State v. Aldridge

Court of Appeals of Georgia

State v. Aldridge

577 S.E.2d 863, 259 Ga. App. 673, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 234

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 14, 2003

DocketA02A1878

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 577 S.E.2d 863 (State v. Aldridge) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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State v. Aldridge, 577 S.E.2d 863, 259 Ga. App. 673, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 234 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

Phipps, Judge.

Roland Lanier Aldridge was charged by accusation with driving on a suspended license. When the case was called for a bench trial, defense counsel requested that disposition on the case be “withheld” so that Aldridge could “straighten [ ] out” the matter. The solicitor-general initially rejected that request, but after further remarks from the court, Aldridge, and defense counsel, the solicitor-general agreed to leave the decision of the final disposition to the court and the defendant. The court announced that it would dismiss the charge and entered a written order to that effect (without specifically indicating whether such dismissal was with or without prejudice).

1. The State contends that the court had no authority to dismiss the accusation in this case, but it cites no authority supporting its contention, and we find none. Rather, trial courts are authorized to *674 dismiss accusations. 1 Because a trial court may not impermissibly interfere with the State’s right to prosecute, generally, such dismissals do not amount to “dismissals with prejudice” or acquittals. 2 So long as the dismissal in this case did not amount to a dismissal with prejudice, or an acquittal, there was no error. 3

Decided February 14, 2003. Wensley Hobby, Solicitor-General, for appellant. Joel E. Williams, Jr., for appellee.

2. As the trial court’s ruling did not address the merits of the State’s charge, we do not consider the State’s remaining contentions regarding the lack of sworn testimony concerning the charge.

Judgment affirmed.

Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur.

1

State v. Grimes, 194 Ga. App. 736 (392 SE2d 727) (1990).

2

See State v. Luttrell, 207 Ga. App. 116 (427 SE2d 95) (1993) (“The Civil Practice Act provides for dismissals with prejudice of civil cases, but the court knows of no statutory . . . authority which permits such dismissals in criminal cases.”) (citations and punctuation omitted); State v. Roca, 203 Ga. App. 267, 268 (416 SE2d 836) (1992); State v. Cooperman, 147 Ga. App. 556 (249 SE2d 358) (1978); compare State v. Blackwell, 245 Ga. App. 135, 137-139 (2) (537 SE2d 457) (2000) (trial court had authority to dismiss charges where prosecution would violate defendant’s constitutional rights).

3

See Roca, supra at 268; Grimes, supra at 737.

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Phipps, Judge.

Roland Lanier Aldridge was charged by accusation with driving on a suspended license. When the case was called for a bench trial, defense counsel requested that disposition on the case be “withheld” so that Aldridge could “straighten [ ] out” the matter. The solicitor-general initially rejected that request, but after further remarks from the court, Aldridge, and defense counsel, the solicitor-general agreed to leave the decision of the final disposition to the court and the defendant. The court announced that it would dismiss the charge and entered a written order to that effect (without specifically indicating whether such dismissal was with or without prejudice).

1. The State contends that the court had no authority to dismiss the accusation in this case, but it cites no authority supporting its contention, and we find none. Rather, trial courts are authorized to *674 dismiss accusations. 1 Because a trial court may not impermissibly interfere with the State’s right to prosecute, generally, such dismissals do not amount to “dismissals with prejudice” or acquittals. 2 So long as the dismissal in this case did not amount to a dismissal with prejudice, or an acquittal, there was no error. 3

Decided February 14, 2003. Wensley Hobby, Solicitor-General, for appellant. Joel E. Williams, Jr., for appellee.

2. As the trial court’s ruling did not address the merits of the State’s charge, we do not consider the State’s remaining contentions regarding the lack of sworn testimony concerning the charge.

Judgment affirmed.

Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur.

1

State v. Grimes, 194 Ga. App. 736 (392 SE2d 727) (1990).

2

See State v. Luttrell, 207 Ga. App. 116 (427 SE2d 95) (1993) (“The Civil Practice Act provides for dismissals with prejudice of civil cases, but the court knows of no statutory . . . authority which permits such dismissals in criminal cases.”) (citations and punctuation omitted); State v. Roca, 203 Ga. App. 267, 268 (416 SE2d 836) (1992); State v. Cooperman, 147 Ga. App. 556 (249 SE2d 358) (1978); compare State v. Blackwell, 245 Ga. App. 135, 137-139 (2) (537 SE2d 457) (2000) (trial court had authority to dismiss charges where prosecution would violate defendant’s constitutional rights).

3

See Roca, supra at 268; Grimes, supra at 737.

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577 S.E.2d 863, 259 Ga. App. 673, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 234, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-aldridge-gactapp-2003.

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