IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE ) ) v. ) I.D. # 1505015619A ) 1505015619B ANTHONY ABBATIELLO, ) ) Defendant. )
Submitted: January 3, 2020 Decided: April 8, 2020
ORDER DENYING ANTHONY ABBATIELLO’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
This 8th day of April, 2020, upon consideration of the Motion for
Postconviction Relief (the “Postconviction Motion”) filed by Anthony Abbatiello,
Trial Counsel’s and the State’s responses thereto, the record in this matter, and the
applicable legal authorities, including Rule 61 of the Superior Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure (“Rule 61”), it appears to the Court that:
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. On March 24, 2016, after a three-day trial, Abbatiello was convicted of
Attempted Assault First Degree, Reckless Endangering First Degree, Home
Invasion, Robbery First Degree, four counts of Possession of a Firearm during the
Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Possession of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited (“PABPP”), 1 and
various traffic offenses. As a result of those convictions, Abbatiello faced a
minimum mandatory sentence of 38 years at Level V. After a presentence
investigation, the Court sentenced Abbatiello to 53 years at Level V, suspended after
46 years, 6 months for decreasing levels of probation.2
2. Abbatiello’s convictions stemmed from a May 9, 2015 home invasion.3
Carla Weston was leaving her hotel room when an intruder pushed her back into the
room, displayed a gun, and demanded money. Weston complied, and the intruder
then fled the room with the money and Weston’s purse and cellphones. Weston went
outside and alerted a nearby group of people that she had just been robbed. The
group pursued the intruder, at which point he turned and fired at least three shots
toward the crowd. The intruder eventually fled in a vehicle that picked him up on a
roadway adjacent to the hotel.
3. Detective Paul Doherty of the Delaware State Police developed
Abbatiello as a suspect approximately one week later. Based on a partial license
plate provided by witnesses, police also identified Bernard Bryant as the driver of
1 Abbatiello’s “person prohibited” charges were severed and tried in a separate bench trial immediately following the jury’s verdict in the “A” case. 2 State v. Abbatiello, I.D. No. 1505015619 (Del. Super. July 15, 2016) (SENTENCING ORDER). Abbatiello’s sentence was effective Aug. 17, 2015. 3 All facts are drawn from the State’s response to Defendant’s postconviction motion and the August 29, 2017 Delaware Supreme Court Order. See State’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Postconviction Relief (D.I. 132); Abbatiello v. State, 2017 WL 3725063 (Del. Aug. 29, 2017). Citations to the docket in this order are to the docket in I.D. No. 1505015619A. 2 the vehicle in which Abbatiello fled. Records showed attempted contact between
cell phones linked to Abbatiello and Bryant the night before and the morning of the
robbery. In addition, Investigator Brian Daly testified that Abbatiello’s call detail
record showed only two phone calls on May 9, 2015. One call occurred
approximately four hours before the robbery, and Daly testified the cell tower
location indicated Abbatiello’s phone was in Delaware during that call. 4 On cross-
examination, Daly conceded that no records showed Abbatiello in the vicinity of the
Fairview Inn at the time of the robbery.
4. When shown a photo lineup, Weston identified Abbatiello within a few
seconds as the intruder. Police later went to Abbatiello’s home, but Abbatiello fled
in a vehicle as police arrived. Police officers pursued Abbatiello and found the
vehicle a few minutes later on the side of the road. It was apparent the vehicle had
been involved in a collision, but Abbatiello had fled the scene. Abbatiello was not
arrested until several months later. At his residence, police collected clothing
consistent with the clothing worn by the intruder during the robbery.
5. At trial, Abbatiello’s podmate, Nicolas Jamison, testified that while
awaiting trial, Abbatiello told Jamison he committed the robbery, had a gun, fired it
at a person pursuing him, and planned to call alibi witnesses. Abbatiello in fact
4 State v. Abbatiello, I.D. No. 1505015619 (Trial Transcript) (hereinafter “Trial Tr.”) (Mar. 23, 2016) 44-49. 3 called two alibi witnesses at trial, both of whom testified Abbatiello was in
Philadelphia at the time of the robbery. Abbatiello also took the stand, denied having
any role in the robbery, and testified he was in Philadelphia at the time it occurred.
