State Public Defender v. Iowa District Court For Scott County
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Opinion
In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 25–0011
Submitted September 16, 2025—Filed January 30, 2026
State Public Defender,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Iowa District Court for Scott County,
Defendant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine Dalton
Ploof, district associate judge.
The State Public Defender on certiorari review challenges a district court’s
orders appointing a local public defender and denying motions to withdraw in
six criminal cases. Writ Sustained.
Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which McDonald,
McDermott, and May, JJ., joined. Waterman, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., joined. Mansfield, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., joined.
Jeff Wright, State Public Defender, and Jacob Mason (argued), Assistant
State Public Defender, for plaintiff.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General; Eric Wessan (argued), Solicitor General;
Patrick C. Valencia, Deputy Solicitor General; and William C. Admussen (until
withdrawal), Assistant Solicitor General, for defendant. 2
Oxley, Justice.
Our state, like many across the nation, is facing an indigent defense crisis.
But this legal dispute over the powers and duties of local public defenders in
Iowa Code section 13B.9 (2024) is not the vehicle to fix the complex policy
matters in that strained system. Our review is limited to determining what role,
if any, a district court plays in deciding whether a local public defender is facing
a temporary overload of cases that requires it to return new court appointments
to represent indigent defendants back to the court.
This proceeding involves six unrelated criminal cases pending in Scott
County. In each case, the Davenport local public defender’s office (Davenport PD)
sought to withdraw from representing the indicted indigent defendant based on
a temporary overload of cases, as it is directed to do under Iowa Code section
13B.9(4)(a). While the Iowa District Court for Scott County appropriately
appointed the Davenport PD to represent the indigent defendants initially, see
Iowa Code § 13B.9(1), a local public defender is mandated that it “shall return
the case to the court” in two circumstances: “[i]f a conflict of interest arises or if
the local public defender is unable to handle a case because of a temporary
overload of cases.” Id. § 13B.9(4)(a).
Miguel Puentes, the Davenport Public Defender, filed a motion in each case
stating that “after consideration of all applicable factors including the number of
attorneys in the office and caseloads, [the office] has determined they are still
ethically unable to handle this case.” The district court rejected the motion,
directing Puentes to be attached to each case’s docket when no one from his
office made an appearance as directed by the court. Not so much because the
district court disbelieved Puentes’s representations about the workload of his
office, but because the district court had no one else to appoint. 3
The State Public Defender brought this certiorari proceeding to challenge
the district court’s refusal to allow the local public defender to withdraw from
the six cases. The case requires us to determine the roles between the local
public defender and the court in determining whether the statutory condition
precedent of “a temporary overload of cases” is met. Id. The State Public Defender
argues that the local public defender has sole authority to make that
determination. On behalf of the district court, the attorney general argues that
the court has a role, such that the district court acted within its discretion in
rejecting the local public defender’s attempt to return these cases when the court
had no one else to appoint.
We agree with the attorney general that the district court has a role in
ensuring the condition precedent for returning a case is met. But the district
court’s role is limited when the condition is the local public defender’s inability
“to handle a case because of a temporary overload of cases.” Id. Unless the court
has reason to believe that the local public defender misrepresented its office’s
caseload, district courts should be highly deferential to whether a temporary
overload has been shown to allow the case to be returned to the district court.
Here, Puentes’s representations satisfied his burden to establish the
precondition to returning each case. The district court acted beyond its authority
when it refused to accept the representation and allow the Davenport PD out of
the six cases. The writ is therefore sustained.
I. Indigent Public Defense in Iowa.
It is a cornerstone of constitutional jurisprudence that indigent defendants
charged with crimes punishable by imprisonment are entitled to a state-provided
defense lawyer. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Hall v.
Washington Co., 2 Greene 473, 478–79 (Iowa 1850). The right to a 4
court-appointed attorney is also codified in the Iowa Code. See Iowa Code
§ 815.9(1) (establishing guidelines for determining whether a defendant is
indigent and therefore “entitled to an attorney appointed by the court”).
Traditionally, the obligation to represent indigent defendants was seen as one
shared by the bar. See, e.g., Soldat v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Emmet Cnty., 283 N.W.2d
497, 500 (Iowa 1979) (en banc) (“Lawyers generally should also be more willing
to accept court appointments, even at some inconvenience and financial sacrifice
to themselves, so that the profession may better discharge what has traditionally
been the lawyer’s obligation to assist courts in the administration of justice.”).
Yet, as we recognized in Soldat v. Iowa District Court for Emmet County, by the
late 1970s “the burden of representing indigents [had fallen] upon a small
segment of the bar, rather than all lawyers, as was originally intended.” Id. This
was not an Iowa-centric problem, but one that states across the country were
experiencing. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense
Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 427, 432–43 (2009) (discussing
lawsuits across the nation seeking systemic reform of indigent defense around
the same time).
In 1981, the Iowa General Assembly established the position of state
public defender (SPD) within the executive branch to meet the state’s obligation
to provide counsel to indigent defendants. See 1981 Iowa Acts ch. 23, § 2
(codified as amended at Iowa Code § 13B.2 (2024)). The Governor appoints the
“state public defender, who shall serve at the pleasure of the governor, subject
to confirmation.” Iowa Code § 13B.2. As relevant here, the SPD is tasked with
“coordinat[ing] the provision of legal representation to all indigents under arrest
or charged with a crime who face the possibility of imprisonment under the
applicable criminal statute or ordinance.” Id. § 13B.4(1)(a). Since 1988, the SPD 5
has been statutorily authorized to establish (or abolish) local public defender
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In the Iowa Supreme Court
No. 25–0011
Submitted September 16, 2025—Filed January 30, 2026
State Public Defender,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Iowa District Court for Scott County,
Defendant.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine Dalton
Ploof, district associate judge.
The State Public Defender on certiorari review challenges a district court’s
orders appointing a local public defender and denying motions to withdraw in
six criminal cases. Writ Sustained.
Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which McDonald,
McDermott, and May, JJ., joined. Waterman, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., joined. Mansfield, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., joined.
Jeff Wright, State Public Defender, and Jacob Mason (argued), Assistant
State Public Defender, for plaintiff.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General; Eric Wessan (argued), Solicitor General;
Patrick C. Valencia, Deputy Solicitor General; and William C. Admussen (until
withdrawal), Assistant Solicitor General, for defendant. 2
Oxley, Justice.
Our state, like many across the nation, is facing an indigent defense crisis.
But this legal dispute over the powers and duties of local public defenders in
Iowa Code section 13B.9 (2024) is not the vehicle to fix the complex policy
matters in that strained system. Our review is limited to determining what role,
if any, a district court plays in deciding whether a local public defender is facing
a temporary overload of cases that requires it to return new court appointments
to represent indigent defendants back to the court.
This proceeding involves six unrelated criminal cases pending in Scott
County. In each case, the Davenport local public defender’s office (Davenport PD)
sought to withdraw from representing the indicted indigent defendant based on
a temporary overload of cases, as it is directed to do under Iowa Code section
13B.9(4)(a). While the Iowa District Court for Scott County appropriately
appointed the Davenport PD to represent the indigent defendants initially, see
Iowa Code § 13B.9(1), a local public defender is mandated that it “shall return
the case to the court” in two circumstances: “[i]f a conflict of interest arises or if
the local public defender is unable to handle a case because of a temporary
overload of cases.” Id. § 13B.9(4)(a).
Miguel Puentes, the Davenport Public Defender, filed a motion in each case
stating that “after consideration of all applicable factors including the number of
attorneys in the office and caseloads, [the office] has determined they are still
ethically unable to handle this case.” The district court rejected the motion,
directing Puentes to be attached to each case’s docket when no one from his
office made an appearance as directed by the court. Not so much because the
district court disbelieved Puentes’s representations about the workload of his
office, but because the district court had no one else to appoint. 3
The State Public Defender brought this certiorari proceeding to challenge
the district court’s refusal to allow the local public defender to withdraw from
the six cases. The case requires us to determine the roles between the local
public defender and the court in determining whether the statutory condition
precedent of “a temporary overload of cases” is met. Id. The State Public Defender
argues that the local public defender has sole authority to make that
determination. On behalf of the district court, the attorney general argues that
the court has a role, such that the district court acted within its discretion in
rejecting the local public defender’s attempt to return these cases when the court
had no one else to appoint.
We agree with the attorney general that the district court has a role in
ensuring the condition precedent for returning a case is met. But the district
court’s role is limited when the condition is the local public defender’s inability
“to handle a case because of a temporary overload of cases.” Id. Unless the court
has reason to believe that the local public defender misrepresented its office’s
caseload, district courts should be highly deferential to whether a temporary
overload has been shown to allow the case to be returned to the district court.
Here, Puentes’s representations satisfied his burden to establish the
precondition to returning each case. The district court acted beyond its authority
when it refused to accept the representation and allow the Davenport PD out of
the six cases. The writ is therefore sustained.
I. Indigent Public Defense in Iowa.
It is a cornerstone of constitutional jurisprudence that indigent defendants
charged with crimes punishable by imprisonment are entitled to a state-provided
defense lawyer. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Hall v.
Washington Co., 2 Greene 473, 478–79 (Iowa 1850). The right to a 4
court-appointed attorney is also codified in the Iowa Code. See Iowa Code
§ 815.9(1) (establishing guidelines for determining whether a defendant is
indigent and therefore “entitled to an attorney appointed by the court”).
Traditionally, the obligation to represent indigent defendants was seen as one
shared by the bar. See, e.g., Soldat v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Emmet Cnty., 283 N.W.2d
497, 500 (Iowa 1979) (en banc) (“Lawyers generally should also be more willing
to accept court appointments, even at some inconvenience and financial sacrifice
to themselves, so that the profession may better discharge what has traditionally
been the lawyer’s obligation to assist courts in the administration of justice.”).
Yet, as we recognized in Soldat v. Iowa District Court for Emmet County, by the
late 1970s “the burden of representing indigents [had fallen] upon a small
segment of the bar, rather than all lawyers, as was originally intended.” Id. This
was not an Iowa-centric problem, but one that states across the country were
experiencing. See, e.g., Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense
Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 427, 432–43 (2009) (discussing
lawsuits across the nation seeking systemic reform of indigent defense around
the same time).
In 1981, the Iowa General Assembly established the position of state
public defender (SPD) within the executive branch to meet the state’s obligation
to provide counsel to indigent defendants. See 1981 Iowa Acts ch. 23, § 2
(codified as amended at Iowa Code § 13B.2 (2024)). The Governor appoints the
“state public defender, who shall serve at the pleasure of the governor, subject
to confirmation.” Iowa Code § 13B.2. As relevant here, the SPD is tasked with
“coordinat[ing] the provision of legal representation to all indigents under arrest
or charged with a crime who face the possibility of imprisonment under the
applicable criminal statute or ordinance.” Id. § 13B.4(1)(a). Since 1988, the SPD 5
has been statutorily authorized to establish (or abolish) local public defender
offices depending on the potential number of cases where a local public defender
would be involved, the population of the area to be served, the willingness of local
private attorneys to handle such cases, and other factors the SPD deems
important. Id. § 13B.8(1). The SPD is responsible for staffing and equipping each
local public defender office with funds appropriated by the general assembly. See
id. § 13B.8(2)–(4). The Davenport PD is one such local public defender office.
The SPD is required to provide notice to the clerk of court “in each county
served by a public defender designating which public defender office shall receive
notice of appointment of cases.” Id. § 13B.4(2). The SPD may also identify
designees to be appointed in place of the local public defender office. Id.
Designees may be individual Iowa lawyers, nonprofit organizations employing
Iowa lawyers, or another local public defender office. Id.; see also id. § 13B.9(4)(a)
(“As used in this subsection, ‘successor designee’ may include another local
public defender office . . . .”).
The SPD may also contract with Iowa attorneys or nonprofit organizations
to provide legal services to indigent defendants. Id. § 13B.4(3). The SPD
“establish[es] fee limitations for particular categories of cases.” Id. § 13B.4(4)(a).
The general assembly sets the hourly rates paid to court-appointed indigent
defense attorneys who are not under a section 13B.4 contract with the SPD. See
id. § 815.7(2)–(9). The current rates are “eighty-eight dollars per hour for class
‘A’ felonies, eighty-three dollars per hour for class ‘B’ felonies, and seventy-eight
dollars per hour for all other cases.” Id. § 815.7(10) (2026).
Despite this statutory scheme, Iowa has experienced an indigent defense
crisis for some time based on a shortage of attorneys available to represent
indigent defendants—both inside and outside of the state public defender 6
system. And it is getting worse. According to the Legislative Services Agency, the
number of private attorneys willing to contract with the SPD over the last decade
has cut in half—from 1,018 in 2015 to approximately 500 in 2024. Legis. Servs.
Agency, Fiscal Servs. Div., Public Defenders and Contract Attorneys 1 (2025),
https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/FTNO/1463204.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4V5B-6QK5].
But this case is not the vehicle for fixing that shortage. Rather, as in all
cases before our court, we address only the specific dispute before us. See
State v. Thompson, 954 N.W.2d 402, 410–11 (Iowa 2021) (recognizing that the
judicial power is the power to construe and interpret the laws within the context
of applying them to decide a specific controversy); Planned Parenthood of the
Heartland v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 915 N.W.2d 206, 212 (Iowa 2018)
(“Our constitution tasks . . . the judiciary with construing and applying the laws
to cases brought before the courts.”), overruled on other grounds by, Planned
Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Reynolds ex rel. State, 975 N.W.2d 710
(Iowa 2022). Here, the dispute is limited to the Davenport PD’s attempt to return
to the court its appointed representation in six specific cases based on a
temporary overload and the district court’s refusal to accept the return of these
six cases.
