State Of Washington, V. Steven Richard Well

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: January 20, 2026
• Docket: 86404-1
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 86404-1-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION STEVEN RICHARD WELL,

Appellant.

DÍAZ, J. — On an agreed change of plea, a court acquitted Steven Richard

Well by reason of insanity of a murder committed in 2010 and committed him to

Western State Hospital (Western State). He now asks this court to reverse the

judgment of acquittal and order of commitment and to remand this matter to the

trial court so he may withdraw his plea. He argues the plea was not made

voluntarily and wrongly accepted because the court misinformed him that the

statutory maximum penalty was the “maximal possible penal sentence” under

former RCW 10.77.025(1) (2010) and imposed the same. Disagreeing that either

was error, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND No. 86404-1-I/2

In August 2010, the State charged Well with murder in the second degree

with a deadly weapon enhancement for causing the death of his landlord, Judith

Garcia, by stabbing her multiple times with a knife. Well moved the court, with the

State’s agreement, for acquittal on the grounds of insanity pursuant to RCW

10.77.080. 1 In his statement on plea of guilty, Well stated he understood that the

“maximum penal sentence for the crime of Murder in the Second Degree is LIFE

in prison” and that “the court may order me hospitalized for a period of up to the

maximum possible penal sentence, which is life.”

At a December 2010 hearing, Well’s counsel affirmed that Well intended to

pursue a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and that he understood that by

doing so, “he is giving up substantial rights,” including that “even a determinate

sentence as charged may be shorter than what he is facing at Western State

Hospital. Knowing all of those things, that is how he is preferring to go forward

today.”

The court accepted the agreed recommendation of the parties, based upon

the evidence in the record, including a recent forensic mental health evaluation.

The evaluation noted that Well had a long and documented history of being

diagnosed with the major mental illness of chronic paranoid schizophrenia.

Before issuing its order, the court engaged in a colloquy with Well to confirm

he understood his rights and the legal ramifications he would be accepting “by

1 The legislature has revised or recodified portions of chapter 10.77 RCW several

times since 2010. See, e.g., LAWS OF 2025, ch. 358, § 2, effective July 27, 2025. But the relevant statutory language has been unchanged throughout this time period. Because Well continues to cite to the statute in effect at the time of his motion for acquittal, we do the same, for clarity and consistency. 2 No. 86404-1-I/3

moving for a judgment of acquittal on grounds of insanity[.]” Well affirmed that he

understood, should the court acquit him in this way, that it “may order [he] be

hospitalized for the rest of [his] life[.]” Thereafter, the court issued an order

committing Well to Western State, finding he presented a “substantial likelihood of

committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security unless kept under

further control by the Court or other persons or institutions” and concluding

treatment less restrictive than detention in a mental hospital was not in Well’s or

others’ best interests.

The order committed Well “for a period of up to the maximum possible

sentence for the crime upon which the Defendant has been acquitted, pursuant to

RCW 10.77.110(1) and 10.77.025(1)[–] [t]he maximum sentence for Murder in the

Second Degree is LIFE in prison.”

Still at Western State, Well timely appeals the judgment of acquittal and

commitment order in March 2024.

II. ANALYSIS

The principal question in this appeal is the meaning of the term “the

maximum possible penal sentence” in RCW 10.77.025(1).

The State asserts that the term refers to the maximum sentence for the type

of offense a defendant was charged with. Well contends the term refers to the top

of the applicable standard range under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA),

ch. 9.94A RCW, given that defendant’s criminal history. Well claims that he did

not change his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because the court

wrongly agreed with and advised him of the State’s interpretation. He also claims

3 No. 86404-1-I/4

that the court erred by imposing a term of commitment based on that

understanding. We agree with the State.

It is true that “as a matter of constitutional due process . . . a guilty plea may

stand only if the record in some manner indicates an intelligent and voluntary

waiver” of a person’s “rights.” Wood v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 501, 506, 554 P.2d 1032

(1976). Similarly, due process requires that a person who moves for a judgment

of acquittal by reason of insanity do so voluntarily and understand its

consequences. State v. Brasel, 28 Wn. App. 303, 312, 623 P.2d 696 (1981). This

is so because, in making such a motion, a defendant “subjects himself to the

possibility of commitment . . . for as long as the maximum penal sentence for the

offense charged.” Id. at 312.

Indeed, RCW 10.77.025(1) states:

Whenever any person has been: (a) Committed to a correctional facility or inpatient treatment under any provision of this chapter; or (b) ordered to undergo alternative treatment following his or her acquittal by reason of insanity of a crime charged, such commitment or treatment cannot exceed the maximum possible penal sentence for any offense charged for which the person was committed, or was acquitted by reason of insanity.

(Emphasis added.)

