NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2145-23
STATE TROOPERS FRATERNAL ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DIVISION OF STATE POLICE,
Defendant-Respondent. __________________________
Argued March 18, 2025 – Decided April 4, 2025
Before Judges Smith and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-2396-23.
Lauren Sandy argued the cause for appellant (Crivelli, Barbati, and DeRose, LLC, attorneys; Lauren Sandy, of counsel and on the briefs).
Jana R. DiCosmo, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jana R. DiCosmo, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff State Troopers Fraternal Association (STFA) appeals a trial court
order denying its motion to vacate an arbitration award dismissing its grievance
against the State of New Jersey, Division of State Police (NJSP), contending the
NJSP violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in calculating
overtime rates. We affirm.
I.
We derive the salient facts from the record. The STFA filed a grievance
on behalf of all NJSP Troopers, alleging the NJSP improperly calculated their
hourly overtime rate under Article V, section E, paragraph three of the CBA (the
OT Provision), utilizing the actual number of working days in each fiscal year,
rather than 2,080 annual hours. The OT Provision reads as follows:
All overtime shall be compensated as paid compensation at the time and one-half (1-1/2) rate, (the overtime rate shall be base plus maintenance divided by 2,080 x 1.5), unless the employee, at said employee's sole option, elects to take compensation for overtime in compensatory time off (C.T.O.) which shall accumulate in a C.T.O. bank. Compensatory time compensation in the C.T.O. bank shall accumulate at time and one-half (one and one-half hours banked for each hour of overtime worked in quarter hour units).
When the NJSP denied the grievance, the STFA requested arbitration. An
arbitration hearing was held, with the arbitrator framing the issue as : "[d]id the
A-2145-23 2 [NJSP] violate the [CBA] when it used the annual State of New Jersey-
Department of [t]he Treasury Circulars ([t]reasury [c]irculars) to calculate the
[o]vertime [r]ate instead of language contained in the [a]greement at Article V:
E. (3)?"
At the arbitration hearing the STFA proffered the testimony of Steven
Kuhn, STFA's Vice President. Kuhn testified the 2,080 1 multiplier has been in
the parties' CBA since the 1987-1990 contract and has appeared in every
agreement thereafter. Kuhn stated the NJSP calculated overtime compensation
during the fiscal year 2020 by utilizing 2,096 as the multiplier, which reduced
overtime pay by sixty-two cents an hour.
The NJSP proffered the testimony of two witnesses: (1) Zachary
Burkhalter, the payroll supervisor for the Department of Treasury, Office of
Management and Budget; and (2) Stacey Monte, the Human Resource Manager
who oversees payroll operations for NJSP. Burkhalter testified that the treasury
circulars mandate state employees be paid according to the number of fiscal year
working days, which can vary between 260, 261, and 262 days, where the
employing agency, such as the Division of State Police, utilizes the Treasury's
1 This figure is based on 260 working days in the fiscal year, with twenty -six pay periods and 8 hours in a working day.
A-2145-23 3 centralized payroll. Monte's testimony was consistent with that of Burkhalter
on the material issues.
The arbitrator denied the STFA's grievance as unsupported by the
evidence, finding:
it [is] clear from the record evidence that [NJSP was] correct in arguing that the intent of the parties in 1987 was that the [a]greement's reference in 1987 to 2080 as the basis for determining the divisor to be used in computing overtime was merely illustrative and descriptive, instead of prescriptive. While the words in the [a]greement's language may at first reading appear to require use of 2080 in determining the divisor, as [STFA] argues, the record evidence is ample that the parties, until [STFA] first raised the prescriptive issue in 2019, had used other appropriate divisors for over [thirty] years, both from the outset in the first years after 1987, and in almost three of every four years thereafter, thereby indicating forcefully that both [NJSP and STFA], until 2019, had consistently previously interpreted the [a]greement's words as illustrative and descriptive, not prescriptive.
The arbitrator found STFA's "reliance on the language being plainly and
simply clear, as it might . . . first appear, [was] swept aside by the weight of the
record evidence that establishe[d] the manner in which both parties had actually
conducted their relationship otherwise over the three decades preceding
[STFA's] first raising the prescriptive issue in 2019."
A-2145-23 4 The STFA filed an order to show cause (OTSC) with the Law Division
seeking to vacate the arbitration award. In denying the OTSC, the trial court
determined the arbitrator's conclusion was "reasonably debatable" and did not
meet the standard for setting aside the arbitration award.