6. After the jury found him guilty, Abbatiello appealed his convictions,
and on August 29, 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an order affirming
Abbatiello’s convictions.5 The Supreme Court issued its mandate on September 18,
2017.6 Since that time, Abbatiello has filed numerous motions, including a motion
for sentence modification that was denied on November 29, 2017,7 multiple motions
to compel,8 and the present motion for postconviction relief.
7. Abbatiello filed his original pro se postconviction motion on April 23,
2018.9 On May 29, 2018, Abbatiello filed a motion for appointment of counsel,10
which the Court granted on June 5, 2018.11 Patrick Collins, Esquire (“Postconviction
Counsel”) was appointed to represent Abbatiello for purposes of seeking
postconviction relief, but Abbatiello ultimately decided he wanted to proceed
without counsel.12 On June 27, 2019, this Court entered an order permitting Collins
5 Abbatiello, 2017 WL 3725063. 6 D.I. 87. 7 D.I. 90. 8 In a separate order issued simultaneously with this order, the Court is denying Abbatiello’s most recent motion to compel and motion to appoint an expert. 9 D.I. 95. 10 D.I. 102. 11 D.I. 104. 12 D.I. 118. 4 to withdraw.13 Abbatiello has filed many amendments to his original postconviction
motion, and the Court will consider the July 24, 2019 Postconviction Motion14 and
August 8, 2019 supplement15 collectively as the final and complete statement of
Abbatiello’s claims. In his pro se Postconviction Motion, Abbatiello raises 17
grounds for relief, which generally fall into the categories of prosecutorial
misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial Counsel and the State
responded to Abbatiello’s arguments,16 and Abbatiello filed a reply in further
support of his claims.17
ANALYSIS
8. Before addressing the merits of any claim for postconviction relief, this
Court first must determine whether the motion procedurally is barred under Rule
61.18 A motion for postconviction relief may be barred for timeliness and repetition,
among other things. A Rule 61 motion is untimely if it is filed more than one year
after a final judgment of conviction.19 A defendant also is barred from filing
successive motions for relief under the Rule.20 The Rule further prohibits motions
13 D.I. 121; see also D.I. 120. 14 D.I. 123. 15 D.I. 126. 16 See Aff. of Timothy J. Weiler in Resp. to Rule 61 Mot. for Postconviction Relief (D.I. 128); D.I. 132. 17 D.I. 133. 18 Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991); Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 19 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). 20 Id. 61(i)(2); see id. 61(d)(2)(i)-(ii) (regarding the pleading requirements for successive motions). 5 based on any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading up to
the judgment of conviction, unless the movant demonstrates “[c]ause for relief from
the procedural default” and “[p]rejudice from violation of the movant’s rights.” 21
Finally, the Rule bars consideration of any ground for relief that previously was
adjudicated in the case.22
9. Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural bars, this Court may
consider a motion that otherwise is barred if the motion is based on claims that the
Court lacked jurisdiction, or the motion satisfies the pleading requirements set forth
in Rule 61(d)(2).23 Rule 61(d)(2) requires a movant to plead with particularity that
(i) “new evidence exists that creates a strong inference that the movant is actually
innocent in fact of the acts underlying the charges of which he was convicted;” or
(ii) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the United States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the
movant’s case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.”24
10. Abbatiello’s Postconviction Motion timely was filed. This is his first
motion for postconviction relief, and the motion therefore is not barred as successive.
21 Id. 61(i)(3)(A)-(B). 22 Id. 61(i)(4). 23 Id. 61(i)(5). 24 Id. 61(d)(2)(i)-(ii). 6 As set forth below, however, several of Abbatiello’s arguments are barred because
they previously were adjudicated or were not raised in a timely manner.
