State v. 28 Containers of Thick & Frosty

514 P.2d 140, 82 Wash. 2d 722, 1973 Wash. LEXIS 718
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 30, 1973
DocketNo. 42472
StatusPublished

This text of 514 P.2d 140 (State v. 28 Containers of Thick & Frosty) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State v. 28 Containers of Thick & Frosty, 514 P.2d 140, 82 Wash. 2d 722, 1973 Wash. LEXIS 718 (Wash. 1973).

Opinions

Finley, J.

This is an appeal by the Birds Eye Division of General Foods Corporation, manufacturer of a food product advertised as Thick & Frosty, from a trial court decision affirming an embargo order placed upon 28 containers of this product by the Washington State Department of Agriculture.

The containers were embargoed on June 1, 1970, in Bel-lingham, Washington, pursuant to the provisions of RCW 15.38.040 and RCW 69.04.110. In sustaining the embargo order, the trial court found the following pertinent facts upon the basis of the testimony, exhibits, and record before the court: (1) that Thick & Frosty is a product containing a percentage of milk to which fat or oil other than milk fat has been added;1 (2) that Thick & Frosty is a frozen product and is stored at zero degrees Fahrenheit, the same as frozen dairy products such as ice cream; (3) that the labeling on the advertising material in which the Thick & Frosty [724]*724plastic container is packaged attractively depicts in twc large pictures what appears to be a milk shake, accompanied by the following words and phrases appearing severa] times as indicated: “Shake” — seven times; “Makes Five 8-Oz. Shakes” — twice; “Frozen Thick Shake Concentrate”— three times; “Frosty Cold Thick Shake You Make at Home”; “Directions to Make One Shake”; “For thinner shake, add more milk”; (4) that General Foods, in using the word “shake” on the label of Thick & Frosty, is capitalizing on the widespread use of the word “shake” as synonymous with “milk shake” so as to confuse the general public; (5) that Thick & Frosty is displayed and sold from refrigerated cases the same as ice cream and ice milk products are displayed and sold; (6) that in the frozen state Thick & Frosty looks like ice cream or ice milk; (7) that General Foods has, by substituting vegetable oil in place of milk fat in Thick & Frosty, made a product which appears to be of greater value than it is. Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded: (1) that Thick & Frosty is in imitation and semblance of genuine dairy products, to wit: ice cream and ice milk; (2) that Thick & Frosty is a filled dairy product as defined in the filled dairy products act (chapter 15.38 RCW) and an economically adulterated food product as defined in the Uniform Washington Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (chapter 69.04 RCW); (3) that as a filled dairy product Thick & Frosty is subject to the prohibitory provisions of chapter 15.38 RCW and chapter 69.04 RCW; (4) that Thick & Frosty is misbranded and mislabeled in violation of the Uniform Washington Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (chapter 69.04 RCW).

In response to this ruling supporting the embargo order, the appellant argues that Thick & Frosty is neither a “filled dairy product” within the meaning of RCW 15.38.010(2) nor a misbranded product under RCW 69.04.250. We disagree.

[725]*725The package and container described by the trial court in which Thick & Frosty is marketed are pictured below.

The purpose of the filled dairy products act was stated by the legislature to be as follows:

Filled dairy products resemble genuine dairy products so closely that they lend themselves readily to substitution for and confusion with such dairy products and in many cases cannot be distinguished from genuine dairy products by the ordinary consumer. The manufacture, sale, exchange, purveying, transportation, possession, or offering for sale or exchange or purveyance of filled [726]*726dairy products creates a condition conducive to substitution, confusion, deception, and fraud, and one which if permitted to exist tends to interfere with the orderly and fair marketing of foods essential to the well-being of the people of this state. It is hereby declared to be the of this chapter to correct and eliminate the above referred to; to protect the public from fraud and deception; to prohibit practices inimical to the general welfare; and to promote the orderly and fair marketing of essential foods.

RCW 15.38.001. In response to this declaration of purpose,

[727]*727and concerning the constitutionality of the filled dairy products act, we stated the following in Reesman v. State, 74 Wn.2d 646, 651, 445 P.2d 1004 (1968):

The legislature has thus put its finger squarely upon the evil which the enactment was designed to guard against, i.e., the manufacture, distribution and sale of a substitute dairy product which, by its resemblance to the natural product, is conducive to consumer confusion and deception. This has been held to be a valid basis upon, which to rest the exercise of the state’s police power, for the prevention of deception and fraud upon the consuming public is in the public interest. Carolene Prods. Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 89 L. Ed. 15, 65 Sup. Ct. 1, 155 A.L.R. 1371 (1944); Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Mitchell, 323 U.S. 32, 89 L. Ed. 25, 65 Sup. Ct. 9 (1944); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 10 L. Ed. 2d 248, 83 Sup. Ct. 1210 (1963); Poole & Creber Market Co. v. Breshears, 343 Mo. 1133, 125 S.W.2d 23 (1939); Hathaway v. McDonald, 27 Wash. 659, 68 Pac. 376 (1902). The underlying objective, therefore, of the legislation cannot be said to be unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious, or in violation of a constitutional mandate.

The constitutionality and soundness of the filled dairy products act, as a measure for the protection of the consuming public from confusion, deception, and fraud, is well-settled.

Before a particular product may be subjected to the in-junctive penalties of the act, a two-part statutory test for “filled dairy products” must be met.2 First, the product must contain some milk to which any oil or fat other than [728]*728milk fat has been added, and second, the resulting product must be “in imitation or semblance” of any dairy product. In the instant case, the product embargoed contains 3.5 percent nonfat dry milk to which hydrogenated vegetable oil has been added, and therefore meets the first statutory requirement. The second requirement, concerning the “imitation or semblance” of a dairy product, presents the real point of controversy for this court.

In Reesman v. State, supra,

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Carolene Products Co. v. United States
323 U.S. 18 (Supreme Court, 1944)
Sage Stores Co. v. Kansas Ex Rel. Mitchell
323 U.S. 32 (Supreme Court, 1944)
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul
373 U.S. 132 (Supreme Court, 1963)
Midget Products, Inc. v. Jacobsen
295 P.2d 542 (California Court of Appeal, 1956)
Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Kansas State Board of Health
388 P.2d 582 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1964)
State Ex Rel. Humiston v. Meyers
380 P.2d 735 (Washington Supreme Court, 1963)
Hoppe v. State
469 P.2d 909 (Washington Supreme Court, 1970)
Reesman v. State
445 P.2d 1004 (Washington Supreme Court, 1968)
Baltimore Butterine Co. v. Talmadge
32 F.2d 904 (S.D. Georgia, 1929)
Aeration Processes, Inc. v. Jacobsen
184 Cal. App. 2d 836 (California Court of Appeal, 1960)
Poole & Creber Market Co. v. Breshears
125 S.W.2d 23 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 1939)
Hathaway v. McDonald
68 P. 376 (Washington Supreme Court, 1902)
Defiance Milk Products Co. v. Du Mond
132 N.E.2d 829 (New York Court of Appeals, 1956)
Talmadge v. Baltimore Butterine Co.
37 F.2d 1014 (Fifth Circuit, 1930)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
514 P.2d 140, 82 Wash. 2d 722, 1973 Wash. LEXIS 718, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-v-28-containers-of-thick-frosty-wash-1973.