II. Factual Background and Proceedings.
This original certiorari proceeding involves six different, unrelated criminal
cases with nearly identical procedural facts.1 The defendants were each charged
1Each of the six defendants was charged with a serious misdemeanor and faced potential
jail time: (1) John H. Shepherd III was charged with “possession of methamphetamine, first offense”; (2) James A. Doty Jr. was charged with “possession of marijuana, first offense” and “person ineligible to carry dangerous weapons”; (3) Jamie A. Spahr was charged with “domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury or mental illness, first offense”’ (4) Stephon L. Glass was charged with “possession of a controlled substance, second offense—marijuana only” and “person ineligible to carry dangerous weapons”; (5) Lashayla S. Montgomery was charged with 7
with committing a serious misdemeanor through criminal complaints filed close
in time in 2024: one each on September 26, October 19, and October 29, and
three criminal complaints filed on October 23. Each defendant requested
court-appointed counsel based on indigency, and the district court appointed
the Davenport PD.
In the first case, filed on September 26, an attorney from the Davenport
PD filed an appearance on October 1. But it was quickly followed by a motion to
withdraw two days later, stating: “The State Public Defender is unable to
continue representing Defendant due to a conflict of interest as follows,” with an
“X” marked next to “Temporary overload.” The prayer for relief stated:
“WHEREFORE, we respectfully ask that this motion be granted.” The motion was
signed by Miguel Puentes, the chief public defender for the Davenport PD. On
October 21, a district associate judge responded to the motion in an order
stating: “The Court determines the motion shall be denied without prejudice as
the local public defender office is fully staffed at this time.”
In each of the other cases, the Davenport PD filed a motion to withdraw
soon after the respective order appointing it—the same or the next day. Each
motion included the following statement: “In accordance with Iowa Code Section
13B.9(4), the public defender is returning the case to the court.” Puentes signed
each of these motions.
The same district associate judge who denied the motion in the first
case also denied the motions in the subsequent cases using verbatim orders:
To date, the Court has utilized all available contract attorneys to grant motions by the state public defender’s office on conflict cases, co-defendant cases, and to the extent possible, “temporary overload” cases. The Court notes that the state public defender’s second
“driving while license denied or revoked”; and (6) Jacionna L. Stowers was charged with “possession of a controlled substance—marijuana, first offense.” 8
motion filed in some cases does not state any reason for the withdrawal.
The local state public defender’s office recently became fully staffed. The Court is unaware of the caseload of the public defender’s office, per attorney, prior to . . . being fully staffed as compared to the current caseload now that full staffing has occurred. The Court does not know the ideal caseload per attorney nor the maximum caseload per attorney. The Court is unaware of the methodology for arriving at the ideal or maximum caseload. The court is appointing and will continue to appoint contract and non-contract private attorneys whenever they are available or willing to take court appointed cases. However, there remains insufficient attorneys available to take appointments for well over a year and this still exists today. Accordingly, due to a lack of information provided by the movant, and lack of attorneys to take the cases if the motions are granted, the Court cannot make a determination that the movant is unable to represent the defendant and the motion is denied.
Puentes promptly filed a “second motion to withdraw” in all six cases, without
requesting a hearing. The motions again stated that the Davenport PD was
“returning the case[s] to the court.” Although it did not expressly address the
district court’s reference to the Davenport PD recently becoming fully staffed,
each motion stated: “The public defender is in receipt of the court’s order denying
their first motion to withdraw and after consideration of all applicable factors
including the number of attorneys in the office and caseloads, has determined
they are still ethically unable to handle this case.” (Emphasis added.) No affidavit
or other evidence was provided regarding the caseload of any of the attorneys in
the local office.
On November 6, the district court again denied the motion in all six cases
in an order stating: “The first motion was denied and the order specifically says
if the Public Defender wishes to have the order reconsidered a hearing is to be
scheduled. Until a hearing is scheduled and heard, the motion remains denied.” 9
The Davenport PD did not request a hearing or otherwise respond to the district
court’s second set of orders.
A month passed without any action taken by the Davenport PD to
represent the six indigent defendants. On December 6, the district court entered
an order in all six cases expressing its frustration with the Davenport PD’s
inaction:
A few weeks ago, the local public defender refused to sign the written arraignment. They refuse to advise these clients or inform these clients about their options and legal rights at arraignment. Some of these defendants had not been provided their Trial Information prior to signing a written arraignment. The only notice the clients receive for their PTC is from the court. None is provided from the local public defender’s office. . . .
The Court is dum[b]founded by the failure of the local office to provide basic required representation of their clients when the State Public Defender has a state-wide staff to assist the local office with the overload, and the State Public Defender himself has the statutory duty to provide indigent defendants with appropriate representation.
....
An appearance shall be entered and a signature provided within 10 working days. That attorney will be responsible for representing the Defendant unless or until a withdrawal has been granted. If an entry of appearance is not filed in this matter as required by this order, the Court will appoint the Chief of the Local Public Defender’s Office personally. The Chief is required to appear on the case, or may assign the case to another staff attorney, or other designated attorney identified by The S[t]ate Public Defender, as the court has no attorneys available to appoint.
The Davenport PD filed no response to this order and took no action to represent
the six indigent defendants. On December 19, the district court entered its fourth
order in all six cases stating, “[A]ttorney Miguel Puentes is responsible for this
case. As Chief Public Defender in the Davenport office, he certainly may
designate a staff attorney to file an appearance in his stead.” 10
The next day, the Davenport PD made a filing titled “Notice of Return
pursuant to Iowa Code Section 13B.9(4)(a)” in each of the six cases. No affidavit
or other evidence or information about workloads was submitted with any of the
notices. Each notice stated:
[T]he Office of the State Public Defender . . . hereby notices the Court that due to a temporary overload, this case is returned to the Court. As the Court is aware, this does not burden our Office with a requirement to have the matter heard or proof shown, rather it directs the Court to act pursuant to this section.
On December 31, the district court entered its fifth order in each case reiterating
that no contract attorneys were available, the Davenport PD’s motions to
withdraw had been denied, and the “notice fails to provide any additional basis
to modify any of the Court’s previous orders.”
Later the same day, the State Public Defender filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari with our court. He argued that the Iowa District Court for
Scott County acted illegally by denying the Davenport PD’s motions to return or
withdraw from these six cases due to a temporary overload. He asks us to direct
the district court to enter an order withdrawing the Davenport PD and appointing
replacement counsel pursuant to Iowa Code section 815.10(3). He also requested
a stay of the district court orders. We granted the unresisted application for a
writ of certiorari but denied the request for a stay.2 We retained the writ of
certiorari and sustain it for the reasons below.
III. Analysis.
We first reject the attorney general’s arguments that the State Public
Defender’s petition for a writ of certiorari was untimely and that he failed to
preserve error for our review. The State Public Defender’s petition was timely
2None of the six defendants are incarcerated on these charges. They were released from
custody on bond or on their personal recognizance pending trial. 11
filed within thirty days of the district court’s December orders, and we have
discretion to review the “inextricably intertwined” earlier rulings denying the
Davenport PD’s motions to withdraw. Hammer v. Branstad, 463 N.W.2d 86, 89
(Iowa 1990).
Turning to the merits, we agree with the district court that it has a role to
play when a local public defender “returns” a case to which it has been appointed
based on an assertion that its office has a “temporary overload” within the
meaning of Iowa Code section 13B.9(4)(a). But we disagree about the extent of
that role. Under the facts of this case, the Davenport PD’s representation in the
second motion to withdraw, filed in each of the six underlying cases, satisfied its
burden to establish that the local office had a temporary overload to support
returning the six cases. The district court therefore should have accepted the
return of the cases. That said, the local public defender was obligated to “counsel
and defend . . . the defendant[s]” until the district court entered an order
accepting the return of the cases. Iowa Code § 13B.9(1)(a) (2024). We reject the
State Public Defender’s argument that the local public defender’s representation
ended upon its unilateral return of the case to the court.
A. Standard of Review. “In a certiorari case, we review a district court’s
ruling for correction of errors at law.” State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 886 N.W.2d
595, 598 (Iowa 2016). “When reviewing for correction of errors at law, we are
bound by ‘the district court’s well-supported factual findings’ but not its legal
conclusions.” Id. (quoting State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Clarke Cnty.,
745 N.W.2d 738, 739 (Iowa 2008)). “A writ of certiorari lies where a lower board,
tribunal, or court has exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise has acted illegally.”
Id. (quoting State Pub. Def. v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Plymouth Cnty., 747 N.W.2d 218,
220 (Iowa 2008)). “Illegality exists when the court’s findings lack substantial 12
evidentiary support, or when the court has not properly applied the law.” Id.
(quoting Iowa Dist. Ct. for Plymouth Cnty., 747 N.W.2d at 220).
B. Whether the State Public Defender’s Petition Was Timely Filed and
Whether He Preserved Error. “A petition for writ of certiorari must be filed
within 30 days after entry of the challenged decision.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.107(1)(b).
The district court denied the Davenport PD’s motions to withdraw in October
and November, more than thirty days before the State Public Defender filed its
petition for a writ of certiorari on December 31, 2024. The attorney general
therefore argues that the State Public Defender’s petition was untimely and failed
to preserve error. We decline to hold that the die was cast by the October or
November rulings denying the Davenport PD’s motions to withdraw. To the
contrary, those rulings, by their own terms, were not final but rather invited the
Davenport PD to set hearings and make a record supporting its grounds to
withdraw.
The State Public Defender’s petition was filed within thirty days of the
district court’s December orders that he challenges as illegal: specifically, the
December 6 orders requiring a public defender to file an appearance, the
December 19 orders specifically appointing Puentes or his designated staff
attorney, and the December 31 orders rejecting any relief from Puentes’s
“Notice of Return” under section 13B.9(4)(a). Those December orders are
inextricably intertwined with the October and November orders denying the
Davenport PD’s motions to withdraw, and all the district court’s orders are
interlocutory. We conclude that we have jurisdiction, and our review may include
the earlier rulings. See Hammer, 463 N.W.2d at 89.
In Hammer v. Branstad, the plaintiffs filed a putative class action
challenging the State’s implementation of comparative worth legislation 13
adjusting salaries of state government employees. Id. at 87. The district court
granted class certification in an order entered in November 1988 and granted
the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on liability in February 1989,
with damages to be determined at trial. Id. at 88. We granted the defendants’
application for interlocutory appeal filed in March. Id. The plaintiffs argued that
the class certification order was not reviewable because it was entered over thirty
days before the defendants sought appellate review. Id. We disagreed, explaining:
[S]ituations may arise in which earlier orders which have not been appealed are so inextricably intertwined with the issues presented in an appeal of a subsequent interlocutory order that consideration of both orders is necessary to best facilitate the litigation as a whole. This is such a case. To deny an appellate court the right to review the merits of prior orders in such situations would unduly tie its hands.
Id. at 89.
The State Public Defender’s certiorari action is also such a case. See id.
The validity of the district court’s interlocutory orders from October through
December all turn on whether the local public defender was entitled, under
section 13B.9(4)(a), to withdraw from the six criminal cases based on its
representation that its office suffered from a temporary overload of cases without
providing detailed evidence of the extent of the overload. Applying Hammer, we
decline to confine our review to the December rulings.
We also hold that error was preserved. The Davenport PD presented the
temporary overload issue to the district court repeatedly, and the district court
ruled on the issue, denying relief, which preserved error. See Meier v. Senecaut,
641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate
review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district
court before we will decide them on appeal.”). So we turn to the merits. 14
C. Whether the District Court Exceeded Its Jurisdiction or Acted
Illegally in Applying Iowa Code Section 13B.9(4)(a). The State Public Defender
argues that it is entirely within the local public defender’s authority to “return”
a case to the district court because of a temporary overload of cases, and when
it does, the district court can do nothing but accept that return, release the local
public defender’s office from the case, and appoint another attorney under
section 815.10 if no successor designee has been designated. The attorney
general argues that the district court must have a role in determining whether
the statutory threshold—the existence of a “temporary overload of cases”—has
been met before it must then appoint another attorney. We agree with the
attorney general that the district court has a role. The question is the extent of
that role.
We start with the statutory text. A local public defender “shall handle every
case to which [it] is appointed” by the district court “if the local public defender
can reasonably handle the case.” Iowa Code § 13B.9(3). Section 13B.9(4)(a)
provides:
If a conflict of interest arises or if the local public defender is unable to handle a case because of a temporary overload of cases, the local public defender shall return the case to the court. If the case is returned and the state public defender has filed a successor designation, the court shall appoint the successor designee. If there is no successor designee on file, the court shall make the appointment pursuant to section 815.10. As used in this subsection, “successor designee” may include another local public defender office . . . .
Under the plain meaning of section 13B.9(4)(a), a temporary overload is required
to trigger the court’s duty to appoint someone else—a successor designee if one
has been designated by the SPD, or substitute counsel under section 815.10 if
not. That statute in turn provides, as relevant: 15
2. If the state public defender or the state public defender’s designee is unable to represent an indigent person, the court shall appoint an attorney who has a contract with the state public defender to represent the person in the particular type of case and in the county in which the case is pending.
3. If the court determines that no contract attorney is available to represent the person, the court may appoint a noncontract attorney. The order of appointment shall include a specific finding that no contract attorney was available.
Id. § 815.10(2)–(3).
Here, the district court found that no contract attorneys were available for
appointment to these six cases under section 815.10(2). With respect to its
discretionary authority under section 815.10(3), the district court concluded that
no willing, noncontract private attorneys were available. Because there was no
one else to appoint, the district court concluded that there was no statutory basis
for relieving the SPD of its duty to represent these indigent defendants. See id.
§ 13B.4(1)(a) (“The state public defender shall coordinate the provision of legal
representation to all indigents under arrest or charged with a crime who face the
possibility of imprisonment under the applicable criminal statute or ordinance.”).
It therefore rejected the Davenport PD’s “return” of the cases.
1. The state public defender’s obligation to coordinate indigent defense is
distinct from determining whether a local public defender can return a case. Before
getting into what happens when a local public defender “returns” a case to the
court, it is important to understand the specific scheme that the general
assembly created for the powers and duties of state and local public defenders.
Returning a case based on a temporary overload of cases—or based on a conflict
of interest, for that matter—under section 13B.9(4)(a) is done at the local public
defender level, not the state public defender level. By focusing on the state public
defender’s role in coordinating indigent defense, the district court erroneously 16
conflated the roles of the SPD and a local public defender. These are distinct
offices with distinct obligations under chapter 13B. To the extent another local
public defender office could assist the Davenport PD, that consideration comes
into play only after the local public defender returns a case to the court. When a
case is returned, the district court then appoints a designee if one has been
identified by the state public defender. See id. § 13B.9(4)(a) (“If the case is
returned [by the local public defender] and the state public defender has filed a
successor designation, the court shall appoint the successor designee.”
(emphasis added)). The SPD may designate another local public defender office
as a successor designee, see id. (“As used in this subsection, ‘successor designee’
may include another local public defender office.”), and if it does, then the court
can appoint that other local office to take the returned case, id. But the SPD’s
statutory obligation to coordinate statewide indigent defense does not affect
whether the Davenport PD can return a case for a temporary overload.
Two points are important here. First, it is the state public defender who is
responsible for filing a successor designation with each district court clerk’s
office, not the local public defender. See id. § 13B.4(2) (“In each county in which
the state public defender files a designation, the state public defender’s designee
shall be appointed by the court to represent all eligible persons . . . in all cases
and proceedings specified in the designation.” (emphasis added)). So the decision
of whether to designate another local office—such as the Cedar Rapids,
Dubuque, or Burlington offices—as a successor designee for the Davenport PD
belongs to the SPD in its role of coordinating indigent defense across the state,
not the Davenport PD in its determination of whether it is experiencing a
temporary overload. 17
Second, whether the SPD has identified a successor designee for the court
to appoint in the local public defender’s place is irrelevant to the separate,
preliminary question about whether the local public defender has met the
statutory conditions to return a case. While the SPD is authorized to file a
designation of successor designees, and the court is required to appoint that
successor designee when a case is returned by a local public defender, id.
§ 13B.9(4)(a), whether a successor designation has been filed with the court
plays no part in determining whether the local public defender can return a case
to the court in the first place.
The dissents, like the district court, treat the availability of replacement
counsel as relevant to whether a local public defender may return a case in the
first instance. It is not. Section 13B.9(4)(a) does not condition the return of a
case—whether for a conflict of interest or for a temporary overload of cases—on
the availability of replacement counsel. These are distinct and sequential events.
See id. (“If a conflict of interest arises or if the local public defender is unable to
handle a case because of a temporary overload of cases, the local public defender
shall return the case to the court. If the case is returned and the state public
defender has filed a successor designation, the court shall appoint the successor
designee. If there is no successor designee on file, the court shall make the
appointment pursuant to section 815.10.”); cf. State Pub. Def., 886 N.W.2d
at 600 (“[T]he plain language of [section 13B.9(4)(a)] allocated to the court—not
the public defender—the responsibility of selecting and appointing a successor
counsel . . . .”).
It may very well be that the general assembly did not contemplate that
there might not be an available replacement when the local public defender office
faced a temporary overload, the very position in which the district court found 18
itself in these six cases. But that does not change the plain language of section
13B.9(4)(a), which provides no statutory basis for considering whether a
replacement is available before deciding whether a local public defender can
return a case.
This takes us back to the point about the distinct roles of the state public
defender and a local public defender. Section 13B.9(4)(a) allows a local public
defender to return a case when it is temporarily overloaded. The state public
defender has its own distinct statutory obligation to “coordinate the provision of
legal representation to all indigents under arrest or charged with a crime who
face the possibility of imprisonment.” Id. § 13B.4(1)(a). The district court erred
in relying on the state public defender’s obligations under section 13B.4 in
refusing the local public defender’s attempt to return these six cases, even if the
Davenport PD was in fact temporarily overloaded.
2. The district court has a very limited role in accepting the return of a case
based on a temporary overload. The dispute in this case revolves around what it
means for a local public defender to “return [a] case to the court.” Id.
§ 13B.9(4)(a) (“If a conflict of interest arises or if the local public defender is
unable to handle a case because of a temporary overload of cases, the local public
defender shall return the case to the court.” (emphasis added)). This
language—“shall return the case”—is not the language typically used when a
party requests relief from the court. See, e.g., Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.431(1) (“A motion
is an application made by any party or interested person for an order related to
the action.”); id. r. 1.602(2)(a) (“Upon application of any party . . . , [with
exceptions], the court or its designee shall enter a scheduling order . . . .”); id.
r. 1.801 (“On motion, the place of trial may be changed . . . .”). Yet, when an
action does not need court approval, we often see language making that point 19
clear. See, e.g., id. r. 1.943 (“A party may, without order of court, dismiss that
party’s own petition . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. r. 1.972(1) (“If a party . . . is in
default under rule 1.971(1) or 1.971(2), the clerk shall enter that party’s default
in accordance with the procedures set forth in this rule without any order of
court.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, we have previously recognized that the general
assembly’s express direction that a local public defender “shall return the case”
when confronted with a conflict of interest differs from “the general rule under
the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct . . . that appointed counsel may not
withdraw from representation without permission from the appointing
authority.” State Pub. Def., 886 N.W.2d at 599 (comparing a local public
defender’s duty under section 13B.9(4)(a) with Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct
32:1.16(c) and comment 3 to that rule).
In construing a particular word or phrase’s meaning, we must consider
“the context of the other words used in the provision [and] how the provision fits
into the greater statutory scheme.” Beverage v. Alcoa, Inc., 975 N.W.2d 670, 681
(Iowa 2022). The local public defender office cannot “return” just any case under
section 13B.9(4)(a). Rather, its ability to do so is limited to two circumstances:
(1) “[i]f a conflict of interest arises”; or (2) “if the local public defender is unable
to handle a case because of a temporary overload of cases.” Iowa Code
§ 13B.9(4)(a).
There is no dispute that the court has a role in determining whether a
public defender must, or may, withdraw from representing a criminal defendant
based on a conflict of interest. That role can be fairly robust because “[t]he
question of whether a conflict exists is a mixed question of fact and law.” State v.
McKinley, 860 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Iowa 2015). For instance, State v. McKinley
required us to determine whether two public defenders with the Polk County 20
adult public defender’s office who had been appointed to represent a defendant
charged with first-degree murder were required to withdraw after they learned
other attorneys in their office had previously represented three of the State’s
witnesses against their client on unrelated charges. See 860 N.W.2d at 876. The
determination turned on whether the facts presented an actual concurrent
conflict of interest within the meaning of Iowa Rule of Professional Conduct
32:1.7, id. at 881–82, or a serious potential for conflict that would be materially
adverse to the public defender office’s former clients under rule 32:1.9, id. at
882–83. Even then, in concluding that rules 32:1.7 and 32:1.9 did not require
withdrawal, we gave considerable deference to the attorneys’ professional
statements about their lack of knowledge concerning the prior representations
by their colleagues as well as the prophylactic measures within their office to
shield them from problematic information. Id. at 883.
That deference to the public defender is also reflected in our recent case of
State v. Miller, 975 N.W.2d 807 (Iowa 2022). In Miller, the district court granted
a public defender’s motion to withdraw shortly before trial. The motion stated
only that further representation would result in the attorney violating the rules
of professional conduct and that the attorney could not be more specific without
violating the attorney–client privilege. See id. at 810. On appeal from his
conviction following a trial where the defendant represented himself with standby
counsel, the defendant used the district court’s statement “that it had ‘no choice
but to grant [the] application to withdraw,’ ” to argue the district court abused
its discretion by not inquiring further. Id. at 813. In rejecting the defendant’s
argument, we cited with approval comment 3 to rule 32:1.16:
When a lawyer has been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority. . . . The court may request an explanation for the withdrawal, while the 21
lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer’s statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient.
Id. at 814 (omission in original) (quoting Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.16,
cmt. [3]).
Like in McKinley, we applied the facts of the case—based on the attorney’s
professional statement—to the law developed in our rules to protect the
attorney–client privilege. We accepted the professional statement without
imposing a more stringent evidentiary burden because “attorneys are officers of
the court, and ‘when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the
court, their declarations are virtually made under oath.’ ” Id. (quoting
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486 (1978)).
Although section 13B.9(4)(a) treats conflicts of interest and a temporary
overload of cases as parallel bases for a public defender to “return [a] case to the
court,” there is a critical difference between the analysis required for each.
Whereas “[t]he question of whether a conflict exists is a mixed question of fact
and law,” McKinley, 860 N.W.2d at 878, the question of whether “the local public
defender is unable to handle a case because of a temporary overload of cases,”
Iowa Code § 13B.9(4)(a), is entirely a question of fact. A “temporary overload” is
not a legally defined term. Unlike the body of law and professional rules directly
addressing conflicts of interest, there are no rules or standards in Iowa setting
limits for an attorney’s acceptable workload in general, let alone for a local public
defender office.
Here, in response to the district court’s first round of orders denying the
motions to withdraw and noting that the Davenport PD had recently become fully
staffed, the Davenport PD filed a second motion in each of the six cases. In each, 22
the Davenport PD expressly stated: “The public defender is in receipt of the
court’s order denying their first motion to withdraw and after consideration of all
applicable factors including the number of attorneys in the office and caseloads,
has determined they are still ethically unable to handle this case.” (Emphasis
added.) Puentes signed each motion containing this statement. In our view, this
statement satisfied the Davenport PD’s burden to substantiate the condition
precedent to returning the six cases to the court on the basis that it was “unable
to handle [each] case because of a temporary overload of cases.” Iowa Code
§ 13B.9(4)(a). Puentes “compl[ied] with applicable law requiring notice to . . . a
tribunal” to terminate the representation. Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.16(c).
Absent reason to doubt Puentes’s representations, this case is no different than
the professional statements we accepted in McKinley and Miller.
Once the Davenport PD satisfied the factual inquiry, the district court
exceeded its authority by refusing to accept the return of the six cases and look
for replacement counsel under the hierarchy set out by the general assembly in
section 13B.9(4)(a). Unlike a conflict of interest, which involves a mixed question
of law and facts, there is no legal standard in Iowa against which the court could
gauge the representation made by the Davenport PD that its office was unable
to handle these particular cases based on a temporary overload. See, e.g., Off. of
Pub. Advoc. v. Sup. Ct., First Jud. Dist., 566 P.3d 235, 245–46 (Alaska 2025)
(“We agree with other courts that have recognized that a court may not interfere
with the management of public defender services unless ‘presented with a case
that demonstrates that the [public defender agency’s] operations violate the
constitution . . . .’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Kerr v. Parsons, 378 P.3d 1,
13 (N.M. 2016) (Vigil, J., concurring specially))); cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
226 (1962) (explaining that courts will not “enter upon policy determinations for 23
which judicially manageable standards are lacking”). The district court
recognized the lack of guidance against which to measure the workload even if
the Davenport PD had provided details about the number and types of cases in
its office. Even while asking for specific information about the office’s workload
since becoming fully staffed, the district court stated in its order:
The Court is unaware of the caseload of the public defender’s office, per attorney, prior to . . . being fully staffed as compared to the current caseload now that full staffing has occurred. The Court does not know the ideal caseload per attorney nor the maximum caseload per attorney. The Court is unaware of the methodology for arriving at the ideal or maximum caseload.
The district court is “unaware of the methodology” for determining either
the optimum or the maximum caseload because there is none, at least not a
legally mandated one in Iowa. Our professional rules of conduct do impose duties
on an attorney that tangentially touch on the amount of work an individual
attorney can accept. See, e.g., Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.1 (requiring
attorneys to provide competent representation, which requires, inter alia,
“preparation reasonably necessary for the representation”); id. r. 32:1.3
(requiring an attorney to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client”); id. r. 32:8.4(d) (identifying professional misconduct to
include “engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice”). But none of our rules set a guideline for determining when an
attorney—let alone an entire local public defender office—is sufficiently
temporarily overloaded with cases that they cannot ethically accept any more.
3. What constitutes an overload is for the local public defender to determine.
A compelling canon of statutory construction is constitutional avoidance. See
Simmons v. State Pub. Def., 791 N.W.2d 69, 74 (Iowa 2010) (“If fairly possible, a
statute will be construed to avoid doubt as to constitutionality.”). Digging too 24
deeply into a local public defender’s caseload to decide whether the office is
experiencing a temporary overload sufficient to allow the public defender to
return a particular case risks infringing on the SPD’s responsibility for
coordinating indigent defense and flirts with separation of powers concerns.
See, e.g., Off. of Pub. Advoc., 566 P.3d at 246–47 (explaining that it was only
“[b]ecause the court had a duty to ensure [the represented defendant’s
constitutional] rights were protected[ that] it did not violate the separation of
powers doctrine” when the district court concluded the public defender agency’s
understaffing prevented it from adequately represent a criminal defendant to the
level of creating a conflict of interest to support ordering the agency to withdraw
and appointing the Office of Public Advocacy).
We recognize that the court has a role in ensuring that when a local public
defender represents that its office cannot accept a particular case based on a
temporary overload of cases, that representation is sincere. But by leaving it to
the local public defender to make the factual determination of what amounts to
an overload, we thread the constitutional needle and avoid treading into areas
left to the political branches of government. To hold otherwise would require
district courts to dig into the details of a local public defender office in
determining what level of caseload was sufficiently onerous to be considered a
“temporary overload,” potentially encroaching upon its personnel and hiring
decisions. Would the district court need details about the office’s vacation and
sick policies? Accommodations made for an attorney’s maternity leave?
Or cancer diagnosis? Courts could also encroach on attorney–client privileged
information. Would the district court need details about the planned defense in
each case to properly allocate the case’s weight in assessing the office’s overall
workload? 25
The primary dissent insists that Puentes should be required to present
evidence of the number of attorneys in his office, the number of cases each
attorney carried and how many went to trial, how many hours each attorney
worked, and the office’s prior workload levels for comparison purposes, as well
as information most likely beyond his control, such as hours worked by public
defenders in other offices across the state or by contract attorneys and the
workload of “similarly situated prosecutors.” These are the kind of details the
district court expected from the Davenport PD in an evidentiary hearing. But
then what? To ask the question is to answer it. Without standards against which
to measure this information, individual district court judges would quickly turn
into micromanagers of the local public defender office in their county. The
general assembly has instead given that responsibility to the executive branch.
“The local public defender shall be responsible for assigning cases to
individual attorneys within the local public defender office and for making
decisions concerning cases in which the local public defender has been
appointed.” Iowa Code § 13B.9(3). And the SPD determines the types of cases its
designees can accept from the outset. See id. § 13B.4(2) (“The appointment shall
not be made if the state public defender or the state public defender’s designee
notifies the court that the state public defender’s designee will not provide
services in certain cases as identified in the designation by the state public
defender.”). Our conclusion that the district court’s role does not extend to
determining the specific caseload that satisfies the requirement for a
“temporary overload” in a particular situation avoids interfering with these
statutory responsibilities delegated to the public defender office. Cf. Belin v.
Reynolds, 989 N.W.2d 166, 177 (Iowa 2023) (rejecting Governor’s argument that
the court could not assess the timeliness of her response to an Open Records 26
Act request because the analysis required by the Act would not involve inquiry
into “political questions, like whether the Governor properly allocated resources
when staffing her office”); King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 18 (Iowa 2012) (“[T]his
lawsuit asks the courts to enter into a longstanding debate over the merits of
state mandates versus local control in public education. That may require an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”);
Des Moines Reg. & Trib. Co. v. Dwyer, 542 N.W.2d 491, 494–95 (Iowa 1996)
(en banc) (explaining that the nonjusticiable “ ‘political question[s]’ . . . principle
stems primarily from the separation of powers doctrine which requires we leave
intact the respective roles and regions of independence of the coordinate
branches of government”).
4. Our distinct statutory scheme makes comparison to other jurisdictions of
little value. Cases from other states are of little assistance to us given their
materially distinct public defender statutory provisions. Thus, it would be
improper—as the primary dissent suggests—to “follow the decisions of other
jurisdictions that require their public defenders to prove an overload that
justifies withdrawal from or avoidance of future appointments, with the trial
court deciding whether the defender has provided the necessary quantum of
evidence” without considering those statutory differences.
For instance, Florida law expressly says: “In no case shall the court
approve a withdrawal by the public defender or criminal conflict and civil
regional counsel based solely upon inadequacy of funding or excess workload of
the public defender or regional counsel.” Fla. Stat. § 27.5303(1)(d) (2025). The
Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that a district court is not “obligated to
permit the withdrawal automatically upon the filing of a certificate by the public
defender reflecting a backlog” flows directly from that statutory scheme. Skitka v. 27
Florida, 579 So. 2d 102, 104 (Fla. 1991). Indeed, a Florida court is statutorily
precluded from allowing a public defender to withdraw based solely on an
overload of cases—the opposite of our own scheme that expressly directs a local
public defender to return a case on that very basis.3
Similarly, Missouri has a detailed statutory scheme under which a district
public defender can “request a conference to discuss caseload issues” concerning
individual defenders with the court, following which the court can grant relief
and appoint a private attorney only “upon a finding that the individual public
defender or defenders will be unable to provide effective assistance of counsel
due to caseload issues.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 600.063(1), (3) (West, Westlaw through
Jan. 15, 2026) (emphasis added). Likewise, in California, a district court can
appoint a private attorney to represent an indigent defendant where “the court
finds that, because of a conflict of interest or other reasons, the public defender
has properly refused” to represent an indigent criminal defendant. Cal. Penal
Code § 987.2(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through Jan. 15, 2026) (emphasis added).
Again, the California statute expressly allows for court findings. Our scheme
provides no similar role for Iowa courts.
In comparison, Iowa Code section 13B.9(4)(a) is closer to Wyoming’s
statute. There, if at the time of an indigent defendant’s initial appearance he
“does not have an attorney and wishes one, the court shall notify an available
public defender for the judicial district or shall appoint an attorney to represent
the needy person if no public defender is available.” Lozano v. Cir. Ct. of Sixth
3The various factors a Florida court weighs in considering whether to allow a public defender to withdraw based on a work overload also flows from that statutory scheme. See, e.g., In re Certification of Conflict in Motions to Withdraw Filed by Pub. Def. of Tenth Jud. Cir., 636 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla. 1994) (noting that the public defender’s “history of seeking withdrawal, the sheer number of cases affected . . . , and the substantial financial burden . . . all mandate[] careful scrutiny of the motions to withdraw”). These factors cannot be wholesale lifted into a diametrically opposed scheme. 28
Jud. Dist., 460 P.3d 721, 733 (Wyo. 2020) (emphasis altered) (quoting Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 7-6-105(b) (LexisNexis 2019)). Reasoning that “[b]y its plain terms, section
105(b) contemplates that even before an appointment is made, a determination
may have been made that the public defender is not available for an
appointment,” the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized that the statute “begs the
question of who is to make the determination of unavailability, the appointing
court or the public defender.” Id. at 733–34. But nothing in the statute provided
“a procedure for determining a public defender’s availability at the initial
appearance stage of the proceedings.” Id. at 734. Considering the lack of a
statutory procedure coupled with the direction to “the court to notify an available
public defender, [the court] read section 105(b) to contemplate that it is the
public defender who will make the determination of its availability before
representation is undertaken.” Id.
While Iowa Code chapter 13B is concededly different than the Wyoming
statute, our statutory language and structure are much closer to Wyoming’s
statute than they are to Florida’s, Missouri’s, or California’s. Chapter 13B
provides no process for determining whether a local public defender is
temporarily overloaded. Further, section 13B.9(4)(a) is directed first to the local
public defender, requiring it to “return the case to the court” “if the local public
defender is unable to handle a case because of a temporary overload of cases.”
Iowa Code § 13B.9(4)(a). The court is then directed to “appoint the successor
designee” if one is on file, and if there isn’t one, to “make the appointment
pursuant to section 815.10.” Id.
Like the Wyoming Supreme Court, we believe that leaving the detailed
determination of when a local public defender is temporarily overloaded to the
public defender “neither undermines nor is inconsistent with an appointing 29
court’s authority over its orders of appointment, but instead allocates discretion
in a workable manner.” Lozano, 460 P.3d at 734. We agree with that court’s
reasoning:
The public defender is in the best position to know its resources, including its attorneys, the skills and experience of its attorneys, and the weight and complexity of each office’s caseload. We see little to be gained by requiring an evidentiary hearing for each individual case in which the public defender declares its unavailability based on those factors that are uniquely within its knowledge.
Id.
5. The district court abused its discretion in rejecting the Davenport PD’s
return of the cases. Given the purely factual nature of the issue, and the lack of
a standard against which to measure whether a local defender’s office’s workload
amounts to a temporary overload, the district court abused its discretion by
requiring an evidentiary hearing before accepting the Davenport PD’s
representations in the six motions. Those representations satisfied the statutory
condition for returning the case when the local public defender “is unable to
handle a case because of a temporary overload of cases.” Iowa Code § 13B.9(4)(a).
The district court was obligated to then search for replacement counsel as
directed by section 13B.9(4)(a).
This is not to say that a local public defender’s unembellished return of a
case with only a citation to section 13B.9(4)(a) necessarily satisfies the burden
of establishing the condition for returning a case. This is where the district
court’s role—although limited—comes in. The precondition of a temporary
overload that makes a local public defender unable to take a particular case
must still be satisfied. The district court properly exercised its discretion in
response to the first motions filed in each case here, where the motions either
checked a “temporary overload” box on a motion template or merely stated: 30
“In accordance with Iowa Code Section 13B.9(4), the public defender is returning
the case to the court.” And a district court would be well within its discretion to
reject the return of a case in instances like the State’s hypothetical of a local
public defender office claiming to be overloaded because the entire office was
taking eleven days off in August to attend the state fair. A local public defender
office cannot shirk its constitutional and statutory obligations to provide counsel
for indigent defendants.
Neither the district court nor the dissents really quarrel with the sincerity
of the Davenport PD’s representation that its office was overloaded despite
recently becoming fully staffed.4 Their concerns focus on the unavailability of
substitute counsel given the lack of contract or willing noncontract attorneys to
appoint in the local public defender’s place. These are valid concerns in the
greater scheme of providing an indigent defendant with her constitutionally
mandated right to court-appointed counsel. But whether a local public defender
office is suffering from a temporary overload of cases is not a relative term that
depends on the availability of replacement counsel. Here, the conflict-of-interest
counterpart is again telling. When a local public defender seeks to return a case
based on a conflict of interest, the unavailability of replacement counsel does not
affect the determination of whether the local public defender has a conflict with
his client. That determination depends on the particulars of the public defender’s
relationship with her client, irrespective of whether a replacement attorney is
available. In the same way, whether a local public defender is temporarily
overloaded depends on the specifics of the cases currently being handled by the
4That the Davenport PD had recently become fully staffed does not undermine Puentes’s
representations that—considering the attorneys in his office and their then-current caseloads—the office’s temporary overload precluded it from accepting these six specific cases. Neither does the primary dissent’s suppositions about future events or what the state public defender might do in future cases. 31
local public defender’s office and its staff, not on whether a replacement attorney
is available elsewhere.
6. What we are not deciding. This certiorari proceeding addresses only
whether the court should have accepted the Davenport PD’s return of these six
cases based on Puentes’s representations without requiring an evidentiary
hearing. It does not address who is to be appointed in their place. We sympathize
with the district court’s frustration that the Davenport PD was not sufficiently
staffed to represent these indigent defendants in one of Iowa’s busiest counties.
We also share its frustration with the dwindling number of attorneys willing to
serve as contract attorneys across the state and especially in Scott County. Nor
do we suggest that the district court should have appointed unwilling private
attorneys to take on a criminal case, a decision within the district court’s broad
discretion. See Iowa Code § 815.10(3) (“If the court determines that no contract
attorney is available to represent the person, the court may appoint a
noncontract attorney.” (emphasis added)). We are only deciding the meaning of
section 13B.9(4)(a) as it pertains to the Davenport PD’s ability to return the six
criminal cases at issue here to the Iowa District Court for Scott County based on
a temporary overload. Nothing more, nothing less.
Section 13B.9(4)(a) is directed at the local public defender’s temporary
unavailability, not the SPD’s statewide availability. Thus, the focus in this case
is limited to the Davenport PD’s temporary overload of cases. It does not address
the SPD’s separate obligation to coordinate indigent defense under chapter 13B,
an obligation “intended . . . to implement Sixth Amendment rights.” Simmons,
791 N.W.2d at 88. Nor does it address overloads in public defender offices that
reach a level of permanency or the SPD’s ability—or obligation—to designate 32
successor designees for its local public defender offices—including neighboring
local public defender offices in Cedar Rapids, Burlington, or Dubuque.
This decision does not address what must happen moving forward in the
proceedings for the six affected defendants to avoid violating their constitutional
rights to counsel. The district court will either find attorneys to appoint or face
the potential of allowing criminal cases to be dismissed for lack of
constitutionally mandated appointed counsel.
IV. Conclusion.
The district court exceeded its limited role in determining whether the
Davenport PD should be allowed to withdraw from the six identified cases by
requiring an evidentiary hearing detailing the office’s workload instead of
accepting Puentes’s representation—made as an officer of the court—that,
having considered the number of attorneys and their caseloads, his office could
not handle these six cases because of a temporary overload. For the reasons
above, we sustain the State Public Defender’s writ of certiorari and vacate the
district court’s orders attaching Puentes to the six pending criminal cases in
Scott County after the Davenport PD returned the cases.
Writ Sustained.
McDonald, McDermott, and May, JJ. join this opinion. Waterman, J., files
a dissenting opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., join.
Mansfield, J., files a dissenting opinion, in which Christensen, C.J., and
Waterman, J., join. 33
#25–0011, SPD v. District Court
Waterman, Justice (dissenting).
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the State Public Defender (SPD)
preserved error and timely sought certiorari review. But I respectfully dissent
from the majority’s resolution of this appeal on the merits. And I join Justice
Mansfield’s dissent. I would affirm the district court’s well-reasoned rulings
denying the SPD’s motions to withdraw.5 In my view, the SPD bears the burden
of proving it has a “temporary overload” within the meaning of Iowa Code
section 13B.9(4)(a) (2024). At the district court, the SPD offered no evidence to
show that a temporary overload in fact existed after it undisputably became fully
staffed. The district court correctly denied its motions to withdraw based on that
failure of proof. The majority today erroneously abdicates the court’s role in
deciding whether the SPD established grounds to withdraw.
