[Cite as State v. Alford, 2014-Ohio-5284.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 101203
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
DARRYL ALFORD
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-05-469026-A
BEFORE: Kilbane, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 26, 2014 APPELLANT
Darryl Alford, pro se Inmate No. 493-759 P.O. Box 901 Trumbull Correctional Institution Leavittsburg, Ohio 44430
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Daniel T. Van Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center - 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Darryl Alford, appeals from the denial of his fourth motion
to vacate his plea and/or vacate void sentence, filed on February 25, 2014. For the reasons set
forth below, we conclude that the claims raised by the defendant are barred by res judicata and
without merit under the controlling case law.
{¶2} The facts of this matter were set forth in defendant’s 2010 appeal, State v. Alford,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93911, 2010-Ohio-4130 (“Alford I”) as follows:
Alford worked at New York Frozen Foods in Bedford; his ex-girlfriend, Jennifer Davis, also worked there. On [June 14, 2005], Alford approached Davis in the plant to talk to her. Davis told Alford that she did not want to talk to him * * *.
Davis found her supervisor and advised him of the situation. Davis then returned to her work area, where she was again approached by Alford; he told her that if he got fired he would kill her. * * *.
Alford * * * left on sick leave. * * * The police arrived at the plant, and while taking Davis’s statement, saw Alford’s vehicle in the vicinity of the plant. Alford, who was driving the car, parked in the lot of a nearby business, exited the car dressed in camouflage with a black object in his hands. He cut through a wooded area that led to the rear of New York Frozen Foods.
Alford entered the plant and fired shots * * *. Alford confronted [an employee], pulled a gun on him, and told him he was going to shoot Davis after he “finished” with him[. The employee restrained Alford] until the police apprehended him.
Over 20 shotgun shells and a body armor were recovered from the scene and/or from Alford’s person. A rifle, machete, shotgun ammunition, and rifle ammunition were recovered from Alford’s car.
Alford I at ¶ 6-10.
{¶3} On August 5, 2005, Alford was indicted on a six-count indictment. In Count 1, he
was charged with failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer with a furthermore
clause that the operation of the motor vehicle caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm
to person or property. In Counts 2 and 4, he was charged with attempted murder with one- and three-year firearm specifications and a body armor specification. In Counts 3 and 5, he was
charged with felonious assault with one- and three-year firearm specifications and a body armor
specification. In Count 6, he was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
{¶4} On October 27, 2005, Alford pled guilty to failure to comply with an order or
signal of a police officer as charged in Count 1, and felonious assault with one-year firearm
specifications and body armor specifications as charged in Counts 3 and 5. The remaining
counts and specifications were nolled. On that same date, Alford was sentenced to 12 years in
prison.
{¶5} On November 14, 2005, Alford filed a pro se appeal, which was dismissed on
March 20, 2006, for failure to file the record. State v. Alford, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87275 (
see Motion Nos. 379031 and 382174). Alford filed a second pro se appeal on May 8, 2006,
which was dismissed as untimely. State v. Alford, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87856 (see Motion
No. 383933).
{¶6} On September 5, 2008, Alford filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas. This petition was dismissed May 11, 2009,
because the issues were not raised in a direct appeal and for Alford’s failure to certify a statement
regarding his institutional account. Alford v. Goodrich, N.D. Ohio No. 1:12-cv-2931, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 184592 (Dec. 6, 2013) (describing the Ashtabula County habeas proceedings and
denying federal habeas petition).
{¶7} On May 27, 2009, Alford filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial
court denied the motion and Alford appealed to this court. This court affirmed the conviction,
but held that the trial court did not “adequately set forth postrelease control advisements in its
judgment entry” and remanded for resentencing. Alford I at ¶ 19. {¶8} On October 13, 2010, prior to the resentencing hearing ordered by this court,
Alford filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea. On October 15, 2010, the trial court denied
the motion and resentenced Alford to a 12-year prison term. Alford again appealed to this court.
This court affirmed the trial court, concluding that the remand for resentencing did not vest the
trial court with discretion to consider the motion to withdraw the plea. State v. Alford, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 95946, 2011-Ohio-4811 (“Alford II”).
{¶9} On October 12, 2011, Alford filed a motion to reopen his appeal. This court
denied the motion and held that since App.R. 26 applies only to direct appeals, Alford could not
employ App.R. 26 to challenge the denial of his motion to vacate his guilty plea. State v. Alford,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95946, 2011-Ohio-6259.
{¶10} On December 22, 2011, defendant again filed a motion to vacate plea and/or void
sentence, and complained that the sentence imposed failed to contain a mandatory license
suspension (on the specification for failure to comply), and therefore, his plea was not
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered, and his sentence is void. The trial court denied
the motion on January 3, 2012. The court wrote:
Defendant’s motion to vacate plea and/or void sentence is denied. Post-release
control notice was given. Failure to advise him of driver’s license suspension does
not affect defendant’s constitutional rights and no prejudice exists to alter plea nor
to void sentence.
