Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON November 25, 2025 DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 60130-3-II
Respondent,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION WILLIAM DAVID FARRIS, JR.
Appellant.
PRICE, J. — William D. Farris was convicted of first degree burglary–domestic violence
(DV), second degree assault–DV, unlawful imprisonment–DV, and interfering with domestic
violence reporting following a violent incident with his former girlfriend, C.N. Farris appeals,
arguing that the trial court erred by permitting improper vouching of C.N.’s testimony and
bolstering of her credibility. Farris also argues his convictions for second degree assault and
unlawful imprisonment violate double jeopardy. We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2023, C.N. obtained a domestic violence protection order against Farris.
Four days later, Farris broke into C.N.’s two-story house in the middle of the night. Once inside,
Farris attacked C.N. and would not allow her to leave. C.N. was eventually able to escape through
a window and call 911 from a neighbor’s home.
The State charged Farris with second degree assault–DV, first degree burglary–DV,
unlawful imprisonment–DV, felony harassment, and interfering with domestic violence reporting.1
1 The State also charged Farris with felony violation of court order, but this charge was later dismissed on procedural grounds. No. 60130-3
Before the start of trial, Farris filed a motion in limine to preclude witnesses from
commenting on the credibility of other witnesses. Specifically, Farris requested that the trial court,
[p]rohibit any witness from vouching for another witness, or the prosecution from vouching or even suggesting that the witnesses for the State are credible, in . . . opening, examination, or closing.
Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 11. The trial court granted Farris’ motion.
C.N. took the stand first and testified that on the night of the incident, she awoke to the
sound of breaking glass. When she heard footsteps on the stairs, she grabbed her phone and hid
in the bathroom.
C.N. tried to call 911, but Farris forced open the bathroom door and shoved her into the
wall. Once in the bathroom, Farris grabbed her phone and threw it out of reach saying, “Bitch,
you’re not calling the cops today; oh no . . . .” Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 204. Farris then
punched her repeatedly, yelled at her, called her a “stupid bitch,” and threatened to kill her. VRP
at 207. C.N. recalled that, at some point, Farris stopped abruptly and went downstairs, continuing
to yell at her as he did.
C.N. testified that she followed Farris downstairs and tried to escape out the front door.
But Farris slapped her hands away from the door, told her, “You’re not going nowhere,” and
threatened to punch her as he said, “You want some more?” VRP at 209. Farris then ordered C.N.
to get on the couch, as he unzipped his pants and threatened to urinate on her. After a moment,
Farris zipped up his pants and left the room.
C.N. testified that once Farris left the room, she escaped out a window and ran to her
neighbor’s house, where they called 911 and waited for the police to arrive.
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The next day, Officer Hoyhtya-Keogh, who had been sitting at counsel table with the
prosecutor throughout the trial, took the witness stand. He explained that he responded to the 911
call, interviewed C.N. at the scene, and took photos of her injuries.
At that point, the State asked the officer if he thought C.N.’s interview at the scene was
“pretty much consistent” with her testimony the previous day in court. VRP at 282. Farris
objected.
The trial court excused the jury to hear arguments about the objection. Farris argued that
the State’s question violated the motion in limine pertaining to improper vouching because asking
the officer about the consistency of C.N.’s testimony was asking for a comment on the credibility
of another witness. Saying that C.N.’s testimony was “consistent” was, according to Farris,
essentially saying that C.N.’s testimony “must be accurate,” which constituted vouching. VRP at
282.
The State responded that an answer to the question would not be vouching because the
officer would not be commenting on the truthfulness of C.N.’s testimony or commenting on her
credibility. The State also argued that the answer would not constitute hearsay “because it’s not
asking for a statement [C.N.] gave him.” VRP at 283.
The trial court overruled Farris’ objection, agreeing with the State that commenting on the
consistency of C.N.’s statements was different than commenting on her credibility. The trial court
also noted that although the issue was not whether the testimony was hearsay, the evidence rules
allow admission of “prior consistent statements” and “inconsistent statements,” which means that
those types of statements are not comments on credibility. VRP at 284.
Farris did not raise any other basis for his objection to the question.
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After the jury returned to the courtroom, the State repeated its question, and the officer
gave a one-word answer:
[State:] Was [C.N.’s] testimony yesterday consistent with what she told you that night? [Officer Hoyhtya-Keogh:] Yes.
VRP at 285.
After the close of testimony, the trial court gave its instructions to the jury. As to the charge
of second degree assault, the to-convict instruction provided that the defendant must have inflicted
“substantial bodily harm.” It stated,
To convict the defendant of the crime of assault in the second degree as charged in Count 1, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That on or about the 30th day of September, 2023, the defendant intentionally assaulted [C.N.]; (2) That the defendant thereby recklessly inflicted substantial bodily harm on [C.N.]; and (3) That this act occurred in the State of Washington.
