State v. Alexander

307 P.2d 784, 131 Mont. 97, 1957 Mont. LEXIS 91
CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 26, 1957
Docket9737
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 307 P.2d 784 (State v. Alexander) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Alexander, 307 P.2d 784, 131 Mont. 97, 1957 Mont. LEXIS 91 (Mo. 1957).

Opinion

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON:

The appellant was convicted of the crime of assault in the second degree; made a motion for a new trial which was denied; and this appeal was taken from the judgment of conviction and the order denying motion for a new trial.

The fact situation in this matter is that the complaining witness, Don Lussenden, was employed and resided at the Emil Durr Ranch west of Choteau, since October 1, 1955. On March 17, 1956, during the early morning hours when he was asleep in his room upstairs he was awakened by someone knocking on the door. He got up and was putting on his trousers when he heard another knock, and as he was going downstairs there was a third knock. He walked over to the door, flipped the light switch and turned on the 150 watt light in the kitchen, in which room the door was situated. When he had the door open about ten inches, he recognized the appellant, Duane Alexander, who had a shotgun and who attempted to bring it up into position to fire, at the same time making a statement to the complaining witness that, “Now I got you, you son-of-a-bitch.” The complaining witness upon seeing the shotgun coming up slammed the door. The door hit the barrel of the gun and the appellant again tried to raise the shotgun but it *99 was too close to the door and he couldn’t raise it. The complaining witness then started to run for the stairway which was about twenty feet away from the door. As he was going up the stairway, and at a point approximately halfway up, the appellant fired the gun. Part of the shot hit the complaining •witness and the rest hit the staircasing, making about a five-inch circle on the wall. The complaining witness proceeded on to his bedroom, secured his gun from under his pillow, and then heard the appellant holler: “Come on down you cowardly son-of-a-bitch. ’ ’ Complaining witness then fired his pistol down into the kitchen. After that shot was fired the appellant said: ‘ ‘ That is all right; I am ready to die anyway. ’ ’ The complaining witness did not go downstairs again until about 6:15 a. m. at which time he called the sheriff and the undersheriff responded to his call.

The upper-half of the kitchen door was glass; the light from the 150 watt light in the kitchen shone through the glass and the complaining witness recognized the appellant through the glass door. In addition to this he had known the appellant for approximately one year or a little better; knew his voice and recognized his voice in making the statements that are herein-before quoted. While the complaining witness first thought the attack took place about 2:10 a. m., by looking at a small clock he had upstairs, he later heard a large clock downstairs stop running, which clock made considerable noise when it was running and this noise of the operation of the clock stopped shortly after he got back upstairs, in his estimate, between ten and twenty minutes. Upon examination this large clock was stopped at exactly 3 :30 a. m.

While some of the witnesses for the appellant claimed that the large clock did not run, the complaining witness testified that he started the large clock up and it ran all the time he was living there except when he forgot to wind it.

An empty 12-gauge shotgun shell was found immediately outside the kitchen door.

*100 There had been no previous trouble between the complaining witness and the appellant.

Mrs. Emil Durr testified she was the owner of the Emil Durr ranch; that the appellant had worked for her on the ranch from about the middle of September 1954 until the last week of September 1955; that she had to let him go, and had employed the complaining witness in his place, and that the complaining witness started to work the first week in October 1955 at her ranch. She also stated that the appellant called her on the phone a number of times after his employment had been terminated, and as to these conversations she testified:

“A. He called me one time and asked, ‘How often does your hired man come to town’. I said, ‘I don’t know. Whenever he needs to come in for anything, I suppose’. He said, ‘I’m just telling you that one of these times when he comes in here you are going to have to get somebody else to take his place for about three weeks because you will need somebody else to do his work there during that length of time after we get through with him.
“Q. What did you say to that? A. I was indignant and slammed down the receiver. I asked him if he was threatening and slammed down the receiver.
“Q. Did the defendant call you any other time after that? A. Well, he called me one time and I said, ‘Duane, why do you keep calling me all the time when you don’t have anything particular to say and just keep bawling me out’. He said, ‘I intend to make things just as miserable for you as I possibly can’.
“Q. Did you receive any other call after the first one you related concerning that telephone call? A. Well, after he would call and be bawling me out for numerous things, well, maybe the next day he would turn around and call up and apologize to me and say that he was sorry and that he didn’t know why he had done it and I would tell him to forget it.
“Q. How many times did that happen? A. I don’t know. Perhaps half a dozen times.
*101 “Q. During what period? A. "Well, I would say about the middle of October — two or three weeks after he was let out from us, and until perhaps the latter part of October.”

It is significant that she received no calls after the assault upon the complaining witness.

Eeuel Golding testified that he had known the appellant for about four or five years; that about a week prior to March 17, 1956, the appellant came to his home and in the course of the conversation mentioned something about coyotes and wanted to know if Golding had a gun and was advised that he did have. The defendant then said he might want to borrow it some day, but he never did come back and get it.

The defense was an alibi. Appellant’s proof tended to show that he was present in the town of Fairfield around 10:00 in the evening until 2:00 on the morning of March 17, 1956. The appellant testified he left Fairfield and drove to the Blinker ranch, where he was then employed, and arrived there about 3:00 a. m.; that it required about an hour to drive from Fair-field to the ranch, and that when he got to the ranch he went to bed.

The appellant admitted he knew the complaining witness, stating that he had nothing against him; that he had no ill feeling on his part on leaving the Durr ranch. He admitted that on one occasion he had called Mrs. Durr on the phone but his version of the conversation was that he told her: “Mrs. Durr, I am hearing rumors around that I stole a cow and you are hurting me, and I will make it just as miserable for you as I can and will tell who really stole the cow.” He also admitted that he called her about some papers and the title to his old Chevrolet car. Several witnesses testified as to the good reputation of the appellant in the community in which he lives.

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Related

State v. Hollywood
358 P.2d 437 (Montana Supreme Court, 1960)
State v. Pankow
333 P.2d 1017 (Montana Supreme Court, 1959)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
307 P.2d 784, 131 Mont. 97, 1957 Mont. LEXIS 91, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-alexander-mont-1957.