Now, based only on the SPD’s say so—and with no meaningful judicial
oversight—the SPD can evade its statutory obligations and undermine the State’s
constitutional requirement to provide defense counsel for indigents facing
possible incarceration. As the majority recognizes, the consequences of today’s
decision include dismissal of criminal charges “for lack of constitutionally
mandated appointed counsel.”
Importantly, the majority did not accept the SPD’s position that the district
court must appoint unwilling private attorneys to substitute for public
defenders. But if the district court ultimately does so, and the private attorneys
file motions to withdraw on grounds of financial hardship or lack of competence
5Because I do not accept the majority’s blinkered view of the SPD’s role vis a vis the Davenport branch, I will refer to the state-wide entity as the “State Public Defender” or “SPD,” and I will refer to the Davenport branch of the SPD as “the local office” or “the Davenport office.” 34
in criminal law, I assume the district court will take their word and grant the
motions, as it now must do for the SPD.
The majority opinion is wrong for multiple reasons:
• It violates well-settled principles on the burden of proof.
• It disregards the district court’s stated reason for denying the motions,
namely “due to a lack of information provided by the movant [the SPD]”
(a failure of proof) and instead mischaracterizes the rulings as based
solely on the unavailability of contract lawyers.
• It mischaracterizes as a “professional statement” the public defender’s
conclusory assertion about workload, even though under our
precedent, such uninterrogated statements cannot satisfy the proof
requirement.
• It is contrary to well-settled precedent recognizing the courts’ duty of
inquiry when adjudicating motions to withdraw under section
13B.9(4)(a).
• It myopically focuses on the SPD’s Davenport office, without
considering the SPD’s ability to reallocate resources from its other local
offices to fulfill its statutory obligation to coordinate statewide indigent
defense.
• It is internally inconsistent. It asserts on the one hand that the SPD’s
temporary overload is an unreviewable political question (with no
standards to guide its determination), and on the other hand that the
SPD’s overload is a purely factual determination (and thus reviewable).
It cannot be both.
• It misapplies the separation of powers doctrine. Under chapter 13B, the
district court appoints defense counsel, including the SPD, so the 35
corresponding power to adjudicate motions to withdraw must fall
within the court’s role. The powers go hand in hand: if the court violates
“the separation of powers” by denying motions to withdraw, how can it
appoint counsel in the first instance?
• It allows the SPD to encroach on judicial power by effectively
eliminating judicial oversight over withdrawals based on the mere
allegation of a temporary workload.
• It fails to distinguish between temporary and permanent overloads. The
Davenport office was fully staffed, yet the SPD gave no deadline for
when the overload would end. Isn’t that a permanent overload?
• In seeking to avoid a constitutional problem, the majority creates a
bigger one: unrepresented indigent defendants in our state courts.
I will address the majority’s errors at greater length below.
I. The SPD Bears the Burden to Prove Its Temporary Overload.
The SPD has the burden to prove its temporary overload of cases under
the plain meaning of section 13B.9(4)(a) before the SPD is entitled to withdraw
from the representation of an indigent defendant. The SPD admittedly submitted
no evidence of an overload. The district court correctly found that no temporary
overload has been shown. Without proof of an overload, the district court acted
within its discretion to deny the SPD’s motion to withdraw, and the SPD is not
entitled to return the case for appointment of substitute counsel.
A. The SPD Failed to Satisfy Its Burden to Prove a Temporary
Overload. Well-settled legal principles require the SPD to prove that it was
temporarily overloaded. The SPD is the plaintiff in this certiorari action and is
the party alleging a temporary overload as the basis for relief from the district
court’s order appointing it as defense counsel. If the SPD cannot establish its 36
purported overload, then the local public defender must handle the cases to
which it is appointed. See Iowa Code § 13B.9(3), (4)(a). “Ordinarily, the burden
of proof on an issue is upon the party who would suffer loss if the issue were not
established.” Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(e); see also In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467,
475–76 (Iowa 2018) (applying Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.904(3)(e) to
place the burden of proof when the controlling statute is silent). Here, that party
is the SPD. And under the “ordinary default rule,” the “burden lies, as it typically
does, on the party seeking relief.” Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49,
51, 56, 58 (2005); see also In re N.S., 13 N.W.3d 811, 822 (Iowa 2024) (applying
the ordinary default rule and Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 6.904(3)(e) to
place the burden of proof on the party seeking relief); Pioneer Ctrs. Holding Co.
Emp. Stock Ownership Plan & Tr. v. Alerus Fin., N.A., 858 F.3d 1324, 1335 (10th
Cir. 2017) (noting that the burden of proof has “been and should be assigned to
the plaintiff who generally seeks to change the present state of affairs and who
therefore naturally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or
persuasion” (quoting 2 McCormick on Evidence § 337 (7th ed. 2013))).
It makes sense to place the burden of proof on the SPD, which has the
information necessary to ascertain the existence of any temporary overload,
including the workload of its staff attorneys in the Davenport office, and its
ability to assign Scott County cases to its staff attorneys in Cedar Rapids,
Dubuque, Burlington, or elsewhere. See In re N.S., 13 N.W.3d at 822 (“It makes
sense to place the burden of proof on petitioners, who best know their own course
of treatment and progress since their mental health commitment.”); see also
Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 60–61 (discussing a party’s unique or
superior access to information as a factor for assigning it the burden of proof);
Walker v. Schult, 45 F.4th 598, 616 (2d Cir. 2022) (“The burden of proof as to a 37
given issue is normally placed on the party who has an affirmative goal and
presumptive access to proof.”).
I would follow the decisions of other jurisdictions that require their public
defenders to prove an overload that justifies withdrawal from or avoidance of
future appointments, with the trial court deciding whether the defender has
provided the necessary quantum of evidence. See, e.g., Pub. Def. v. State, 115 So.
3d 261, 279–82 (Fla. 2013) (holding that under Florida law, district courts
determine whether a public defender’s motion to withdraw based on workload
has a sufficient evidentiary foundation); State v. Covington, 318 So. 3d 21, 26–
27 (La. 2020) (requiring case-by-case determination of overload); Area 5 Pub. Def.
Off. v. Kellogg, 610 S.W.3d 383, 390 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020) (remanding case for trial
court to make factual findings whether individual attorneys have excessive
caseloads).
The SPD cites no case from any jurisdiction holding that the trial court
has no role in determining whether an overload permits the public defender to
withdraw from cases and avoid new assignments. The majority cites but one: a
divided Wyoming Supreme Court decision that interpreted a materially different
statute: Lozano v. Cir. Ct., 460 P.3d 721, 734 (Wyo. 2020) (concluding that the
public defender has sole discretion to declare its unavailability due to workload,
without an evidentiary hearing). Lozano is distinguishable. Unlike the six Scott
County cases at issue here, private attorneys were available for appointment in
Lozano. Id. at 725. And unlike the Iowa SPD, the Wyoming public defender
submitted evidence showing: (1) that it had “4.5 attorneys handling the workload
of 7.5 attorneys,” (2) that it had no applicants for its vacant positions, and
(3) that it was lobbying the Wyoming Governor for greater funding. Id. at 724–
25. 38
Lozano is also distinguishable because its analysis relied on a Wyoming
statute that merely permits the court to “notify” an “available” public defender,
leaving the office to determine its own availability. See id. at 733–34 (citing Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 7-6-105(b) (Lexis 2019)). I find more persuasive the concurring
opinion’s determination that “the public defender does not have unreviewable
authority to declare the attorneys in her office are not ‘available.’ ” See id. at 739
(Kautz, J., specially concurring). As Justice Kautz explained,
Because the statute requires the court to notify an available public defender, and requires the court to appoint someone else if no public defender is available, I conclude the statute intends for the court to make the final decision about availability. No language in the statutes indicates the public defender decides availability and then dictates that to the court.
The context of the public defender statutes in the criminal process indicates to me that the court decides availability. It is obvious that by appointing a public defender, the appointing court is impliedly finding that the public defender is available. Likewise, if the appointing court finds no public defender is available, it appoints someone other than the public defender. Such findings are judicial functions, not circumstances which the executive branch may unilaterally dictate to the court.
Id. Accordingly, Justice Kautz concluded, “I would hold that under the statutes,
the public defender should provide evidence to the court about [un]availability
[due to workload], but the appointing court makes the final decision . . . .” Id.
at 740. I reach the same conclusion on the overload issue under Iowa Code
section 13B.9(4)(a).
B. Public Defender Puentes’s Statements in Written Filings Do Not
Carry the SPD’s Burden of Proof. The majority effectively considers Puentes’s
assertions in his motions to withdraw as “professional statements” that can
shoulder the SPD’s evidentiary burden. The SPD never made that argument at
district court or on appeal, so it has been waived or forfeited. Morris v. Steffes 39
Grp., Inc., 924 N.W.2d 491, 498 (Iowa 2019) (holding that “unbriefed issues” were
waived). We should not reverse the district court on grounds never raised below
or on appeal. Nor should our court “assume a partisan role and undertake [a
party’s] research and advocacy.” Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins., 215 N.W.2d 239,
240 (Iowa 1974) (en banc).
Even if preserved, the “professional statement” argument lacks merit,
which explains why the SPD didn’t raise it. We have allowed courts to rely on
counsel’s professional statements in uncontested motions or when made on the
record in open court, where counsel can be probed by the court or
cross-examined. See, e.g., Frunzar v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins., 548 N.W.2d 880,
888 (Iowa 1996) (“Under Iowa law, professional statements are treated as
affidavits and the attorney making the statement may be cross-examined
regarding the substance of the statement.”). Indeed, we have long held that it is
an abuse of discretion to deny a request to question the lawyer on the record
about his professional statement. Cogley v. Hy Vee Food Stores, Inc., 137 N.W.2d
310, 311–13 (Iowa 1965) (reversing ruling that vacated default judgment because
counsel for plaintiff was denied the opportunity to cross-examine defense
counsel about his professional statement made in open court).
Puentes’s conclusory statements in written filings cannot be “professional
statements” proving the requisite temporary overload because the district court
judge had no opportunity to question him on the record. See id. The district court
was entitled to probe whether a temporary overload still existed after the
Davenport office became fully staffed. The court repeatedly invited the SPD to set
its motions for hearing so that a record could be “made and reported.” The SPD
chose not to do so. The district court acted within its discretion when it declined
to find that a single sentence in each motion about a claimed overload met the 40
SPD’s burden of proof. Moreover, Puentes’s statement lacked any information
about the SPD’s number of staff attorneys, its cases per attorney, the hours its
attorneys worked, or any comparison with prior workloads—any of which might
have helped to establish the claimed overload. Finally, Puentes’s statement fails
to address the statutory requirement that the alleged overload be “temporary.”
The majority’s professional statement theory doesn’t fly.
The majority notes that we gave deference to defense counsel’s professional
statements about conflicts of interest in State v. Miller, 975 N.W.2d 807, 813–15
(Iowa 2022) (permitting withdrawal), and State v. McKinley, 860 N.W.2d 874, 883
(Iowa 2015) (rejecting conflict claim). But in both cases, the district court had
the opportunity to question defense counsel in open court and engaged in a
colloquy with counsel. See Miller, 975 N.W.2d at 810–11; McKinley, 860 N.W.2d
at 877. Not so here, because the SPD never set its motions for hearing as the
district court directed. Moreover, deference was especially warranted in Miller
because further judicial inquiry into the conflict of interest would have invaded
the attorney–client privilege with a client who apparently wanted to testify falsely
at trial:
Here, defense counsel declared in his motion to withdraw and at the hearing on that motion that professional considerations require termination of the representation but stressed that he could not “be specific without violating attorney–client privilege.” He reiterated this again when the district court asked whether he believed it would be unethical for him to serve as standby counsel, explaining that he would still “be in the same ethical situation [he’s] in now.” The district court thoroughly examined the situation and conducted the level of inquiry it believed was best in that situation. We cannot find the district court abused its discretion by granting defense counsel’s motion to withdraw after defense counsel stated that professional considerations required termination of the representation. 41
975 N.W.2d at 815 (alteration in original). No such deference is warranted when,
as here, the district court could have probed the SPD’s allegations of temporary
overload without intruding on confidential or privileged communications.
Because the SPD has the burden to prove its temporary overload, and
because it offered no evidence supporting its allegations, the district court
correctly denied the SPD’s motions to withdraw from or return the six cases.
The district court has discretion to forgo an evidentiary hearing on the
temporary overload issue and may simply proceed to appoint successor counsel
when willing private attorneys are available. That has been the practice in Scott
County and many other counties. But the district court did not abuse its
discretion here by requiring the SPD to submit proof of its temporary overload
when contract attorneys and other willing private lawyers were unavailable.
II. The Majority Disregards Our Precedent Imposing a Duty of Inquiry on District Courts to Determine Whether Grounds to Withdraw Exist.
Our rules of professional conduct governing Iowa lawyers, including public
defenders, require court-appointed counsel to obtain the district court’s
permission to withdraw from a case. See Iowa R. of Prof’l Conduct 32:1.16(c) (“A
lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a
tribunal when terminating a representation.”); id. cmt. [3] (“When a lawyer has
been appointed to represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of
the appointing authority.”). Under the majority’s decision, the district court is no
more than a rubber stamp when the SPD alleges a temporary overload. I would
not discard the court’s role so lightly. District court judges should remain
gatekeepers, enforcing requirements for withdrawing from court-appointed
representation of indigent defendants.