CP at 39. And, as to the charge of unlawful imprisonment, the to-convict instruction provided, in
part, that the defendant must have interfered with the victim’s liberty by restraining their
movements. It read,
To convict the defendant of the crime of unlawful imprisonment as charged in Count IV, each of the following six elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That on or about the 30th day of September, 2023, the defendant knowingly restrained the movements of [C.N.] in a manner that substantially interfered with her liberty; (2) That such restraint was without [C.N.]’s consent; (3) That the defendant knew that such restraint was without [C.N.]’s consent; (4) That such restraint was without legal authority; (5) That the defendant knew that such restraint was without legal authority; and (6) That any of these acts occurred in the State of Washington.
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CP at 50.
During closing argument, the State discussed how the evidence tied to the elements of the
charged crimes. For second degree assault, the State argued that Farris assaulted C.N. by punching
her repeatedly in the upstairs bathroom. This, the State contended, resulted in the reckless
infliction of substantial bodily injury due to the extent of C.N.’s injuries following the incident.
Then, for unlawful imprisonment, the State asked the jury to use their “common sense and
experience” to determine whether Farris unlawfully restrained C.N. VRP at 420. The State then
specifically described several different acts that it asserted constituted unlawful restraint, including
Farris punching C.N. in the bathroom:
He restrained her several different ways. First, by beating her in the bathroom. She couldn’t get away. Secondly, he went downstairs. . . . [S]he said she followed him .... [T]hen she said she got to the bottom of the stairs and . . . tried to go to the door, and what did he do? Slapped her hands away from the door. “You can’t go. You need to lie down over here.” . . . At that point she can’t move. . . . [H]e unzips his fly and says[,] “I’m going to pee on you.” A woman her size sitting on a couch, and a man that is . . . 6’5” and 210 pounds is standing over her with his fly open. You think she can just get up and leave at that point? . . . [H]e’d already beat her once. What was going to happen if she got up and tried to run away again?
VRP at 419-20. Throughout its closing argument, the State never mentioned Officer Hoyhtya-
Keogh’s testimony that C.N.’s in-court testimony was consistent with her report to law
enforcement at the scene.
The jury found Farris guilty on several counts—second degree assault–DV, first degree
burglary–DV, unlawful imprisonment–DV, and interfering with domestic violence reporting.2
2 The jury found Farris not guilty of felony harassment.
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The trial court imposed a standard range sentence of 48 months in prison and 18 months in
community custody.
Farris appeals.
ANALYSIS
Farris raises two issues on appeal. First, Farris argues that the trial court erred by permitting
Officer Hoyhtya-Keogh to be asked about the consistency of C.N.’s testimony, claiming that it
constituted improper vouching and bolstered C.N.’s credibility. Second, Farris argues that his
convictions for second degree assault and unlawful imprisonment violate double jeopardy.
I. ADMISSION OF OFFICER HOYHTYA-KEOGH’S TESTIMONY
Farris argues that when Officer Hoyhtya-Keogh testified that C.N.’s trial testimony was
consistent with her statement at the scene, he improperly vouched for her and bolstered her
credibility. We disagree. The testimony did not constitute vouching, and any bolstering of C.N.’s
credibility, even if inadmissible under ER 801(d)(1)(ii), was harmless.3
A trial court’s admission of testimony is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
State v. Bluford, 188 Wn.2d 298, 305, 393 P.3d 1219 (2017). A trial court abuses discretion if its
decision is manifestly unreasonable or is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.
State v. Borboa, 157 Wn.2d 108, 121, 135 P.3d 469 (2006).
3 Farris also makes two additional arguments for why Officer Hoyhtya-Keogh’s answer about C.N.’s statements should have been excluded—unfair “exploitation” of ER 615’s exception for excluding witnesses from trial and, separate from his improper vouching argument, improper opinion under ER 701. Br. of Appellant at 24. However, neither of these arguments was raised before the trial court. Because Farris makes no argument under RAP 2.5(a) to suggest we should consider these arguments for the first time on appeal, we decline to review them.
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But evidentiary errors may also be harmless. A nonconstitutional error is harmless where
there is no reasonable probability that the error materially affected the verdict. State v. Gunderson,
181 Wn.2d 916, 926, 337 P.3d 1090 (2014).
Generally, no witness may offer testimony in the form of an opinion regarding the veracity
of another witness. State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 927, 155 P.3d 125 (2007); State v. Warren,
134 Wn. App. 44, 52-53, 138 P.3d 1081 (2006) (“No witness may state an opinion about a victim’s
credibility because such testimony ‘invades the province of the jury to weigh the evidence and
decide the credibility of [the witness].’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Jones, 71 Wn.
App. 798, 812, 863 P.2d 85 (1993))), aff’d, 165 Wn.2d 17, 195 P.3d 940 (2008). Improper
vouching can occur both when a prosecutor provides personal assurances of a witness’s veracity
and when a witness testifies as to the truthfulness of another witness’s testimony. State v. Brett,
126 Wn.2d 136, 175, 892 P.2d 29 (1995); State v. Korum, 157 Wn.2d 614, 651, 141 P.3d 13 (2006).
For example, it is improper vouching for a law enforcement witness to say “[the victims] are telling
me the truth.” State v. Perez-Valdez, 172 Wn.2d 808, 817-18, 265 P.3d 853 (2011) (alteration in
original).
Here, Officer Hoyhtya-Keogh’s testimony falls short of improper vouching. The State’s
single question was limited exclusively to whether C.N.’s statement was consistent with her
testimony:
[State:] Was [C.N.’s] testimony yesterday consistent with what she told you that night? [Officer Hoyhtya-Keogh:] Yes.
VRP at 285. There is nothing in the officer’s answer that suggests a comment on C.N.’s veracity.
The officer was saying nothing akin to, for example, C.N. was “telling me the truth.” Perez-
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Valdez, 172 Wn. 2d at 817-18. Thus, we reject Farris’ argument that the testimony was improper
vouching.
Farris also directs us to State v. Alexander, 64 Wn. App. 147, 822 P.2d 1250 (1992),
arguing that statements suggesting consistency may still be improper because they can bolster
credibility. In Alexander, the court explained, separately from a discussion about vouching, that
“evidence that [a witness] repeatedly told the same story out of court is not admissible to
corroborate or bolster [their] testimony.” Id.at 152.
The concern raised in Alexander appears to be based on the rationale behind ER 801(d)(1)
regarding certain past statements of witnesses not being hearsay. The rule provides that a statement
is not hearsay if:
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross[-]examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . (ii) consistent with the declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive . . . .
ER 801(d)(1)(ii).
But, as noted in the rule, not all past consistent statements are admissible; there must first
be an express or implied charge of recent fabrication. Stated another way,
While the witness’ prior consistent statements are not admissible to prove that the in-court allegations are true, the statements are admissible to rebut a suggestion of recent fabrication. Recent fabrication is inferred when counsel’s examination “raise[s] an inference sufficient to allow counsel to argue the witness had a reason to fabricate her story later.” The alleged fabrication must be recent because if the statement[s] were made after the events giving rise to the inference of fabrication, it would have no probative value in counteracting the charge of fabrication.
State v. Makela, 66 Wn. App. 164, 168, 831 P.2d 1109 (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Bargas,
52 Wn. App. 700, 702-03, 763 P.2d 470 (1988)), review denied, 120 Wn.2d 1014 (1992). “Cross-
examination that merely attempts to point to inconsistencies in the witness’s testimony does not
raise an inference of recent fabrication and does not justify admission of prior consistent
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statements.” State v. McWilliams, 177 Wn. App. 139, 148, 311 P.3d 584 (2013), review denied,
179 Wn.2d 1020 (2014).
One of the reasons behind this limitation on prior consistent statements is that evidence
that simply demonstrates “that the witness said the same thing on other occasions” does not carry
much probative value “ ‘for the simple reason that mere repetition does not imply veracity.’ ” State
v. Harper, 35 Wn. App. 855, 858, 670 P.2d 296 (1983) (quoting 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
Evidence ¶ 801(d)(1)(B)[01], at 801-117 to 118 (1981)), review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1035 (1984).
To the extent that Farris is arguing that there was no charge of “recent fabrication” here
that would make the officer’s statement admissible under ER 801(d)(1)(ii), we agree. Although
Farris had challenged C.N.’s credibility, he never made a charge that she had any reason for a
“recent fabrication.”
But even if the trial court erred when it permitted the officer to confirm that C.N.’s
testimony was consistent with her statement to the officer, any error was harmless. There is no
reasonable probability that the single question to Officer Hoyhtya-Keogh affected the outcome of
the trial. As noted above, even if there is an inference that consistency indicates truth, the inference
is weak. See Harper, 35 Wn. App. at 858. The probability of this weak inference affecting the
verdict is especially remote here because it was a single question and answer. Further, the State
never mentioned the testimony again, either in further questioning or in closing argument. The
State simply made no argument to the jury at any time that C.N.’s consistent statements supported
her credibility. Accordingly, even assuming the admission of the testimony was error, there is no
reasonable probability that the testimony affected the jury’s verdict, making its admission
harmless.
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II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Farris next argues that his convictions for both second degree assault–DV and unlawful
imprisonment–DV violate double jeopardy. He points out that the State argued that the same
action, the punching of C.N. in the bathroom, supported both the second degree assault and
unlawful imprisonment. And because the State relied on this same evidence to support both
crimes, Farris contends that double jeopardy was violated. We disagree.