I. Several of Abbatiello’s claims procedurally are barred.
11. In Abbatiello’s Postconviction Motion and his Reply in Further Support
of the Postconviction Motion, he articulates several alleged violations of his
constitutional rights, including: (1) the State failed to correct the testimonies of
Daly,25 Jamison,26 and Detective Doherty;27 (2) the State partially withheld
Jamison’s criminal history;28 and (3) the Court failed to inquire as to potential racial
bias during voir dire.29
12. All these arguments are barred as claims that were not timely raised
during trial or on direct appeal.30 Abbatiello’s contention that the State failed to
correct witness testimony and partially withheld a witness’s criminal history, as well
as his contention that the Court failed to inquire as to potential racial bias during voir
dire, all were arguments that could have been raised in the proceedings leading to
Abbatiello’s conviction. Abbatiello has not argued there is cause for relief from the
procedural default.31
25 D.I. 123 at 8-10 (“Claim 2”). 26 Id. at 20-22 (“Claim 7”). 27 Id. at 24-26 (“Claim 9”). 28 Id. at 16-20 (“Claim 6”). 29 D.I. 126 (“Claim 16”). 30 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3). 31 See id. 7 13. Abbatiello does, however, argue the procedural bars should not apply
under Rule 61(d)(2)(i) because new evidence creates a strong inference that he
actually is innocent in fact of the charges for which he was convicted. Specifically,
Abbatiello argues that “missing” phone calls, not contained in the phone records
produced in discovery, will show Abbatiello was in Philadelphia at the time the
robbery occurred.32
14. Abbatiello’s actual innocence argument fails on the merits. Rule 61’s
actual innocence exception requires “new evidence creating a strong inference that
[the defendant] was actually innocent of the underlying charges.”33 Abbatiello’s
argument is conclusory and therefore does not meet the pleading requirement for
actual innocence. Abbatiello claims the State committed prosecutorial misconduct
by suppressing sections of the call detail record for Abbatiello’s phone, which he
alleges would reveal additional phone calls that would place him in Philadelphia at
the time of the robbery. As discussed in detail below,34 Abbatiello has failed to show
there are missing sections to the call detail record for his phone. Accordingly, he
has not shown that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
32 D.I. 123 at 12-13 (“Claim 4”). 33 Winn v. State, 2015 WL 8710303, at *2 (Del. Dec. 11, 2015); see State v. Taylor, 2018 WL 3199537, at *7 (Del. Super. June 28, 2018). 34 See ¶¶ 20-24, infra. 8 found him guilty, and Abbatiello therefore cannot meet his burden to demonstrate
actual innocence under Rule 61(d)(2).
II. Abbatiello’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims do not support postconviction relief. 15. Abbatiello’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims could not be raised
at trial or on direct appeal from his conviction and therefore are not barred
procedurally.35 Abbatiello contends his trial counsel, Timothy J. Weiler, Esquire
(“Trial Counsel”), failed to (1) suppress cell phone information; (2) investigate or
obtain an expert witness; (3) object to the State’s perjury warning; (4) compel
witnesses to testify; (5) address inconsistencies in witness testimony; (6) investigate
Weston’s illegal activity; (7) object to and present evidence regarding Susan
Chambers’ lineup misidentification; (8) object to the State’s cross-examination of
witnesses and/or rehabilitate those witnesses; and (9) cross-examine witnesses about
the traffic offenses. Abbatiello argues Trial Counsel also provided the State with
inadmissible prior witness statements and deprived Abbatiello of his rights during
jury selection.36 He additionally contends his appellate counsel, Bernard J.
O’Donnell, Esquire (“Appellate Counsel”) was ineffective because he failed to raise
prosecutorial misconduct claims regarding Daly’s and Detective Doherty’s
testimony.
