IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) C.A. No. 2311006153 ) ) GERALD AIKEN ) ) Defendant. )
Submitted: March 17, 2025 Decided: April 4, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss;
DENIED.
Zachary R. Greer, Esq., Department of Justice, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Gerald Aiken, Pro Se.
WINSTON, J. I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Aiken’s Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) seeking dismissal
of all charges against him. Because Aiken’s Motion is both untimely and without
merit, for the following reasons, his Motion is DENIED.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Gerald Aiken (“Aiken”)1 was arrested on March 6, 2024, on the following
charges: Disregarding a Police Officer’s Signal; Driving a Vehicle While License is
Suspended or Revoked; Driving Without Proof of Insurance; Driving Without a
Registration Card; Aftermarket Window Tint Without Certificate; Disregarding a
Stop Sign; Turning a Vehicle Without a Proper Signal; Unreasonable Speed; and
Aggressive Driving.2 Aiken’s arraignment was first scheduled on June 7, 2024, at
which time he failed to appear.3 Accordingly, the Court issued a capias.4 Aiken
returned his capias on September 10, 2024.5 Aiken was arraigned and waived his
right to an attorney on October 4, 2024.6
1 In his Motion, the Defendant refers to himself as “Gerald Aikens;” however, his Superior Court records reflect that his surname is “Aiken.” There is no dispute that Gerald Aikens and Gerald Aiken are one in the same. Hereinafter, he will be referred to by “Aiken,” the last name provided in the record. 2 D.I. 30; see also D.I. 33 ¶ 1. 3 D.I. 33 ¶ 2. 4 Id. 5 D.I. 33 ¶ 3. 6 See D.I. 7; see also D.I. 9 (“Waiver of Counsel Form”). 2 The Scheduling Order in this case was first issued on October 7, 2024, which
established the following deadlines: (1) First Case Review: November 18, 2024, and
(2) Final Case Review: December 23, 2024.7 In that Scheduling Order, the Court
ordered all pretrial motions, except for motions to suppress, to be filed “twenty (20)
days before the final case review” on December 23, 2024.8
At Aiken’s final case review, a plea offer was extended by the State.9 A
colloquy was then performed, and it was determined that Aiken knowingly and
voluntarily rejected this offer.10 Aiken was originally scheduled for trial on January
6, 2024.11 The State requested and was granted a continuance, and trial was then set
for February 10, 2025.12 On that date, due to court scheduling issues, Aiken’s case
was not selected for trial.13 Trial is currently scheduled for April 7, 2025.14
On February 24, 2025, Aiken filed the instant Motion to Dismiss.15 In it,
Aiken argues that his criminal history and motor vehicle violation history as
7 D.I. 33 ¶ 4. 8 Id.; see also D.I. 22. 9 D.I. 33 ¶ 5. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 D.I. 33 ¶ 6. 13 D.I. 33 ¶ 7. 14 Id. 15 D.I. 29. 3 provided through discovery: (1) “is occasionally incomplete or inaccurate;” (2) is
not admissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence (“D.R.E.”) 609(b); (3) is not
admissible under D.R.E 609(c); and (4) is not admissible under D.R.E. 609(d).