Double jeopardy protections found in both the Washington State Constitution and the
United States Constitution provide that a person shall not face multiple punishments or
prosecutions for “the same offense.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy protects both against a second trial for the
same offense and multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Ray, __ Wn.3d __, 575 P.3d
321, 327 (2025). However, this protection “ ‘does not prohibit against the imposition of separate
punishments for different offenses.’ ” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.
Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 817, 453 P.3d 696 (2019)).
In the context of multiple punishments from a single trial, like in this case, we apply the
“multiple punishments” double jeopardy analytical framework. Id. Under this framework, the
question becomes whether both of Farris’ convictions punish the same offense and whether the
legislature intended to impose separate punishments. State v. Noltie, 116 Wn.2d 831, 848, 809
P.2d 190 (1991). The delineation of “offenses” is fundamentally a legislative function, so our
analysis is anchored in the specific statutes giving rise to the convictions in question and the
specific punishments authorized by the legislature. Ray, 575 P.3d at 327-28.
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In its recent decision in Ray, our Supreme Court clarified the four-part test that we apply
when assessing double jeopardy claims with convictions arising under different statutes.4 Id. at
328. In the first step of this four-part test, we look at the statutes involved and consider express or
implicit legislative intent. Id. Second, we apply the Blockburger5 test, also called the same
evidence test or the same elements test, to determine if the offenses are the same in fact and in law.
Id. Under this test, we consider the legal elements of each offense “as charged and proved” at
trial. State v. Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d 577, 620, 451 P.3d 1060 (2019) (emphasis omitted)
(plurality opinion) (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Offenses are
not the same in law under the Blockburger test if each offense requires proof of an element that
the other does not. Ray, 575 P.3d at 331. When the Blockburger analysis establishes that two
convictions are not the same in law, no further analysis is required to determine whether they are
the same in fact. See Id.
Next, for the third step of the four-part test, we determine, when applicable, whether the
offenses merge. Id. at 328. Fourth, we determine if there are any “ ‘other indicators of legislative
intent’ ” that present clear evidence that could overcome the presumption established by the
Blockburger test. Id. (quoting Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 621) (opinion of Gordon McCloud, J.).
Here, we begin our double jeopardy analysis with the four-part test. For step one, neither
party has provided any evidence of explicit or implicit legislative intent with respect to the crimes
of second degree assault and false imprisonment, so we move to the second step.
4 In cases involving multiple violations of the same statute, we apply the unit of prosecution analysis which asks, “what act or course of conduct has the Legislature defined as the punishable act.” Villanueva-Gonzalez, 180 Wn.2d 975, 980, 329 P.3d 78 (2014) (quoting State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 634, 965 P.2d 1072 (1998)). 5 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932).
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For the second step, we analyze whether the offenses are the same in law under the
Blockburger test. As charged in this case (and as provided in the to-convict instructions), second
degree assault required an intentional assault that recklessly caused substantial bodily harm. RCW
9A.36.021(1)(a). Unlawful imprisonment required unlawfully restraining a person without their
consent in a manner that substantially interferes with their liberty. RCW 9A.40.040, .010(6). The
assault required infliction of substantial bodily harm, while unlawful imprisonment did not; and
unlawful imprisonment required a substantial interference with one’s liberty, while the second
degree assault did not. With these differences, each crime clearly required additional proof of fact
that was not required for the other crime, making them not the same in law under the Blockburger
test. Thus, no further analysis is required to determine whether they are the same in fact.6 See
Ray, 575 P.3d at 331 (holding that multiple convictions did not violate double jeopardy because
the offenses were not the same in law, despite the fact that the offenses were the same in fact
because they were based on the same evidence).
The third step, if applicable, requires analysis of whether the crimes merge. Id. at 328 But
merger applies “only in cases involving lesser included offenses.” Id. That is not the case here,
and in any event, neither party frames the issue as one of merger.
As a final step, we analyze whether there are any “ ‘other indicators of legislative intent’ ”
to overcome the “strong presumption” established by the Blockburger test. Id. (quoting
Muhammad, 194 Wn.2d at 620). Here, no party has offered any indication of legislative intent
6 By focusing on the State’s emphasis on the punching in the bathroom for both crimes, Farris’ argument primarily relies on establishing that the offenses are the same in fact under the same evidence test aspect of the Blockburger test. However, he fails to address whether the offenses were the same in law. See Ray, 575 P.3d at 331-32.
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that overcomes the strong presumption established by the Blockburger test, and we have found
none.
Thus, Farris’ convictions for second degree assault and unlawful imprisonment do not
violate the constitutional prohibition on double jeopardy.
CONCLUSION
We affirm Farris’ convictions.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
PRICE, J. We concur:
LEE, P.J.
GLASGOW, J.