35 State v. Evans-Mayes, 2016 WL 4502303, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 25, 2016). 36 D.I. 126 (“Claim 17”). 9 16. To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must meet the well-known “Strickland standard,” i.e., that counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.37 There is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was
reasonable.38 Accordingly, a defendant must make specific allegations of actual
prejudice and substantiate them; mere allegations or conclusory statements will not
suffice.39
17. Abbatiello does not meet the requisite burden to prevail on his multiple,
scattershot ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Trial and Appellate Counsel’s
representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and
Abbatiello does not prove there is a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. My reasoning
follows.
A. Trial Counsel reasonably decided not to move to suppress the cell site location information. 18. In his first claim for postconviction relief,40 Abbatiello contends Trial
Counsel was ineffective by failing to suppress the warrant that Detective Doherty
37 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). 38 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 39 Id.; see Monroe v. State, 2015 WL 1407856, at *3 (Del. Mar. 25, 2015). 40 D.I. 123 at 6-8 (“Claim 1”). 10 obtained for Abbatiello’s cell site location information. Abbatiello argues Detective
Doherty’s affidavit supporting the warrant did not meet the statutory requirements,
and Trial Counsel therefore was ineffective for failing to challenge the warrant.
19. According to his response to Abbatiello’s motion, Trial Counsel
concluded he had no good faith basis to the challenge the search warrant based upon
the affidavit’s sufficiency. Trial Counsel reviewed the affidavit and concluded it
contained sufficient facts and evidence to support the search warrant’s issuance.41
Trial Counsel’s probable cause evaluation was appropriate,42 and his decision not to
move to suppress the cell site location information therefore did not fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness.
B. Appellate Counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise a prosecutorial misconduct claim regarding Daly’s testimony. 20. In his second postconviction claim,43 Abbatiello contends Appellate
Counsel failed to argue on direct appeal that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct
with respect to Daly’s testimony. Abbatiello contends Daly falsely testified as to the
number of voice calls associated with Abbatiello’s phone on the day of the robbery.
In support of that argument, Abbatiello points to call records associated with Louise
Cuculino’s phone. Cuculino purportedly was Abbatiello’s girlfriend, and the State
obtained MetroPCS records for her phone that showed she made several phone calls
41 D.I. 128. 42 See also D.I. 132 at 6. 43 D.I. 123 at 8-10 (“Claim 2”). 11 to Abbatiello’s phone number on May 9, 2015.44 Those phone calls were not,
however, reflected on Abbatiello’s call record. Although Trial Counsel sought to
question Daly about Cuculino’s call records, the records were not properly
authenticated, and the Court therefore did not admit them into evidence.45
21. Abbatiello argues the inconsistency between his and Cuculino’s phone
records implies Daly falsely testified, and Appellate Counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise this issue on direct appeal. Appellate Counsel’s decision not to argue
prosecutorial misconduct on appeal was reasonable because the trial record did not
support such a claim. The record evidence admitted at trial did not show any
inconsistency between the phone records because Cuculino’s phone records were
not authenticated and never were admitted into evidence. The fact that Cuculino’s
phone records exist does not mean Daly perjured himself or the State committed
misconduct by eliciting Daly’s testimony regarding Abbatiello’s phone records,
which were authenticated and admitted.46 In short, Abbatiello fails adequately to
allege Appellate Counsel’s representation did not meet the objective standard of
reasonableness or that the result of the appeal would have been different had
Appellate Counsel raised this claim.
44 See Trial Tr. (May 23, 2016) 211-216. 45 Id. at 213-219. 46 As explained below, Trial Counsel’s representation relating to the admissibility of the phone records was not ineffective. 12 C. Trial Counsel’s decisions not to consult an expert witness, obtain a complete call detail record, or impeach the expert witness were reasonable. 22. In his third claim for postconviction relief,47 Abbatiello contends Trial
Counsel was ineffective for “failing to investigate the cell device record, consult an
expert, seek a complete certified record, and impeach the state’s expert.” Abbatiello
contends he told Trial Counsel of the conflict between Daly’s testimony and
Cuculino’s phone records, but Trial Counsel did not adequately address those issues
on cross-examination. Abbatiello additionally argues that Trial Counsel’s failure to
consult an expert witness or obtain the complete certified call data record was
unreasonable.
23. Trial Counsel effectively cross-examined the State’s expert witness and
elicited testimony beneficial to Abbatiello, namely that Abbatiello’s phone records
did not place him within the vicinity of the Fairview Inn at the time of the robbery.48
Having elicited testimony helpful to Abbatiello, Trial Counsel made the strategic
decision not to discredit that witness.49 Counsel’s strategic decisions are afforded
substantial deference.50
47 D.I. 123 at 10-12 (“Claim 3”). 48 D.I. 128. 49 Id. 50 See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681 (“Because advocacy is an art and not a science, and because the adversary system requires deference to counsel’s informed decisions, strategic choices must be respected in these circumstances if they are based on professional judgment.”); State v. Cabrera, 2015 WL 3878287, at *6 (Del. Super. June 17, 2015) (“The Court will give deference to strategic 13 24. As to Abbatiello’s contention that Trial Counsel should have consulted
an expert regarding the cell phone records, that argument is premised on Abbatiello’s
contention that the call detail record offered by the State was incomplete. That
premise is entirely unsupported. The State authenticated the call detail records for
Abbatiello’s phone, and there is no evidence the records were “incomplete” or
somehow edited. Even if Trial Counsel had succeeded in authenticating Cuculino’s
phone record, Abbatiello has not shown those records would have changed Daly’s
analysis or that of any other expert. Although Cuculino’s phone records show she
made several brief calls to Abbatiello’s phone number on the day of the robbery,
those calls did not register to Abbatiello’s phone. Accordingly, eliciting testimony
regarding the phone calls Cuculino made would not have changed the substance of
Daly’s expert testimony, which was limited to the fact that the call in the early
morning of May 9, 2015 showed Abbatiello was in Delaware. At most, the jury
would have heard that Cuculino at least attempted to call Abbatiello at other times
during that day.51 But, since those calls did not register to Abbatiello’s phone, there
was no associated cell tower data regarding the location of Abbatiello’s phone at the
time of the calls. It follows that Cuculino’s records, even if authenticated and
decisions made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options, as such decisions are virtually unchallengeable.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 51 The record reflects Daly would not have been able to explain the disparity, and that several explanations were possible, including that the call went to voicemail. Trial Tr. (Mar. 23, 2016) 213-216. 14 admitted at trial, neither would have impeached Daly’s testimony nor offered the
jury any evidence in support of Abbatiello’s defense that he was in Philadelphia at
the time of the robbery. Accordingly, Abbatiello has not shown a reasonable
probability that the result at trial would have been different had Trial Counsel
consulted an expert or succeeded in admitting Cuculino’s phone records at trial.
D. Trial Counsel appropriately advised Abbatiello and the potential witnesses and consulted Abbatiello about calling additional witnesses. 25. In his fifth claim for postconviction relief,52 Abbatiello contends Trial
Counsel failed to object to the State’s perjury warning and should have compelled
the potential defense witnesses to testify. Abbatiello contends “counsel told Blaise
Abbatiello, Joseph McPhilemy, Salvatore Catania and James Harrington that they
are going to be arrested if they testify regardless of whether they were telling the
truth.”53 Abbatiello argues the proceedings would have ended differently if Trial
Counsel had compelled the other witnesses to testify.
26. As an initial matter, the Supreme Court addressed the State’s perjury
warning on appeal and concluded it was proper under Delaware law.54 Accordingly,
Trial Counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the State’s warning. As to
Trial Counsel’s statements to potential alibi witnesses, counsel denies any
52 D.I. 123 at 13-16 (“Claim 5”). 53 See id. at 14 (citing Def.’s App. and Exs. to Pro Se Final Am. Mot. for Postconviction Relief (D.I. 124), Ex. C1 (Aff. of Blaise Abbatiello)). The Court hereinafter refers to Blaise Abbatiello by his first name to distinguish him from Defendant. No disrespect is intended. 54 Abbatiello, 2017 WL 3725063, at *2. 15 conversations with any witnesses concerning a threat of arrest, jail, or lawyers.55
Trial Counsel advised the witnesses of the State’s position regarding the risk of a
perjury charge.56
27. In regard to Abbatiello’s claim that Trial Counsel should have
compelled additional defense witnesses to testify, Trial Counsel discussed with
Abbatiello whether to call Bryant as a witness and how Bryant’s testimony could be
favorable. Abbatiello ultimately decided he did not want Bryant interviewed or
called as a witness.57 Abbatiello cannot now claim that, but for this strategic decision
in which he participated, the result of the proceedings would have been different.
E. Trial Counsel effectively addressed witness statement inconsistencies. 28. In his eighth claim for postconviction relief,58 Abbatiello contends Trial
Counsel was ineffective in failing to address inconsistencies in witness statements
and for failing to impeach Detective Doherty’s and Weston’s testimony regarding
Weston’s initial failure to recall Abbatiello’s tattoos. Abbatiello contends witness
inconsistencies were a central issue to the case, and the jury could have disregarded
the State’s entire case had Trial Counsel highlighted the tattoo identification
information.
55 D.I. 128. 56 Id. 57 Id.; see also D.I. 124, Ex. H2. 58 D.I. 123 at 22-24 (“Claim 8”). 16 29. Trial Counsel responds that he cross-examined Weston regarding at
least six inconsistencies, including Abbatiello’s tattoos,59 and also cross-examined
Detective Doherty regarding Weston’s initial failure to recall those tattoos.60
Abbatiello fails to meet his burden on this claim because Trial Counsel’s
representation in this regard objectively was reasonable.
F. Appellate Counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a prosecutorial misconduct claim regarding Detective Doherty’s testimony. 30. In his ninth claim for postconviction relief,61 Abbatiello contends
Appellate Counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the State’s
alleged misconduct regarding Detective Doherty’s testimony. Abbatiello posits that
in her initial interview with Detective Doherty, Weston did not identify her assailant
as having any tattoos, but she later testified differently and stated he did have tattoos.
The State then recalled Detective Doherty to the stand, who explained that Weston
stated in her initial interview that she did not recall the robber having tattoos, but
later contacted Detective Doherty and stated it was possible the assailant had sleeve
tattoos on his arms.
31. Abbatiello’s argument is premised on his contention that the State
committed misconduct by failing to “correct” Detective Doherty’s false testimony.
59 D.I. 128. 60 Id. 61 D.I. 123 at 24-26 (“Claim 9”). 17 Abbatiello fails, however, to show that any false testimony was offered. Detective
Doherty’s affidavit of probable cause reflects that Weston “added she believed
[suspect 1] possibly has ‘sleeve’ style tattoos on his forearms, but she could not be
entirely sure.”62 Detective Doherty’s and Weston’s testimonies were consistent with
that record. Accordingly, Abbatiello’s ninth postconviction claim fails because he
has not shown that Appellate Counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness or that the result of the appeal would have been different
if Appellate Counsel had raised this argument.
G. Trial Counsel was not ineffective regarding Weston’s alleged illegal activity. 32. In his tenth claim for postconviction relief,63 Abbatiello contends Trial
Counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate Weston and her purported
involvement in illegal activity. Abbatiello alleges this inquiry would have showed
Weston was engaged in prostitution or drug dealing and thereby revealed another
person’s motive to rob Weston. Abbatiello asserts Trial Counsel relied exclusively
on the State’s records despite information Abbatiello provided to aid in his defense,
and that Trial Counsel should have pursued Weston’s criminal history to cast doubt
on the reliability of her identification or the credibility of her testimony.
