State v. 1978 Ltd Ii

Opinion

No. 84-439

I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE O M N A A F OTN

STATE O F MONTANA,

Plaintiff and A p p e l l a n t ,

1978 LTD I1 and R I C K Y HENDRICKSON,

D e f e n d a n t and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e T w e l f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f H i l l , The H o n o r a b l e Chan E t t i e n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

COUNSEL O RECORD: F

For Appellant:

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana Ronald W. S m i t h , County A t t o r n e y , Havre, Montana Edward C o r r i g a n a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , Havre

F o r Respondent :

James Conway a r g u e d , Montana L e g a l S e r v i c e s , K a l i s p e l l , Montana

Submitted: A p r i l 1 5 , 1985

Decided: J u n e 2 5 , 1985

Filed: - JI \:',! < : i92j5

Clerk M r . J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e Court.

T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a n o r d e r o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ,

Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , dismissing f o r f e i t u r e proceedings

a g a i n s t a n a u t o m o b i l e on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t p r o p e r n o t i c e o f

s e i z u r e and i n t e n t i o n t o i n s t i t u t e f o r f e i t u r e p r o c e e d i n g s was

n o t s e n t t o t h e owner w i t h i n f o r t y - f i v e days o f t h e seizure

a s r e q u i r e d b y s e c t i o n 44-12-201, MCA.

R i c k y H e n d r i c k s o n w a s a r r e s t e d on J a n u a r y 2 5 , 1984, f o r

h a v i n g LSD a n d m a r i j u a n a i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n w h i l e d r i v i n g h i s

F o r d LTD t o G r e a t F a l l s . A s a u t h o r i z e d b y s e c t i o n 44-12-103,

MCA, the c a r was seized and impounded by the H i l l County

Sheriff's Department. Pursuant to section 44-12-201, MCA,

notice of the seizure of the car, along with the County

Attorney's intention to institute forfeiture proceedings

a g a i n s t i t , was s e n t t o Hendrickson w i t h i n f o r t y - f i v e d a y s o f

the seizure. The n o t i c e w a s s u f f i c i e n t i n a l l r e s p e c t s b u t

one: it did not inform Hendrickson that he must file an

answer w i t h i n twenty days o f the mailing of the notice o r

f a c e d e f a u l t judgment. An a n s w e r w a s n o t f i l e d a n d on March

27, 1984, d e f a u l t judgment was e n t e r e d .

On A p r i l 5 , 1 9 8 4 , H e n d r i c k s o n ' s a t t o r n e y f i l e d a m o t i o n

for relief f r o m t h e d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e

notice did not comply w i t h requirements o f due p r o c e s s or

Montana Rules o f C i v i l Procedure. The H i l l C o u n t y A t t o r n e y

a g r e e d t h a t t h e n o t i c e was d e f i c i e n t a n d d i d n o t c o n t e s t t h e

motion for relief. Instead, he f i l e d a n amended n o t i c e o f

intention to institute forfeiture proceedings, t h o u g h more

t h a n f o r t y - f i v e d a y s h a d p a s s e d s i n c e t h e c a r was s e i z e d . On

May 21, 1984, Hendrickson filed a motion to dismiss. He

argued that the amended notice cannot relate back to the filing of the original notice, so that the forty-five day

notice requirement of section 44-12-201, MCA, was not

complied w i t h . J u d g e Chan E t t i e n a g r e e d w i t h t h i s a r g u m e n t

and d i s m i s s e d t h e c a s e on J u l y 1 3 , 1984.

I t i s conceded by b o t h p a r t i e s t o t h i s a p p e a l t h a t t h e

notice of seizure and intention to institute forfeiture

p r o c e e d i n g s w h i c h was i s s u e d by t h e H i l l County S h e r i f f and

served on Hendrickson was defective and violative of due

process. The p a r t i e s a l s o c o n c e d e t h a t t h i s d e f e c t i v e n o t i c e

deprived t h e D i s t r i c t Court of j u r i s d i c t i o n t o e n t e r d e f a u l t

judgment. We agree. Therefore, the sole issue to be

resolved i s whether the defective notice, timely filed in

accordance with section 44-12-201, MCA, could be amended

though more than forty-five days had passed since the

a u t o m o b i l e s o u g h t t o b e f o r f e i t e d was s e i z e d .

Appellant argues that, as a civil action, the

forfeiture proceedings under section 44-12-201 should be

governed by the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure.

Specifically appellant cites to Rule 4 ( D ) ( 7 ) , M.R.Civ.P.,

which r e a d s :

"Amendment. At any time, in its discretion, and upon s u c h n o t i c e and t e r m s a s it deems j u s t , t h e c o u r t may a l l o w any p r o c e s s o r proof o f s e r v i c e t h e r e o f t o b e amended u n l e s s it c l e a r l y a p p e a r s t h a t m a t e r i a l p r e j u d i c e would r e s u l t t o the substantial rights of the p a r t y a g a i n s t whom t h e p r o c e s s i s s u e d . "

This rule, a p p e l l a n t contends, expresses t h e philosophy of

c i v i l procedure favored today: t h a t c a s e s should be decided

on their merits, and not be dismissed due to procedural

defects. I n support of t h i s contention, appellant c i t e s t o

Meyers v. Interwest Corp. (Utah 19811, 632 P.2d 879. In

Meyers t h e p l a i n t i f f f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t on t h e f i n a l d a y o f a four year statute of limitations period. Approximately t w o

y e a r s a f t e r summons was i s s u e d t h e d e f e n d a n t , having f a i l e d

t o f i l e an answer, f i l e d a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s on t h e g r o u n d s

that the summons stated t h a t defendant had twenty days t o

a n s w e r when the law allowed thirty days. The Utah trial

c o u r t d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s a n d a l l o w e d t h e summons t o

he amended d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o f limitations

had run. Citing t o rule 4(h) of t h e Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, which is identical t o Rule 4 ( ~ () 7 ) , M.R.Civ.P.,

supra, the Utah Supreme Court found that allowing an

amendment d i d n o t amount t o m a t e r i a l p r e j u d i c e t o t h e r i g h t s

of the party a g a i n s t whom p r o c e s s issued. I n a d d i t i o n it

f o u n d t h a t t h e d e f e c t i n t h e summons w a s i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l , a n d

therefore t h e passage of t i m e did not deprive t h e t r i a l court

of jurisdiction to permit an amendment. Specifically the

Utah court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to

entertain a motion to amend summons after the statute of

l i m i t a t i o n s had run. Further, it h e l d that the amendment

r e l a t e d back t o t h e i n i t i a l summons, just a s amendments t o

c o m p l a i n t s r e l a t e back t o t h e f i l i n g o f t h e i n i t i a l complaint

under Rule 15(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Rule

15 ( c ) , M.R.Civ. P.)

We have no quarrel with the reasoning used or the

d e c i s i o n r e a c h e d i n Meyers. W e do n o t b e l i e v e however, t h a t

Meyers c a n b e c o n v i n c i n g l y a n a l o g i z e d t o t h e c a s ~ t hand. a

T h i s a c t i o n f o r f o r f e i t u r e i s b a s e d on a p r o c e d u r e a u t h o r i z e d

by Chapter 12 o f Title 44 of the Montana Code. Section

44-12-201 reads a s follows:

