FILED APRIL 30, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40700-4-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION ) ZACHARY GENE BOYCE, ) ) Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — Zachary Boyce appeals the sentencing court’s inclusion
of his felony juvenile adjudications of guilt in his offender score. RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b),
which the legislature amended after Boyce committed his current offenses but before his
sentencing, prohibits counting most juvenile felony adjudications in an offender score.
Both RCW 9.94A.345 and RCW 10.01.040 require an offender to be sentenced
based on the law at the time the offense was committed. The legislature can avoid this
result by including language in a new statute that gives it retroactive application. Here,
the legislature did not include any language that would give RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b)
retroactive application. We affirm the trial court’s calculation of Boyce’s offender score,
which included his juvenile adjudications of guilt. No. 40700-4-III State v. Boyce
BACKGROUND
On June 30, 2023, police arrested Zachary Boyce after an anonymous caller
reported hearing people yelling inside a house. Boyce’s criminal history included several
juvenile felony adjudications of guilt. At the time, a defendant’s offender score required
courts to count a prior violent juvenile felony adjudication of guilt as 1 point and a prior
nonviolent juvenile adjudication of guilty as ½ point. Former RCW 9.94A.525(7)
(2021).
On May 11, 2023, the legislature enacted Engrossed House Bill 1324, which
amended RCW 9.94A.525 to eliminate most juvenile felony adjudications of guilt from
being included in a defendant’s offender score. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 415, § 2. The
legislature codified the amendment at RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) and gave it an effective date
of July 23, 2023. Id.
In December 2023, Boyce pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm in
the first degree and felony harassment (intent to kill). Prior to his plea, he reserved the
right to appeal the inclusion of his juvenile felony adjudications in his offender score.
The trial court sentenced Boyce based on an offender score of 5, which included his prior
juvenile felony adjudications.
Boyce appealed to this court.
2 No. 40700-4-III State v. Boyce
ANALYSIS
Boyce argues the sentencing court erred by including his prior juvenile felony
adjudications in his offender score. The question is whether Boyce’s sentence must be
based on the law in effect at the time he committed his offenses or at the time of his
sentencing. The answer depends on statutory construction, which we review de novo.
State v. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d 708, 713, 487 P.3d 482 (2021).
We have rejected the arguments raised by Boyce in at least three published
opinions—State v. Gibson, 33 Wn. App. 2d 618, 563 P.3d 1079, review denied, 4 Wn.3d
1035, 570 P.3d 716 (2025); State v. Troutman, 30 Wn. App. 2d 592, 546 P.3d 458,
review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1016, 554 P.3d 1217 (2024); and State v. Tester, 30 Wn. App. 2d
650, 546 P.3d 94, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1019, 556 P.3d 1094 (2024). We reject
Boyce’s argument here.
Both RCW 9.94A.3451 and the savings clause, RCW 10.01.040,2 require a
defendant to be sentenced based on the law in effect at the time the offense was
1 RCW 9.94A.345 provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any sentence imposed under this chapter shall be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the current offense was committed.” 2 RCW 10.01.040 provides in relevant part: “Whenever any criminal or penal statute shall be amended or repealed, all offenses committed or penalties or forfeitures incurred while it was in force shall be punished or enforced as if it were in force, notwithstanding such amendment or repeal, unless a contrary intention is expressly
3 No. 40700-4-III State v. Boyce
committed. The savings clause applies to “substantive changes in the law,” which
includes changes to “the punishment for offenses or the type of punishments possible.”
Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 721-22. Because the savings clause is in derogation of common
law, the legislature can avoid the savings clause by using less than express language.
Retroactivity “‘need only be expressed in words that fairly convey that intention.’”
Id. at 720 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing examples of where the
legislature included sufficient language in the amended statute to give it retroactive
application) (quoting State v. Ross, 152 Wn.2d 220, 238, 95 P.3d 1225 (2004)). Here,
there is nothing in RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) that fairly conveys a legislative intent for
retroactive application. Boyce does not argue that RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) contains any
such language.
In Gibson, the majority refused to apply a precipitating event analysis. 33 Wn.
App. 2d at 623. Under that analysis, a statute applies prospectively, not retroactively, if
the precipitating event under the statute occurred after the date of enactment. Jenks,
197 Wn.2d at 722. Application of a precipitating event analysis would likely result in
RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) being applied retroactively. Gibson, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 625-26
(Maxa, J. dissenting). However, Jenks suggests that a precipitating event analysis is
declared in the amendatory or repealing act.”
4 No. 40700-4-III State v. Boyce
reserved for statutory amendments affecting only attorney fees and costs of litigation.
197 Wn.2d at 723. Thus, a precipitating event analysis has no application here.
Boyce seeks to avoid the result required by the savings clause by arguing that
RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) is a remedial statute. He cites the legislative intent of the
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FILED APRIL 30, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40700-4-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) PUBLISHED OPINION ) ZACHARY GENE BOYCE, ) ) Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — Zachary Boyce appeals the sentencing court’s inclusion
of his felony juvenile adjudications of guilt in his offender score. RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b),
which the legislature amended after Boyce committed his current offenses but before his
sentencing, prohibits counting most juvenile felony adjudications in an offender score.
Both RCW 9.94A.345 and RCW 10.01.040 require an offender to be sentenced
based on the law at the time the offense was committed. The legislature can avoid this
result by including language in a new statute that gives it retroactive application. Here,
the legislature did not include any language that would give RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b)
retroactive application. We affirm the trial court’s calculation of Boyce’s offender score,
which included his juvenile adjudications of guilt. No. 40700-4-III State v. Boyce
BACKGROUND
On June 30, 2023, police arrested Zachary Boyce after an anonymous caller
reported hearing people yelling inside a house. Boyce’s criminal history included several
juvenile felony adjudications of guilt. At the time, a defendant’s offender score required
courts to count a prior violent juvenile felony adjudication of guilt as 1 point and a prior
nonviolent juvenile adjudication of guilty as ½ point. Former RCW 9.94A.525(7)
(2021).
