was

properly instructed on the castle doctrine as established in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2—is

whether the castle doctrine’s presumption of reasonable fear may be rebutted only by

the five statutory exceptions to the presumption outlined in subsection (c) of the castle

doctrine statute. See N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c) (2023) (“The presumption set forth in

subsection (b) of this section shall be rebuttable and does not apply in any of the

following [five] circumstances . . . .”). The majority, relying on nonbinding statements,

or dicta, in State v. Phillips, 386 N.C. 513 (2024), formally limits the refutability of

the presumption to only those five circumstances. Because I would hold that the

majority’s reliance on nonbinding dicta in Phillips is misguided and that the plain

language of the castle doctrine statute does not limit rebutting the presumption of

reasonable fear to the five circumstances in the castle doctrine statute, I respectfully

dissent.

The concurrence in Phillips, which I joined, explained the path that jurors

should take as they apply the castle doctrine, but it did not adopt nor suggest that

the five exceptions are the only possibilities for rebutting the presumption of

reasonable fear. Phillips, 386 N.C. at 529 (Earls, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part). The concurrence acknowledged, as the Phillips majority did, that the castle

doctrine statute creates a reasonable presumption of fear provided that the

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prerequisites outlined in subsection 14-51.2(b) are met, entitling a criminal

defendant to complete jury instructions that inform jurors of the use of lawful force

and gives them a clear decision tree for examining it. Id. at 530; see also N.C.G.S.

§ 14-51.2(b) (2023). But the majority also affirmed that the castle doctrine is not a

“license to kill,” meaning that there are limits to the castle doctrine’s protections.

See Phillips, 386 N.C. at 525 (“The expansive protections afforded to lawful occupants

of a home does not mean that the castle doctrine is ‘a license to kill’ or that the statute

allows for ‘open season on Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.’ ” (quoting State v. Copley,

386 N.C. 111, 123 (2024))). The castle doctrine statute uses a burden-shifting

provision, creating a presumption in favor of the defendant that, per subsection 14-

51.2(c), the State is entitled to rebut. See N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c) (providing that the

presumption of a lawful occupant’s reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm is

“rebuttable and does not apply in any of the . . . circumstances” listed in subsection

(c)); Copley, 386 N.C. at 122. For example, in discussing the implicit limits of the

castle doctrine, the concurrence explained that jurors must first consider any

evidence of entry being lawful or unforceful, such as when a person is conducting

door-to-door sales, delivering packages or mail, or accepting the homeowner’s

invitation to enter the property. See Phillips, 386 N.C. at 530 (Earls, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part). If jurors conclude an entry was “unlawful[ ] and

forceful[ ]” as required by subsection 14-51.2(b), that is what triggers the presumption

of reasonableness. Id.; see also N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b).

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The next step for jurors would then be to consider whether the State rebutted

the presumption in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c). In Phillips, the issue was

whether the jury instructions failed to accurately explain the law, preventing the

jurors from assessing the legality of the defendant’s use of force. Phillips, 386 N.C.

at 528 (majority opinion); see also id. at 531 (Earls, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part). That the Phillips majority provided a full background on the

development and evolution of the castle doctrine in North Carolina to ultimately

reach the conclusion that the jury instructions in Phillips were erroneous does not

necessarily make the entirety of its statements binding, especially where the

statements, though informative, were not determinative. That the concurrence

agreed with the need for proper jury instructions in Phillips does not foreclose holding

today that the castle doctrine’s presumption of reasonableness is rebuttable beyond

the five circumstances in the statute. Doing so is not a departure from the

concurrence’s position in Phillips; rather, it is an extension of the Phillips

concurrence’s interpretation that the castle doctrine, while broad when appropriately

applied, still has necessary limits.

Language unnecessary to a court’s decision is obiter dictum and not binding to

subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Washburn v. Washburn, 234 N.C. 370, 373 (1951)

(holding that statements in the text of an opinion unnecessary to the determination

of a case is obiter dicta). This Court’s decision in McKinney v. Goins, 387 N.C. 35

(2025), is illustrative of this principle. There, this Court addressed a constitutional

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challenge to legislation reviving expired tort claims. Id. at 41. The defendant argued

that a “revival provision” violated vested rights and relied on prior decisions—

particularly Wilkes County v. Forester, 204 N.C. 163 (1933), and Jewell v. Price, 264

N.C. 459 (1965)—to support the proposition that retroactive revival of time-barred

claims is unconstitutional. McKinney, 387 N.C. at 46–47. The Court rejected this

reading and held that the relevant language in both Wilkes County and Jewell was

nonbinding dicta. Id. at 54–58.

In Wilkes County, although the Court included broad language asserting that

reviving a time-barred claim would be unconstitutional because it impaired vested

rights, the holding turned on the statutory text of a statute enacted in 1931. 204 N.C.

at 168–69. The Court interpreted the plain language of the statute as not applying

retroactively and decided the case on those grounds. Id. at 166–69. The subsequent

constitutional commentary, including the statement that reviving a barred claim

would be unconstitutional, was unnecessary to the resolution of the dispute. See id.

at 170. Similarly, in Jewell, the Court ruled on statutory grounds, concluding that

the statute extending the limitations period did not apply retroactively. Jewell, 264

N.C. at 461–63 (citing N.C.G.S. § 1-50). While the Jewell Court reiterated the

language from Wilkes County, it did so hypothetically and noted that the plaintiffs

had conceded the new statute did not govern. See id. at 461.

Much like in Wilkes County and Jewell, the language in Phillips regarding the

castle doctrine was not necessary to the case’s outcome or disposition. The dispositive

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issue in Phillips was whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury to consider

the proportionality of the defendant’s use of force—even after finding that she was

entitled to the castle doctrine’s presumption of reasonableness. 386 N.C. at 517. This

Court ultimately held that this instruction was erroneous because proportionality

becomes relevant only if the State first rebuts the statutory presumption by proving

one of the five exceptions listed in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c). Id. at 525–26.

However, the Court’s broader explanation of how the castle doctrine statute

“operates”—including its step-by-step summary of subsections (b), (d), and (e)—was

not essential to that holding. Id. at 524–25. For instance, the Court’s description of

subsection (d) as creating a “non-rebuttable” presumption regarding the intruder’s

intent, id. at 524, or its statement that immunity under subsection (e) attaches once

subsection (b) applies, id. at 525, were neither contested nor required to resolve the

jury instruction issue. Instead, those comments functioned as background exposition

and statutory overview—language helpful for context but not critical to the outcome.

Furthermore, the Phillips Court’s overview of the castle doctrine in North

Carolina provides that the General Assembly intended to broaden the castle doctrine

through its 2011 amendments. Phillips, 386 N.C. at 520. According to the majority in

Phillips and here, the legislature did so by repealing N.C.G.S. § 14-51.1 and codifying

N.C.G.S. §§ 14-51.2 and -51.3, and this change clarified when the use of deadly force

is justified in self-defense or in defense of habitation (the castle doctrine). Phillips,

386 N.C. at 520; see also State v. Austin, 279 N.C. App. 377, 378 (2021). Another

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expansion of the doctrine since 2011 is “the defendant no longer has the burden to

prove key elements of the traditional self-defense doctrine.” Austin, 279 N.C. App. at

380; see also N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(f). These expansions do not compel, however, a

conclusion that subsection (c) limits the rebuttable presumption to only the

circumstances set forth in subsection (c) as the Phillips court extraneously declared.

Phillips, 386 N.C. at 524.

Because the quoted statutory interpretation in Phillips was not necessary to

resolve the precise legal question before the Court, it qualifies as nonbinding dicta.

That the concurrence in Phillips did not quibble with irrelevant and nonbinding

aspects of the majority there is of no import here: what matters is that dicta from

Phillips now fully embraced in this case is incorrect.

Interpreting the castle doctrine’s presumption of reasonableness as rebuttable

only under the circumstances listed in subsection (c) of the castle doctrine statute also

conflicts with longstanding principles of statutory construction. Statutory

construction requires courts to “look first to the language of the statute itself.” Hieb

v. Lowery, 344 N.C. 403, 409 (1996). When the language of a statute is unambiguous,

“there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give [a statute] its

plain and [ordinary] meaning.” State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 152 (1974) (quoting

7 Strong’s, N.C. Index 2d, Statutes § 5 (1968)). But when a statute is ambiguous,

then judicial construction must be used to determine the statute’s legislative purpose.

Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209 (1990). Determining that

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purpose is found from the “language of the act [and] its legislative history.” State ex

rel. N.C. Milk Comm’n v. Nat’l Food Stores, Inc., 270 N.C. 323, 332 (1967).

With these principles in mind, the castle doctrine statute clearly and

unambiguously provides that the presumption of reasonableness afforded to a home’s

lawful occupant may be rebutted beyond the five circumstances in subsection (c). The

relevant portions of the castle doctrine statute are as follows:

(b) The lawful occupant of a home . . . is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm . . . when using defensive force that is intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to another if both of the following apply:

(1) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering . . . .

(2) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had occurred.

(c) The presumption set forth in subsection (b) of this section shall be rebuttable and does not apply in any of the following circumstances . . . .

N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b)–(c) (emphasis added).

While subsection (c) lists five specific situations in which the presumption

“does not apply,” nothing in the statute’s text expressly limits rebuttal of the

presumption to only those five circumstances. See N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c). Subsection

(c) states that the presumption “shall be rebuttable and does not apply in any of the

following circumstances,” but it does not say the presumption is rebuttable only in

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those circumstances. See id. The legislature’s use of the word “and”—a conjunction

that functions to connect related but distinct ideas—supports this interpretation.

See And, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2007). By stating that

the presumption “shall be rebuttable and does not apply” in certain instances, the

statute draws a distinction between (1) the general rebuttable nature of the

presumption, and (2) specific situations where the presumption fails to arise in the

first place.

Had the legislature intended to make the five exceptions in subsection (c) the

only means by which the presumption may be overcome, it could have structured the

provision differently—such as by stating, “The presumption shall only be rebuttable

in the following circumstances.” Instead, it employed “shall be rebuttable” as a

general directive and followed it with a nonexhaustive list of conditions under which

the presumption does not apply ab initio. See N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c).

When the legislature has intended to limit the rebuttal of a presumption to

specific, enumerated grounds, it has done so expressly. For example, in N.C.G.S.

§ 113-421, which governs presumptive liability for water contamination in oil and gas

development, the statute provides that the presumption of contamination is

rebuttable only through a limited number of defenses. It explicitly states that the

presumption of contamination “is rebutted by a defense established as set forth in

subsection (a1)” and then proceeds to list four specific, exclusive grounds for rebuttal.

N.C.G.S. § 113-421(a)–(a1) (2023). This structure and phrasing make clear that no

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other basis for rebuttal is permitted beyond those identified in subsection (a1). Had

the legislature intended for the castle doctrine presumption to function in a similar

way, it could have used the same or similar language to limit rebuttal to the five

circumstances in subsection (c).

Similarly, in N.C.G.S. § 20-305.1, the legislature provides a rebuttable

presumption that a dealer’s declared retail rate for warranty repairs is reasonable.

Subsection (a1) expressly outlines how that presumption may be rebutted:

The average of the parts markup rate and the average labor rate shall both be presumed to be reasonable, however, a manufacturer or distributor may, not later than 30 days after submission, rebut that presumption by reasonably substantiating that the rate is unfair and unreasonable in light of the retail rates charged for parts and labor by all other franchised motor vehicle dealers located in the dealer’s relevant market area offering the same line‑make vehicles.

N.C.G.S. § 20-305.1(a1) (2023) (emphasis added). This language creates a formal

rebuttal mechanism that includes comparative data, timing, and procedural rights,

clearly signaling legislative intent to narrowly tailor how the presumption may be

overcome. The absence of similar language or structure in N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(c)

indicates that the legislature did not intend to similarly restrict rebuttal of the castle

doctrine’s presumption.

These examples demonstrate that when the legislature intends to limit a

rebuttable presumption to specific, enumerated grounds or to impose structured

rebuttal mechanisms, it knows how to do so. The absence of any such language in

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the castle doctrine statute indicates that subsection (c) was not intended to serve as

the exclusive grounds for rebuttal. Rather, subsection (c) unambiguously provides

common circumstances in which the presumption will not apply, without foreclosing

the possibility that other facts—such as the intruder’s lack of aggression, unarmed

status, or physical limitations—may also suffice to rebut the presumption of

reasonable fear.