Aiken next argues that the officer’s beliefs are “based on opinions,” which “[are] not
admissible to attack or support the witness’ credibility” under D.R.E. 610. Aiken
further argues this matter must be dismissed because: (1) extrinsic evidence is not
admissible under D.R.E. 608; (2) there was no certification of the record in violation
of “Court Rule title 21 Section 2803”; and (3) “no information was obtain[ed] from
[the] traffic light signal violation monitoring system.” The State responded in
opposition on March 17, 2025.16 The State alleges that none of the grounds cited in
Aiken’s Motion provide adequate notice of the basis for dismissal and, thus, should
be ignored. This is the Court’s Opinion and Order.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 12(c), the Court is vested with
authority to set the time for pretrial motions, either at the time of arraignment or “as
soon thereafter as practicable....”17 Accordingly, pursuant to this Court’s criminal
case management plan, pretrial motions in this matter must be filed twenty days
16 D.I. 33. 17 State v. Ayers, 2014 WL 606562 at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 17, 2014) (citing Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 12(c)). 4 before the final case review.18 Pretrial motions include defenses and objections
based on defects in the institution of the prosecution, defects in the indictment or
information, motions to suppress evidence, motions to compel discovery, and
motions for severance of charges or defendants.19
IV. ANALYSIS
Aiken alleges multiple grounds upon which he requests dismissal; however,
his Motion was filed over two months after the December 23, 2024, deadline.20 At
no time did Aiken move to extend the time for the filing of pretrial motions. Despite
being labeled as a “Motion to Dismiss,” Aiken’s Motion only raises “defense[s],
objection[s], or request[s] which [are] capable of determination without the trial of
the general issue” and, thus, constitutes a pretrial motion.21 Aiken’s Motion is,
therefore, untimely.
The Superior Court has broad discretion to enforce its pretrial orders and need
not consider untimely pretrial motions absent exceptional circumstances.22 The
defendant bears the burden to prove that exceptional circumstances prevented the
18 D.I. 22. 19 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 12(b). 20 D.I. 29. 21 Id. 22 Davis v. State, 38 A.3d 278, 280 (Del. 2012) (citing Barnett v. State, 691 A.2d 614, 616 (Del.1997), abrogated on other grounds by Lecates v. State, 987 A.2d 413, 420 (Del. Oct. 15, 2009)). 5 filing of a timely motion.23 Aiken has failed to satisfy that burden. Aiken has not
shown that the motion was based on evidence not available as of the deadline, or
that extraordinary circumstances precluded the filing of a timely motion.24 However,
even considering the Motion on its merits, Aiken fails to present any legitimate
grounds for dismissal.
First, Aiken’s arguments that dismissal must be granted pursuant to D.R.E.
608, 609, and 610 misinterpret D.R.E.’s relevance to a motion to dismiss. The
Delaware Rules of Evidence primarily govern the admissibility of evidence in court
proceedings and do not provide grounds for dismissing a criminal case. As to
Aiken’s concerns regarding admissibility of certain evidence, such concerns are not
issues that could result in dismissal of the charges; rather, they are more properly
dealt with at trial. To the extent Aiken’s arguments are meant to challenge the
officer’s credibility, such concerns go to the weight of the evidence and not its
admissibility.25
Aiken’s argument that his criminal history and motor vehicle violation history,
as provided in discovery, is “occasionally incomplete or inaccurate” is likewise
without merit. Aiken provides no explanation as to how this information is
23 Id. at 281 (citing Barnett v. State, 691 A.2d at 616). 24 See D.I. 29. 25 See Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1127, 1132. 6 incomplete or inaccurate. Nor does Aiken offer any explanation as to how, even if
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) C.A. No. 2311006153 ) ) GERALD AIKEN ) ) Defendant. )
Submitted: March 17, 2025 Decided: April 4, 2025
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss;
DENIED.
Zachary R. Greer, Esq., Department of Justice, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Gerald Aiken, Pro Se.
