State v. Ackerson

Opinion

358 August 19, 2026 No. 788

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JEFFERY LAIFE ACKERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Multnomah County Circuit Court 21CR45246; A182938

Celia A. Howes, Judge. Argued and submitted July 30, 2025. Bruce A. Myers, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission.

Robert M. Wilsey, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge.

POWERS, J. Reversed and remanded.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 358 (2026) 359

POWERS, J. Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV), asserting that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the arresting officer lacked probable cause. As explained below, we conclude that the state failed to present sufficient evidence that the officer’s subjective belief that defendant committed UUV or possession of a stolen vehicle (PSV) was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for errors of law. State v. Ehly, 317 Or 66, 75, 854 P2d 421 (1993). We are bound by the trial court’s factual findings if there is constitutionally adequate evidence to support them. State v. Edwards, 319 Or App 60, 62, 509 P3d 177, rev den, 370 Or 212 (2022). If the trial court did not make express findings of fact on all pertinent issues and if there is evidence from which such facts could be decided in more than one way, we will “presume that the facts were decided in a manner consistent with the court’s ultimate conclusion.” Ehly, 317 Or at 75.

Although the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history, we provide a brief recitation of the undisputed facts adduced during the suppression hearing for context in this nonprecedential memorandum opinion. Port of Portland Officer Byrd responded as backup for a fellow officer who discovered a stolen truck in a hotel parking lot. En route to the hotel, Byrd received confirmation that the truck was reported stolen after dispatch ran the VIN. Upon arrival, Byrd observed a 2005 Ford F-250 pickup truck partially occupying four different parking spots. Byrd also observed that the truck was missing license plates and contained two individuals who he believed were asleep. Byrd ordered the individuals out of the vehicle. Byrd and his partner then arrested defendant, who exited from the driver’s seat, immediately upon his exit from the truck.

Defendant was charged with unauthorized use of a vehicle (UUV), ORS 164.135, and possession of a stolen vehicle (PSV), ORS 819.300. After he was charged, defendant 360 State v. Ackerson

filed a motion to suppress, arguing that Byrd lacked probable cause to arrest him. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress, reasoning that Byrd had articulated enough facts at the suppression hearing, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, to support probable cause to arrest defendant. Defendant then waived his right to a jury trial and was tried to the court. The court found him guilty of UUV and acquitted him of PSV. This timely appeal follows.

A warrantless arrest is permissible under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution if the arresting officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed a crime. State v. Gibson, 268 Or App 428, 430, 342 P3d 168 (2015). Probable cause exists when the arresting officer’s subjective belief that a crime has been committed is objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. State v. McCall, 315 Or App 538, 542, 501 P3d 1086 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 505 (2022). To determine objective reasonableness , we examine the totality of the circumstances to discern whether the officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that, more likely than not, the person committed an offense. State v. Hudson, 253 Or App 327, 343, 290 P3d 868 (2012), rev den, 353 Or 562 (2013).

As noted earlier, defendant was charged with both UUV and PSV. On appeal, defendant challenges probable cause only for the mental state elements of UUV and PSV, not the use or possession elements. To show that an officer had probable cause to arrest a defendant for UUV, the state must present evidence to prove that the officer’s subjective belief at the time of the arrest that the defendant, more likely than not, “was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that [the defendant] did not have the owner’s consent to use the vehicle” was objectively reasonable given the totality of the circumstances. ORS 164.135(1)(a)(A)-(C); State v. Huerta-Contreras, 336 Or App 251, 253, 560 P3d 728 (2024), rev allowed, 373 Or 736 (2025).1 Similar to UUV, to demonstrate probable cause to 1 As the parties acknowledge, ORS 164.135 was amended in 2019, which changed the mental state as to the status of the vehicle as stolen from “knowing ” to “reckless”—viz., that the person is “aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk” that the owner did not consent. See Or Laws

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 358 (2026) 361

arrest for PSV, the state must present evidence to prove that the officer’s subjective belief at the time of arrest that the defendant, more likely than not, knew or had reason to believe that the vehicle was stolen was objectively reasonable given the totality of the circumstances. ORS 819.300(1); McCall, 315 Or App at 543.

In probable cause cases for UUV and PSV, we have routinely required additional “suspicious conduct,” aside from the presence of a stolen vehicle, to conclude that an officer’s belief was objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Gibson, 268 Or App at 433 (concluding that the additional fact that the defendant was unable to locate the vehicle registration while driving in a stolen vehicle was sufficient to establish probable cause for UUV); State v. Ayvazov, 246 Or App 641, 647, 267 P3d 196 (2011), rev den, 351 Or 675 (2012) (concluding that the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for UUV because the defendant had recently been seen driving the car and attempting to “run down a woman”); State v. Rayburn, 246 Or App 486, 490-91, 266 P3d 156 (2011), rev den, 351 Or 675 (2012) (concluding that a report of a stolen vehicle being driven recklessly and objects being thrown from the vehicle, along with the defendant’s presence in the vehicle, and the driver being unable to remove the key from the ignition, were sufficient to establish probable cause for UUV); McCall, 315 Or App at 544-45 (concluding that the officer had probable cause for PSV when the defendant was spotted outside a stolen vehicle while tampering with the vehicle’s door handle using a pair of pliers).

