FILED
Oct. 17,2013
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 30836-7-111 ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) TOMMY J. VILLANUEVA, ) PUBLISHED OPINION ) Respondent. )
BROWN, J. - The State appeals the trial court's lost wages award to Tommy J.
Villanueva, who successfully asserted self-defense in the State's assault prosecution.
The State contends the trial court erred because Mr. Villanueva's lost wages were not
involved in his legal defense since the wage loss stemmed from his arrest four days
before the State filed formal charges against him. We construe RCW 9A.16.110 to
provide reimbursement for costs stemming from arrest charges referred by law
enforcement to the State for formal charging and prosecution that results in a self-
defense acquittal. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
On June 20,2010, law enforcement arrested Mr. Villanueva and booked him in
jail as a suspect for two charges of first degree assault based on probable cause he
stabbed two people with a knife in an altercation. His employer fired him the next day No. 30836-7-111 State v. Villanueva
because he missed work while confined in jail and had been previously warned about
absenteeism. After his preliminary appearance and bail hearing on June 21, 2010, he
posted a bond and obtained release from jail. On June 25, 2010, the State formally
charged Mr. Villanueva by information with two counts of first degree assault. A jury
acquitted him on January 26, 2012, finding he acted in self-defense. He moved
successfully under RCW 9A.16.110, for reimbursement of costs involved in his legal
defense. The trial court awarded him $48,910.54, including $10,020.00 in lost wages.
While wavering on the issue, the court ultimately found "his loss of his job was based on
the arrest, and the necessity for a defense from that time forward." Report of
Proceedings at 16. The State appealed.
ANALYSIS
The issue is whether the trial court erred in interpreting RCW 9A.16.11 0 to
include wage loss stemming from Mr. Villanueva's arrest that led to his assault
prosecution and self-defense acquittal. The State acknowledges his job loss resulted
from his arrest but contends it matters not because the statute's plain language applies
solely upon formal charges filed by the State.
We interpret RCW 9A.16. 11 0 de novo. 1 See City of Seattle v. Fontanilla, 128
Wn.2d 492,494-98,909 P.2d 1294 (1996); see a/so Multicare Med. Ctr. v. Oep't of Soc.
& Health Servs., 114 Wn.2d 572,582 n.15, 790 P.2d 124 (1990). When interpreting a
statute, we must "discern and implement" our legislature's intent. State v. J.P., 149
1 Mr. Villanueva incorrectly argues the abuse of discretion review standard applies. The State challenges the trial court's interpretation of RCW 9A.16.11 0 but does not challenge its discretionary determination of the award's amount.
No. 30836-7-111 State v. Villanueva
Wn.2d 444,450,69 P.3d 318 (2003); see State ex reI. Great N. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n
of Wash., 52 Wash. 33, 36,100 P. 184 (1909). If the statute's meaning is plain, we
must effectuate it as an expression of our legislature's intent. Dep't of Ecology v.
Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9,43 P.3d 4 (2002); Walker v. City of Spokane,
62 Wash. 312, 318,113 P. 775 (1911). If the statute's meaning is ambiguous, we may
construe it by ascertaining our legislature's intent from legislative history, relevant
judicial opinions, and recognized canons of construction. Cockle v. Dep't of Labor &
Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583 (2001); Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates, 4 Wn.2d
498,507-08,104 P.2d 478 (1940). A statute's meaning is ambiguous "if it is subject to
two or more reasonable interpretations." State v. McGee, 122 Wn.2d 783, 787, 864
P.2d 912 (1993). But a statute's meaning is not ambiguous "merely because different
interpretations are conceivable." State v. Tili, 139 Wn.2d 107, 115,985 P.2d 365
(1999).
The statute partly provides,
(1) No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself .... (2) When a person charged with a crime listed in subsection (1) of this section is found not guilty by reason of self-defense, the state of Washington shall reimburse the defendant for a" reasonable costs, including loss of time, legal fees incurred, and other expenses involved in his or her defense. This reimbursement is not an independent cause of action. To award these reasonable costs the trier of fact must find that the defendant's claim of self-defense was sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. If the trier of fact makes a determination of self-defense, the judge shall determine the amount of the award.
RCW 9A.16.110 (emphasis.added).
If a fact finder acquits a criminal defendant by reason of self-defense, the statute
requires the State to reimburse him or her for certain costs. But the statute is unclear
on the scope of costs recoverable. The words "involved in his or her defense" plainly
require that the costs arise from some form of criminal charge. But these words are
ambiguous because they could reasonably refer to either a formal charge filed by the
State by information or an arrest charge referred by law enforcement to the State for a
prosecutor's charging decision. Therefore, we construe RCW 9A.16.11 0 to determine
the legislative intent.
We have reviewed RCW 9A.16.11 D's entire legislative history from its 1977 I enactment through its 1995 amendments. We find this legislative history unhelpful
I because it is just as ambiguous as the statute itself. Therefore, we turn to relevant
judicial opinions interpreting RCW 9A.16.11 O.
Our Supreme Court has said "the statute's purpose is to ensure that costs of
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FILED
Oct. 17,2013
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
W A State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 30836-7-111 ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) TOMMY J. VILLANUEVA, ) PUBLISHED OPINION ) Respondent. )
BROWN, J. - The State appeals the trial court's lost wages award to Tommy J.
Villanueva, who successfully asserted self-defense in the State's assault prosecution.
The State contends the trial court erred because Mr. Villanueva's lost wages were not
involved in his legal defense since the wage loss stemmed from his arrest four days
before the State filed formal charges against him. We construe RCW 9A.16.110 to
provide reimbursement for costs stemming from arrest charges referred by law
enforcement to the State for formal charging and prosecution that results in a self-
defense acquittal. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
On June 20,2010, law enforcement arrested Mr. Villanueva and booked him in
jail as a suspect for two charges of first degree assault based on probable cause he
stabbed two people with a knife in an altercation. His employer fired him the next day No. 30836-7-111 State v. Villanueva
because he missed work while confined in jail and had been previously warned about
absenteeism. After his preliminary appearance and bail hearing on June 21, 2010, he
posted a bond and obtained release from jail. On June 25, 2010, the State formally
charged Mr. Villanueva by information with two counts of first degree assault. A jury
acquitted him on January 26, 2012, finding he acted in self-defense. He moved
successfully under RCW 9A.16.110, for reimbursement of costs involved in his legal
defense. The trial court awarded him $48,910.54, including $10,020.00 in lost wages.
While wavering on the issue, the court ultimately found "his loss of his job was based on
the arrest, and the necessity for a defense from that time forward." Report of
Proceedings at 16. The State appealed.
ANALYSIS
The issue is whether the trial court erred in interpreting RCW 9A.16.11 0 to
include wage loss stemming from Mr. Villanueva's arrest that led to his assault
prosecution and self-defense acquittal. The State acknowledges his job loss resulted
from his arrest but contends it matters not because the statute's plain language applies
solely upon formal charges filed by the State.
We interpret RCW 9A.16. 11 0 de novo. 1 See City of Seattle v. Fontanilla, 128
Wn.2d 492,494-98,909 P.2d 1294 (1996); see a/so Multicare Med. Ctr. v. Oep't of Soc.
& Health Servs., 114 Wn.2d 572,582 n.15, 790 P.2d 124 (1990). When interpreting a
statute, we must "discern and implement" our legislature's intent. State v. J.P., 149
1 Mr. Villanueva incorrectly argues the abuse of discretion review standard applies. The State challenges the trial court's interpretation of RCW 9A.16.11 0 but does not challenge its discretionary determination of the award's amount.
No. 30836-7-111 State v. Villanueva
Wn.2d 444,450,69 P.3d 318 (2003); see State ex reI. Great N. Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n
of Wash., 52 Wash. 33, 36,100 P. 184 (1909). If the statute's meaning is plain, we
must effectuate it as an expression of our legislature's intent. Dep't of Ecology v.
Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9,43 P.3d 4 (2002); Walker v. City of Spokane,
62 Wash. 312, 318,113 P. 775 (1911). If the statute's meaning is ambiguous, we may
construe it by ascertaining our legislature's intent from legislative history, relevant
judicial opinions, and recognized canons of construction. Cockle v. Dep't of Labor &
Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801, 808, 16 P.3d 583 (2001); Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates, 4 Wn.2d
498,507-08,104 P.2d 478 (1940). A statute's meaning is ambiguous "if it is subject to
two or more reasonable interpretations." State v. McGee, 122 Wn.2d 783, 787, 864
P.2d 912 (1993). But a statute's meaning is not ambiguous "merely because different
interpretations are conceivable." State v. Tili, 139 Wn.2d 107, 115,985 P.2d 365
(1999).
The statute partly provides,
(1) No person in the state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting by any reasonable means necessary, himself or herself .... (2) When a person charged with a crime listed in subsection (1) of this section is found not guilty by reason of self-defense, the state of Washington shall reimburse the defendant for a" reasonable costs, including loss of time, legal fees incurred, and other expenses involved in his or her defense. This reimbursement is not an independent cause of action. To award these reasonable costs the trier of fact must find that the defendant's claim of self-defense was sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. If the trier of fact makes a determination of self-defense, the judge shall determine the amount of the award.
RCW 9A.16.110 (emphasis.added).
If a fact finder acquits a criminal defendant by reason of self-defense, the statute
requires the State to reimburse him or her for certain costs. But the statute is unclear
on the scope of costs recoverable. The words "involved in his or her defense" plainly
require that the costs arise from some form of criminal charge. But these words are
ambiguous because they could reasonably refer to either a formal charge filed by the
State by information or an arrest charge referred by law enforcement to the State for a
prosecutor's charging decision. Therefore, we construe RCW 9A.16.11 0 to determine
the legislative intent.
We have reviewed RCW 9A.16.11 D's entire legislative history from its 1977 I enactment through its 1995 amendments. We find this legislative history unhelpful
I because it is just as ambiguous as the statute itself. Therefore, we turn to relevant
judicial opinions interpreting RCW 9A.16.11 O.
Our Supreme Court has said "the statute's purpose is to ensure that costs of
defense shall befall '[n]o person in the state' if he or she acts in self-defense; and ...
reimbursement is available when such person incurs costs in defending against some
kind of 'legal jeopardy.'" Fontanilla, 128 Wn.2d at 500 (alteration in original) (quoting
former RCW 9A.16.110(1) (1989». The court then noted the phrase "'legal jeopardy of
any kind whatsoever" "expansively modifie[s]" and "enlarge[s] upon" the traditional
meaning of legal jeopardy, which usually attaches in a jury trial when the judge
empanels the jury and attaches in a bench trial when the parties present evidence to the
judge. Id. (quoting former RCW 9A.16.110(1» (citing State v. Joswick, 71 Wn. App.
311,314,858 P.2d 280 (1993». Division Two of this court has said the phrase
'''involved in his or her defense'" "connotes the defendant's participation in the entire
prosecution process; it is not limited to participation in a specific part of the process."
State v. Jones, 92 Wn. App. 555, 562,964 P.2d 398 (1998) (quoting RCW
9A.16.110(2». The court then noted a preliminary appearance or bail hearing is part of
this process. Id. at 562.
In State v. Anderson, the defendant sought an award under former RCW
9A.16.110 for the 202 days he spent in jail between arrest and acquittal. 72 Wn. App.
253,255,863 P.2d 1370 (1993). Law enforcement arrested him and booked him in jail
for first degree murder on March 17, 1990 and the prosecution filed information
accusing him offirst degree murder on March 19,1990. 2 Id. After a jury acquittal by
reason of self-defense, the trial court denied his request for lost time reimbursement.
Id. at 256. The Anderson court held the words '''loss of time ... involved in his or her
defense'" include "lawful earnings a defendant would have received but for being
prosecuted." Id. at 261 (omission in original) (quoting former RCW 9A.16.110(2».