WINSTON, J. I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Aiken’s Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) seeking dismissal
of all charges against him. Because Aiken’s Motion is both untimely and without
merit, for the following reasons, his Motion is DENIED.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Gerald Aiken (“Aiken”)1 was arrested on March 6, 2024, on the following
charges: Disregarding a Police Officer’s Signal; Driving a Vehicle While License is
Suspended or Revoked; Driving Without Proof of Insurance; Driving Without a
Registration Card; Aftermarket Window Tint Without Certificate; Disregarding a
Stop Sign; Turning a Vehicle Without a Proper Signal; Unreasonable Speed; and
Aggressive Driving.2 Aiken’s arraignment was first scheduled on June 7, 2024, at
which time he failed to appear.3 Accordingly, the Court issued a capias.4 Aiken
returned his capias on September 10, 2024.5 Aiken was arraigned and waived his
right to an attorney on October 4, 2024.6
1 In his Motion, the Defendant refers to himself as “Gerald Aikens;” however, his Superior Court records reflect that his surname is “Aiken.” There is no dispute that Gerald Aikens and Gerald Aiken are one in the same. Hereinafter, he will be referred to by “Aiken,” the last name provided in the record. 2 D.I. 30; see also D.I. 33 ¶ 1. 3 D.I. 33 ¶ 2. 4 Id. 5 D.I. 33 ¶ 3. 6 See D.I. 7; see also D.I. 9 (“Waiver of Counsel Form”). 2 The Scheduling Order in this case was first issued on October 7, 2024, which
established the following deadlines: (1) First Case Review: November 18, 2024, and
(2) Final Case Review: December 23, 2024.7 In that Scheduling Order, the Court
ordered all pretrial motions, except for motions to suppress, to be filed “twenty (20)
days before the final case review” on December 23, 2024.8
At Aiken’s final case review, a plea offer was extended by the State.9 A
colloquy was then performed, and it was determined that Aiken knowingly and
voluntarily rejected this offer.10 Aiken was originally scheduled for trial on January
6, 2024.11 The State requested and was granted a continuance, and trial was then set
for February 10, 2025.12 On that date, due to court scheduling issues, Aiken’s case
was not selected for trial.13 Trial is currently scheduled for April 7, 2025.14
On February 24, 2025, Aiken filed the instant Motion to Dismiss.15 In it,
Aiken argues that his criminal history and motor vehicle violation history as
7 D.I. 33 ¶ 4. 8 Id.; see also D.I. 22. 9 D.I. 33 ¶ 5. 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 D.I. 33 ¶ 6. 13 D.I. 33 ¶ 7. 14 Id. 15 D.I. 29. 3 provided through discovery: (1) “is occasionally incomplete or inaccurate;” (2) is
not admissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence (“D.R.E.”) 609(b); (3) is not
admissible under D.R.E 609(c); and (4) is not admissible under D.R.E. 609(d).
Aiken next argues that the officer’s beliefs are “based on opinions,” which “[are] not
admissible to attack or support the witness’ credibility” under D.R.E. 610. Aiken
further argues this matter must be dismissed because: (1) extrinsic evidence is not
admissible under D.R.E. 608; (2) there was no certification of the record in violation
of “Court Rule title 21 Section 2803”; and (3) “no information was obtain[ed] from
[the] traffic light signal violation monitoring system.” The State responded in
opposition on March 17, 2025.16 The State alleges that none of the grounds cited in
Aiken’s Motion provide adequate notice of the basis for dismissal and, thus, should
be ignored. This is the Court’s Opinion and Order.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 12(c), the Court is vested with
authority to set the time for pretrial motions, either at the time of arraignment or “as
soon thereafter as practicable....”17 Accordingly, pursuant to this Court’s criminal
case management plan, pretrial motions in this matter must be filed twenty days
16 D.I. 33. 17 State v. Ayers, 2014 WL 606562 at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 17, 2014) (citing Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 12(c)). 4 before the final case review.18 Pretrial motions include defenses and objections
based on defects in the institution of the prosecution, defects in the indictment or
information, motions to suppress evidence, motions to compel discovery, and
motions for severance of charges or defendants.19
IV. ANALYSIS
Aiken alleges multiple grounds upon which he requests dismissal; however,
his Motion was filed over two months after the December 23, 2024, deadline.20 At
no time did Aiken move to extend the time for the filing of pretrial motions. Despite
being labeled as a “Motion to Dismiss,” Aiken’s Motion only raises “defense[s],
objection[s], or request[s] which [are] capable of determination without the trial of
the general issue” and, thus, constitutes a pretrial motion.21 Aiken’s Motion is,
therefore, untimely.
