State of Washington v. United States Department of the Navy
This text of State of Washington v. United States Department of the Navy (State of Washington v. United States Department of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
1 HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES
9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 10 AT SEATTLE
11 STATE OF WASHINGTON, CASE NO. 19-cv-1059-RAJ
12 Plaintiff, ORDER
13 v.
14 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16
17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motions for 19 Reconsideration. Dkts. # 142, 144. The Court has considered Federal Defendants’ 20 response. Dkt. # 156. The Court has also considered reply briefs filed by Citizens of the 21 Ebey’s Reserve for a Healthy Safe and Peaceful Environment (“COER”) and the State of 22 Washington. Dkts. # 157, 159. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS in part and 23 DENIES in part the Motions. 24 25 26 1 II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Motions for reconsideration are disfavored under the Local Rules for the Western 3 District of Washington. See LCR 7(h)(1). Thus, “in the absence of a showing of manifest 4 error in the prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have 5 been brought to [the Court’s] attention earlier with reasonable diligence,” such motions 6 will ordinarily be denied. Id. 7 III. DISCUSSION 8 The detailed history of this dispute is detailed in the Court’s Report & 9 Recommendation dated December 10, 2021, and Order on Remedy. Dkts. # 109, 140. 10 The Court found the Navy violated NEPA but remanded the FEIS and ROD without 11 vacatur. Dkt. # 140. Both the State of Washington and COER move for reconsideration 12 of the Court’s remedy order. Dkts. # 142, 144. The Court previously issued an order 13 ruling on these Motions for Reconsideration, without providing Defendants an 14 opportunity to respond as required by LCR 7(h)(1). Dkt. # 150. In light of this situation, 15 the Court held the order in abeyance pending the Court’s receipt of Federal Defendants’ 16 response to Plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration. Dkt. # 155. 17 The State of Washington notes that its limited motion for reconsideration of the 18 Court’s remedy order seeks clarification on its request that the court retain jurisdiction 19 over the matter, set a one-year deadline for the Navy’s compliance with its obligations 20 under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Administrative Procedure Act 21 (APA), and require the Navy to file status reports every 60 days describing its progress. 22 Dkt. # 140. COER also seeks this relief with its motion. Dkt. # 144 at 7-9. Federal 23 Defendants assert that the Court should not exercise jurisdiction over a matter on remand, 24 arguing that retaining oversight over remand proceedings runs contrary to the traditional 25 rule. Dkt. # 156 at 3. Additionally, Federal Defendants argue that the State’s request to 26 1 provide regular status reports is unjustified and burdensome because “there is no 2 evidence in the record that the Navy has unreasonably delayed taking required actions, 3 failed to meet deadlines, or demonstrated a history of noncompliance with this Court’s 4 orders.” Id. at 4. 5 District courts have “broad latitude in fashioning equitable relief when necessary 6 to remedy an established wrong[.]” NWF v. NMFS II, 524 F.3d 917, 936 (9th Cir. 2008) 7 (quoting Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also 8 Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. EPA, 633 F.2d 803, 813 (9th Cir. 1980); Idaho Farm Bureau 9 Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court observes that exercise 10 of discretion to retain jurisdiction over a matter on remand is “typically reserved for cases 11 alleging unreasonable delay of agency action or failure to comply with a statutory 12 deadline, or for cases involving a history of agency noncompliance with court orders or 13 resistance to the fulfillment of legal duties.” Baystate Med. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 587 F. Supp. 14 2d 37, 41 (D.D.C. 2008). Nonetheless, specific and targeted requirements, such as setting 15 a deadline for compliance with NEPA, may be appropriate in certain cases. See e.g., 16 High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 643-45 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that 17 district court acted within its discretion when it required agency to assess cumulative 18 impacts by a set date); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 839 F. Supp. 19 2d 1117, 1128-30 (D. Or. 2011) (declining to vacate an agency’s unlawful decision but 20 retaining jurisdiction and setting a deadline for agency compliance). 21 In recognition of the significance of the Navy’s errors, the Court will retain 22 jurisdiction and sets a deadline for compliance with NEPA of no later than May 1, 2025. 23 The Navy must file status reports every 90 days describing its progress toward 24 compliance. The Court observes Defendants’ argument that there is no history of 25 noncompliance with the Court’s orders. Dkt. # 156 at 4. However, that is not a 26 1 prerequisite to retaining jurisdiction and imposing a deadline for compliance. See e.g., 2 Alaska v. Lubchenco, No. 10-cv-00271-TMB, 2012 WL 13035040, at *3-4 (D. Alaska 3 Mar. 5, 2012) (imposing deadline for compliance for an agency’s action on remand 4 “[g]iven the extensive delays in the underlying agency process”). The Navy may move 5 for and the Court will, upon a showing of good cause, grant appropriate extensions of the 6 deadlines set forth above. Accordingly, this part of the Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. 7 Separately, COER argues that the Court incorrectly concluded that the harms of 8 the residents have not significantly increased since the record on decision (ROD) and that 9 the Court failed to scrutinize the Navy’s national defense argument given reasonable 10 alternatives. Dkt. # 144. COER seeks vacatur or partial vacatur. Id. at 6. These 11 arguments improper for a motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff does not show manifest 12 error of law and fails to make a showing of new facts that could not have been brought 13 to the Court’s attention earlier. LCR 7(h)(1). In assessing the appropriate remedy, the 14 Court applied the two-part test outlined in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. United States Nuclear 15 Regulatory Commission, 988 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Under that test, the Court 16 weighs “the seriousness of the agency’s errors against ‘the disruptive consequences of an 17 interim change that may itself be changed.’” Center for Food Safety v. Regan, 56 F.4th 18 648, 663 (9th Cir. 2022); see Dkt. # 140 at 5. COER does not take issue with the law 19 applied by the Court, but simply would have reweighed the factors in its favor; in 20 particular, COER asks the Court to not take the Navy’s representations of national 21 security risk at face value. Dkt. # 144 at 6. But the Court has ruled consistently on this 22 issue in not second-guessing senior military officials’ professional judgments. See 23 Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 2020 WL 8678103, at *6 (W.D. Wash. July 22, 2020), 24 adopted, 2021 WL 796552 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 2, 2021) (recognizing that “the increased 25 Growler presence for training at OLF Coupeville is essential for national security”). 26 1 Furthermore, a district court balances the hardships of the public interest against a private 2 interest, the public interest should receive greater weight.” F.T.C. v. World Wide Factors, 3 Ltd., 882 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1989). This applies to Plaintiff’s request to revert 4 Growler training to Ault Field instead of OLF Coupeville. Dkt. # 144 at 7.
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