A. The District Court’s Duty of Inquiry Extends to the SPD’s Alleged
Temporary Overload. Iowa Code section 13B.9(4)(a) provides two grounds for a 42
court-appointed public defender to withdraw: (1) a conflict of interest, and (2) a
temporary overload. The district court must grant the SPD’s motion to withdraw
only if the SPD proves one of those grounds. The majority acknowledges that the
district court decides whether a conflict of interest requires the public defender
to withdraw. But it inexplicably disclaims the district court’s role in determining
whether the public defender must withdraw on grounds of a temporary overload.
Why treat the two grounds differently? I would decline to create such an anomaly
in our precedent.
Under well-settled Iowa precedent, the district court, not the SPD, decides
whether conflicts of interest require withdrawal. See, e.g., State Pub. Def. v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 886 N.W.2d 595, 599–600 (Iowa 2016) (concluding that “the plain
language of [section 13B.9(4)(a)] allocated to the court—not the public
defender—the responsibility of selecting and appointing a successor counsel”
and approving the practice where the local public defender “notif[ied] the court
of the concurrent conflicts of interest . . . and [appeared] at the hearing upon
short notice to answer the court’s questions”); McKinley, 860 N.W.2d at 885–86
(determining no conflict of interest existed); see also McKinley, 860 N.W.2d
at 892–93 (Waterman, J., specially concurring) (noting that one public defender’s
conflict should not be automatically imputed to another); State v. Mulatillo, 907
N.W.2d 511, 521 (Iowa 2018) (reversing district court order that disqualified
defense counsel on prosecution’s motion alleging conflict of interest that we
found to be unsupported by substantial evidence); State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for
Dubuque Cnty., 870 N.W.2d 849, 856–57 (Iowa 2015) (reversing district court
order that disqualified prosecutor on alleged conflict grounds).
The district court also has a well-settled “duty of inquiry” to determine
whether grounds exist to allow appointed counsel to withdraw. State v. Miller, 43
975 N.W.2d at 813–15 (addressing district court’s duty of inquiry into a public
defender’s motion to withdraw to avoid an ethical violation); State v. Wells, 738
N.W.2d 214, 219 (Iowa 2007) (recognizing the court’s duty of inquiry to determine
whether substitute counsel is required due to an alleged breakdown in
communication between the defendant and appointed counsel). Without any
good reason, the majority eliminates the district court’s duty of inquiry whenever
the SPD asserts a temporary overload. Why? If the temporary overload exists,
the SPD should have no problem proving it.
The majority offers only one reason for distinguishing between motions to
withdraw based on a conflict of interest and motions based on a temporary
overload. Without citing any authority, the majority asserts that the district court
must decide the conflict ground because that determination involves a “mixed
question of law and facts,” while the court must defer to the SPD’s assertion of
a temporary overload because that involves “entirely a question of fact.” That
distinction makes no sense. Courts routinely decide fact questions as well as
mixed questions of law and fact. Why tie the district court’s hands on one but
not the other?
In any event, the Alaska Supreme Court recently equated the public
defenders’ overload with conflicts of interest. Off. of Pub. Advoc. v. Super. Ct., 566
P.3d 235, 246 (Alaska 2025) (determining that the public defenders’ overload
constituted a conflict of interest under ethical rules and stating that “[c]ourts
must inquire when an apparent conflict of interest exists to ensure that the
defendant receives conflict-free representation”).
It is common practice nationally for the trial court to determine whether
appointed counsel established grounds to withdraw. See, e.g., Riley v. Dist. Ct.
in & for Second Jud. Dist., 507 P.2d 464, 465 (Colo. 1973) (en banc) (stating that 44
“counsel for an indigent defendant cannot withdraw without permission” of the
court and noting that it is the defense counsel’s burden “to prove to the court’s
satisfaction” the grounds to withdraw (second quoting People v. Wolff, 167
N.E.2d 197, 199 (Ill. 1960))); In re Lovitt, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2024 WL 1588629,
at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2024) (“[T]he trial court may not permit the
[appointed] attorney to withdraw without first determining whether the attorney
has good cause to do so.”); Commonwealth v. Fortune, 302 A.3d 780, 789 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2023) (affirming trial court’s denial of a public defender’s motion to
withdraw over an alleged conflict the court rejected).
By eliminating the district court’s duty of inquiry to decide whether
grounds to withdraw were proven, the majority opinion is at odds with the great
weight of authority in Iowa and nationwide.
B. The District Court’s Duty of Inquiry Is Not Obviated by the SPD’s
Claims of Confidentiality. For the first time in its appellate reply brief, the SPD
argues that determining overload involves questions of confidentiality, including,
“how a particular attorney deals with stress and their general mental and
physical health which may impact how many cases they can competently
handle.” It further asserts that “[s]uch things cannot or should not be known to
the court, so it naturally follows that an assessment of whether an attorney is
‘overloaded’ cannot be made by the court.”
We do not consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief. State v.
Warren, 955 N.W.2d 848, 867 (Iowa 2021) (“We generally will not consider issues
raised for the first time in a reply brief in an appeal, let alone in an application
for further review.” (quoting State v. Shackford, 952 N.W.2d 141, 147–48 (Iowa
2020))); Goodenow v. City Council, 574 N.W.2d 18, 27 (Iowa 1998) (declining to
address issue where plaintiffs did not raise issue “in their initial brief”). In any 45
event, the confidentiality argument is unpersuasive, and the majority does not
rely on it.
In my view, the district court can and should explore whether the
Davenport office is temporarily overloaded based on objective metrics, including
by comparing: (1) the hours worked per attorney during the alleged overload to
other time periods, (2) the hours worked by SPD’s other offices or contract
lawyers, and (3) the workload of similarly situated prosecutors. The district court
likewise could inquire into the number of trials per attorney and the attorneys’
individual caseloads. Many employers, including (we assume) the State of Iowa,
perform studies from time to time to determine how busy certain offices are in
order to determine how best to utilize their resources. This holistic inquiry would
not delve into the confidential mental health status of individual staff attorneys.
III. Separation of Powers Principles Require Affirmance.
Both the SPD and the majority get the separation of powers doctrine
backward. Both would curtail judicial powers by effectively eliminating the
court’s role in determining whether the SPD proved a temporary overload to
withdraw or avoid its representation of indigent defendants. Properly understood
and applied, the separation of powers doctrine requires our court to affirm the
district court’s rulings denying the SPD’s motions to withdraw.
It is a bedrock principle of American constitutional law that indigent
defendants charged with crimes punishable by imprisonment are entitled to a
state-supplied criminal defense lawyer at state expense. Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). The State of Iowa, to meet its constitutional
obligations, enacted legislation to create an office of the state public defender in
the executive branch. See 1981 Iowa Acts ch. 23, § 2 (codified as amended at
Iowa Code § 13B.2 (2024)). The SPD has the statutory duty to “coordinate the 46
provision of legal representation to all indigents,” Iowa Code § 13B.4(1)(a), and
through its local offices “shall handle every case to which [it] is appointed if [it]
can reasonably handle the case,” id. § 13B.9(3).
Constitutional challenges under the separation of powers are reviewed
de novo. State v. Basquin, 970 N.W.2d 643, 651 (Iowa 2022). All three branches
of state government have important roles to play in protecting indigents’
constitutional right to counsel at state expense. The legislature enacted Iowa
Code chapter 13B and appropriates funding annually for the SPD and contract
lawyers for indigent defendants. 1981 Iowa Acts ch. 23; Iowa Code § 13B.6; Iowa
Code § 815.7. The executive branch operates the SPD. Iowa Code § 13B.2. The
judicial branch adjudicates cases and runs the court system. Iowa Const. art. V,
§ 1. The Iowa Constitution expressly vests the supreme court with “supervisory
and administrative control” over all state courts. Id. art. V, § 4. “[S]ome acts can
be properly entrusted to more than one branch of government, and some
functions inevitably intersect.” Basquin, 970 N.W.2d at 657 (alteration in
original) (noting that the separation of powers “is not rigid” and “entrust[s] both
the legislature and the judiciary with ensuring that the judicial branch functions
and administers justice”).
We must interpret chapter 13B and related statutes to comply with the
Iowa and U.S. Constitutions. See id. at 657–58 (describing the scope of judicial
power and separation of powers); State v. Folkerts, 703 N.W.2d 761, 765 (Iowa
2005) (“Courts have inherent power to protect a defendant’s rights from being
violated in a criminal proceeding.”); Simmons v. State Pub. Def., 791 N.W.2d 69,
85–86 (Iowa 2010) (“It is the responsibility of the judicial branch to ensure that
indigents receive effective assistance of counsel as required by article I,
section 10 [right to counsel].”). In Simmons v. State Public Defender, for example, 47
we construed section 13B.4(4) to strike down the SPD’s administrative rule that
had set a $1,500 per appeal hard-fee cap. 791 N.W.2d at 88. Today’s case
presents yet another chance for our court to interpret chapter 13B to ensure the
elected branches honor their constitutional obligations to provide for indigent
This case turns on the proper interpretation of Iowa Code chapter 13B.
Under the separation of powers, statutory interpretation is plainly the role of the
court. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
The majority opines that the constitutional avoidance doctrine supports
its position giving the SPD a pass to avoid interfering with an executive branch
agency. In my view, the constitutional avoidance doctrine cuts the other way,
favoring the interpretation of chapter 13B that enforces the indigent defendant’s
right to counsel. See Simmons, 791 N.W.2d at 88 (“We are also confident that the
legislature intended chapter 13B to implement Sixth Amendment rights.”). That
constitutionally mandated goal would be thwarted if the SPD could unilaterally
withdraw from cases and avoid new cases through unsupported allegations of a
temporary workload when no contract lawyers are available. We should construe
the statute “to avoid potential constitutional infirmity.” Id. The majority’s
interpretation creates greater constitutional problems than it solves.
A. The District Court Did Not Intrude on the SPD’s Internal
Operations. The SPD argues that the district court acted illegally by appointing
Puentes by name in the six cases. It contends that assignment of cases within
its local office is an exclusively executive function and that “[t]he court lacks any
authority to designate the local office supervisor.” Additionally, the SPD claims
that Puentes has no statutory authority to reassign the cases within the 48
Davenport office once they are assigned to him. Finally, the SPD claims the court
could not appoint Puentes by name because he is a government employee who
cannot be appointed to the role of a private attorney. The SPD misreads the
statute and the district court’s orders.
Under the Code, the district court appoints defense counsel. Iowa Code
section 13B.9(3) expressly provides that “[t]he local public defender shall handle
every case to which the local public defender is appointed if the local public
defender can reasonably handle the case.” The same code section further
provides: “The local public defender shall be responsible for assigning cases to
individual attorneys within the local public defender office and for making
decisions concerning cases in which the local public defender has been
appointed.” Id. And the district court orders expressly allowed Puentes or the
SPD to appoint another public defender in his place. Therefore, Puentes could
have reassigned the cases to other staff attorneys within the Davenport office if
he chose to do so. The district court’s orders do not run afoul of the Code.
The SPD notes that its staff attorneys are government employees who are
not allowed to engage in private practice. True. But then the SPD misconstrues
the district court’s order as illegally appointing Puentes in a private counsel
capacity in the six criminal cases. That’s not what the district court did. Rather,
the orders expressly appointed Puentes in his capacity as “Chief Public Defender
in the Davenport office,” not as a private attorney.
Before appointing Puentes, the district court waited for a staff attorney in
the Davenport office to file an appearance in response to any of its multiple
orders appointing that office—none did. The court waited until the SPD had an
opportunity to respond to its December 6 order that required SPD attorneys to
file individual appearances in the cases—those appearances never came. And 49
still the district court waited until after it filed an order warning that Puentes
would be named if no other attorney from the office appeared—no attorney ever
appeared. Puentes is the supervising attorney of the Davenport office. He filed
the motions to withdraw. The orders appointing him expressly provided that
Puentes could reassign the cases to other staff attorneys. The district court
thereby left intact the SPD’s discretion to pick which staff attorney handles which
case. There was no violation of chapter 13B or the separation of powers.
B. The Majority Needlessly Relinquishes Judicial Power. As explained
above, under a correct reading of the statute and our precedent, it is the district
court that decides whether grounds exist for the SPD to withdraw from cases.
The majority opinion cedes the court’s responsibilities and allows the SPD to
decide the overload question unilaterally. The majority inconsistently argues that
the district court can’t decide whether the SPD has a temporary overload
because: (1) it is a political question without standards for the court to apply,
citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 (1962), for the proposition “that courts
will not ‘enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable
standards are lacking’ ” (quoting id.)); and (2) because it is a purely factual
question. Neither argument is convincing.
1. Determination of whether a temporary overload exists is not a
nonjusticiable political question. By characterizing the determination of whether
the SPD has a temporary overload as a nonjusticiable political question, the
majority makes a serious mistake. No other court has reached that conclusion.
The majority takes out of context this passage from the district court’s rulings:
The Court is unaware of the caseload of the public defender’s office, per attorney, prior to . . . being fully staffed as compared to the current caseload now that full staffing has occurred. The Court does not know the ideal caseload per attorney nor the maximum caseload 50
per attorney. The Court is unaware of the methodology for arriving at the ideal or maximum caseload.
Read in context, the district court was stating that the SPD, by providing no
information, failed to prove that it was in fact temporarily overloaded, not that
no court could decide that as an inherently political question. Today’s case is
nothing like Baker, where the Supreme Court declined to review Tennessee’s
congressional reapportionment plan, 369 U.S. at 187–88, nor does it resemble
the other cases the majority cites for the political question doctrine: King v. State,
818 N.W.2d 1, 4, 17–18 (Iowa 2012) (declining to adjudicate dispute over control
of public education), and Des Moines Reg. & Trib. Co. v. Dwyer, 542 N.W.2d 491,
494–95 (Iowa 1996) (en banc) (declining to require release of senate phone
records).
