State v. Adams

CourtSuperior Court of Rhode Island
DecidedApril 19, 2010
DocketP.M. No. 08-175
StatusPublished

This text of State v. Adams (State v. Adams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. Adams, (R.I. Ct. App. 2010).

Opinion

DECISION
Joshua Adams appeals from a September 22, 2009 decision of a Superior Court Magistrate affirming the classification order issued by the Sex Offender Board of Review. The Sex Offender Board of Review and the Magistrate found that Mr. Adams should be classified as a Level III sex offender, for purposes of G.L. 1956 § 11-37.1.

Travel
On January 10, 2008, the State instituted Superior Court proceedings to "affirm the finding of the Sex Offender Board of Review" (December 26, 2007 Record of the Sex-Offender Board of Review and Motion to Affirm Proceedings). Mr. Adams objected.1 The matter came on for hearing before a Magistrate of the Court who concluded "the decision of the Board . . . is affirmed. Petitioner shall be classified as a Level III. Community notification shall be made accordingly . . ." (Tr. of July 21, 2009, p. 13.) A motion for stay of the Magistrate's orders was granted temporarily. Counsel then scheduled the case for hearing before a Justice and briefed the appeal. *Page 2

Standard of Review
G.L. 1956 § 8-2-39.2 sets forth the parameters of this Court's review of a Magistrate's Order:

"8-2-39.2. Drug Court Magistrates — Appointment, duties and powers. — (a) * * *

(f) A party aggrieved by an order entered by the Drug Court Magistrate shall be entitled to a review of the order by a justice of the Superior Court. Unless otherwise provided in the rules of procedure of the court, such review shall be on the record and appellate in nature. The Superior Court shall, by rules of procedure, establish procedures for reviews of orders entered by a Drug Court Magistrate, and for enforcement of contempt adjudications of a Drug Court Magistrate."

Upon review, "a Justice of the Superior Court is required only to give a de novo review of the Magistrate's decision, based on the record." State v. Dubois, P.M. No. 07-1611 (Superior Court, 2009, p. 4.) This review of a Magistrate's decision is limited in scope, by the language of the statute.

To review an order of a Magistrate, this Court must consider the procedure that the Magistrate must employ in reviewing the findings of the Sex Offender Board of Review. When the Superior Court initially conducts a review of a classification by the Sex Offender Board of Review, the State has the initial "burden of going forward, which burden shall be satisfied by presentation of a prima facie case that justifies the proposed level of and manner of notification." Section 11-37.1-16(a). The term "prima facie case" in this context has been statutorily defined as meaning that "(l) [a] validated risk assessment tool has been used to determine the risk of re-offense; [and] (2) reasonable means have been used to collect the information used in the validated risk assessment tool." Section 11-37.1-16(b), as amended by P.L. 2003, Ch. 162 § 1. State v. Germane,971 A.2d, 555, 570, fn. 24. *Page 3

Analysis
It is important to note, upfront, that the Magistrate provided a thoughtful, comprehensive analysis, detailed in the transcript of the proceedings before him on July 2l, 2009. On pages 2 through 13 he discussed the burden of proof, the evidence before him, and made findings of fact regarding Mr. Adams' home setting. The Magistrate reviewed the reports of the consultants and the conclusions of the Board to reach a well-reasoned conclusion. For example, after having reviewed the analyses and diagnostic assessments, the Magistrate expressed his concern for Mr. Adams' extended period without treatment. (Tr. July 21, 2009, p. 8.)

Mr. Adams, via this challenge to the Magistrate's ruling, doesnot contend that the Magistrate erred in applying the law. No cases are cited in his memoranda. Mr. Adams does not question whether the Magistrate applied an incorrect standard of review. Mr. Adams only dispute is whether the Magistrate's (and the Sex Offender Board of Review's) factual conclusions, were based on the evidence as presented.

The record of the Sex Offender Board of Review contains a variety of information including the J-SOAP2 clinical assessment tool, a report made by Mr. Myles Glatter, a licensed social worker, various police reports and statements, and a Department of Children, Youth Families (DCYF) progress report. Mr. Adams attempted to supplement the record with a supplemental report from Mr. Glatter and correspondence from the mother of one of his victims. This Justice refused to re-open the record, given the limited nature of the proceedings on appeal. Re-opening the record now, with documents which were not presented to the Sex Offender Board of Review and may not *Page 4 have been presented to the Magistrate, would provide Mr. Adams with a third bite at the fact-finding apple. The case is now before the Court on an appeal of the Magistrate's Order. This review is on the record only. G.L. 1956 § 8-2-11.1(d). Before the Magistrate was the limited issue of whether the decision of the Sex Offender Board of Review was appropriate and should be confirmed.

Mr. Adams contends that his life style was stable, and questions the Magistrate's conclusion that his life was unstable. Mr. Adams relies upon a letter submitted by a victim's mother (Mr. Adams' sister) to establish that the family unit is a cohesive family group. The letter was written on January 15, 2008 and is not included in the Board's record, as certified to this Court in January 2008. The Glatter report of April, 2005 describes Mr. Adams as living in a group home, unemployed at age l9, and trying to move to independent living. The DCYF progress report of December 2005 describes how Mr. Adams moved into his own apartment in Providence in October of 2005, was severely beaten while working at a gas station, and then moved into a house that his mother owned. (DCYF Juvenile Probation Progress Report, 11-5-03). Essentially, after having been convicted, he was living alone, out of school and unemployed in Carolina, R. I. Although the Probation Report stated his mother lived with him occasionally, the November l8, 2005 sex offender registration form of Mr. Adams lists his sister (the mother of the victim) as the next of kin. Clearly, the Magistrate was appropriate in concluding that Mr. Adams' life was unstable based on the record as presented.

Mr. Adams then questions the significance of the Magistrate's conclusion that Mr. Adams is not presently in counseling. Mr. Adams completed seven years of counseling, including residential care. Claiming that "he should not be penalized for successfully *Page 5 completing his programs" (Adams' November 18, 2009 Memorandum at p. 6.) misses the mark. The statute and the classification system consider the risk of re-offense to determine the appropriate treatment level. "The regulations shall provided for three (3) levels of notification depending upon the risk of re-offense level of the sex offender . . ." Section 11-37.1-12.

Mr. Adams also criticizes the Magistrate's conclusion, drawn on Mr.

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Related

McKune v. Lile
536 U.S. 24 (Supreme Court, 2002)
State v. Germane
971 A.2d 555 (Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2009)

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Bluebook (online)
State v. Adams, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-adams-risuperct-2010.