Over 30 years ago, in State v. Sunich, this court examined the meaning of

the language at issue here. 76 Wn. App. 202, 205, 884 P.2d 1 (1994) (addressing

former RCW 10.77.020, which also provided, in relevant part, “. . . such

commitment or treatment cannot exceed the maximum possible penal sentence

for any offense charged for which [the defendant] was acquitted by reason of

insanity”). As here, Sunich there argued those words meant that the trial court was

4 No. 86404-1-I/5

only permitted to sentence him to the longest standard range sentence applicable

under the SRA. Id. Just as Well argues, Sunich asserted that the maximum

permissible commitment under chapter 10.77 RCW “should coincide with the

maximum standard range sentence the trial court could have imposed for his

offense had he been convicted.” Id. Sunich reasoned that the maximum penal

sentence “necessarily would have been determined according to the SRA upon

conviction, so the high end of the standard range presumptively represents the

maximum possible sentence.” Id.

This court rejected Sunich’s argument, explaining that we may not render

any language meaningless when giving effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. at 205-

06. We concluded Sunich “misrea[d] the statute” because his interpretation would

give no effect to the qualifying language “for any offense charged.” Id. at 206. We

noted that the legislature had not chosen to use the words “the maximum possible

sentence upon conviction.” Id. at 206 (emphasis added). By using the words “for

any offense charged,” we determined the statute “directs us to the maximum

possible sentence at charging, not upon conviction.” Id. We further held that “the

SRA, which applies only upon conviction, simply does not come into play[.]” Id.

In response, Well argues that two United States Supreme Court decisions

have since effectively abrogated Sunich. Br. of Appellant at 13, 21 (citing Blakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) & Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000)). In Blakely and Apprendi, the

United States Supreme Court held that “the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the

maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the

5 No. 86404-1-I/6

maximum he may impose without any additional findings.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at

303-04; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. This claim is unavailing for several reasons.

For one, Well does not provide any binding authority that extends these

holdings in Apprendi and Blakely to cases in which charges are resolved by

acquittals based on insanity (rather than by guilty pleas or convictions), such that

those cases might constrain the terms of chapter 10.77 RCW or abrogate Sunich.

DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962))

(“Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required

to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has

found none.”). 2

To the contrary, more than one subsequent opinion from this court—

published after Apprendi and Blakely—has upheld Sunich’s conclusion as to the

manner in which RCW 10.77.025(1) sets the maximum length of commitment

following an insanity acquittal.

First, in State v. Schwab, we likewise addressed an argument by an

appellant who sought to withdraw a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. 141

Wn. App. 85, 88, 167 P.3d 1225 (2007). Schwab argued his plea had not been

knowing, intelligent, or voluntary because he claimed he had not been advised of

the maximum term of confinement, namely, up to life at Western State, for assault

in the first degree with a deadly weapon. Id. at 93-94. We rejected that assertion

because the record showed he had, in fact, been expressly advised that he could

2 Well acknowledges he lacks supporting authority for his position when asserting

that Washington “courts have yet to fully incorporate the requirements of Apprendi and Blakely.” (Emphasis added.) 6 No. 86404-1-I/7

be committed for “the statutory period which would be up to life in prison.” Id. at

94. In so concluding, we left Sunich’s interpretation undisturbed that the maximum

sentence for the charged offense—not the top of the presumptive SRA-range—is

the maximum possible term of commitment under chapter 10.77 RCW. See also

id. at 93 (summarizing that Brasel had held a person deemed not guilty by reason

of insanity “could be committed to a state hospital for the criminally insane for a

term up to the maximum possible penalty for the offense charged”).

Thereafter, in State v. Reanier, this court unequivocally reaffirmed Sunich

as we explained a trial court’s authority to order a term of commitment pursuant to

RCW 10.77.025(1). 157 Wn. App. 194, 203-04, 237 P.3d 299 (2010). We cited

Sunich, in holding that “[t]he ‘maximum possible penal sentence’ refers to the

statutory maximum of the charged offense, not the top end of the standard range

as defined by the [SRA].” Id. Finally, in considering the various challenges to such

an interpretation, we held that such arguments were “better directed to the

legislature.” Id. at 208-09.

Here, as in Reanier, “the legislature ‘is presumed to be aware of judicial

interpretation of its enactments,’ and where statutory language remains

unchanged after a court decision the court will not overrule clear precedent

interpreting the same statutory language.” Id. at 204-05 (quoting Riehl v.

Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 147, 94 P.3d 930 (2004) (footnote omitted).

Given that the statutory term at issue has remained the same within RCW 10.77

after Sunich, Apprendi and Blakely, we decline to overrule our prior well-reasoned

case law.

7 No. 86404-1-I/8

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm.

WE CONCUR: