State v. Abaya

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 9, 2026
• Docket: WD-25-051
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State v. Abaya, 2026-Ohio-2160.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. WD-25-051

Appellee Trial Court No. 23 CR 28

v.

Amanda C. Abaya DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: June 9, 2026

***** Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristofer Kristofferson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Dan Weiss, for appellant. *****

SULEK, J.

{¶ 1} Appellant, Amanda C. Abaya, appeals from the August 7, 2025 judgment of

the Wood County Court of Common Pleas convicting her of one count of aggravated

possession of drugs and one count of possession of a fentanyl-related compound and

sentencing her to a prison term of a minimum four years and a maximum of six years as well as a prison term of fifteen months, to be served concurrently. Abaya’s single

assignment of error challenges her sentence because she claims that her right of

allocution was violated. Because the trial court provided both Abaya and her counsel the

opportunity to make statements prior to imposition of the sentence and did not impede

Abaya’s right to speak in support of mitigation, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On February 2, 2023, the Wood County Grand Jury indicted Abaya on one

count of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(d),

a felony of the second degree (count 1); one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs in

violation of R.C. 2925.03(A) and (C)(1)(c), a felony of the second degree (count 2);

trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and

(C)(9)(c), a felony of the fourth degree (count 3); and possession of a fentanyl-related

compound, a violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(11)(b), a felony of the fourth degree

(count 4). The charges stemmed from an incident on April 9, 2022, when Abaya was

pulled over for weaving while driving and the police discovered she possessed two tennis

balls containing methamphetamine.

{¶ 3} Abaya initially pleaded not guilty. Her attendance at subsequent hearings

was intermittent. She failed to appear for several hearings and multiple scheduled

meetings with the probation department. Her bond was revoked twice during the

proceedings. Abaya eventually withdrew her not-guilty plea and entered a guilty plea to

counts 2 and 3 pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. In exchange, the State agreed

2. to dismiss counts 1 and 4 at sentencing. The trial court accepted Abaya’s guilty plea

following a Crim.R. 11 colloquy.

{¶ 4} At the outset of the sentencing hearing, held on August 4, 2025, Abaya

informed the court that she had recently suffered a significant head injury in a motorcycle

accident, a portion of her skull had been removed, she was scheduled for surgery to repair

her skull on August 17, 2025, and she would need to be in the hospital for two to seven

days. The court held a recess in chambers and then resumed sentencing.

{¶ 5} Following the recess, the court noted on the record that it would be

proceeding with sentencing that day. After inquiring whether there were any changes to

the presentence investigation report (PSI), the court requested statements in mitigation as

follows:

THE COURT: …[Abaya’s counsel], anything in mitigation, please?

[ABAYA’S COUNSEL]: Yes, Judge. As the Court is aware she was in a horrific motorcycle accident, her skull, part of it, is frozen at the hospital.

…

[ABAYA’S COUNSEL]: She doesn’t have a terrible record. This was a very serious case. Today is her son’s 12[th] birthday.

The State originally had recommended the minimum sentence, it’s a mandatory sentence. I think – I’m asking you to consider that in light of what she’s been through, what she’s going to go through in the future. I think this has taught her – and still teaching her quite a lesson. So I would ask you to take all that into consideration. Thank you.

The trial court then heard from the State before asking Abaya whether she would like to

make a statement, as follows:

3. THE COURT: … Ms. Abaya, you’ve heard the statements of your counsel as well as the State, anything you’d like to add or tell the Court, ma’am?

[ABAYA]: Is there any way I can still see my doctor? Is the jail able to take me out so I can get my skull back? Is the jail able to take me?

THE COURT: Anything that – this is sentencing.

[ABAYA]: I’m terrified, I’m very terrified without that part of [my] skull.

THE COURT: That is very understand[able]. But ma’am, we’re here for sentencing.

[ABAYA]: I understand.

The court then began making its findings with respect to Abaya’s sentence, discussing the

considerations under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12, during which Abaya interrupted as

follows

THE COURT: … The Court does not consider race, ethnic background, gender or religion of the defendant. And it is left to the discretion regardless of any recommendation ---

[ABAYA]: Even medical?

THE COURT: It is left to the discretion of the Court to determine the most appropriate sanction utilizing those purposes and principles…. You have not been compliant with the Court orders. You’ve failed to appear for the pre-sentence investigation. And certainly there have been multiple failures to appear, so [your] behavior while you’ve been on bond has been noncompliant.

[ABAYA]: Your Honor, even if you guys can pick me right up at the hospital –

[THE COURT]: Okay. Well, ma’am, this has been going on for well over two years.

The court then continued to discuss the many times that Abaya failed to appear for

random drug screens, her positive drug test, her removal of an ankle monitor, and her

4. failure to turn herself in after reporting that she planned to do so. Based on those factors,

the court imposed a prison term for both counts.

{¶ 6} Abaya filed a timely appeal of her sentence.

II. Assignment of Error

{¶ 7} Abaya asserts the following assignment of error for review: “The trial court

erred when it failed to comply with Criminal Rule32(A)(1) and appellant’s sentence

should be vacated.”

III. Law and Analysis

{¶ 8} In her assignment of error, Abaya contends that her right to allocution was

violated. She contends that when she began to speak on her own behalf, the trial court

“abruptly stopped [her] from fully and thoroughly speaking in mitigation.”

{¶ 9} Crim.R. 32(A)(1) provides that, “[a]t the time of imposing sentence, the

court shall … [a]fford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and

address the defendant personally and ask if he or she wishes to make a statement in his or

her own behalf or present any information in mitigation of punishment.”

{¶ 10} “The right to allocution is ‘much more than an empty ritual: it represents a

defendant’s last opportunity to plead [their] case or express remorse.’” State v.

Champeau, 2024-Ohio-4602, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Green, 90 Ohio St.3d 352,

359-360 (2000). “Although the right of allocution is absolute, it is not unlimited…. A

trial court can limit a defendant’s allocution if it concerns extraneous matters unrelated to

the sentence and is not about mitigation.” State v. Brockington, 2019-Ohio-1812, ¶ 11

(6th Dist.), quoting State v. Hofmann, 2004-Ohio-6655, ¶ 32-33 (6th Dist.).

5. {¶ 11} To violate a defendant’s right to allocution, the trial court’s statements

must actually prevent the defendant from speaking in support of mitigation, and

“[i]nterruptions by the trial court during the allocution process do not necessarily result in

prejudicial error requiring reversal.” Id., citing Hoffman at ¶ 34; State v. Turner, 2019-

Ohio-934, ¶ 33-34 (7th Dist.); State v. Cline, 2015-Ohio-4085, ¶ 13-15 (8th Dist.). To

determine whether a trial court’s interruption violated an appellant’s right to allocution,

appellate courts have considered whether appellant’s counsel made a statement, the

length and content of the trial court’s statements, whether the appellant continued to

speak after the trial court’s interruption, and whether there was any indication that the

appellant had more to say following the trial court’s interruption. See, e.g., State v.

Roach, 2016-Ohio-4656, ¶ 16 (7th Dist.) (holding that there was no prejudicial error in

trial court’s interruption of appellant’s allocution where the trial court’s interruption was

a brief comment regarding the appellant’s statement, there was no indication that the

appellant had more to say, and appellant’s counsel made a statement on appellant’s

behalf); State v. Servantes, 2023-Ohio-2116, ¶ 52-53 (11th Dist.) (no indication appellant

had more to say and appellant’s counsel spoke in support of mitigation); State v. Maston,

2021-Ohio-1975, ¶ 11-12 (2nd Dist.) (appellant remained steadfast in denying blame

despite trial court’s interruptions and appellant’s counsel spoke on appellant’s behalf);

Turner, 2019-Ohio-934 at ¶ 32-34 (appellant continued to speak following trial court’s

interruption). Further, as other appellate courts have noted, transcripts do not always

indicate whether the trial court actually interrupted the appellant or just began speaking

after the appellant was done talking. Turner at ¶ 34, citing Roach at ¶ 16. (“Appellant

6. may have been trailing off or somehow giving the impression he was finished. A trial

transcript is not like a script for a play and does not contain indicators of demeanor or

measures of time between pauses.”).

{¶ 12} Here, Abaya’s counsel, on the invitation of the trial court, gave a statement

on mitigation, referring specifically to Abaya’s skull injury and medical issues. The trial

court also expressly invited Abaya to speak on her own behalf. In response, Abaya asked

several logistical questions about obtaining medical treatment while incarcerated,

requesting information about how she would arrange transportation to the hospital and

her medical appointments. In response to those questions, the trial court reminded Abaya

that the hearing was regarding sentencing in an attempt to redirect Abaya to speak

regarding mitigation. Abaya then expressed her fear about the serious nature of her

medical condition. The trial court confirmed that Abaya’s fear was understandable and

again attempted to redirect Abaya to speak regarding mitigation. In response, Abaya

merely stated that she understood without making any additional statements. The record

does not indicate that Abaya had anything further to say at that time. Later in the

hearing, however, she interrupted the court, asking for more details about the timing of

her treatment in relation to her prison term, demonstrating that Abaya had not been

intimidated into silence by the trial court’s statements during her allocution. In short,

both Abaya and her counsel made statements calling attention to Abaya’s medical

condition and her concerns about obtaining the appropriate treatment while incarcerated,

the court repeatedly directed Abaya to talk about her sentence, and there is no indication

that Abaya had more to say about her sentence. Accordingly, even if Abaya’s logistical

7. questions about obtaining medical treatment and her expression of fear about her medical

condition are construed as relevant to mitigation, there is no indication that the trial

court’s statements prevented Abaya from exercising her right to allocution.

{¶ 13} Abaya’s assignment of error is found not well-taken.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 14} Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Wood County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed. Pursuant to App.R. 24, costs of this appeal are assessed to

Abaya.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Thomas J. Osowik, P.J. JUDGE

Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE

Charles E. Sulek, J. CONCUR. JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

8.