State Revenue Commission v. Glenn

6 S.E.2d 384, 61 Ga. App. 567, 1939 Ga. App. LEXIS 477
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedDecember 5, 1939
Docket27565.
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 6 S.E.2d 384 (State Revenue Commission v. Glenn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Revenue Commission v. Glenn, 6 S.E.2d 384, 61 Ga. App. 567, 1939 Ga. App. LEXIS 477 (Ga. Ct. App. 1939).

Opinion

MacIntyre, J.

The State Revenue Commission made an assessment against T. K. Glenn, the defendant, for income taxes for the year 1935. In December, 1932, the defendant organized under the laws of Delaware a corporation known as Walhalla Investment Company. The defendant owned 98 shares of stock and was the beneficiary owner of the two remaining shares. In order to obtain this stock, the defendant (hereafter called the taxpayer) on January 3, 1933, conveyed four tracts of land to said corporation in consideration of its stock. The taxpayer said three parcels of said land were bought before 1931, and that its fair market value on January 1, 1931, was $392,500; that he purchased the fourth parcel on November 12, 1932 at a cost of $122,000, making the aggregate bases of the four parcels of property for the purpose of income tax, $514,500. On April 15, 1935, Walhalla Investment Company was dissolved and the taxpayer received the four tracts of land back from the corporation. He contends that the value at this time was $206,100, whereas it was valued at $514,500 at the time it was transferred to the corporation, making a net loss of $308,400 to the taxpayer.

The question presented is whether or not the judge erred in overruling the demurrer to the affidavit of illegality, and this question arises entirely out of the disallowance by the State Revenue Commission of the loss claimed by the taxpayer upon the dissolution of Walhalla Investment Company in his income .tax returns. If he actually sustained a loss, and if that loss was deductible, the judg *569 ment of the trial court should be affirmed. If he did not, under the statute, suffer a loss, or, if having suffered one, the statutes did not permit him to deduct the loss for income-tax purposes, then the judgment should be reversed. For the purpose of the demurrer let us assume or admit that the taxpayer sustained this loss on account -of his dealings with the corporation in which he owned 98 per cent, of the capital stock.

Cpde, § 92-3108, provides: “The words ‘net income’ mean the gross income of a taxpayer, less the deductions allowed by this law.” Code, § 92-3109, in part, provides: “In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions: . . (d) Losses sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.” Code, § 92-3110, provides: “In computing the net income no deductions shall in any case be allowed in respect of: . . (e) Shrinkage in value of property of any kind.” Code, § 92-3120 (d), provides: “The distribution to the taxpayer of the assets of a corporation shall be treated as a sale of the stock or securities of the corporation owned by him, and the gain or loss shall be computed accordingly.” All of these Code sections were taken from the income-tax act of 1931 (Ga. L. Ex. Sess., 1931, p. 24). The amending act of 1935 (Ga. L. 1935, pp. 121, 124, § 3) stated: “That said title 92, division I, part IX, chapter 92-31 of the Code of Georgia of 1933 be further amended by adding at the end of subsection (d) of section 92-3109 the following: ‘Provided, that no deduction shall be allowed for any claimed losses arising by reason of the sale by an individual of tangible or intangible property to a corporation in which such individual and/or the members of the family of such individual own a majority of .the capital stock, or to the wife or husband or any member of the family of such individual; nor shall any such claimed loss be allowed to any corporation on account of the sale of any property, tangible or intangible, to any stockholder and/or stockholders owning fifty per cent, or more of the capital stock in any such corporation or the wife or husband or any member of the family of any such stockholder and/or stockholders; nor shall any such claimed loss be allowed to any person or corporation on account of the sale of any property, tangible or intangible, where the seller purchases the same or similar property within thirty days from the date of any such sale.’”

*570 Thus, subsection (d) of Code, § 92-3109, gives one of the rules to be followed in computing the net income of the taxpayer. This rule is that the “losses sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise” are allowed as a deduction from the gross income, but, since the Code of 1933, the amending act of 1935 has modified the rule in that it provided that no deductions shall be allowed for any claimed losses arising by reason of the sale by any individual of tangible or intangible property (stock) to a corporation in which such individual owns a majority of the capital stock; nor shall any such claimed loss be allowed to any corporation on account of the sale of any property, tangible or intangible, to any stockholder owning fifty per cent, or more of the capital stock in any such corporation.

Is not the question, in its final analysis, whether the amending, act of 1935, which is added at the end of subsection (d) of Code, § 92-3109, applies to and affects only this, subsection (d) of Code, § 92-3109, or does it apply to and affect the entire chapter 92-31 of the Code of 1933? It should be noted that the amending act of 1935 does not state that it is amending Code, § 92-3109, or that it is amending subsection (d) of that section, but it states that it is further amending “title 92, division I, part IX, chapter 92-31 of the Code of Georgia, 1933,” and then states in-effect that the place where said amendment shall be inserted in said chapter is at the end of subsection (d) of section 92-3109.

Chapter 92-31 of the Code of 1933, which deals with income tax, is headed “Imposition, rate, and computation of taxes; exemptions.” Code, § 92-3109, which is included in this chapter is headed “Deductions from gross income,” and enumerates in various subsections \Vhat deductions are allowed from gross income in computing net income. One of these subsections, designated as “d,” is headed, “Losses.” This subsection then defines the word “losses,” as used therein, to be “losses sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.” The “losses” thus defined may be deducted from the taxpayer’s gross income and might be called deductible “losses.” Code, § 92-3110, is headed “Items not deductible,” and it is therein stated in subsection (e) that no deductions are allowed for “shrinkage in value of property [of the taxpayer] of any kind,” and finally, the last section of this chapter (Code, § 92-3120) is headed: “Gain or loss *571 in exchange of property; corporate stock; 'reorganization’ and 'party to a reorganization’ defined.” Among the definitions in this section (92-3120) is subsection (d) which is as follows: ''The distribution to the taxpayer of the assets of a corporation shall be treated as a sale of the stock or securities of the corporation owned by him, and the gain or loss shall be computed accordingly.” Thus, if the assets of the corporation in which the taxpayer was a stockholder had been distributed to him, he would have been allowed to ''treat such distribution of the assets as a sale of the stock . . of the corporation owned by him,” and in case of a loss on account of such distribution of the corporation’s assets this could have been computed as a loss deductible under the Code, § 92-3109 (d).

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Bluebook (online)
6 S.E.2d 384, 61 Ga. App. 567, 1939 Ga. App. LEXIS 477, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-revenue-commission-v-glenn-gactapp-1939.