On appeal, defendant contends that Byrd did not have probable cause because none of the circumstances Byrd observed—individually or all together—are sufficient to support an objectively reasonable belief that defendant had the requisite mental states for UUV or PSV. The trial court determined that Byrd had probable cause based primarily on five observations: (1) The truck defendant was in—a 2005 Ford F-250—was a commonly stolen vehicle; (2) defendant

2019, ch 530, § 1. Thus, although every UUV case cited in this opinion besides Huerta-Contreras applied the previous version of the statute, that change does not otherwise affect the analysis we draw from those decisions.

362 State v. Ackerson

was sleeping in the hotel parking lot instead of in the hotel; (3) the area surrounding the hotel parking lot was an area where Byrd testified that “we found multiple stolen vehicles and arrested many people on warrants”; (4) the truck was parked in a manner that occupied four parking spots; and (5) the truck was missing license plates. Specifically, defendant argues that none of Byrd’s observations demonstrated that defendant was reckless as to the risk that he was in a vehicle without the owner’s consent or that he knew or had reason to believe that he possessed a stolen vehicle. The state remonstrates that Byrd had probable cause because Byrd observed defendant sleeping in the driver’s seat of a vehicle that had been reported stolen and that the vehicle was missing license plates.2 The state maintains that, although there is no evidence that defendant personally understood that missing license plates would indicate that a vehicle is stolen, we have repeatedly recognized that missing plates contributes to probable cause of UUV and PSV.

We conclude, under the totality of the circumstances, that the state failed to produce sufficient evidence to support an objectively reasonable belief that defendant had the requisite mental states for UUV or PSV. As an initial matter, we agree with the state’s argument that missing license plates can contribute to an objectively reasonable belief that a defendant has committed UUV or PSV. See, e.g., State v. Duffee, 336 Or App 763, 766-67, 561 P3d 1140 (2024) (concluding that the vehicle missing license plates was one of several factors supporting the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed UUV or PSV). Here, however, without more, the missing license plates are not sufficient to support an objectively reasonable belief about defendant’s knowledge because there is no evidence that tied the missing plates to defendant’s mental state. That is, the state did not adduce any evidence to suggest that defendant was aware of the missing license plates or that he removed them himself.

Further, this case is unlike Gibson, where we concluded that the defendant’s inability to locate the car’s 2 The state acknowledges on appeal that, under Huerta-Contreras, Byrd’s observations that the parking lot was a location where multiple stolen vehicles had been recovered and that Ford F-250s are commonly stolen vehicles add little to the probable cause analysis in this case.

Nonprecedential Memo Op: 352 Or App 358 (2026) 363

registration, while in a stolen vehicle, was a factor that an officer could rely on to conclude, more likely than not, that the defendant knew the vehicle was stolen. 268 Or App at 433. A missing plate differs from a driver not being able to locate registration information because a driver would typically be aware of where the registration information is located, so the failure to identify it, when taken in totality, supports an inference that the driver was aware of the risk that the driver did not have consent to operate the vehicle.3 Given that conclusion and the state’s acknowledgment noted above about the application of Huerta-Contreras, we conclude that the observations by Byrd, even when taken together, do not demonstrate that defendant had any awareness that he was in a stolen vehicle.

In sum, the state failed to provide sufficient evidence that Byrd’s subjective belief that defendant, more likely than not, knew or was aware of the risk that the vehicle was stolen was objectively reasonable. That is, under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that there was insufficient evidence to support an objectively reasonable belief that defendant had committed the crimes of UUV and PSV. Although Byrd may have had reasonable suspicion to stop and question defendant to further investigate the suspicious circumstances, we conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, Byrd arrested defendant without first developing sufficient evidence that made it more likely than not that defendant committed UUV or PSV.4 Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.

Reversed and remanded.

3 An exhibit offered at trial showed that a single dealer license plate was found in the truck after the arrest. Byrd testified at trial that dealer plates are sold to dealerships and “not normally found out and about with non-dealer personnel driving them.” However, that evidence was not before the trial court for its suppression ruling and Byrd was not aware of that information prior to arresting defendant.

4 Indeed, although Byrd’s post-arrest observations included discovering that the driver’s side lock had been “pried out” and damaged, that the ignition on the truck was damaged, and, as noted above, that there was a dealer license plate inside the truck, none of that evidence could be considered by the trial court when it made its suppression ruling.