On May 11, 2023, the legislature enacted Engrossed House Bill 1324, which
amended RCW 9.94A.525 to eliminate most juvenile felony adjudications of guilt from
being included in a defendant’s offender score. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 415, § 2. The
legislature codified the amendment at RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) and gave it an effective date
of July 23, 2023. Id.
In December 2023, Boyce pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm in
the first degree and felony harassment (intent to kill). Prior to his plea, he reserved the
right to appeal the inclusion of his juvenile felony adjudications in his offender score.
The trial court sentenced Boyce based on an offender score of 5, which included his prior
juvenile felony adjudications.
Boyce appealed to this court.
2 No. 40700-4-III State v. Boyce
ANALYSIS
Boyce argues the sentencing court erred by including his prior juvenile felony
adjudications in his offender score. The question is whether Boyce’s sentence must be
based on the law in effect at the time he committed his offenses or at the time of his
sentencing. The answer depends on statutory construction, which we review de novo.
State v. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d 708, 713, 487 P.3d 482 (2021).
We have rejected the arguments raised by Boyce in at least three published
opinions—State v. Gibson, 33 Wn. App. 2d 618, 563 P.3d 1079, review denied, 4 Wn.3d
1035, 570 P.3d 716 (2025); State v. Troutman, 30 Wn. App. 2d 592, 546 P.3d 458,
review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1016, 554 P.3d 1217 (2024); and State v. Tester, 30 Wn. App. 2d
650, 546 P.3d 94, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1019, 556 P.3d 1094 (2024). We reject
Boyce’s argument here.
Both RCW 9.94A.3451 and the savings clause, RCW 10.01.040,2 require a
defendant to be sentenced based on the law in effect at the time the offense was
1 RCW 9.94A.345 provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any sentence imposed under this chapter shall be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the current offense was committed.” 2 RCW 10.01.040 provides in relevant part: “Whenever any criminal or penal statute shall be amended or repealed, all offenses committed or penalties or forfeitures incurred while it was in force shall be punished or enforced as if it were in force, notwithstanding such amendment or repeal, unless a contrary intention is expressly
3 No. 40700-4-III State v. Boyce
committed. The savings clause applies to “substantive changes in the law,” which
includes changes to “the punishment for offenses or the type of punishments possible.”
Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 721-22. Because the savings clause is in derogation of common
law, the legislature can avoid the savings clause by using less than express language.
Retroactivity “‘need only be expressed in words that fairly convey that intention.’”
Id. at 720 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing examples of where the
legislature included sufficient language in the amended statute to give it retroactive
application) (quoting State v. Ross, 152 Wn.2d 220, 238, 95 P.3d 1225 (2004)). Here,
there is nothing in RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) that fairly conveys a legislative intent for
retroactive application. Boyce does not argue that RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) contains any
such language.
In Gibson, the majority refused to apply a precipitating event analysis. 33 Wn.
App. 2d at 623. Under that analysis, a statute applies prospectively, not retroactively, if
the precipitating event under the statute occurred after the date of enactment. Jenks,
197 Wn.2d at 722. Application of a precipitating event analysis would likely result in
RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) being applied retroactively. Gibson, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 625-26
(Maxa, J. dissenting). However, Jenks suggests that a precipitating event analysis is
declared in the amendatory or repealing act.”
4 No. 40700-4-III State v. Boyce
reserved for statutory amendments affecting only attorney fees and costs of litigation.
197 Wn.2d at 723. Thus, a precipitating event analysis has no application here.
Boyce seeks to avoid the result required by the savings clause by arguing that
RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) is a remedial statute. He cites the legislative intent of the
amendment, which includes giving “real effect to the juvenile system’s express goals
of rehabilitation and integration,” and recognizing “how grave disproportionality within
the juvenile legal system may subsequently impact sentencing ranges in adult court.”
LAWS OF 2023, ch. 415, § 1(1), (5). We note that this statement of intent is not part of the
statutory amendment. See RCW 9.94A.525.
Even if RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) is remedial, we disagree that remedial
amendments to penal statutes require retroactive application. “[T]he general rule
that a remedial statute applies retroactively ‘does not apply when a statute is subject to
RCW 10.01.040.’” Troutman, 30 Wn. App. 2d at 598 n.6 (quoting State v. Jenks,
12 Wn. App. 2d 588, 600, 459 P.3d 389 (2020), aff’d, 197 Wn.2d 708). As noted above,
RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) is subject to the savings clause, RCW 10.01.040. “‘[A]bsent
language indicating a contrary intent, an amendment to a penal statute—even a patently
remedial one—must apply prospectively under RCW 10.01.040.’” Jenks, 12 Wn. App.
5 No. 40700-4-III State v. Boyce
2d at 600 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. McCarthy, 112 Wn. App. 231, 237,
48 P.3d 1014 (2002)).
Ultimately, whether to grant RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) retroactive application
is a question of legislative intent. There are two statutes, RCW 9.94A.345 and
RCW 10.01.040, that require defendants to be sentenced based on the law at the time the
offense was committed. The legislature knows how to avoid this result—it can include
words in the statutory amendment that fairly convey an intent for the amendment to
apply retroactively. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 720. As noted above, there is nothing in
RCW 9.94A.545(1)(b) that fairly conveys an intent for it to apply retroactively. We
conclude that the legislature did not intend for RCW 9.94A.545(1)(b) to apply
retroactively.
We affirm the trial court.
________________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, J.
WE CONCUR:
________________________________ ________________________________ Cooney, A.C.J. Hill, J.