2. Determination of the SPD’s temporary overload involves questions of fact
that the district court can decide. In my view, the judiciary is obviously the branch
of government to decide whether the public defender is overloaded. The majority
aptly cites the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct that require lawyers (including
public defenders) to be competent (including adequate preparation), diligent, and
prompt, as well as those imposing a duty to avoid conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice. See Off. of Pub. Advoc., 566 P.3d at 246 (referencing
ethical rules in determining case overload). Those duties compose the day-to-day
practice of law in our courts, and supervising their execution is well within a
district court’s wheelhouse and our court’s purview. After all, courts oversee and
regulate the practice of law. See Iowa Code § 602.10101 et. seq.
If the Davenport office had too many cases to allow for competent
representation or adequate time to prepare, it should have provided evidence to
support that claim. Standards exist to help determine how many cases are too 51
many.6 The district associate judge who issued the rulings under review was
herself a public defender before she went on the bench. Officially promulgated
caseload limits in Iowa are not required to permit the district court to direct the
SPD to set a hearing and make an evidentiary record as to its alleged overload.
The majority short-circuits the proceedings below by simply allowing the
SPD to withdraw without proving its overload exists. A well-developed record
would permit the district court and reviewing courts to evaluate claims of
overload and determine whether the alleged overload is temporary or permanent.
The SPD’s appellate briefing nowhere disputes the district court’s finding that
the Davenport office is fully staffed. So why is the Davenport office now seeking
to withdraw or return cases when it didn’t do so before? What changed? Are the
staff attorneys working the same number of hours per week as the private
attorneys they would like to have replace them? How does the caseload per staff
attorney compare to private contract attorneys? To prosecutors? What about
other SPD local offices that have never claimed a temporary overload? The
district court should be permitted to explore those issues. And an evidentiary
record would help the legislature evaluate the need to increase funding for
indigent defense.
The majority accurately observes that some of our rules of procedure
expressly allow parties to act without court approval:
Yet, when an action does not need court approval, we often see language making that point clear. See, e.g., [Iowa R. Civ. P.] 1.943 (“A party may, without order of court, dismiss that party’s own
6See, e.g., Nicholas M. Pace, Malia N. Brink, Cynthia G. Lee, Stephen F. Hanlon, National Public
Defense Workload Study, Rand. Corp. ix–xi (2023) [hereinafter NPDWS] (surveying various workload guidelines and standards for criminal defense counsel and proposing new standards), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2500/RRA2559- 1/RAND_RRA2559-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KPS4-R89Y]; M. Eve Hanan, Public Defender Workload and the Promise of Gideon, 33 Nev. Law. 8, 8 (2025) (describing the NPDWS “as a starting point for jurisdiction-specific workload standards”). 52
petition . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. r. 1.972(1) (“If a party . . . is in default under rule 1.971(1) or 1.971(2), the clerk shall enter that party’s default in accordance with the procedures set forth in this rule without any order of court.” (emphasis added)).
The phrase “without order of court” appears nowhere in Iowa Code
section 13B.9(4)(a). If the legislature wanted to permit the SPD to withdraw
unilaterally without court approval, then it would have said so by adding
“without order of court” or equivalent language. It said no such thing here. “We
are not at liberty to rewrite the statute.” Marek v. Johnson, 958 N.W.2d 172, 177
(Iowa 2021). Yet the majority today effectively amends the statute in the guise of
interpretation to remove the court’s role in determining whether a temporary
overload exists.
The majority begrudgingly suggests the district court could push back only
if “the court has reason to believe that the local public defender misrepresented
its office’s caseload.” I won’t impugn the motives of a harried public defender
who may simply be following orders in asserting that the Davenport office is
overloaded. But if the majority is reading a new bad-faith misrepresentation
standard into section 13B.9(4)(a), why not remand the case to let the district
court apply it first? After all, as the district court noted, the Davenport office
recently became fully staffed. See, e.g., Off. of Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman v.
Edwards, 825 N.W.2d 8, 24 (Iowa 2012) (holding that district court acted within
its discretion to order deposition of administrative law judge upon showing of
bad faith sufficient to overcome mental process privilege).
In my view, the district court had discretion to ask the SPD for more
information about its alleged temporary overload, and to require proof from the
SPD before granting its motions to withdraw. Other courts have rejected
separation of powers challenges to far more intrusive judicial oversight over 53
public defenders. See, e.g., Off. of Pub. Advoc., 566 P.3d at 246–47 (rejecting
separation of powers challenge to trial court’s appointment of executive branch
Office of Public Advocacy to represent indigent defendant); Tucker v. State, 394
P.3d 54, 71–72 (Idaho 2017) (determining that separation of powers doctrine did
not preclude judicial review of indigent defendants’ pre-conviction systemic
challenge to constitutionality of allegedly inadequate public defender office and
stating that “[t]he right to counsel, which Appellants seek to vindicate, is not
entrusted to a particular branch of government”); Lavallee v. Justices in
Hampden Sup. Ct., 812 N.E.2d 895, 911 (Mass. 2004) (addressing systemic
challenge by indigent criminal defendants and requiring dismissal of criminal
charges if counsel not appointed within prescribed deadlines); Comm. for Pub.
Couns. Servs. v. Middlesex & Suffolk Cnty. Dist. Cts., No. SJ–2025–0244, 2025
WL 2048501, at *7 (Mass. July 3, 2025) (invoking Lavallee protocols requiring
pretrial release or dismissal of charges if defense counsel is not appointed within
prescribed deadlines); State v. Young, 172 P.3d 138, 142–43 (N.M. 2007) (staying
death penalty cases pending increased funding from legislature for the indigent
defense counsel and collecting cases); Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217,
227 (N.Y. 2010) (holding that systemic challenge to efficacy of public defender
office was justiciable and remanding for further proceedings and stating that “[i]t
is, of course, possible that a remedy in this action would necessitate the
appropriation of funds and perhaps, particularly in a time of scarcity, some
reordering of legislative priorities” but noting that “this does not amount to an
argument upon which a court might be relieved of its essential obligation to
provide a remedy for violation of a fundamental constitutional right”); Davison v.
State, 466 P.3d 231, 295–96 (Wash. 2020) (en banc) (recognizing judicial
authority to adjudicate class action challenge alleging systemic deficiencies in 54
indigent defense and stating that “[t]he State’s obligation to safeguard the right
to counsel therefore does not rest solely with the legislature, executive, or
judiciary[;] [t]he State shares that responsibility among its various branches”);
see also Betschart v. Oregon, 103 F.4th 607, 613, 628 (9th Cir. 2024) (affirming
injunction ordering pretrial release of unrepresented indigent defendants and
stating that “[i]t is Oregon, and not the district court, that created this crisis”);
Farella v. Anglin, 346 F.R.D. 92, 102 (W.D. Ark. 2024) (certifying class action of
pretrial detainees alleging constitutional violations for lack counsel at bond
hearings).
As these cases demonstrate, courts are not powerless to protect the
constitutional rights of indigent defendants facing potential loss of liberty.
IV. The SPD’s Davenport Office Should Not Be Viewed in Isolation.
The majority errs by viewing the Davenport office in isolation. As both the
SPD and district court judges in Davenport are well aware, staff attorneys from
other offices previously have been assigned to defend Scott County cases. In
Eastern Iowa, the SPD has local offices in Cedar Rapids (a seventy-five-minute
drive from the Scott County Courthouse in Davenport), Dubuque (a seventy-two-
minute drive), and Burlington (a ninety-minute drive). And many pretrial
hearings can now be conducted by Zoom, which makes it easier for public
defenders from offices outside of Scott County to represent indigent defendants
there. The other local offices to date have not claimed temporary overloads. The
SPD has a statutory duty to coordinate indigent defense statewide. Iowa Code
§ 13B.4(1)(a). As the majority recognizes, the SPD has the statutory authority to
designate other local offices for appointment to Scott County cases. See id.
§ 13B.9(4)(a) (“As used in this subsection, ‘successor designee’ may include 55
another local public defender office.”). So why doesn’t the SPD direct its nearby
local offices to help its Davenport office?
It is hornbook law that a party cannot escape a legal duty by unreasonably
causing the condition that excuses its performance. See State v. Beres, 943
N.W.2d 575, 583 (Iowa 2020). If the SPD fails to take reasonable measures to
avoid a temporary overload, it should remain obligated under section 13B.9(3)
to continue its representation of indigent defendants. The SPD certainly has the
authority to assign Scott County cases to its other local offices. It has done so in
the past. The SPD could hire more attorneys for its Davenport office. Contract
lawyers are available for class “A” felonies in Scott County. The SPD could allow
available contract attorneys to defend class “A” felonies in Scott County, freeing
up time for its staff attorneys to defend lesser felony and misdemeanor cases for
which no private contract lawyers are available. The SPD could seek additional
funding from the legislature to raise hourly rates for contract attorneys. The SPD
should not be allowed to avoid its statutory and constitutional obligations merely
on the strength of its own predilections.
An evidentiary record would allow the district court to compare the
workload of the local public defender’s staff attorneys to the workload of
prosecutors and private contract attorneys. And an evidentiary record is needed
before the court can properly determine whether the alleged overload is
temporary, as required under the Code. That inquiry will necessarily entail a
comparison of the SPD staff attorney workloads at different times and in different
local offices.
V. Is this a Temporary or Permanent Overload?
Because the SPD did not accept the district court’s repeated invitations to
make an evidentiary record, we cannot tell whether the alleged overload is 56
temporary or permanent. Given that the SPD’s Davenport office was “fully
staffed,” this overload, if it exists, appears to be permanent. But the statute
allows withdrawals only for temporary overloads.
Section 13B.9(4)(a) does not create a mechanism to appoint private
attorneys to handle the SPD’s permanent overload. That solution must come
from the politically accountable elected branches. See Betschart, 103 F.4th at
613, 628 (9th Cir. 2024) (affirming class certification and preliminary injunction
requiring pretrial release from jail of unrepresented indigent defendants). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit aptly observed, “Oregon
could solve this problem overnight simply by paying appointed counsel a better
wage.” Id. at 628. The same is true in Iowa.
Underfunding indigent defense now will only lead to greater costs later.
More indigent defendants will claim they received ineffective assistance of
counsel from allegedly overworked or incompetent defense counsel, requiring
more rounds of litigation necessitating more court-appointed counsel, and in
some cases, new trials on the same charges. The legislature has already pushed
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims to postconviction proceedings, resulting in
“inordinate delays.” See State v. Young, No. 23–1924, 2025 WL 1452559, at *9
(Iowa Ct. App. May 21, 2025) (Tabor, C.J., specially concurring). The SPD’s
appellate division has recently moved to withdraw from some postconviction
appeals, citing its own overload of cases. Only three contract attorneys are
available for postconviction cases in Scott County, Iowa’s third most populous
county. See Ruiz v. State, No. 24–0085, 2024 WL 3887241, at *3 n.5 (Iowa Ct.
App. Aug. 21, 2024) (Tabor, C.J., dissenting). And we have already seen a
substantial jury verdict in a legal malpractice action against the State, finding
that an overworked public defender’s errors led to the wrongful conviction and 57
imprisonment of an innocent man. See Clark v. State, 7 N.W.3d 740, 748, 755
(Iowa 2024) (discussing $12 million jury award against the State but remanding
for new trial due to instructional error).
District courts could let the SPD pause incoming appointments or
withdraw from cases if contract lawyers were available as replacements. At
today’s hourly rate, too few private attorneys are available. This is a money-
solvable problem.
VI. The SPD Failed to Show the District Court Abused Its Discretion.
We review rulings on motions for substitute counsel for abuse of
discretion. Mulatillo, 907 N.W.2d at 517–18; State v. Brooks, 540 N.W.2d 270,
272 (Iowa 1995) (noting that district court has substantial discretion). As I see
it, the district court acted within its discretion in denying the SPD’s unsupported
motions to withdraw or return the cases when no contract attorneys were
available. Allowing the SPD to withdraw inevitably would delay resolution of the
six cases and deprive the defendants of their constitutional right to counsel. The
SPD has not shown that the district court abused its discretion. I would affirm
on that ground.
The SPD wanted the district court to appoint unwilling private attorneys
in its place under Iowa Code section 815.10(3), which provides: “If the court
determines that no contract attorney is available to represent the person, the
court may appoint a noncontract attorney. The order of appointment shall
include a specific finding that no contract attorney was available.” The district
court found that no contract attorneys were available for appointment to these
six cases. The SPD does not dispute that factual finding but contends that the
district court was then required under section 815.10(3) to appoint unwilling 58
private attorneys from among the 200 licensed attorneys in Scott County. But
the statute requires no such thing.
Section 815.10(3) uses the permissive term “may,” which textually allows
but does not require the district court to appoint a noncontract lawyer. See Iowa
Code § 815.10(3) (“If the court determines that no contract attorney is available
to represent the person, the court may appoint a noncontract attorney.”