"Notice of s e i z u r e and intention t o institute f o r f e i t u r e proceedings. A peace o f f i c e r o r an o f f i c e r of the s e i z i n g a g e n c y who s e i z e s a n y p r o p e r t y o t h e r t h a n c o n t r o l l e d substances under the provisions of t h i s chapter s h a l l , w i t h i n 45 d a y s o f t h e s e i z u r e s , f i l e a n o t i c e of t h e s e i z u r e and i n t e n t i o n t o i n s t i t u t e f o r f e i t u r e proceedings with t h e c l e r k of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e county i n which t h e s e i z u r e o c c u r s , and t h e c l e r k s h a l l s e r v e n o t i c e t h e r e o f on a l l owners o r c l a i m a n t s o f t h e p r o p e r t y by one o f the f o l l o w i n g methods ... " (Emphasis added. )

The l a n g u a g e o f t h i s s t a t u t e i s m a n d a t o r y . Notice o f s e i z u r e

and i n t e n t t o i n s t i t u t e f o r f e i t u r e p r o c e e d i n g s must b e s e r v e d

on t h e owners o f t h e p r o p e r t y w i t h i n f o r t y - f i v e days. Th.ere

i s no p r o v i s i o n i n C h a p t e r 12 f o r a n e x t e n s i o n o f t h i s t i m e limit. Despite this, appellant urges that Rule 4 (Dl (7) ,

M.R.Civ.P. be applied, as per the Meyers case, to allow

amended n o t i c e a f t e r f o r t y - f i v e d a y s . W e r e f u s e t o d o s o and

a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r t h e following reasons.

First, the statute involved in this case is an

e x c e p t i o n t o t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t p r o p e r t y may n o t b e s e i z e d

without a prior factfinding hearing. Though the Supreme

Court has upheld such forfeiture statutes as involving

extraordinary situations, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht

L e a s i n g Co. ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 416 U.S. 663, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d

452, w e concur w i t h t h e Wisconsin Court i n S t a t e v . Rosen

(Wisc. 1 9 7 6 ) , 240 N.W.2d 168, t h a t because such s e i z u r e s a r e

ex parte, t h e s t a t u t o r y safeguards should b e r i g i d l y adhered

to. I n Rosen t h e W i s c o n s i n C o u r t d i s c u s s e d t h e procedural

requirements in forfeiture actions under a statute very

s i m i l a r t o t h e one a t i s s u e i n t h i s c a s e . O May 2 9 , n 1974

David Rosen had h i s c a r s e i z e d by t h e p o l i c e i n a c c o r d a n c e

w i t h t h e Uniform C o n t r o l l e d S u b s t a n c e s A c t o f W i s c o n s i n . On

June 12, 1974, papers were served that commenced the

forfeiture action. On September 9, 1974, Rosen filed a

motion t o d i s m i s s on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t a h e a r i n g had n o t been set w i t h i n the s i x t y day t i m e p e r i o d provided by statute.

The t r i a l c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e m o t i o n . The Wisconsin Supreme

Court affirmed, s t a t i n g t h a t i n f o r f e i t u r e a c t i o n s safeguards

which a r e s t a t u t o r i l y p r o v i d e d s h o u l d b e s t r i c t l y c o n s t r u e d .

T h e r e f o r e , t h e c o u r t c o n t i n u e d , t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s p r o v i d e d by

s t a t u t e must be c o n s i d e r e d mandatory. Forfeiture statutes

seek:

" t o p r o v i d e a prompt a d j u d i c a t i o n o f t h e issues involved in the forfeiture proceeding, and s e e k t o m i t i g a t e t h e harsh effects of the seizure and f o r f e i t u r e proceeding ... The i n t e r e s t of the state and the public in c o n t r o l l i n g t h e d r u g t r a f f i c , which t h e f o r f e i t u r e a c t i o n i s designed t o p r o t e c t , i s a d e q u a t e l y s e r v e d by t h e i n i t i a l seizure. The i n t e r e s t s o f t h e p o s s i b l y innocent owner should likewise be p r o t e c t e d by s t r i c t c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r a l mandate o f [the statute]." Rosen, 240 N.W.2d a t 172.

W e agree. The S t a t e ' s r e l i a n c e on Meyers v . I n t e r w e s t Corp.,

a l o n g w i t h i t s i n s i s t e n c e t h a t R u l e 4 ( D ) ( 7 ) , M.R.Civ.P., be

applied to this case, misses t h e e s s e n t i a l p o i n t t h a t t h e

s e i z u r e and f o r f e i t u r e s t a t u t e s a t i s s u e a r e s p e c i a l i n t h a t

t h e y a l l o w a n ex p a r t e t a k i n g o f p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y . No s u c h

s t a t u t e s a r e a t i s s u e i n Meyers and f o r t h a t r e a s o n w e f i n d

t h a t case unpersuasive.

Second, i n addition t o t h e requirement t h a t n o t i c e of

s e i z u r e and i n t e n t i o n t o i n s t i t u t e f o r f e i t u r e p r o c e e d i n g s b e

g i v e n w i t h i n f o r t y - f i v e d a y s , s e c t i o n 44-12-202, MCA p r o v i d e s

that. w i t h i n twenty days a f t e r t h e mailing o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f

notice, the owner of the property shall file a verified

answer t o t h e a l l e g a t i o n s concerning t h e u s e o f t h e p r o p e r t y .

No e x t e n s i o n o f time f o r f i l i n g t h e a n s w e r may h e g r a n t e d .

Further, section 44-12-203, MCA, provides that there is a

r e b u t t a b l e p r e s u m p t i o n o f f o r f e i t u r e o f t h e p r o p e r t y and t h a t if a v e r i f i e d answer i s n o t f i l e d w i t h i n twenty days a f t e r

mailing or publishing notice, the court upon motion "must

order the property forfeited to the state." The strict

requirements of these statutes indicates the no-nonsense

a t t i t u d e of t h e d r a f t e r s with respect t o drug t r a f f i c . But

j u s t a s t h e s e s t a t u t e s impose s t r i c t r e q u i r e m e n t s , t h e y must

be enforced s o a s t o a v o i d , t o t h e g r e a t e s t e x t e n t p o s s i b l e ,

prejudicing the rights of t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom t h e y a r e

directed. S i n c e , i n e f f e c t , a p a r t y whose p r o p e r t y i s s e i z e d

under t h e s e s t a t u t e s must answer w i t h i n twenty d a y s o r l o s e

t h e property, t h e r e is s t r o n g reason t o i n s i s t t h a t t h e S t a t e

provide proper notice so a s t o p r o t e c t t h e i n n o c e n t p e r s o n

from t h e u n w i t t i n g s u r r e n d e r o f h i s p r o p e r t y .

Third, even if the S t a t e c o u l d demonstrate t h a t Rule

4 (D) (7) should apply in this case, no amendment would be

a 1 lowed. For contrary to the contention of the State,

a l l o w i n g a n amendment t o t h i s p r o c e s s beyond t h e l i m i t a t i o n

period would significantly prejudice Hendrickson's rights.

The v e r y e x e r c i s e o f t h e s e i z u r e a n d f o r f e i t u r e s t a t u t e s b y

the State is a serious infringement on t h e rights of the

p a r t y whose p r o p e r t y is seized without a hearing. Such a

procedure is allowed only because it is considered a

significant weapon i n the battle against drug trafficking.

To a s s e r t , a s t h e S t a t e d o e s , t h a t t h e r e i s no p r e j u d i c e t o

H e n d r i c k s o n by a l l o w i n g amended n o t i c e n i n e t y - f i v e days a f t e r

seizure and fifty days past the statutory requirement is

simply unreasonable. By adhering to due process and

s t a t u t o r y requirements, the State ensures the rights of the

p e r s o n c h a r g e d , and p e r m i t s t h e i n n o c e n t p e r s o n t o r e g a i n t h e

use of h i s property a s rapidly a s possible. To a l l o w amended

notice past the limitation period under section 44-12-201, MCA, would have the potential for serious infringement of the rights of innocent persons. The decision of the District Court is affirmed.

We concur: