FILED
JULY 23, 2013
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 30242-3-111 ) Consolidated with Respondent, ) No. 30243-1-111 ) v. ) ) URIEL PONCE, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. ) 1 BROWN, J. - Uriel Ponce appeals his felony harassment and witness tampering
convictions, contending we must reverse both for insufficient evidence. We affirm his
felony harassment conviction, but reverse his witness tampering conviction for
insufficient evidence. Additionally we review, and reject, his claims surrounding the trial
court's late filing of written CrR 3.5 factual findings and legal conclusions.
FACTS
Considering Uriel's evidence sufficiency challenge, we present the facts in the
light most favorable-to the State. See State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216,221,616 P.2d 628
(1980) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560
1 To avoid confusing appellant with his brother, we address Uriel Ponce as "Uriel" and Jose Ponce as "Jose." We intend no disrespect. No. 30242-3-111, consol. with No. 30243-1-111 State v. Ponce
(1979». Antonia Ponce and her son, Jose Ponce, each worked at a Taco Bell in Pasco.
The store manager, Freddy Chavez, eventually fired Jose and fired Ms. Ponce four or
five months later. Ms. Ponce sued Taco Bell for wrongful termination. During her
employment, Mr. Chavez periodically interacted with Ms. Ponce's sons, including Uriel,
and became familiar with their voices.
On January 10, 2011, Mr. Chavez answered a telephone call at work. The caller,
who was male, requested Mr. Chavez's name. When Mr. Chavez responded, the caller
spoke profanities, saying Mr. Chavez "was a b***h" because he "talked s**t to women."
Report of Proceedings (RP) at 106. Then, the caller said he was going to "beat" and
"kill" Mr. Chavez, telling him to "come outside" upon the caller's arrival. RP at 106. Mr.
Chavez hung up the telephone and reported the conversation to law enforcement about
five minutes later, upon a coworker's suggestion.
Based on what the caller said, Mr. Chavez thought there was a possibility the
caller would carry out his threat. Because the threat seemed related to Ms. Ponce's
lawsuit against Taco Bell and the caller sounded like one of her sons, Mr. Chavez
became concerned for his and his family's safety. Thus, Mr. Chavez dialed *69 from the
Taco Bell line, wrote down the last telephone number to call in, and gave it to law
enforcement, who determined it belonged to Uriel's cellular phone. Jose had no access
to Uriel's cellular phone at the time.
The State charged Uriel with felony harassment, witness tampering, and witness
intimidation. Uriel did not ask Jose if he was involved in the criminal charges or pending
No. 30242-3-111, consol. with No. 30243-1-111 State V. Ponce
trial. But Uriel's girl friend, Kelsey Cavazos, wrote a confession on behalf of Jose, who
signed it upon Uriel's prompting. The confession states,
I Jose Ponce admit guilt for threatening Freddy Chavez, the charge for which my brother Uriel Ponce was charged for. I was angry with my brother. We had, had an altercation, I had stolen his phone, and made a phone call to Taco Bell. I asked Freddy if they accepted Visa, then proceeded to threaten him. I was angry because Freddy had fired me and my mom, and because of the resulting lawsuit my mom had with Taco Bell. I knew the cops would go for my brother because of his criminal record. I knew the cops would take him, no questioning, but did not think of the reprocusisions [sic] my brother faced. All this happened on the day of 1.10.11 at around between 12:45 pm - 1:OOpm.
x Jose Ponce
Ex. 5.
Jose signed the confession "[o]ut of fear" for his safety because he thought Uriel
"would do something to [him] if [he] didn't." RP at 214, 221. But Jose never threatened
Mr. Chavez. Uriel later admitted to Ms. Ponce that he, not Jose, made the telephone
call to Taco Bell. Uriel told Ms. Ponce he convinced Jose to sign the confession
because he was a juvenile and would receive a less severe sentence than Uriel. About
a month after signing it, Jose recanted the confession in a meeting with a prosecutor
and detective.
Following a CrR 3.5 suppression hearing, the trial court ruled orally to admit
certain statements Uriel gave law enforcement during arrest and interrogation. But the
trial court did not enter written CrR 3.5 factual findings and legal conclusions.
No. 30242-3-111, conso/. with No. 30243-1-111 State V. Ponce
Uriel did not testify at trial. A jury found him guilty of felony harassment and
witness tampering but acquitted him of witness intimidation. He appealed each
conviction separately. This court consolidated the two appeals.
In his second opening brief, Uriel requested remand for the trial court to enter
written CrR 3.5 factual findings and legal conclusions. The trial court did so
preemptively about two months later. The State then supplemented the clerk's papers
and argued in its second responsive brief that the belated entry is harmless error
because Uriel cannot show it prejudiced him. He did not file a reply brief.
ANALYSIS
A. Evidence Sufficiency
The issue is whether sufficient evidence supports Uriel's felony harassment and
witness tampering convictions. 2 He contends we must reverse both convictions
because the State failed to prove certain elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires the State to prove all
essential elements of a charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368
(1970). And, "The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of
affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to
muster in the first proceeding." Burks V. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S. Ct. 2141,
2 At the close of evidence, Uriel moved unsuccessfully for either dismissal or a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence to prove witness tampering. We review the denial of Uriel's motion de novo, performing the same function as the trial court. See State v. Longshore, 141 Wn.2d 414,420,5 P.3d 1256 (2000); State V. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594,607-08,918 P.2d 945 (1996).
No. 30242-3-111, con sol. with No. 30243-1-111 State v. Ponce
57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978) (construing U.S. CONST. amend. V). Evidence is sufficient to
support a guilty finding if, '''after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Green, 94 Wn.2d at 221 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). An evidence sufficiency challenge "admits the truth
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FILED
JULY 23, 2013
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 30242-3-111 ) Consolidated with Respondent, ) No. 30243-1-111 ) v. ) ) URIEL PONCE, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. ) 1 BROWN, J. - Uriel Ponce appeals his felony harassment and witness tampering
convictions, contending we must reverse both for insufficient evidence. We affirm his
felony harassment conviction, but reverse his witness tampering conviction for
insufficient evidence. Additionally we review, and reject, his claims surrounding the trial
court's late filing of written CrR 3.5 factual findings and legal conclusions.
FACTS
Considering Uriel's evidence sufficiency challenge, we present the facts in the
light most favorable-to the State. See State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216,221,616 P.2d 628
(1980) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560
1 To avoid confusing appellant with his brother, we address Uriel Ponce as "Uriel" and Jose Ponce as "Jose." We intend no disrespect. No. 30242-3-111, consol. with No. 30243-1-111 State v. Ponce
(1979». Antonia Ponce and her son, Jose Ponce, each worked at a Taco Bell in Pasco.
The store manager, Freddy Chavez, eventually fired Jose and fired Ms. Ponce four or
five months later. Ms. Ponce sued Taco Bell for wrongful termination. During her
employment, Mr. Chavez periodically interacted with Ms. Ponce's sons, including Uriel,
and became familiar with their voices.
On January 10, 2011, Mr. Chavez answered a telephone call at work. The caller,
who was male, requested Mr. Chavez's name. When Mr. Chavez responded, the caller
spoke profanities, saying Mr. Chavez "was a b***h" because he "talked s**t to women."
Report of Proceedings (RP) at 106. Then, the caller said he was going to "beat" and
"kill" Mr. Chavez, telling him to "come outside" upon the caller's arrival. RP at 106. Mr.
Chavez hung up the telephone and reported the conversation to law enforcement about
five minutes later, upon a coworker's suggestion.
Based on what the caller said, Mr. Chavez thought there was a possibility the
caller would carry out his threat. Because the threat seemed related to Ms. Ponce's
lawsuit against Taco Bell and the caller sounded like one of her sons, Mr. Chavez
became concerned for his and his family's safety. Thus, Mr. Chavez dialed *69 from the
Taco Bell line, wrote down the last telephone number to call in, and gave it to law
enforcement, who determined it belonged to Uriel's cellular phone. Jose had no access
to Uriel's cellular phone at the time.
The State charged Uriel with felony harassment, witness tampering, and witness
intimidation. Uriel did not ask Jose if he was involved in the criminal charges or pending
No. 30242-3-111, consol. with No. 30243-1-111 State V. Ponce
trial. But Uriel's girl friend, Kelsey Cavazos, wrote a confession on behalf of Jose, who
signed it upon Uriel's prompting. The confession states,
I Jose Ponce admit guilt for threatening Freddy Chavez, the charge for which my brother Uriel Ponce was charged for. I was angry with my brother. We had, had an altercation, I had stolen his phone, and made a phone call to Taco Bell. I asked Freddy if they accepted Visa, then proceeded to threaten him. I was angry because Freddy had fired me and my mom, and because of the resulting lawsuit my mom had with Taco Bell. I knew the cops would go for my brother because of his criminal record. I knew the cops would take him, no questioning, but did not think of the reprocusisions [sic] my brother faced. All this happened on the day of 1.10.11 at around between 12:45 pm - 1:OOpm.
x Jose Ponce
Ex. 5.
Jose signed the confession "[o]ut of fear" for his safety because he thought Uriel
"would do something to [him] if [he] didn't." RP at 214, 221. But Jose never threatened
Mr. Chavez. Uriel later admitted to Ms. Ponce that he, not Jose, made the telephone
call to Taco Bell. Uriel told Ms. Ponce he convinced Jose to sign the confession
because he was a juvenile and would receive a less severe sentence than Uriel. About
a month after signing it, Jose recanted the confession in a meeting with a prosecutor
and detective.
Following a CrR 3.5 suppression hearing, the trial court ruled orally to admit
certain statements Uriel gave law enforcement during arrest and interrogation. But the
trial court did not enter written CrR 3.5 factual findings and legal conclusions.
No. 30242-3-111, conso/. with No. 30243-1-111 State V. Ponce
Uriel did not testify at trial. A jury found him guilty of felony harassment and
witness tampering but acquitted him of witness intimidation. He appealed each
conviction separately. This court consolidated the two appeals.
In his second opening brief, Uriel requested remand for the trial court to enter
written CrR 3.5 factual findings and legal conclusions. The trial court did so
preemptively about two months later. The State then supplemented the clerk's papers
and argued in its second responsive brief that the belated entry is harmless error
because Uriel cannot show it prejudiced him. He did not file a reply brief.
ANALYSIS
A. Evidence Sufficiency
The issue is whether sufficient evidence supports Uriel's felony harassment and
witness tampering convictions. 2 He contends we must reverse both convictions
because the State failed to prove certain elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires the State to prove all
essential elements of a charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368
(1970). And, "The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of
affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to
muster in the first proceeding." Burks V. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S. Ct. 2141,
2 At the close of evidence, Uriel moved unsuccessfully for either dismissal or a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence to prove witness tampering. We review the denial of Uriel's motion de novo, performing the same function as the trial court. See State v. Longshore, 141 Wn.2d 414,420,5 P.3d 1256 (2000); State V. Jackson, 82 Wn. App. 594,607-08,918 P.2d 945 (1996).
No. 30242-3-111, con sol. with No. 30243-1-111 State v. Ponce
57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978) (construing U.S. CONST. amend. V). Evidence is sufficient to
support a guilty finding if, '''after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Green, 94 Wn.2d at 221 (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). An evidence sufficiency challenge "admits the truth
of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom."
State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). We defer to the jury's
assessment of witness credibility and evidence weight or persuasiveness. State v.
Carver, 113 Wn.2d 591, 604, 781 P.2d 1308,789 P.2d 306 (1989).
First, Uriel challenges his felony harassment conviction. A defendant is guilty of
harassment if, without lawful authority, he or she "knowingly threatens ... [t]o cause
bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened or to any other
person," and "by words or conduct places the person threatened in reasonable fear that
the threat will be carried out." RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i), (b). This form of harassment is
a class C felony if the defendant "threaten[s] to kill the person threatened or any other
person." Former RCW 9A.46.020(2)(b)(ii) (2003).
Uriel contends insufficient evidence shows he, by words or conduct, placed Mr.
Chavez in reasonable fear Uriel would fulfill his threat to kill. We disagree because Mr.
Chavez testified he thought, based on what the caller said, a possibility existed the
caller would carry out his threat. Mr. Chavez recounted he became concerned for his
and his family's safety because the threat seemed related to Ms. Ponce's lawsuit
against Taco Bell and the caller sounded like one of her sons. Thus, a rational jury
No. 30242-3-111, conso!. with No. 30243-1-111 State v. Ponce
could infer the caller's words caused Mr. Chavez to reasonably fear the caller would
carry out his threat. And, Ms. Ponce testified Uriel admitted he, not Jose, made the call
to Taco Bell. Other witnesses confirmed the call came from Uriel's cellular phone, to
which Jose had no access at the time. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, a rational jury could 'find beyond a reasonable doubt that Uriel's words
placed Mr. Chavez in reasonable fear Uriel would fulfill his threat to kill. Therefore, we
affirm Uriel's felony harassment conviction.
Second, Uriel challenges his witness tampering conviction. A defendant is guilty
of witness tampering if he or she "attempts to induce a witness or person he or she has
reason to believe is about to be called as a witness in any official proceeding" to
"[t]estify falsely," "withhold any testimony," or "[a]bsent himself or herself from such
proceedings." RCW 9A.72.120(1)(a)-(b). Additionally, a defendant may, by statute, be
guilty of witness tampering with respect to "a person whom he or she has reason to
believe may have information relevant to a criminal investigation." RCW 9A.72.120(1).
But the trial court omitted this element from the jury instructions without objection.
Therefore, the omission is the law of the case. See State v. Hickman, 135 Wn.2d 97,
102, 954 P.2d 900 (1998). While the State attempts to fill this void by applying the jury
instruction defining a "current or prospective witness," the definition applies solely to
witness intimidation, not witness tampering. 11A WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 115.53 note on use at 439 (3d ed. 2008).
Moreover, Uriel aptly contends insufficient evidence shows he knew Jose was a
witness or had reason to believe he was about to be called as such in Uriel's criminal
trial. Under RCW 9A. 72.120(1)'s applicable language, "The accused must know that
the person approached is a witness, or ... have reason to believe that he is about to be
called as such." State v. Stroh, 91 Wn.2d 580,583,588 P.2d 1182 (1979); see State v.
Rempel, 53 Wn. App. 799,805,770 P.2d 1058 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, 114
Wn.2d 77 (1990). While the State apparently identified Jose as a potential witness
before Uriel prompted him to sign the confession, no testimony or exhibit disclosed this
fact. Jose recounted Uriel did not ask him if he was involved in the criminal charges or
pending trial. And, Uriel did not testify regarding his knowledge. A rational jury would
lack evidence to infer Uriel knew Jose was a witness or had reason to believe he was
about to be called as such in Uriel's criminal trial. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, a rational jury could not find this essential element beyond a
reasonable doubt. Therefore, we reverse Uriel's witness tampering conviction and
remand for the trial court to dismiss the charge.
B. Written CrR 3.5 Record
The issue is whether the trial court reversibly erred by failing to enter written CrR
3.5 factual findings and legal conclusions until after Uriel filed his second opening brief
with this court. His initial request for remand is now moot because we can no longer
provide such relief. See In re Oet. of Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 376-77, 662 P.2d 828
(1983). Thus, we instead consider the State's argument that reversal is unwarranted
because the belated entry is harmless error.
Following a CrR 3.5 suppression hearing, a trial court "shall set forth in writing:
(1) the undisputed facts; (2) the disputed facts; (3) conclusions as to the disputed facts;
and (4) conclusion as to whether the statement is admissible and the reasons therefor."
CrR 3.5(c). A trial court's belated entry of written CrR 3.5 factual findings and legal
conclusions is harmless error unless a party shows it prejudiced him or her. State V.
Eaton, 82 Wn. App. 723,727,919 P.2d 116 (1996); see State V. Moore, 61 Wn.2d 165,
175,377 P.2d 456 (1963).
Here, the trial court's later written decision is consistent with its prior oral ruling,
which was itself sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review. And, the trial court
could not have tailored its later written decision to the issues presented on appeal
because Uriel has not challenged admission of his statements to law enforcement.
Therefore, the belated entry is harmless error because Uriel cannot show it prejudiced
him.
Affirmed in part. Reversed in part, and remanded for dismissal of the witness
tampering charge.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
Brown, J. WE CONCUR:
'Korsmo, C.J. Si~(f·