[Cite as State v. Abrams, 2017-Ohio-8536.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
CLERMONT COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : CASE NOS. CA2017-03-018 Plaintiff-Appellee, : CA2017-03-019
: OPINION - vs - 11/13/2017 :
JEFFREY SCOTT ABRAMS, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. 2016-CR-0282
D. Vincent Faris, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, Nicholas Horton, 76 South Riverside Drive, 2nd Floor, Batavia, Ohio 45103, for plaintiff-appellee
The Farrish Law Firm, Michaela M. Stagnaro, 810 Sycamore Street, 6th Floor, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for defendant-appellant
HENDRICKSON, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Jeffrey Scott Abrams, appeals from the sentence he
received in the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to multiple theft
offenses. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm his sentence.
{¶ 2} On May 19, 2016, appellant was indicted on four counts of theft by deception in
violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(3), misdemeanors of the first degree, one count of theft from an
elderly person in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), a felony of the fifth degree, three counts of Clermont CA2017-03-018 CA2017-03-019
theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), of which one was a felony of the fifth degree and two
were misdemeanors of the first degree, one count of robbery in violation of R.C.
2911.02(A)(2), a felony of the second degree, one count of misuse of a credit card in
violation of R.C. 2913.21(B)(2), a misdemeanor of the first degree, two counts of receiving
stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A), felonies of the fifth degree, and one count of
failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B), a
felony of the third degree. The charges arose out of allegations that between April 13, 2016
and May 12, 2016, appellant aided and abetted others in the fraudulent return of
merchandise at various businesses in Clermont County, the theft of a TV from an elderly
person, and the theft of credit cards from two other victims. Appellant acted as the getaway
driver following the commission of the offenses, and his truck had a stolen license plate
affixed to it.
{¶ 3} On January 24, 2017, following plea negotiations, appellant pled guilty to one
count of theft from an elderly person, two counts of theft of a credit card, and one count of
receiving stolen property, all felonies of the fifth degree, as well as three counts of theft,
misdemeanors of the first degree, in exchange for the remaining charges being dismissed.1
A sentencing hearing was scheduled for February 28, 2017, and the trial court ordered that a
presentence investigation report ("PSI") be prepared.
{¶ 4} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard from the state, one of appellant's
victims, defense counsel, and appellant. The state indicated it had reviewed the PSI, which
detailed appellant's lengthy criminal history involving convictions for disorderly conduct,
possession of drugs and drug abuse instruments, possession of cocaine, possession of
heroin, and breaking and entering, and it requested that a prison sentence be imposed on
1. As part of the plea agreement, appellant's robbery offense was amended to theft of a credit card. -2- Clermont CA2017-03-018 CA2017-03-019
appellant. Thereafter, one of appellant's victims testified about the terror she felt when
appellant stole her purse in the parking lot of a shopping plaza after crashing his vehicle into
her shopping cart. She explained appellant's actions have caused an emotional and
psychological toll on her well-being and she stated she "fear[s] when he gets out" of prison.
{¶ 5} Appellant apologized to his victims and expressed remorse for his actions. He
spoke of his heroin addiction and the frustration he felt in being unable to overcome his
addiction and self-destructive ways. Defense counsel acknowledged appellant's drug
addiction had negatively impacted other people in the community, but contended that
appellant's willingness to take responsibility and be held accountable for his actions should
be considered in fashioning an appropriate sentence.
{¶ 6} After reviewing the PSI and victim impact statements and considering the
information presented at the sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that community
control was not an appropriate sanction and that a prison term was warranted. With respect
to appellant's three misdemeanor convictions for theft by deception, the court imposed 180-
day jail sentences on each offense, to be served concurrently to one another and
concurrently to the sentences imposed on the felony counts. With respect to the four fifth-
degree felony offenses, the court imposed 11-month prison terms on each offense and
ordered that the sentences be served consecutively to one another, for an aggregate prison
term of 44 months. The court gave appellant jail-time credit for 293 days and ordered him to
pay $1,644.92 in restitution to three of his victims.
{¶ 7} Appellant timely appealed, raising two assignments of error.