62 D.I. 124, Ex. A2 at ¶ 11. 63 D.I. 123 at 26-29 (“Claim 10”). 18 33. First, Trial Counsel did in fact address Weston’s alleged illegal activity
during cross-examination.64 Additionally, Jamison testified that Abbatiello robbed
Weston because she was a drug dealer.65 Fundamentally, however, the issue of why
someone robbed Weston was not material at trial; the issue at trial was who robbed
her. Accordingly, the fact that other unnamed persons may have been motivated to
rob Weston had no bearing on whether Abbatiello in fact robbed her.66 Accordingly,
Abbatiello has not shown there is a reasonable probability that the result at trial
would have been different if Trial Counsel had focused more on Weston’s alleged
criminal activity or other persons’ alleged motives to rob her.
H. Trial Counsel reasonably decided not to call Chambers as a witness. 34. In his eleventh claim for postconviction relief,67 Abbatiello contends
Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to call Susan Chambers as a witness and to
emphasize that she identified someone other than Abbatiello in the photo lineup.
Chambers was present at the Fairview Inn at the time of the robbery and later was
shown a photo lineup that included Abbatiello’s picture. Chambers chose another
picture, not Abbatiello’s, as the person she believed she saw fleeing from the
64 Id. at 13; see Trial Tr. (Mar. 23, 2016) 103. 65 Trial Tr. (Mar. 23, 2016) 137. 66 See D.I. 128. 67 D.I. 123 at 29-31 (“Claim 11”). 19 Fairview Inn. Chambers stated, however, that her certainty in her selection was only
“five out of ten.”68
35. Trial Counsel concedes he misunderstood before trial which witness
misidentified Abbatiello in the lineup.69 During trial, the State provided Chambers’
contact information to Trial Counsel, but he ultimately did not call her as a witness.
Even if Trial Counsel’s failure to subpoena Chambers fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, Abbatiello has not met Strickland’s second prong.
Chambers’ uncertainty regarding the identification rendered the testimony fairly
unimportant, particularly in comparison to Weston’s identification, the video
surveillance, and the evidence obtained at Abbatiello’s home.70 Abbatiello fails to
meet the burden on this claim because he has not shown the result of the trial would
have been different if Chambers was called as a witness.
I. Trial Counsel’s decision to provide the State with the investigator’s witness interview reports did not amount to ineffective assistance. 36. In his twelfth claim for postconviction relief,71 Abbatiello contends
Trial Counsel was ineffective by providing the State with reports prepared by the
defense investigator, which the State then used to impeach defense witnesses.
Abbatiello argues the reports statutorily were protected from production because (1)
68 D.I. 132 at 15. 69 D.I. 128. 70 Id. 71 D.I. 123 at 31-35 (“Claim 12”). 20 “neither witness accepted the substance of the reports[;]” (2) “Blaise’s reports are
part of a series and when read in order it’s clear that another conversation was only
partially mentioned[;]” (3) Investigator Raymond “Scott did not create those reports
while he was on the phone with them[;]” and (4) “Scott admitted to counsel that he’s
not sure whether or not he took notes.”72
37. Superior Court Criminal Rule 26.2 requires parties to provide any prior
statements of testifying witnesses to opposing counsel once those witnesses have
testified. Both parties to a proceeding are required to produce “any statement of the
witness that is in their possession and that relates to the subject matter concerning
which the witness has testified[.]”73 A statement includes a “substantially verbatim
recital of an oral statement made by the witness that is recorded contemporaneously
with the making of the oral statement[.]”74 Trial Counsel determined that
memoranda prepared by the defense investigator contemporaneously recording the
substance of his interviews with various witnesses met the requirements of Rule
26.2.75 Abbatiello has not shown those reports fall outside Rule 26.2 and therefore
fails to meet his burden of showing counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Moreover, Abbatiello has not shown to a reasonable
72 Id. at 33. 73 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 26.2. 74 Id. 26.2(f)(2). 75 D.I. 128. 21 degree of probability that, but for the production of these witness statements, the jury
would have returned a different verdict. The State’s impeachment of Abbatiello’s
alibi witnesses consisted of more than the statements at issue,76 and the credibility
of those witnesses also was imperiled by Jamison’s testimony, Weston’s
identification, the physical evidence, and the cell phone records.