The STFA appealed, contending the arbitration award must be vacated
because it is not reasonably debatable. The STFA posits the arbitrator
"disregarded the plain and unambiguous contract language[,] . . .[and]
committed a mistake of law" in failing to confine his determination to the four
corners of the agreement, and considering the parties' past practice.
We consider the STFA's arguments in turn.
II.
We begin by acknowledging the scope of our review. The decision to
grant or deny a motion to vacate an arbitration award is a matter of law which
we review de novo. See Yarborough v. State Operated Sch. Dist. of City of
Newark, 455 N.J. Super. 136, 139 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Minkowitz v. Israeli,
433 N.J. Super. 111, 136 (App. Div. 2013)). A trial court's review of an
arbitration award is limited. Strickland v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 475 N.J. Super.
27, 38 (App. Div. 2023). Accordingly, we apply "an extremely deferential
review when a party to a [CBA] has sought to vacate an arbitrator's award."
A-2145-23 5 Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. No. 11 v. City of Trenton, 205 N.J. 422,
428 (2011).
N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 circumscribes the following statutory grounds upon
which an arbitration award may be vacated:
a. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means;
b. Where there was either evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or any thereof;
c. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown therefor, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party;
d.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2145-23
STATE TROOPERS FRATERNAL ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DIVISION OF STATE POLICE,
Defendant-Respondent. __________________________
Argued March 18, 2025 – Decided April 4, 2025
Before Judges Smith and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Docket No. L-2396-23.
Lauren Sandy argued the cause for appellant (Crivelli, Barbati, and DeRose, LLC, attorneys; Lauren Sandy, of counsel and on the briefs).
Jana R. DiCosmo, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Jana R. DiCosmo, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff State Troopers Fraternal Association (STFA) appeals a trial court
order denying its motion to vacate an arbitration award dismissing its grievance
against the State of New Jersey, Division of State Police (NJSP), contending the
NJSP violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in calculating
overtime rates. We affirm.
I.
We derive the salient facts from the record. The STFA filed a grievance
on behalf of all NJSP Troopers, alleging the NJSP improperly calculated their
hourly overtime rate under Article V, section E, paragraph three of the CBA (the
OT Provision), utilizing the actual number of working days in each fiscal year,
rather than 2,080 annual hours. The OT Provision reads as follows:
All overtime shall be compensated as paid compensation at the time and one-half (1-1/2) rate, (the overtime rate shall be base plus maintenance divided by 2,080 x 1.5), unless the employee, at said employee's sole option, elects to take compensation for overtime in compensatory time off (C.T.O.) which shall accumulate in a C.T.O. bank. Compensatory time compensation in the C.T.O. bank shall accumulate at time and one-half (one and one-half hours banked for each hour of overtime worked in quarter hour units).
When the NJSP denied the grievance, the STFA requested arbitration. An
arbitration hearing was held, with the arbitrator framing the issue as : "[d]id the
A-2145-23 2 [NJSP] violate the [CBA] when it used the annual State of New Jersey-
Department of [t]he Treasury Circulars ([t]reasury [c]irculars) to calculate the
[o]vertime [r]ate instead of language contained in the [a]greement at Article V:
E. (3)?"
At the arbitration hearing the STFA proffered the testimony of Steven
Kuhn, STFA's Vice President. Kuhn testified the 2,080 1 multiplier has been in
the parties' CBA since the 1987-1990 contract and has appeared in every
agreement thereafter. Kuhn stated the NJSP calculated overtime compensation
during the fiscal year 2020 by utilizing 2,096 as the multiplier, which reduced
overtime pay by sixty-two cents an hour.
The NJSP proffered the testimony of two witnesses: (1) Zachary
Burkhalter, the payroll supervisor for the Department of Treasury, Office of
Management and Budget; and (2) Stacey Monte, the Human Resource Manager
who oversees payroll operations for NJSP. Burkhalter testified that the treasury
circulars mandate state employees be paid according to the number of fiscal year
working days, which can vary between 260, 261, and 262 days, where the
employing agency, such as the Division of State Police, utilizes the Treasury's
1 This figure is based on 260 working days in the fiscal year, with twenty -six pay periods and 8 hours in a working day.
A-2145-23 3 centralized payroll. Monte's testimony was consistent with that of Burkhalter
on the material issues.