{¶11} Defendant filed a motion to file a delayed appeal on March 22, 2012, which was
denied on April 11, 2012.
{¶12} On February 25, 2014, defendant once again filed a motion to vacate his plea
and/or vacate void sentence, and again argued that since the sentence imposed failed to contain a mandatory license suspension, his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered
and his sentence is void. The trial court denied the motion on March 4, 2014.
{¶13} Defendant appeals herein and assigns the following errors for our review:
Assignment of Error One
In violation of due process and prejudice to the defendant, his guilty pleas were not knowing, voluntary or intelligently entered, because of the Crim. R. 11(c)(2)(a) colloquy was deficient.
Assignment of Error Two
In violation of due process there was never a final appealable order issued to the defendant, pursuant 2505.02, the sentence was clearly and convincingly, contrary to statute.
Assignment of Error Three
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as State v. Alford, 2014-Ohio-5284.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 101203
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
DARRYL ALFORD
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No. CR-05-469026-A
BEFORE: Kilbane, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 26, 2014 APPELLANT
Darryl Alford, pro se Inmate No. 493-759 P.O. Box 901 Trumbull Correctional Institution Leavittsburg, Ohio 44430
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty Cuyahoga County Prosecutor Daniel T. Van Assistant County Prosecutor The Justice Center - 8th Floor 1200 Ontario Street Cleveland, Ohio 44113 MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Darryl Alford, appeals from the denial of his fourth motion
to vacate his plea and/or vacate void sentence, filed on February 25, 2014. For the reasons set
forth below, we conclude that the claims raised by the defendant are barred by res judicata and
without merit under the controlling case law.
{¶2} The facts of this matter were set forth in defendant’s 2010 appeal, State v. Alford,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93911, 2010-Ohio-4130 (“Alford I”) as follows:
Alford worked at New York Frozen Foods in Bedford; his ex-girlfriend, Jennifer Davis, also worked there. On [June 14, 2005], Alford approached Davis in the plant to talk to her. Davis told Alford that she did not want to talk to him * * *.
Davis found her supervisor and advised him of the situation. Davis then returned to her work area, where she was again approached by Alford; he told her that if he got fired he would kill her. * * *.
Alford * * * left on sick leave. * * * The police arrived at the plant, and while taking Davis’s statement, saw Alford’s vehicle in the vicinity of the plant. Alford, who was driving the car, parked in the lot of a nearby business, exited the car dressed in camouflage with a black object in his hands. He cut through a wooded area that led to the rear of New York Frozen Foods.
Alford entered the plant and fired shots * * *. Alford confronted [an employee], pulled a gun on him, and told him he was going to shoot Davis after he “finished” with him[. The employee restrained Alford] until the police apprehended him.
Over 20 shotgun shells and a body armor were recovered from the scene and/or from Alford’s person. A rifle, machete, shotgun ammunition, and rifle ammunition were recovered from Alford’s car.
Alford I at ¶ 6-10.
{¶3} On August 5, 2005, Alford was indicted on a six-count indictment. In Count 1, he
was charged with failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer with a furthermore
clause that the operation of the motor vehicle caused a substantial risk of serious physical harm
to person or property. In Counts 2 and 4, he was charged with attempted murder with one- and three-year firearm specifications and a body armor specification. In Counts 3 and 5, he was
charged with felonious assault with one- and three-year firearm specifications and a body armor
specification. In Count 6, he was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
{¶4} On October 27, 2005, Alford pled guilty to failure to comply with an order or
signal of a police officer as charged in Count 1, and felonious assault with one-year firearm
specifications and body armor specifications as charged in Counts 3 and 5. The remaining
counts and specifications were nolled. On that same date, Alford was sentenced to 12 years in
prison.
{¶5} On November 14, 2005, Alford filed a pro se appeal, which was dismissed on
March 20, 2006, for failure to file the record. State v. Alford, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87275 (
see Motion Nos. 379031 and 382174). Alford filed a second pro se appeal on May 8, 2006,
which was dismissed as untimely. State v. Alford, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87856 (see Motion
No. 383933).
{¶6} On September 5, 2008, Alford filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas. This petition was dismissed May 11, 2009,
because the issues were not raised in a direct appeal and for Alford’s failure to certify a statement
regarding his institutional account. Alford v. Goodrich, N.D. Ohio No. 1:12-cv-2931, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 184592 (Dec. 6, 2013) (describing the Ashtabula County habeas proceedings and
denying federal habeas petition).
{¶7} On May 27, 2009, Alford filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial
court denied the motion and Alford appealed to this court. This court affirmed the conviction,
but held that the trial court did not “adequately set forth postrelease control advisements in its
judgment entry” and remanded for resentencing. Alford I at ¶ 19. {¶8} On October 13, 2010, prior to the resentencing hearing ordered by this court,
Alford filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea. On October 15, 2010, the trial court denied
the motion and resentenced Alford to a 12-year prison term. Alford again appealed to this court.