(emphasis added)); State v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Woodbury Cnty., 989 N.W.2d 652,
656 (Iowa 2023) (“The legislature has directed that, unless otherwise specified,
its use of the word ‘shall’ in a statute ‘imposes a duty’ that is mandatory, while
its use of ‘may’ only ‘confers a power’ that is discretionary.” (quoting Iowa Code
§ 4.1(30)(a), (c) (2021))).7
The district court reasonably exercised its discretion to refrain from
appointing unwilling private attorneys to these criminal cases at the state’s 2024
hourly rate of seventy-six dollars. Iowa Code § 815.7(9) (2025). Unwilling private
attorneys probably would file their own motions to withdraw, on grounds that
they are not competent to try criminal cases or would suffer financial hardship
if required to take time away from their own more lucrative workload, the only
way they can cover payroll and overhead costs at their law firms. See Iowa R. of
Prof’l Conduct 32:1.1 (duty of competence); id. r. 32:6.2 (allowing lawyer “to avoid
appointment by a tribunal . . . for good cause, such as” when “representing the
client is likely to result in violation of the Iowa Rules of Professional Conduct” or
impose “an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer”). As Abraham Lincoln
7The SPD tacitly recognizes that section 815.10(3) does not impose a mandatory duty to
appoint unwilling private attorneys because the SPD has now proposed legislation to change “may” to “shall” in that statute. See S.F./H.F. ___, 91st G.A., 2d Sess. (Iowa 2026) (pre-filed bill, LSB 5354XD), https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/BP/1544366.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7AV-EW2R] 59
is credited with saying: “A lawyer’s time is his stock in trade.” Fred R. Shapiro,
The Oxford Dictionary of American Legal Quotations 257 (1993).
Legal malpractice insurers exclude coverage or charge higher premiums
for criminal defense work. Law firms do not want their lawyers to take on the
liability and reputational risks of bad outcomes in cases outside their expertise.
And even if the private lawyer saw the case through to a verdict or plea, the
defendant could, in postconviction proceedings, argue that his lawyer’s
inexperience amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The SPD has not
shown that the district court abused its discretion by failing to appoint an
unwilling private attorney under section 815.10(3).
In any event, after today’s majority opinion, the district court effectively
must rubber-stamp motions to withdraw when the appointed lawyer says that
the lawyer isn’t competent or that the appointments impose an unreasonable
financial burden. If the district court must accept the SPD’s claim of a temporary
overload, it is reasonable to assume that the court will afford private lawyers the
same grace in granting their motions to withdraw.
The record does not show how many of the lawyers licensed in Scott
County have any experience practicing criminal law specifically, or courtroom
experience generally. Fifteen years ago, in Simmons, we noted that the State
cannot meet its obligation to provide indigent defense counsel by relying on
private lawyers donating their time, stating:
[T]he notion that the state’s obligations can be satisfied indirectly through attorneys volunteering their time and effort arise from the days when a criminal trial was not a long and complicated affair and any generally trained lawyer could step in and handle a case or two without substantial financial sacrifice. Those days have long passed as the criminal law has increased in complexity, and the cost of operating a law office has risen dramatically. 60
791 N.W.2d at 86. That observation lands with even greater force today. To its
credit, the majority opinion does not argue that “the district court should have
appointed private attorneys to take on a criminal case.”
The majority opinion correctly recognizes that we are facing a crisis in
indigent defense. The declining number of attorneys willing to undertake court-
appointed criminal defense cases in Iowa courts is a growing problem statewide
in urban and rural counties alike. According to the Legislative Services Agency,
the number of private attorneys with contracts with the SPD declined by
more than half from 1,018 in 2015 to approximately 500 in 2024. Legis.
Servs. Agency, Fiscal Servs. Div., Public Defenders and Contract Attorneys 1
(2025), https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/FTNO/1463204.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4V5B-6QK5]. “The decrease in attorneys accepting court
appointments has created a crisis in some areas of the state, particularly
Scott and Cerro Gordo Counties” and is attributable in part to “the low rate
of compensation” paid by the SPD. Letter from Iowa State Bar Ass’n 1 (Jan. 3,
2025), https://www.iowabar.org/docdownload/2559033&lang=en
[https://perma.cc/V6B3-KKYY]. “According to the most current ISBA economic
survey, the average overhead costs of operating a law office in Iowa are over $80
per hour.” Id. at 2. Yet the SPD in 2024 paid only $76 per hour for defending
class “C” and “D” felonies and all misdemeanors. Iowa Code § 815.7(9). The
legislature increased that hourly rate by two dollars effective July 1, 2025. 2025
Iowa Acts ch. 154, § 20 (codified at Iowa Code § 815.7(10) (2026)). The shortage
of willing lawyers is especially acute in Scott County, where criminal defense
lawyers can receive $150 per hour over the bridge in Rock Island, Illinois, or
$170 per hour defending cases in Davenport’s federal court. Scott County is the
canary in the coal mine for Iowa’s indigent defense crisis. 61
The district court in its discretion did not attempt to appoint any unwilling
private attorney to represent the indigent defendants because the court found
that the SPD failed to prove the threshold requirement for its withdrawal: that it
is temporarily overloaded. The SPD acknowledges that it offered no evidence to
prove its overload. Iowa Code § 13B.9(4)(a). That failure of proof should be
dispositive.
As the majority recognizes, the district court has discretion to dismiss
criminal cases when the state executive branch fails in its constitutional duty to
provide counsel for indigent defendants through the SPD and no contract
attorneys are available at the state’s hourly rates. The same Scott County district
court judge has already dismissed an OWI, Second Offense, case on those
grounds in a nine-page ruling entered August 15, 2025. State v. Wallace,
No. OWCR449261 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Scott Cnty. Aug. 15, 2025)
[https://perma.cc/6JXA-UGLV]. We can expect many more such dismissals
unless and until the State adequately funds indigent defense.
The majority allows the SPD to win this round in the ongoing battle over
limited resources appropriated by the legislature for indigent defense. The
immediate losers are the six indigent defendants deprived of representation and
the backlogged Associate District Court for Scott County. But viewed through a
wider lens, the losers will be the people of Iowa as public safety erodes because
courts are forced to dismiss more criminal charges. Prosecutors will soon need
to triage which cases to charge. Accused criminals lack lobbying power at the
statehouse. In the future, the legislature may hear from prosecutors and law
enforcement as to the need to increase funding to meet the state’s constitutional
obligation. Stay tuned. 62
For these reasons, and for those stated in Justice Mansfield’s dissent, I
respectfully dissent from today’s opinion reversing the district court’s rulings
that upheld six indigent defendants’ constitutional right to counsel.
Christensen, C.J., and Mansfield, J., join this dissent. 63
#25–0011 State Public Defender v. District Court
Mansfield, Justice (dissenting).
I join Justice Waterman’s dissent. District courts have both statutory and
constitutional obligations to review a public defender office’s claims of a
“temporary overload” as the basis for withdrawing indefinitely from a category of
cases—particularly when there is no one else available to take over. See Iowa
Const. art. I, § 10; Iowa Code § 13B.9(4)(a) (2024). I wish to add only a few
observations.
I. The Majority Opinion Contradicts Itself.
First, the majority opinion is self-contradictory at its core. From the outset,
the majority informs everyone that there is “an indigent defense crisis” and “it is
getting worse.” In other words, we have a permanent problem in Iowa. Yet the
majority claims that there is no way for a district court to determine whether a
fully-staffed public defender office that wants to stop taking certain cases
indefinitely is suffering from a “temporary overload.” It seems to me the majority
has already rebutted this claim at the beginning of their opinion. Whatever
overload exists, it is certainly not temporary.
The majority cannot claim that district courts are unable to diagnose what
they have already diagnosed in the introduction to their opinion.
II. Separation of Powers Is Not at Issue.
Second, the majority’s “separation of powers” concerns are misguided and
overblown.8 As Justice Waterman’s dissent points out, the doctrine of separation
of powers favors affirmance of the district court’s orders.
8Notably, the State Public Defender’s briefs do not raise a separation-of-powers argument;
this is completely the majority’s brainstorm. 64
Consider the position of the attorney general’s office. We should expect the
attorney general’s office to vigorously defend Iowa’s constitutional paradigm,
including the separation of powers. Yet that office is representing the district court
in this matter, and advocating the district court’s position, not the position of the
State Public Defender (SPD).
The majority’s separation of powers argument loses steam as soon as you
look at the one public defender case they have cited—Office of Public Advocacy
v. Superior Court, First Judicial District (OPA), 566 P.3d 235 (Alaska 2025).
OPA arose when a trial court grew concerned about the adequacy of
representation being provided by a local public defender office to a number of
clients. Id. at 238. The court ordered the office to withdraw from a case for which
the office declined to appoint a specific public defender attorney. Id. It appointed
a different legal arm of the executive branch—the Office of Public Advocacy—to
represent that defendant. Id. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court overruled
the public defender’s and the OPA’s objections to this procedure, concluding that
“[b]ecause the court had a duty to ensure [the defendant’s] rights were protected,
it did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by [ordering the Agency to
withdraw and appointing the OPA].” Id. at 247.
The point is the same here: the court system has a constitutional
obligation to see that criminal defendants receive adequate representation. See
Iowa Const. art. I, § 10. Fulfilling that obligation does not encroach on the
executive branch’s role; it’s part of the judiciary’s job. When no available
alternative exists, as it doesn’t in Scott County, the district court is entitled at a
minimum to hold the local public defender office to what the statute requires: the
existence of a “temporary overload” before the local office may withdraw. 65
Apart from the constitutional imperative, under Iowa’s laws, both the
executive branch and the judicial branch play roles in indigent defense. For
example, district courts—not the SPD—must review and approve the use of
experts and investigators by SPD contract attorneys, even though the SPD foots
the bill. See Iowa Code §§ 815.1(1), .5. District courts must decide if attorneys
have “good cause” to exceed presumptive fee limitations. Id. § 815.10A(3)(a). No
one contends that this level of involvement violates the separation of powers,
intrudes on SPD prerogatives, infringes the attorney–client privilege, or is beyond
the competence of district courts.
Other than the fact that the Governor appoints the State Public Defender,
there is also no inherent reason why the SPD should be considered part of the
executive branch. This wasn’t decreed by Montesquieu. See Charles de Secondat,
Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws 215–31 (Thomas Nugent trans., 3d ed.
1758) (1748) (discussing the separation of powers).9 Public defenders aren’t
administering the laws; they are contesting efforts to enforce them.
Indeed, in the federal government, federal public defenders and the rest of
federal indigent defense fall within the judicial branch. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. If
it doesn’t violate separation of powers to have all of indigent defense supervised
by the judicial branch, as federal law provides, I fail to see how it violates
separation of powers for the judicial branch to have a partial role, as decreed by
Iowa law, including Iowa Code section 13B.9(4)(a).
9Moreover, separation of powers does not mean that the branches of government have no
say over each other’s operations. In Federalist No. 47, James Madison explained that Montesquieu’s view of separation of powers “did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over the acts of each other.” 66
III. The Majority’s Assurances Are Not Reassuring.
Finally, at the end of the opinion, the majority tries to soften the blow with
a series of assurances. For example: “This is not to say . . . .” and “What we are
not deciding.” I derive no comfort from the majority’s assurances because they
rest on insubstantial distinctions, are contrary to the very logic of the majority
opinion, or may be displaced by forthcoming events.
For example, the majority seeks to assure us that merely checking a box
and claiming “temporary overload” is not enough. Instead, in order to withdraw,
the public defender office needs to go just slightly further and add the following
words: “The public defender . . . after consideration of all applicable factors
including the number of attorneys in the office and caseloads, has determined
they are . . . ethically unable to handle this case.” I do not see this as a
meaningful distinction. Boilerplate is still boilerplate, whether it’s two words or
a full sentence.
Next, the majority says that the district court would be “well within its
discretion” to reject the return of a case if the public defender office claimed to
be overloaded because the entire office was going on vacation. But how would
the district court know this, because the majority holds that once the magic
words are uttered, the district court cannot even make an inquiry?
Additionally, the majority reiterates that their decision does not address
“overloads in public defender offices that reach a level of permanency.” But
again, how would the district court know whether an overload is temporary or
permanent if it can’t inquire? It certainly appears as if the situation in Scott
County is permanent.
Lastly, the majority seeks to reassure us that its decision does not mean
unwilling private attorneys will be forced to represent criminal defendants at the 67
low hourly rates allowed by Iowa law. See Iowa Code § 815.7(10) (2026)
(authorizing rates of $78 to $88 per hour). The majority highlights that it is not
“suggest[ing] that the district court should have appointed unwilling private
attorneys to take on a criminal case” and notes that a district court’s declining
to do so would be “within the district court’s broad discretion.” See Iowa Code
§ 815.10(3) (2024) (“If the court determines that no contract attorney is available
to represent the person, the court may appoint a noncontract
attorney.” (emphasis added)).
However, the majority fails to note that the SPD has pre-filed a bill for the
2026 legislative session to eliminate this possibility. See S.F./H.F. ___, 91st G.A.,
2d Sess. (Iowa 2026) (pre-filed bill, LSB 5354XD), https://www.legis.iowa.gov
/docs/publications/BP/1544366.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7AV-EW2R]. The
SPD’s proposed legislation would require district courts to appoint unwilling
attorneys by changing the “may” in Iowa Code section 815.10(3) to “shall.” Id.
The bill explanation states,
Current law provides that if no contract attorney is available for appointment by the court, the court may appoint a noncontract attorney.
The bill provides that if the court determines that no contract attorney is available to represent the person, the court is required to appoint a noncontract attorney.
If this bill became law, there would obviously be much to sort out. But it’s
important to appreciate the magnitude of what the SPD is proposing. The state
government would be forcing individuals to provide services to the state on terms
they are not voluntarily willing to accept. Consider where this could lead. If
lawyers were first, who would be next? Would the state government do the same
with Medicaid, mandating that unwilling physicians and dentists accept 68
Medicaid patients at whatever reimbursement rate the state government chose
to offer?
For the reasons set forth in Justice Waterman’s dissent, and those set
forth above, I respectfully dissent.
Christensen, C.J., and Waterman, J., join this dissent.
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
State Public Defender v. Iowa District Court For Scott County, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-public-defender-v-iowa-district-court-for-scott-county-iowa-2026.