Applying this holding, the court considered the defendant's employment status and
income prospects "at the time of his arrest" and throughout the case. Id. at 262. Thus,
Anderson suggests the words '''involved in his or her defense'" apply from arrest
onward. Id. at 255-56, 260-62 (quoting former RCW 9A.16.11 0(2».
2 We take judicial notice of these dates because they are undisputable legislative facts. See ER 201 (a)-(b); Legal Information Network Exchange, PIERCE COUNTY, https:lllinxonline.co.pierce.wa.usl/inxweb/Case/CriminaICase.cfm?cause_num =90-1-01217-6 (last visited September 27,2013) (containing docket information for State v. Anderson, No. 90-1-01217-6 (Pierce County Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 1990».
This interpretation 'finds support from recognized canons of construction. We
construe a statute to effectuate its purpose while avoiding absurd, strained, or unlikely
consequences. Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 62 Wn.2d 319, 321, 382
P.2d 639 (1963); State v. Fjermestad, 114 Wn.2d 828,835,791 P.2d 897 (1990).
Construing the words "involved in his or her defense" as applying upon formal charges
solely would preclude reimbursement for costs reasonably incurred in connection with
events after law enforcement arrests and books a suspect in jail on probable cause but
before the prosecution formally charges a defendant. Such a reading would exclude a
probable cause determination, preliminary appearance, bail hearing, and possibly a
custodial interrogation from the ambit of a person's legal "defense." Cf. Jones, 92 Wn.
App. at 562. See generally CrR 3.2, 3.2.1, 3.5 (setting forth relevant procedures), We
construe the words "involved in his or her defense" to avoid this absurd, strained, and
unlikely consequence.
We construe a remedial statute liberally when necessary to effectuate its
purpose. Peet v. Mills, 76 Wash. 437,439,136 P. 685 (1913); State v. Douty, 92
Wn.2d 930, 936, 603 P.2d 373 (1979). Subsection (2) is remedial because "it relates to
practice, procedure, or remedies and does not affect a substantive or vested right."
Miebach v. Colasurdo, 102 Wn.2d 170, 181,685 P.2d 1074 (1984); see Nelson v. Dep't
of Labor & Indus., 9 Wn.2d 621, 627,115 P.2d 1014 (1941). Again, "the statute's
purpose is to ensure that costs of defense shall befall '[n]o person in the state' if he or
she acts in self-defense; and ... reimbursement is available when such person incurs
costs in defending against some kind of 'legal jeopardy.'" Fontanilla, 128 Wn.2d at 500
(alteration in original) (quoting former RCW 9A.16.11 0(1 )). The cost of a criminal
defense often starts at arrest. Thus, we construe the words "involved in his or her
defense" liberally because doing so is necessary to effectuate the statute's purpose.
Considering all, we construe the words "involved in his or her defense" as
applying upon arrest charges referred by law enforcement to the State for formal
charging and prosecution. Therefore, RCW 9A.16.11 0 provides reimbursement for
costs incurred from arrest through self-defense acquittal. Applying this construction, as
the trial court apparently did, Mr. Villanueva's lost wages were involved in his legal
defense because the trial court found they constituted lawful earnings he would have
received but for being prosecuted. Thus, the trial court did not misinterpret RCW
9A.16.110 and, therefore, did not err in awarding Mr. Villanueva's lost wages.
Mr. Villanueva asks us to award him reasonable appellate costs under RCW
9A.16.110, allowing reimbursement to a defendant acquitted by reason of self-defense
"for postacquittal fees and costs reasonably incurred in the trial or appellate courts."
Jones, 92 Wn. App. at 564. Considering our analysis, we conclude Mr. Villanueva
reasonably incurred costs on appeal. See id. at 564 & n.21. Therefore, we award him
reasonable appellate costs under RCW 9A.16.11 0 and remand for the trial court to
determine the amount. See id. at 564.
\ No. 30836-7-111 State v. Villanueva
1 Affirmed.
1 Brown, J.
WE CONCUR:
~.llOt Siddoway, A.C.J. Kulik, J.
I 8 j