The arbitrator denied the STFA's grievance as unsupported by the
evidence, finding:
it [is] clear from the record evidence that [NJSP was] correct in arguing that the intent of the parties in 1987 was that the [a]greement's reference in 1987 to 2080 as the basis for determining the divisor to be used in computing overtime was merely illustrative and descriptive, instead of prescriptive. While the words in the [a]greement's language may at first reading appear to require use of 2080 in determining the divisor, as [STFA] argues, the record evidence is ample that the parties, until [STFA] first raised the prescriptive issue in 2019, had used other appropriate divisors for over [thirty] years, both from the outset in the first years after 1987, and in almost three of every four years thereafter, thereby indicating forcefully that both [NJSP and STFA], until 2019, had consistently previously interpreted the [a]greement's words as illustrative and descriptive, not prescriptive.
The arbitrator found STFA's "reliance on the language being plainly and
simply clear, as it might . . . first appear, [was] swept aside by the weight of the
record evidence that establishe[d] the manner in which both parties had actually
conducted their relationship otherwise over the three decades preceding
[STFA's] first raising the prescriptive issue in 2019."
A-2145-23 4 The STFA filed an order to show cause (OTSC) with the Law Division
seeking to vacate the arbitration award. In denying the OTSC, the trial court
determined the arbitrator's conclusion was "reasonably debatable" and did not
meet the standard for setting aside the arbitration award.
The STFA appealed, contending the arbitration award must be vacated
because it is not reasonably debatable. The STFA posits the arbitrator
"disregarded the plain and unambiguous contract language[,] . . .[and]
committed a mistake of law" in failing to confine his determination to the four
corners of the agreement, and considering the parties' past practice.
We consider the STFA's arguments in turn.
II.
We begin by acknowledging the scope of our review. The decision to
grant or deny a motion to vacate an arbitration award is a matter of law which
we review de novo. See Yarborough v. State Operated Sch. Dist. of City of
Newark, 455 N.J. Super. 136, 139 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Minkowitz v. Israeli,
433 N.J. Super. 111, 136 (App. Div. 2013)). A trial court's review of an
arbitration award is limited. Strickland v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 475 N.J. Super.
27, 38 (App. Div. 2023). Accordingly, we apply "an extremely deferential
review when a party to a [CBA] has sought to vacate an arbitrator's award."
A-2145-23 5 Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. No. 11 v. City of Trenton, 205 N.J. 422,
428 (2011).
N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8 circumscribes the following statutory grounds upon
which an arbitration award may be vacated:
a. Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means;
b. Where there was either evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or any thereof;
c. Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause being shown therefor, or in refusing to hear evidence, pertinent and material to the controversy, or of any other misbehaviors prejudicial to the rights of any party;
d. Where the arbitrators exceeded or so imperfectly executed their powers that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
"The public policy of this State favors arbitration as a means of settling
disputes that otherwise would be litigated in a court." Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins.
Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 556 (2015) (citing Cnty. Coll. of Morris Staff Ass'n v. Cnty.
Coll. of Morris, 100 N.J. 383, 390 (1985)). To ensure the finality and the
expeditious and inexpensive nature of binding arbitration, there is "a strong
preference for judicial confirmation of arbitration awards," particularly in
A-2145-23 6 public-sector labor disputes. Borough of E. Rutherford v. E. Rutherford PBA
Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013) (quoting Middletown Twp. PBA Loc. 124 v.
Twp. of Middletown, 193 N.J. 1, 10 (2007)).
"Generally, when a court reviews an arbitration award, it does so mindful
of the fact that the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract controls." Id. at 201.
Even where an arbitrator's interpretation "was not the only one that could have
flowed from the [a]greement and may not even have been the best one[,]" the
award will still be confirmed if the conclusion was reasonably debatable.
Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, Loc. No. 11, 205 N.J. at 425. Under this
standard, a court reviewing an arbitration decision "may not substitute its own
judgment for that of the arbitrator, regardless of the court's view of the
correctness of the arbitrator's [interpretation]." Borough of E. Rutherford, 213
N.J. at 201-02 (quoting Middletown Twp. PBA Loc. 124, 193 N.J. at 11)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
To determine "undue means," "[t]he judicial inquiry must consider more
than whether a mere mistake occurred." Minkowitz, 433 N.J. Super. at 150.
Instead, the
formulation requires that the arbitrator[] must have clearly intended to decide according to law, must have clearly mistaken the legal rule, and that mistake must appear on the face of the award. In addition, the error,
A-2145-23 7 to be fatal, must result in a failure of intent or be so gross as to suggest fraud or misconduct.
