[Cite as State v. Aleksic, 2025-Ohio-2231.]
COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Kevin W. Popham, J. : Hon. David M. Gormley, J. -vs- : : SHANE ALEKSIC : Case No. CT2024-0146 : Defendant - Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2024-0644
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 25, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Defendant-Appellant For Plaintiff-Appellee
Christopher D. Brigdon Ronald L. Welch 8138 Somerset Road Muskingum County Prosecuting Attorney Thornville, Ohio 43076 Joseph A. Palmer Chief Appellate Counsel 27 North 5th Street, Suite 201 Zanesville, Ohio 43701 Gormley, J.
{¶1} Defendant Shane Aleksic challenges in this appeal the prison sentence
imposed on him in the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County. Aleksic was
convicted there on three felony charges and one misdemeanor charge, and he was
ordered to serve an aggregate 18-month prison sentence in the case. He argues here
that the trial court failed to consider the principles and purposes that underlie Ohio’s
sentencing statutes, and he claims that a community-control sentence would have
adequately punished him. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
{¶2} In July 2023, Ohio State Highway Patrol troopers found Aleksic asleep in a
vehicle parked at a roadside rest area. With him in the vehicle at the time were a loaded
revolver, some methamphetamine, and some drug paraphernalia, and the discovery of
those items led to the filing of multiple criminal charges against him.
{¶3} Several months later, Aleksic pled guilty to several firearm and drug
charges, the most serious of which was a third-degree-felony charge of having a weapon
while under a disability. No sentencing recommendation was included in the parties’ plea
agreement.
{¶4} At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge imposed an 18-month prison term
on the weapon charge. The sentences on all other charges were imposed concurrently
with that sentence. In his sole assignment of error, Aleksic argues that his sentence is
contrary to law because — in his view — the trial judge failed to consider the sentencing
factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. {¶5} When a felony sentence is challenged at this court, we are permitted under
Ohio law to “increase, reduce, or otherwise modify” the sentence (or to remand the case
to the trial court to do any of those things) if and only if “clear[] and convincing[]” evidence
indicates that the trial court’s sentencing-related findings are not supported by the record
or if the sentence is “otherwise contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
{¶6} “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof” that will
produce in the mind of the trier of fact a “firm belief or conviction as to the allegations
sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477 (1954). Clear and
convincing evidence is something more than a mere preponderance, but it is a lower
burden than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “[A]n appellate court may vacate or
modify any sentence that is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law only if the
appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support
the sentence.” State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 23.
{¶7} To achieve the “overriding purposes of felony sentencing” — protecting the
public from future crime, punishing the offender, making whole any victims and the public,
and rehabilitating the offender, all of which are to be accomplished with the least onerous
and least costly sanctions available — the trial court should “consider the need for
incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime,
rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public,
or both.” R.C. 2929.11(A). R.C. 2929.12 lists general factors relating to the seriousness
of the offender’s conduct and the likelihood of recidivism that the trial court must consider
when imposing a felony sentence. And R.C. 2929.12(A) tells us that the trial court retains “discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles
of sentencing” that are listed in R.C. 2929.11.
{¶8} “Although a trial court must consider the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12, there is no requirement that the court state its reasons . . . for imposing a
particular sentence within the statutory range.” State v. Webb, 2019-Ohio-4195, ¶17 (5th
Dist.). The Revised Code also does not require that the trial court “use specific language
or make specific findings on the record in order to evince the requisite consideration of
the applicable seriousness and recidivism factors.” State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208,
215 (2000), citing R.C. 2929.12.
{¶9} In this case, a presentence investigation was conducted by the trial court’s
probation staff, and the presentence report was reviewed by the trial judge and by counsel
for both parties before the sentencing date. In describing his crimes to the presentence
investigator, Aleksic evidently stated that he had found and picked up what he believed
were marijuana dabs — small amounts of particularly potent cannabis — and that he kept
them in his vehicle because he planned to give them to his partner. At the sentencing
hearing, the state voiced some concern about that story and about Aleksic’s related claim
in the presentence report that he did not know that methamphetamine had been in his
vehicle.
{¶10} At the sentencing hearing, Aleksic’s attorney noted that his client had
completed a 72-hour driver intervention program since his arrest and was engaged in
counseling for his alcohol use. Defense counsel stated, too, that Aleksic was remorseful
for his crimes. {¶11} Once both the prosecutor and defense counsel had spoken at the
sentencing hearing, the trial judge gave Aleksic the opportunity to speak. Aleksic
indicated that he had nothing that he wanted to add.
{¶12} Before announcing the sentence, the trial judge said that he did not believe
Aleksic’s claim about having found what turned out to be methamphetamine. The trial
judge also mentioned Aleksic’s prior convictions, which included aggravated assault, a
misdemeanor conviction in Michigan for operating a vehicle while under the influence of
drugs or alcohol, disorderly conduct, and receiving stolen property.
{¶13} The trial judge then imposed the sentence: 18 months in prison on the F3
charge of having a weapon while under a disability, 11 months in prison on an F5 charge
of aggravated possession of drugs (for the methamphetamine), 11 months in prison on
an F5 charge of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, and 30 days of local
incarceration on an M4 charge of possessing drug paraphernalia. The trial judge imposed
the sentences concurrently for an aggregate prison sentence of 18 months. After
imposing the sentence, the trial judge asked Aleksic’s counsel if there was “anything
further,” and counsel responded, “nothing further.”
{¶14} Aleksic contends that the trial court failed to consider the mitigating factors
mentioned at the sentencing hearing. Aleksic also contends that the trial court failed to
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as State v. Aleksic, 2025-Ohio-2231.]
COURT OF APPEALS MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: : Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J. Plaintiff - Appellee : Hon. Kevin W. Popham, J. : Hon. David M. Gormley, J. -vs- : : SHANE ALEKSIC : Case No. CT2024-0146 : Defendant - Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2024-0644
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 25, 2025
APPEARANCES:
For Defendant-Appellant For Plaintiff-Appellee
Christopher D. Brigdon Ronald L. Welch 8138 Somerset Road Muskingum County Prosecuting Attorney Thornville, Ohio 43076 Joseph A. Palmer Chief Appellate Counsel 27 North 5th Street, Suite 201 Zanesville, Ohio 43701 Gormley, J.
{¶1} Defendant Shane Aleksic challenges in this appeal the prison sentence
imposed on him in the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County. Aleksic was
convicted there on three felony charges and one misdemeanor charge, and he was
ordered to serve an aggregate 18-month prison sentence in the case. He argues here
that the trial court failed to consider the principles and purposes that underlie Ohio’s
sentencing statutes, and he claims that a community-control sentence would have
adequately punished him. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
{¶2} In July 2023, Ohio State Highway Patrol troopers found Aleksic asleep in a
vehicle parked at a roadside rest area. With him in the vehicle at the time were a loaded
revolver, some methamphetamine, and some drug paraphernalia, and the discovery of
those items led to the filing of multiple criminal charges against him.
{¶3} Several months later, Aleksic pled guilty to several firearm and drug
charges, the most serious of which was a third-degree-felony charge of having a weapon
while under a disability. No sentencing recommendation was included in the parties’ plea
agreement.
{¶4} At the sentencing hearing, the trial judge imposed an 18-month prison term
on the weapon charge. The sentences on all other charges were imposed concurrently
with that sentence. In his sole assignment of error, Aleksic argues that his sentence is
contrary to law because — in his view — the trial judge failed to consider the sentencing
factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. {¶5} When a felony sentence is challenged at this court, we are permitted under
Ohio law to “increase, reduce, or otherwise modify” the sentence (or to remand the case
to the trial court to do any of those things) if and only if “clear[] and convincing[]” evidence
indicates that the trial court’s sentencing-related findings are not supported by the record
or if the sentence is “otherwise contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).
{¶6} “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof” that will
produce in the mind of the trier of fact a “firm belief or conviction as to the allegations
sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477 (1954). Clear and
convincing evidence is something more than a mere preponderance, but it is a lower
burden than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “[A]n appellate court may vacate or
modify any sentence that is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law only if the
appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support
the sentence.” State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 23.
{¶7} To achieve the “overriding purposes of felony sentencing” — protecting the
public from future crime, punishing the offender, making whole any victims and the public,
and rehabilitating the offender, all of which are to be accomplished with the least onerous
and least costly sanctions available — the trial court should “consider the need for
incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime,
rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public,
or both.” R.C. 2929.11(A). R.C. 2929.12 lists general factors relating to the seriousness
of the offender’s conduct and the likelihood of recidivism that the trial court must consider
when imposing a felony sentence. And R.C. 2929.12(A) tells us that the trial court retains “discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles
of sentencing” that are listed in R.C. 2929.11.
{¶8} “Although a trial court must consider the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12, there is no requirement that the court state its reasons . . . for imposing a
particular sentence within the statutory range.” State v. Webb, 2019-Ohio-4195, ¶17 (5th
Dist.). The Revised Code also does not require that the trial court “use specific language
or make specific findings on the record in order to evince the requisite consideration of
the applicable seriousness and recidivism factors.” State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208,
215 (2000), citing R.C. 2929.12.
{¶9} In this case, a presentence investigation was conducted by the trial court’s
probation staff, and the presentence report was reviewed by the trial judge and by counsel
for both parties before the sentencing date. In describing his crimes to the presentence
investigator, Aleksic evidently stated that he had found and picked up what he believed
were marijuana dabs — small amounts of particularly potent cannabis — and that he kept
them in his vehicle because he planned to give them to his partner. At the sentencing
hearing, the state voiced some concern about that story and about Aleksic’s related claim
in the presentence report that he did not know that methamphetamine had been in his
vehicle.
{¶10} At the sentencing hearing, Aleksic’s attorney noted that his client had
completed a 72-hour driver intervention program since his arrest and was engaged in
counseling for his alcohol use. Defense counsel stated, too, that Aleksic was remorseful
for his crimes. {¶11} Once both the prosecutor and defense counsel had spoken at the
sentencing hearing, the trial judge gave Aleksic the opportunity to speak. Aleksic
indicated that he had nothing that he wanted to add.
{¶12} Before announcing the sentence, the trial judge said that he did not believe
Aleksic’s claim about having found what turned out to be methamphetamine. The trial
judge also mentioned Aleksic’s prior convictions, which included aggravated assault, a
misdemeanor conviction in Michigan for operating a vehicle while under the influence of
drugs or alcohol, disorderly conduct, and receiving stolen property.
{¶13} The trial judge then imposed the sentence: 18 months in prison on the F3
charge of having a weapon while under a disability, 11 months in prison on an F5 charge
of aggravated possession of drugs (for the methamphetamine), 11 months in prison on
an F5 charge of improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, and 30 days of local
incarceration on an M4 charge of possessing drug paraphernalia. The trial judge imposed
the sentences concurrently for an aggregate prison sentence of 18 months. After
imposing the sentence, the trial judge asked Aleksic’s counsel if there was “anything
further,” and counsel responded, “nothing further.”
{¶14} Aleksic contends that the trial court failed to consider the mitigating factors
mentioned at the sentencing hearing. Aleksic also contends that the trial court failed to
choose the minimum sanctions that would have, in his view, accomplished the purposes
of felony sentencing.
{¶15} In his judgment entry listing the sentence, the trial judge stated that he had
considered the trial-court record in the case as well as all statements made by the parties,
the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, and the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12. The sentencing entry also recounts Aleksic’s prior
criminal record, which included convictions for offenses of violence.
{¶16} At the sentencing hearing itself, the trial judge did not refer expressly to the
factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. When that happens, we presume that the trial court
did consider those sentencing factors. See State v. Hannah, 2015-Ohio-4438, ¶13 (5th
Dist.), citing State v. Adams, 37 Ohio St.3d 295 (1988), paragraph three of the syllabus.
As noted above, the trial judge indicated in his sentencing entry that he had in fact
considered the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 as well as the
seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12.
{¶17} A sentence of 18 months for a conviction on a third-degree felony is
certainly within the permissible statutory range set by R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b) for that level
of offense. The terms of imprisonment and jail time imposed on Aleksic for his other
convictions in the case also align with the ranges spelled out in R.C. 2929.14(A)(5) (for
the F5 offenses) and R.C. 2929.24(A)(4) (for the M1 offense).
{¶18} “A sentence is contrary to law when it falls outside the statutory range for
the offense or if the sentencing court does not consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State
v. Bucey, 2022-Ohio-3573, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.). Aleksic does not dispute that the sentences
imposed on him were within the statutory ranges for his crimes. And nothing in the record
before us causes us to question the language in the sentencing entry indicating that the
trial judge considered the sentencing factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. {¶19} We cannot modify or vacate Aleksic’s sentence unless we clearly and
convincingly find that the record does not support the sentence. Because the record in
this case does in fact support the trial court’s decision, we affirm the judgment.
By: Gormley, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Popham, J. concur.