This court affirmed the trial court, concluding that the remand for resentencing did not vest the
trial court with discretion to consider the motion to withdraw the plea. State v. Alford, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 95946, 2011-Ohio-4811 (“Alford II”).
{¶9} On October 12, 2011, Alford filed a motion to reopen his appeal. This court
denied the motion and held that since App.R. 26 applies only to direct appeals, Alford could not
employ App.R. 26 to challenge the denial of his motion to vacate his guilty plea. State v. Alford,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95946, 2011-Ohio-6259.
{¶10} On December 22, 2011, defendant again filed a motion to vacate plea and/or void
sentence, and complained that the sentence imposed failed to contain a mandatory license
suspension (on the specification for failure to comply), and therefore, his plea was not
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered, and his sentence is void. The trial court denied
the motion on January 3, 2012. The court wrote:
Defendant’s motion to vacate plea and/or void sentence is denied. Post-release
control notice was given. Failure to advise him of driver’s license suspension does
not affect defendant’s constitutional rights and no prejudice exists to alter plea nor
to void sentence.
{¶11} Defendant filed a motion to file a delayed appeal on March 22, 2012, which was
denied on April 11, 2012.
{¶12} On February 25, 2014, defendant once again filed a motion to vacate his plea
and/or vacate void sentence, and again argued that since the sentence imposed failed to contain a mandatory license suspension, his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered
and his sentence is void. The trial court denied the motion on March 4, 2014.
{¶13} Defendant appeals herein and assigns the following errors for our review:
Assignment of Error One
In violation of due process and prejudice to the defendant, his guilty pleas were not knowing, voluntary or intelligently entered, because of the Crim. R. 11(c)(2)(a) colloquy was deficient.
Assignment of Error Two
In violation of due process there was never a final appealable order issued to the defendant, pursuant 2505.02, the sentence was clearly and convincingly, contrary to statute.
Assignment of Error Three
In violation of appellant’s double jeopardy protections under state and federal constitutions the defendant was sentenced to a one (1) year sentence after it had already expired for failure to comply 2921.331.
Assignment of Error Four
Ineffective assistance of counsel.
Crim.R. 11 Issues
{¶14} Within his first assignment of error, defendant asserts that his guilty pleas are
invalid because the trial court did not advise him of the mandatory license suspension, and
therefore, failed to advise him of the maximum penalty for this offense as required by Crim.R.
11.
{¶15} These claims could have been raised in Alford I, but they were not. Therefore,
they are barred by res judicata. In any event, the license suspension has never been imposed,
and defendant has not shown prejudice. State v. Blalock, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80599,
2002-Ohio-3637, ¶ 24 (“Blalock does not maintain he would not have pled guilty, no prejudice resulted from the trial court’s failure to inform him of the suspension.”) Finally, we note that in
Alford II, this court held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea based on the limited resentencing on postrelease control. Similarly,
following the limited remand in Alford II, the trial court was without jurisdiction to consider this
additional issue. See Alford II at ¶ 11.
{¶16} The first assignment of error is without merit.
Sentencing Issues
{¶17} The defendant next maintains, in his second assignment of error, that there was
never a final appealable order in this matter because the trial court failed to impose a mandatory
license suspension on Count 1.
{¶18} The defendant unsuccessfully raised this issue in 2012, and therefore, it is barred
by res judicata. In any event, we note that in State v. Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151,
2012-Ohio-5479, 985 N.E.2d 432, ¶ 10, and in State v. Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318,
2012-Ohio-1908, 972 N.E.2d 509, ¶ 16, the Ohio Supreme Court held that where a license
suspension is a mandatory portion of a sentence and it is not included as a term of the sentence,
the sentence is deemed void in part and the matter is subject to resentencing only as to the
imposition of the mandatory license suspension. Id. at ¶ 18, citing State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio
St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332. With special significance to this matter, however,
the court in Fischer concluded that “[i]n so holding, we reject Fischer’s claim that there was no
final, appealable order in this case.” Id. at ¶ 37.
{¶19} In accordance with all of the foregoing, and pursuant to the clear language of
Fischer, we reject Alford’s assertion that there was no final appealable order in this matter.
{¶20} The second assignment of error is without merit. Double Jeopardy
{¶21} Defendant’s third assignment of error asserts that the resentencing produced a
sentence that is void because the new sentence did not contain the mandatory license suspension,
and he had already completed the one-year term for failing to comply with the order of a police
officer.
{¶22} This assertion is without merit. Fischer at ¶ 8-9; State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio
St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 12.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶23} In his fourth assignment of error, defendant complains that he did not have
effective assistance of counsel.
{¶24} In Alford I, this court rejected defendant’s challenge to the effectiveness of his
counsel. This claim is therefore without merit.
{¶25} Judgment is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas
court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR