State v. Allen

165 So. 203, 183 La. 1069, 1936 La. LEXIS 1036
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJanuary 6, 1936
DocketNo. 33721.
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 165 So. 203 (State v. Allen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Allen, 165 So. 203, 183 La. 1069, 1936 La. LEXIS 1036 (La. 1936).

Opinion

LAND, Justice.

Defendant was found guilty by a. jury of five of assault with intent to rape, and was sentenced to a term of six years in the state penitentiary. He has appealed and relies, for reversal of the judgment against him, upon numerous bills of exceptions.

Before reviewing these bills in this opinion, it is necessary to have before us certain facts of the case, as stated in the per curiams of the various bills reserved by defendant.

It appears, from the facts therein stated, that Robert Nattin, and the defendant, H. G. Allen, left the town of Homer, La., in an automobile on the night of March 28, 1935, on which the crime of assault to rape was committed, and went to Minden, La., seeking “loose women.” While returning to Plomer about midnight of that night, they saw Mrs., Roberta Best on the highway. They stopped and she got in the automobile with them. After traveling toward Plomer some distance, the defendant, Allen, who was driving the automobile, drove off the highway onto a bridge near the highway. All of the time, Mrs. Best was trying to get out of the automobile and away from Robert Nattin and defendant, and finally persuaded them to let her out. After she got out and started in the direction of Minden, Robert Nattin followed and overtook her within a few feet of the parked automobile, in which the defendant, Allen, was seated. Nattin assaulted and tried to rape her. Because of *1073 resistance, he struck her in the face and on the chin with such force that she was rendered unconscious; defendant, Allen, being within a hundred feet of her at the time. About that time, Allen called to Nattin and they got in the automobile. A few minutes thereafter, another automobile, coming in the direction of Homer, ran over the body of Mrs. Best, as she was lying in the middle of the concrete highway, where Nattin had left her. The occupants of the second automobile stopped, went back, and found that she was dead.

Bill No. 1. •

It is contended by counsel for defendant in bill of exceptions No. 1 that, in his opening statement to the jury, the district attorney announced “that it was his purpose to prove that one Robert Nattin had been associated and connected with the defendant, H. G. Allen, in the perpetration of the crime for which defendant, H. G. Allen, was being tried, and that it was his purpose »to prove that said Robert Nattin had been tried for the crime of murder and had been convicted for the crime of manslaughter.” (Italics ours.)

Objection was made to the alleged statement of the district attorney, “for the reason that it was highly prejudicial to the defendant, H. G. Allen, as the crime of murdering Mrs. Best, with which the defendant, Robert Nattin, was charged, could have no connection with or relevancy with or to the crime of assaulting her with intent to rape, * * * with which the defendant, H. G. Allen, was charged and for which he was being tried at said time. * * • * ”

The trial judge overruled the objection for the reason that: “Her death and the assault made upon her all occurred at practically one and the same time and within a few minutes’ time, and the Court considered that the testimony as to her death and the cause of her death was admissible, not only as part of the res gestae but the two facts, the assault with intent to commit rape and the death of Mrs. Roberta Best, grew out of the game transaction and were so connected that it was relevant to prove all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction.”

We find no error in the ruling made by the trial judge.

The defendant, Allen, was present when the crime of assault to rape was being committed by Nattin. He rendered no assistance to the unfortunate victim of that heinous offense; but sat listlessly by in a parked automobile within a short distance from the scene of the crime, watching and ready to speed away with its perpetrator, in order to avoid detection and pursuit. As the direct result of Nattin’s felonious act, this defenseless women was left helpless and unconscious in the middle of the highway, and was run over, within a few minutes after the commission of the crime, by a passing automobile, whose occupants were unaware of her presence on the highway. There was conspiracy to commit the crime of assault to rape, as well as conspiracy to contmit the crime of murder. The body of the assaulted woman was left in the middle of the highway, for no other purpose than that she should be run over and killed by a passing automobile, in order to cover up *1075 the crime" of assault to rape, which had been committed, by sealing the lips of the only eyewitness against the conspirators. The two crimes are so intimately connected and interwoven as to constitute but one continuous criminal transaction, and evidence as to the entire transaction was clearly relevant and admissible.

It is pointed out by the trial judge in the per curiam to bill No. 1 that the statement made by the district attorney was not that he intended to prove “that the said Robert Nattin had been tried for the crime of murder and had been convicted for the crime of manslaughter,” but that the statement made was merely that “Robert Nattin had been tried.”

In this connection, it is also stated in the per curiam to this bill: “There was no testimony that went to the jury in regard to the trial of Robert Nattin (for) killing Mrs. Best, and the court did not consider the statement made by the district attorney prejudicial to the defendant.” We concur in this conclusion, and hold that the ruling made by the trial judge is correct.

Bill No. 2.

Counsel for defendant objected to the statement alleged to have been made by the district attorney, in his opening statement to the jury, “that it was his purpose to prove that the defendant, H. G. Allen, on the night when he was charged with having committed the crime for which he .stands indicted, was seeking a woman companion prior to the alleged commission of the crime.” This statement was excepted to as irrelevant, and immaterial and prejudicial.

The trial judge, however, states in the per curiam to this bill: “The district attorney stated, in his opening statement, that he expected to prove the confessions and admissions made by 'the defendant and statements made by him, which statements and admissions and confessions were free and voluntary; one of which statements was that the defendant, H. G. Allen, who did not live in the Town of Homer, came to Homer on the night of the alleged crime, and he and Robert Nattin left Homer to go to Minden, Louisiana, for the purpose of seeking loose women and a woman companion, which statement of the defendant was made to several witnesses before the crime and afterward, and which statements were free and voluntary, and the court considered said statements relevant and admissible to show the purpose and intention of the defendant and Nattin in making the trip to Minden on the night of the crime.” (Italics ours.)

These statements show that defendant, Allen, and Robert Nattin were on a lustful mission on the night of the crime, which found its final consummation in the assault made by Nattin upon Mrs. Best, in the presence and with the connivance of the defendant, Allen. The evidence clearly shows the purpose and intention of defendant and Nattin on the night of the crime, and was clearly admissible.

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278 So. 2d 38 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1973)
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167 So. 747 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1936)

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Bluebook (online)
165 So. 203, 183 La. 1069, 1936 La. LEXIS 1036, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-allen-la-1936.