Other jurisdictions interpreting similar statutory castle doctrines reinforce the

conclusion that statutory presumptions of reasonableness remain rebuttable through

evidence beyond express statutory exceptions. These courts have found that rigidly

confining the rebuttable presumption to narrow statutory carveouts contravenes

legislative intent, introduces impracticalities, and leads to unjust outcomes. For

instance, in State v. Glenn, 838 S.E.2d 491 (S.C. 2019), the Supreme Court of South

Carolina emphasized that the statutory presumption of reasonable fear—similar to

the one in North Carolina’s castle doctrine—does not foreclose a court’s duty to

consider whether a defendant has otherwise established self-defense. Id. at 496–98.

The statute at issue codified and extended the castle doctrine but still required the

trial court to assess whether the defendant actually and reasonably feared harm and

acted without other means of avoidance. See S.C. Code. Ann. § 16-11-440 (“The

presumption [of reasonableness] does not apply if the person . . . .” (emphasis added)).

The Glenn court faulted the trial court for denying immunity based solely on the

defendant’s technical lack of a “right to be” on the premises, holding that courts must

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also consider whether any unlawful activity was proximately related to the use of

force. 838 S.E.2d at 497–98. That is, the defendant’s alleged trespass did not

automatically preclude immunity if it was not the proximate cause of the

confrontation. Id.

This reasoning reflects an understanding that presumptions of reasonableness

cannot be treated as conclusive when contextual facts undermine their foundation.

The Glenn court explicitly warned against “hyper-technical” readings of such statutes

that would lead to absurd results, such as denying immunity to a person attacked

while unlawfully present in a location, even if their presence was wholly unrelated to

the incident. Id. at 497. The court thus rejected a categorical approach and instead

adopted a flexible, proximate-cause analysis that allows rebuttal even when not

squarely within the statute’s enumerated exceptions. Id. at 497–98.

Similarly, in People v. Owen, 226 Cal. App. 3d 996 (1991), the California Court

of Appeal construed section 198.5 of the Penal Code of California—which, like North

Carolina’s castle doctrine, presumes that a person in their home has a reasonable

fear of death or bodily harm when confronting an unlawful intruder. Id. at 996. The

Owen court held that this presumption is rebuttable and clarified that it imposes on

the prosecution the burden of disproving reasonable fear beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 1005–06. But importantly, the court recognized that if evidence in the record

undermines the factual basis for the presumption—such as if the defendant used

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excessive force or the “intruder” was not clearly threatening—then the presumption

may be overcome. Id. at 1006–07.

Both Glenn and Owen demonstrate a consistent judicial recognition that

statutory presumptions of reasonableness do not create absolute, irrebuttable

shields. Courts must retain discretion to assess reasonableness in light of the entire

record. The legislative silence on limiting rebuttal to enumerated exceptions, when

paired with these interpretations, supports construing the North Carolina castle

doctrine’s presumption as rebuttable through general evidence of unreasonableness.

Even if the castle doctrine statute’s language was ambiguous, canons of

statutory interpretation still support the interpretation that the castle doctrine’s

presumption of reasonableness may be rebutted independently from subsection (c).

Contrary to Mr. Allison’s arguments, the in pari materia canon supports this view.

The in pari materia canon requires courts to interpret statutes dealing with the same

subject matter together and harmoniously, especially when they are enacted as part

of the same legislative scheme. In re R.L.C., 361 N.C. 287, 294 (2007). This canon is

particularly relevant here because the castle doctrine statute and sections 14-51.3

and 14-51.4 were all enacted simultaneously in Session Law 2011-268. See An Act to

Provide When a Person May Use Defensive Force and to Amend Various Laws

Regarding the Right to Own, Possess, or Carry a Firearm in North Carolina, S.L.

2011-268, § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1002, 1002–04.

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Section 14-51.4 further undermines the view that subsection (c) provides the

only rebuttal ground for the presumption of reasonableness, because it disqualifies

an individual from relying on the justifications in sections 14-51.2 and 14-51.3 if the

individual is committing a felony or is the initial aggressor. N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4 (2023).

This exclusion applies even though such disqualifying conduct is not listed in

subsection 14-51.2(c). The language—“[t]he justification described in G.S. 14-51.2

and G.S. 14-51.3 is not available”—confirms that the justifications under both

statutes can be overcome by factual circumstances beyond the scope of subsection (c).

See N.C.G.S. § 14-51.4.

If, as Mr. Allison contends, the presumption under the castle doctrine could be

rebutted only by the five circumstances listed in subsection (c), then section 14-51.4

would be redundant to the extent it bars the presumption based on conduct not found

in subsection (c). The legislature’s decision to codify these exclusions outside of

subsection (c) supports the interpretation that the presumption can be rebutted by

circumstances beyond the scope of subsection (c). Elevating the presumption in

subsection (c) as irrebuttable would ignore this broader statutory context and violate

the in pari materia canon.

Accordingly, interpreting the statutes harmoniously supports the conclusion

that the five exceptions in subsection (c) are not the exclusive means of rebutting the

presumption of reasonable fear. Rather, they are illustrative examples within a

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broader framework that permits the introduction of evidence to challenge the

presumption, consistent with sections 14-51.3 and 14-51.4.

In sum, the castle doctrine’s presumption of reasonable fear may be rebutted

by evidence beyond the five exceptions enumerated in the statute and Phillips is not

controlling because its discussion of subsection (c) of the castle doctrine statute as the

exclusive means of rebutting the presumption constitutes nonbinding dicta.

Looking to the evidence below, the trial court did not plainly err in failing to

instruct the jury that it was mandatory to presume Mr. Allison satisfied the

reasonableness presumption. As stated in the concurrence in Phillips, the castle

doctrine statute creates a rebuttable presumption of reasonable fear “when the

defendant satisfies the specific ... requirements” of N.C.G.S. § 14-51.2(b). Phillips,

386 N.C. at 529. It permits defensive force against one who “unlawfully and forcefully

enter[s]” a protected space. Id. The jury's answer on the issue of whether there was

unlawful and forceful entry dictate whether the presumption of reasonable fear

attached and whether the castle doctrine applied at all. Id. at 531. The State

presented sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Mr. Adams’ entry, even

if unlawful, was not forceful. The State presented evidence that Mr. Adams was

unarmed and no weapons besides Mr. Allison’s shotgun were found on the scene.

There are conflicting accounts over whether Mr. Adams was being aggressive in the

first place. According to Mr. Allison’s testimony, Mr. Adams used his hand and foot

to stop Mr. Allison from shutting his door, but Mr. Adams did not enter the home or

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force entry otherwise. There had been a pushing match between the two in which

Mr. Allison claims Mr. Adams had more strength. However, Mr. Allison also testified

that Mr. Adams just had neck surgery. Mr. Allison also did not have defensive

wounds or injuries. Mr. Allison, determining that Mr. Adams would not leave,

immediately grabbed his shotgun and pointed it at Mr. Adams, though the record

does not indicate reciprocal aggression on Mr. Adams’ part. Mr. Allison counted down

several times while pointing the gun at Mr. Adams, which could undermine the

imminence of perceived danger. After law enforcement arrived and arrested Mr.

Allison, Mr. Allison made comments about not intending to shoot Mr. Adams, which

could suggest that it was not Mr. Allison’s intent to use the gun for self-defense out

of reasonable fear as much as it was to intimidate Mr. Adams. If a person does not

“unlawfully and forcefully” enter another's property, the statutory presumption of

reasonable fear does not attach. Thus, given the conflicting nature of testimony in

this case, it was not mandatory for the jury to presume Mr. Allison satisfied the

reasonableness presumption.

Had the jury concluded that entry was “unlawful[ ] and forceful[ ]” as required

by subsection 14-51.2(b), then the jurors would be tasked with finding whether the

State rebutted the reasonableness presumption. Phillips, 386 N.C. at 531. This case

presents the rare instances that make the majority’s interpretation of the castle

doctrine and subsection (c) untenable—even the flimsiest bit of conflicting evidence

of a unlawful and forceful entry would permit the use of defensive force and

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automatically give the defendant the mandatory presumption of reasonableness that

the State cannot rebut unless the five exceptions in subsection (c) apply. Here, the

State’s evidence undercuts the defendant’s assertion that he was under reasonable

fear of death or serious bodily harm. On these bases, I would not find plain error on

the facts of this case. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Justice EARLS joins in this dissenting opinion.

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