{¶ 8} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 9} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY IMPROPERLY
SENTENCING APPELLANT.
{¶ 10} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred by -3- Clermont CA2017-03-018 CA2017-03-019
sentencing him to 11 months in prison on each felony count and by running the felony
sentences consecutively to one another. Appellant contends the court failed to properly
consider the purposes and principles of sentencing and failed to make the required findings
under R.C. 2929.14(C) before imposing his sentence. He further contends the court erred by
failing to inform him that (1) he is required to submit to random drug testing while in prison
and cannot ingest or be injected with a drug of abuse while in prison, (2) he is required to
submit a DNA sample as a result of his felony convictions, and (3) he had a right to appeal
his sentence. Finally, appellant argues the court erred by ordering him to pay restitution to
his victims without considering his ability to pay the financial sanctions.
{¶ 11} We review the imposed sentence under the standard of review set forth in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2), which governs all felony sentences. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516,
2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1; State v. Crawford, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-12-088, 2013-Ohio-
3315, ¶ 6. Pursuant to that statute, an appellate court does not review the sentencing court's
decision for an abuse of discretion. Marcum at ¶ 10. Rather, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) compels an
appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence only if the appellate court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that "the record does not support the trial court's findings under relevant
statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law." Id. at ¶ 1. A sentence is not
clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court "considers the principles and
purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes
postrelease control, and sentences the defendant within the permissible statutory range."
State v. Ahlers, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-100, 2016-Ohio-2890, ¶ 8; State v. Julious,
12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-12-224, 2016-Ohio-4822, ¶ 8. Thus, this court may "increase,
reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence only when it clearly and convincingly finds that the
sentence is (1) contrary to law or (2) unsupported by the record." State v. Brandenburg, 146
Ohio St.3d 221, 2016-Ohio-2970, ¶ 1, citing Marcum at ¶ 7. -4- Clermont CA2017-03-018 CA2017-03-019
Principles and Purposes of Sentencing
{¶ 12} Appellant contends the "almost maximum" sentence imposed on each fifth-
degree felony offense was "contrary to law and to the purposes and principles of sentencing."
He argues that in considering the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C.
2929.12, the court should have given weight to the fact that he did not "expect to cause harm
to any person or property" in the commission of his offenses and his conduct was influenced
by his substance abuse issues.
{¶ 13} A trial court has discretion to impose a prison term on an offender who pleads
guilty to a fifth-degree felony that is not an offense of violence if the offender "at the time of
the offense was serving, or the offender previously had served, a prison term." R.C.
2929.13(B)(1)(b)(x). "[I]n determining whether to impose a prison term as a sanction for a
felony of the * * * fifth degree, the sentencing court shall comply with the purposes and
principles of sentencing under section 2929.11 of the Revised Code and with section
2929.12 of the Revised Code." R.C. 2929.13(B)(2).
{¶ 14} The purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from future crime
by the offender and to punish the offender. R.C. 2929.11(A). A felony sentence must be
reasonably calculated to achieve the purposes set forth in R.C. 2929.11(A) "commensurate
with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and its impact on the
victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar
offenders." R.C. 2929.11(B). In sentencing a defendant, a trial court is not required to
consider each sentencing factor, but rather to exercise its discretion in determining whether
the sentence satisfies the overriding purpose of Ohio's sentencing structure. State v.
Littleton, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-03-060, 2016-Ohio-7544, ¶ 12. The factors set forth
in R.C. 2929.12 are nonexclusive, and R.C. 2929.12 explicitly allows a trial court to consider
any relevant factors in imposing a sentence. Id. State v. Birt, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012- -5- Clermont CA2017-03-018 CA2017-03-019
02-031, 2013-Ohio-1379, ¶ 64.
{¶ 15} After a thorough review of the record, we find no error in the trial court's
decision to sentence appellant to 11 months in prison for each of his fifth-degree felony
offenses. The record plainly reveals that appellant's sentence is not clearly and convincingly
contrary to law as appellant served a prior prison term, as contemplated by R.C.
2929.13(B)(1)(b)(x), the court properly considered the principles and purposes of R.C.