J. Abbatiello fails to show Trial Counsel’s examination of Blaise and McPhilemy was deficient. 38. In his thirteenth claim for postconviction relief,77 Abbatiello contends
Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to rehabilitate Blaise and McPhilemy’s
credibility. Abbatiello contends Trial Counsel failed to provide additional facts to
rehabilitate the witnesses and should have objected to asked and answered questions
during cross-examination.
39. Trial Counsel warned Abbatiello about the danger of presenting a weak
alibi defense.78 Abbatiello additionally does not identify which of the State’s
questions he contends were objectionable or the grounds for the objections he
believes Trial Counsel should have made. Abbatiello fails to meet the burden on
this claim because his motion lacks specificity as to how Trial Counsel’s
representation on these grounds constitutionally was deficient.
76 Trial Tr. (Mar. 23, 2016) 168-176, 189, 195-201. In addition, Abbatiello’s two alibi witnesses’ testimony internally was inconsistent. 77 D.I. 123 at 35-36 (“Claim 13”). 78 D.I. 128; see also D.I. 124, Ex. H2. 22 K. Abbatiello’s claim that Trial Counsel failed to hold the State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing regarding the traffic offenses fails. 40. In his fourteenth claim for postconviction relief,79 Abbatiello contends
Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine witnesses about the traffic
offenses. Abbatiello argues this failure left him no choice but to take the stand, and
by doing so he exposed himself to a flight instruction.
41. Both Trial Counsel and the Court discussed with Abbatiello the
implications and risks of choosing to testify.80 Abbatiello represented to the Court
that no one forced him to testify, and that he was making that decision of his own
free will.81 Trial Counsel’s strategic decisions in regard to examining Trooper Peter
Irwin, Jr. and Detective Doherty regarding the traffic offenses were reasonable and
did not force Abbatiello to testify. Moreover, it was not Abbatiello’s testimony that
led to the flight instruction; by the time Abbatiello testified, the Court already had
ruled that the record supported giving the jury an instruction regarding flight.
Abbatiello therefore fails to meet his burden on this claim.
79 D.I. 123 at 36-38 (“Claim 14”). 80 D.I. 128; Trial Tr. (Mar. 23, 2016) 154-161. 81 Trial Tr. (Mar. 23, 2016) 154-161. 23 L. Trial Counsel reasonably made jury selection decisions and included Abbatiello in those decisions. 42. In his seventeenth claim for postconviction relief,82 Abbatiello contends
Trial Counsel was ineffective by striking all but one African-American juror,
keeping that juror, and failing to inquire about possible prejudice.
43. Trial Counsel stated it is his practice to inform the defendant about jury
selection and involve him in the selection process.83 Trial Counsel actively involved
Abbatiello in jury selection, and Trial Counsel had the opportunity during voir dire
to inquire about possible bias or prejudice. Moreover, Abbatiello’s claim lacks
specificity regarding what type of purported bias Trial Counsel should have
explored. Striking a juror on the basis of race would have been unconstitutional.
This claim therefore fails.
44. In sum, Abbatiello does not meet his burden of showing Trial Counsel’s
or Appellate Counsel’s performance objectively was unreasonable or that Abbatiello
was prejudiced as a result of any alleged deficiencies.84
82 D.I. 126 (“Claim 17”). 83 D.I. 128. 84 Abbatiello additionally argues that the State committed misconduct by misleading the defense, and that the impact of all cumulative errors render the trial fundamentally unfair. These arguments are not supported by the record, and because the Court finds Abbatiello does not meet the requisite burden on any of his claims, there is no cumulative effect to consider. 24 CONCLUSION
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Anthony Abbatiello’s Motion
for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
/s/ Abigail M. LeGrow
Abigail M. LeGrow, Judge
Original to Prothonotary cc: Matthew Keating, Deputy Attorney General Timothy J. Weiler, Esquire Bernard J. O’Donnell, Esquire Anthony Abbatiello, pro se (SBI No. 791624)