The Superior Court has broad discretion to enforce its pretrial orders and need
not consider untimely pretrial motions absent exceptional circumstances.22 The
defendant bears the burden to prove that exceptional circumstances prevented the
18 D.I. 22. 19 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 12(b). 20 D.I. 29. 21 Id. 22 Davis v. State, 38 A.3d 278, 280 (Del. 2012) (citing Barnett v. State, 691 A.2d 614, 616 (Del.1997), abrogated on other grounds by Lecates v. State, 987 A.2d 413, 420 (Del. Oct. 15, 2009)). 5 filing of a timely motion.23 Aiken has failed to satisfy that burden. Aiken has not
shown that the motion was based on evidence not available as of the deadline, or
that extraordinary circumstances precluded the filing of a timely motion.24 However,
even considering the Motion on its merits, Aiken fails to present any legitimate
grounds for dismissal.
First, Aiken’s arguments that dismissal must be granted pursuant to D.R.E.
608, 609, and 610 misinterpret D.R.E.’s relevance to a motion to dismiss. The
Delaware Rules of Evidence primarily govern the admissibility of evidence in court
proceedings and do not provide grounds for dismissing a criminal case. As to
Aiken’s concerns regarding admissibility of certain evidence, such concerns are not
issues that could result in dismissal of the charges; rather, they are more properly
dealt with at trial. To the extent Aiken’s arguments are meant to challenge the
officer’s credibility, such concerns go to the weight of the evidence and not its
admissibility.25
Aiken’s argument that his criminal history and motor vehicle violation history,
as provided in discovery, is “occasionally incomplete or inaccurate” is likewise
without merit. Aiken provides no explanation as to how this information is
23 Id. at 281 (citing Barnett v. State, 691 A.2d at 616). 24 See D.I. 29. 25 See Demby v. State, 695 A.2d 1127, 1132. 6 incomplete or inaccurate. Nor does Aiken offer any explanation as to how, even if
this information is incomplete or inaccurate, such a mistake would warrant
dismissal.26 This, too, is premature, as it is unknown if the State will even attempt
to introduce this evidence at trial. Accordingly, alleged inaccuracies in Aiken’s
criminal history and motor vehicle violation history are not grounds for dismissal.
Next, Aiken’s argument for dismissal due to there being no “certification of
the record in violation of Court Rule title 21 Section 2803” similarly lacks merit.
Pursuant to 21 Del. C. § 2803, the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles must
certify the conviction record as maintained by the Division of Motor Vehicles of any
person who is a habitual criminal under 21 Del. C. § 2802.27 Defendant provides no
explanation how either § 2802 or § 2803 apply to this matter. Accordingly, any
alleged failure to certify the record is not grounds for dismissal. At most, this statute
may play a role in any eventual sentencing, should Aiken be convicted; but this is
premature and not ripe for a decision.
Finally, Aiken’s argument that this case must be dismissed because “no
information was obtain[ed] from [the] traffic light signal violation monitoring
26 See Demby v. State, 695 A.2d at 1132 (“factual discrepancies, and the inferences to be drawn from them, go to the weight to be accorded the evidence rather than to its admissibility”). State v. Anderson, 2010 WL 4513029 at *4 (Del. Super. Nov. 1, 2010) (citing 21 27
Del. C. § 2803). 7 system” is also without merit. Aiken provides no legal authority for this assertion
and provides no explanation for why this fact—if it is one—would warrant
dismissal. Accordingly, any alleged lack of information from a violation monitoring
system is not grounds for dismissal.
V. CONCLUSION
Aiken fails to offer any legal explanation to justify the untimely filing of this
Motion. Further, Aiken’s Motion fails to establish any grounds that would warrant
dismissal of the criminal charges. Aiken’s Motion to Dismiss is therefore DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Patricia A. Winston Patricia A. Winston, Judge