[Id. at 150-51 (alteration in original) (quoting Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc., 135 N.J. 349, 357 (1994) (internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).]
"[A]n arbitrator's failure to follow the substantive law may . . . constitute
'undue means' which would require the award to be vacated." In re City of
Camden, 429 N.J. Super. 309, 332 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Jersey City Educ.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of Jersey City, 218 N.J. Super. 177, 188 (App. Div.
1987)). Undue means does "not include situations . . . where the arbitrator bases
his decision on one party's version of the facts, finding that version to be
credible." Loc. No. 153, Off. & Pro. Emps. Int'l Union v. Tr. Co. of N.J., 105
N.J. 442, 450 n.1 (1987).
Arbitrators are bound by the four corners of an agreement where its terms
are unambiguous but may look to additional provisions or other extrinsic
evidence where terms are ambiguous or undefined. Policemen's Benevolent
Ass'n, Loc. No. 11, 205 N.J. at 430 (quoting Linden Bd. of Educ. v. Linden
Educ. Ass'n ex rel. Mizichko, 202 N.J. 268, 277 (2010)); see also Hall v. Bd. of
Educ. of Twp. of Jefferson, 125 N.J. 299, 305-06 (1991) ("If contract terms are
unspecific or vague, extrinsic evidence may be used to shed light on the mutual
A-2145-23 8 understanding of the parties."). "The past practice of the contracting parties is
entitled to 'great weight' in determining the meaning of ambiguous or doubtful
contractual terms." Hall, 125 N.J. at 306 (quoting Kennedy v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 16 N.J. 280, 294 (1954)).
Such a construction will meet the reasonably debatable standard if it is
"'justifiable' or 'fully supportable in the record[.]'" Policemen's Benevolent
Ass'n, Loc. No. 11, 205 N.J. at 431 (quoting Kearny PBA Loc. No. 21 v. Town
of Kearny, 81 N.J. 208, 223-24 (1979)). However, when an arbitrator ignores
"the clear and unambiguous language of the agreement" they will be found to
exceed their authority and, therefore, there will be grounds for vacatur under
N.J.S.A. 2A:24-8(d). See City Ass'n of Supervisors & Adm'rs v. State Operated
Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 311 N.J. Super. 300, 312 (App. Div. 1998).
Applying these standards, we discern no error in the trial court's denial of
STFA's motion to vacate the arbitration award, concluding the arbitrator's
interpretation of the agreement is plausible and, thus, reasonably debatable. The
arbitrator found the OT Provision to be ambiguous and looked to extrinsic
evidence to determine the parties' intent to inform the arbitrator's interpretation.
Here, the OT Provision parenthetical can be interpreted in multiple ways.
One interpretation views the parenthetical as a mandatory mathematical
A-2145-23 9 equation for the calculation of overtime pay strictly using the 2,080 multiplier.
This interpretation arguably conflicts with the prior reference to "time and one
[-]half rate" in the same CBA section, since the term "time" fluctuates depending
on how many hours per year the employee works. Another interpretation views
the parenthetical as providing merely an example and viewing the multiplier as
variable, depending on the actual number of working days in a year.
Both interpretations are arguably reasonable based on the proofs at the
arbitration hearing. We conclude the CBA is ambiguous, since it is susceptible
to more than one interpretation, and the arbitrator's consideration of extrinsic
evidence was permissible because neither party was able to produce a witness
who could testify to the intent at the time of the formation of the CBA .
The evidence at the arbitration hearing established that in 1987, when the
2,080 reference was first included in the agreement, there were 261 working
days in the fiscal year and, therefore, the multiplier for overtime calculations
would have been 2,088. Rather than using the 2,080 multiplier for 1987, the
agreement instead references a multiplier for a 260 working day fiscal year
leading to a plausible conclusion the multiplier used in the parenthetical was
only an example of a calculation rather than a specific and mandatory CBA term.
A-2145-23 10 NJSP's past practice of calculating the overtime rate plausibly reflects the
parties' interpretation of the CBA as consistent with the arbitrator's decision.
Since 1987, the NJSP calculated the overtime rate based on the number of
working days in the given fiscal year—using the 2,080, 2,088, and 2,096
multipliers depending on the number of actual working days in the fiscal year.
Burkhalter's testimony that the treasury circulars mandate state employee
salaries be paid according to the actual number of working days supports the
arbitrator's interpretation the CBA parenthetical is "illustrative and descriptive,
instead of prescriptive."
Affirmed.
A-2145-23 11