2929.11, as well as the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, informed appellant he may be subject
to up to three years of postrelease control upon his release from prison, and sentenced
appellant within the permissible statutory range for his fifth-degree felonies in accordance
with R.C. 2929.14(A)(5).
{¶ 16} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court specifically stated:
THE COURT: I've reviewed the presentence investigation report in detail, considered the purposes and principles of sentencing under 2929.11 and -.12. And the purposes and the principles of sentencing are certainly to punish the offender, to hopefully to [sic] send a message to others to not engage in that same kind of conduct that has brought you here. * * *
I – I would say to some extent your conduct is a little less serious than others in terms of how you react to heroin, because I've had people standing there who are younger than you who are going to prison for many, many years because they broke into houses and totally shattered the security of the individuals. This does not lessen the impact that it has had on the victims. It's essentially the same, I suppose, in a large part.
And this is not – as you've said, you've been battling it for years. * * * [I]n '07, you were charged with possession of heroin and cocaine, intervention in lieu of conviction. A treatment program was provided for you at that time, and you were terminated from the treatment program, still placed on community control, still ended up in prison.
Because in '09, you went on a spree of offenses, breaking and entering into not houses, but other structures, and were sentenced to prison at that time. So with the history that you have, serious. And you've obviously reoffended even after going to prison. I will say that there are individuals who have heroin -6- Clermont CA2017-03-018 CA2017-03-019
addictions that get into treatment programs and they survive, and they fight it every day, I'm sure, but they don’t reoffend.
And I can't explain to you why you can't lick it. I wish I could. * * * [G]iven the nature of the offenses, given your criminal history in this matter, community control is not an appropriate sanction.
{¶ 17} Appellant disagrees with the trial court's analysis and its balancing of the
seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12. He believes the court should have
imposed a shorter sentence, given his expressed remorse, his drug-dependency issues, and
the fact that he did not intend to cause harm to any person or property when committing his
offenses. However, it is "[t]he trial court [that], in imposing a sentence, determines the weight
afforded to any particular statutory factors, mitigating grounds, or other relevant
circumstances." State v. Steger, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2016-03-059, 2016-Ohio-7908, ¶
18, citing State v. Stubbs, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-810, 2014-Ohio-3696, ¶ 16. The fact
that the trial court chose to weigh various sentencing factors differently than how appellant
would have weighed them does not mean the trial court erred in imposing appellant's
sentence. The record establishes that appellant has a lengthy criminal history and prior
attempts to rehabilitate and punish him through treatment programs, community control
sanctions, and a term of imprisonment have been unsuccessful. Appellant continues to
abuse drugs and commit crimes. The victims of his current theft-based offenses suffered
financial, emotional, and psychological harm. The 11-month prison sentence imposed on
each felony count protects the public from future crime and punishes appellant.
{¶ 18} Therefore, after reviewing the record, we find no clear and convincing evidence
that the court erred in balancing the factors in R.C. 2929.12. The record supports the trial
court's sentencing decision.
Consecutive Sentences
{¶ 19} We further find that the trial court's decision to run appellant's felony sentences
-7- Clermont CA2017-03-018 CA2017-03-019
consecutively to one another was not contrary to law and is supported by the record.
Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court must engage in a three-step analysis and make
certain findings before imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Clermont
No. CA2014-07-054, 2015-Ohio-1093, ¶ 7. Specifically, the trial court must find that (1) the
consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the
offender, (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the
offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and (3) one of the
following applies:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4); Smith at ¶ 7.
{¶ 20} "In order to impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court is required
to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and
incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry." State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-
Ohio-3177, ¶ 37. While the trial court is not required to give reasons explaining these
findings, it must be clear from the record that the court engaged in the required sentencing
analysis and made the requisite findings. Smith at ¶ 8. "A consecutive sentence is contrary
to law where the trial court fails to make the consecutive sentencing findings as required by
-8- Clermont CA2017-03-018 CA2017-03-019
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)." State v. Marshall, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2013-05-042, 2013-Ohio-
5092, ¶ 8.
{¶ 21} Here, the record reflects that the trial court made the findings required by R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) before imposing consecutive sentences. At the sentencing hearing, the court
stated the following:
I've considered 2929.14(C)(4)(a) through (c) and find that the consecutive structure of this sentence is appropriate. I think a single sentence would demean the seriousness of these charges and the impact and the harm that's been caused.
Other victims in the impact – in the presentence report that they have filed have similar reactions and – and similar problems as [the victim that appeared at sentencing] expressed * * * here in court and all of them not only have lost financially, but more importantly emotionally and psychologically they – they continue to have repercussions as a result of your conduct.
Your prior history is serious, and your likelihood of reoffending is, I think, highest. And again, these are multiple victims. I think a single sentence, if you will, for the felony offenses clearly would demean the seriousness of these charges.
The court reiterated its findings in the sentencing entry, stating it considered R.C.
2929.14(C)(4) and found:
These consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime and punish the defendant.
These consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the Defendant's conduct which involves multiple theft offenses from multiple victims. Further, the harm caused by these multiple offenses were so great and so unusual that no single prison term adequately reflects the seriousness of the Defendant's conduct and a single sentence would demean the seriousness of his conduct.
The Defendant's criminal history also warrants consecutive sentences as he has three prior convictions for felony offenses in Ohio and has served a prior prison term as a result of these prior convictions.
Although the language the trial court used in making the consecutive sentence findings was
-9- Clermont CA2017-03-018 CA2017-03-019
not a word-for-word recitation of the language in the statute, such language is not required.
See State v. Alhashimi, 12th Dist. Nos. CA2016-07-065 and CA2017-07-066, 2017-Ohio-
7658, ¶ 67. "[A]s long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the
correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support the findings,
consecutive sentences should be upheld." Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177 at ¶ 29.
{¶ 22} Here, the trial court did engage in the correct analysis and the record contains
evidence supporting the court's findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). As such, we find no error
in the court's imposition of consecutive sentences.
Failure to Give Advisements
{¶ 23} Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in sentencing him without
informing him that, pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f), he is required to submit to random drug
testing while in prison and cannot ingest or be injected with a drug in prison. He further
contends the court erred in sentencing him because the court never informed him that he
was required, pursuant to R.C. 2901.07(B), to submit a DNA sample as a result of his felony
convictions. We have previously addressed such arguments and found them to be without
merit in State v. Moore, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2014-02-016, 2014-Ohio-5191, ¶ 16-18;
and State v. Setty, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2014-09-068, 2015-Ohio-2012, ¶ 14. For the
reasons set forth in Moore and Setty, we find that any error that resulted from the trial court's
failure to provide the advisements contained in R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f) and 2901.07(B) was
harmless.
{¶ 24} We likewise find the trial court's failure to inform appellant of his right to appeal
under Crim.R. 32(B) was harmless error, as appellant filed a timely appeal and has not
shown any prejudice. See State v. Johnson, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2000-11-089, 2001
Ohio App. LEXIS 4726, *12 (Oct. 22, 2001); State v. McCrae, 5th Dist. Muskingum No.
CT2017-0008, 2017-Ohio-2968, ¶ 18. - 10 - Clermont CA2017-03-018 CA2017-03-019
Restitution Order
{¶ 25} Finally, appellant challenges the trial court's order that he pay $1,644.92 in
restitution to his victims, arguing that the court failed to consider his present and future ability
to pay in accordance with R.C. 2929.19(B)(5). Appellant acknowledges that he did not object
to the trial court's restitution order at the sentencing hearing and that his argument is
therefore reviewed on appeal under a plain-error standard of review. See State v. Sesic,
12th Dist. Madison No. CA2012-08-020, 2013-Ohio-2864, ¶ 6.
{¶ 26} Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), "[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights
may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." Notice of plain
error "must be taken with utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to
prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice." State v. Baldev, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2004-05-
106, 2005-Ohio-2369, ¶ 12.
{¶ 27} R.C. 2929.19(B)(5) provides that a trial court, before imposing a financial
sanction, including restitution, must first "consider the offender's present and future ability to
pay the amount of the sanction or fine." While "[t]here are no express factors that must be
considered or specific findings that must be made regarding the offender's ability to pay,"
there "must be some evidence in the record to show that the trial court acted in accordance
with the legislative mandate that it consider the offender's present and future ability to pay."
State v. Chaffin, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2016-08-026, 2017-Ohio-4041, ¶ 9, citing State v.
Dandridge, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2003-12-330, 2005-Ohio-1077, ¶ 6; State v. Lang, 12th
Dist. Brown No. CA2011-03-007, 2011-Ohio-5742, ¶ 12. This court looks to the totality of the
record to see if this requirement has been satisfied. State v. Rabe, 12th Dist. Clermont No.
CA2013-09-068, 2014-Ohio-2008, ¶ 74.
{¶ 28} The record contains evidence indicating the trial court considered appellant's
present and future ability to pay restitution to his victims. Prior to ordering appellant to pay - 11 - Clermont CA2017-03-018 CA2017-03-019
the financial sanction, the trial court stated it had reviewed the PSI. The PSI indicated
appellant obtained his GED in 2010, and has worked on and off in masonry since he was 17
years old. Although appellant was not working at the time he committed the offenses, he
was 35 years old and in good health. Appellant will be released from prison before he is 39
years old, and there is nothing in the record indicating he will be unable to gain employment
at that time. Further, contrary to appellant's arguments, the fact that he was indigent and
was represented by a public defender does not mean he will not have the future ability to pay
the financial sanction. This court has previously recognized that the determination that a
defendant is indigent for purposes of appointed counsel is separate and distinct from a
determination that the person is indigent for purposes of paying a mandatory fine or financial
sanction. State v. Johnson, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2011-11-212, 2014-Ohio-3776, ¶ 14-16;
State v. Collins, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2014-11-135, 2015-Ohio-3710, ¶ 46. See also
State v. Andrews, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110735, 2012-Ohio-4664, ¶ 29 (noting that Ohio
courts have uniformly held that the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant does
not prohibit the trial court from imposing a financial sanction because "an offender's ability to
pay a fine over a period of time is not equivalent to the ability to pay legal counsel a retainer
fee at the outset of the criminal proceedings").
{¶ 29} As the record contains evidence demonstrating the trial court considered
appellant's present and future ability to pay, appellant's argument that the court committed
plain error in ordering restitution is without merit.
{¶ 30} Accordingly, having found no merit to any of the arguments raised by appellant
in his first assignment of error, we hereby overrule the assignment of error.
{¶ 31} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 32} APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL
IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS THUS PREJUDICING HIS RIGHT TO A - 12 - Clermont CA2017-03-018 CA2017-03-019
FAIR HEARING.
{¶ 33} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues he received ineffective
representation by his trial counsel as counsel "fail[ed] to protect [his] interests in sentencing
concerning the notification issue and the restitution issue."
{¶ 34} To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must
establish that (1) his trial counsel's performance was deficient and (2) such deficiency
prejudiced the defense to the point of depriving the appellant of a fair trial. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Trial counsel's performance will
not be deemed deficient unless it "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at
688. To show prejudice, the appellant must prove there exists "a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Id. at 694. An appellant's failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test
negates a court's need to consider the other. State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 389
(2000).
{¶ 35} Appellant cannot demonstrate he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged errors.
As discussed in our resolution of appellant's first assignment of error, the trial court's failure
to notify appellant that he is required to submit to random drug testing in prison, cannot
ingest or be injected with a drug of abuse while in prison, and is required to submit a DNA
sample resulted in harmless error. Appellant cannot show he was prejudiced by counsel's
failure to object to the court's lack of advisements. Moreover, appellant cannot demonstrate
that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the restitution order, as the court
considered appellant's present and future ability to pay the financial sanction before imposing
the sanction.
{¶ 36} Accordingly, as appellant cannot establish the prejudice prong of Strickland,
we find no merit to his arguments and overrule his second assignment of error. - 13 - Clermont CA2017-03-018 CA2017-03-019
{¶ 37} Judgment affirmed.
RINGLAND and PIPER, JJ., concur.
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