State Of Washington, V. Steven Franklin Talaga

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: June 10, 2024
• Docket: 85451-8
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGON, No. 85451-8-I

Respondent, v. DIVISION ONE

STEVEN FRANKLIN TALAGA, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant.

SMITH, C.J. — Three days after Steven Talaga delivered pills laced with

fentanyl to Brillion Lynch, Lynch died of a fentanyl overdose. Talaga

subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of delivery of a controlled substance

and one count of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. He

stipulated to the certification of probable cause establishing that he sold Lynch

the pills, but did not attest that he caused her death. At the restitution hearing,

the trial court ordered Talaga to pay over $35,000 for Lynch’s burial costs.

Talaga appeals, arguing that the court lacked authority to order restitution for

burial costs because Talaga was not charged with causing Lynch’s death.

Because there was neither a proven causal connection between Talaga’s

crime of conviction and losses resulting from Lynch’s death nor an express

agreement to pay restitution for those damages, the trial court lacked statutory

authority to require Talaga to pay burial expenses. We vacate the restitution

costs and remand for the trial court to strike the costs associated with the burial. No. 85451-8-I/2

FACTS

In March 2021, Steven Talaga sold Percocet pills laced with fentanyl to

Brillion Lynch. Less than 72 hours later, Lynch died from a fentanyl overdose.

As part of an extensive police investigation into the source of the pills, law

enforcement used Lynch’s phone location data and message history to identify

Talaga as a potential seller. Eight months later, Talaga was arrested for

attempting to sell similar narcotics to an undercover officer. The State charged

Talaga with one count of delivery of a controlled substance for his sale to Lynch

and one count of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance for his

sale to the officer. Talaga pleaded guilty to both counts.

The plea agreement stated that Talaga would “pay restitution for the

damages resulting from the defendant’s conduct noted in discovery.” Discovery

included only the information contained in the State’s probable cause

certification, which formed the basis for the charges. Talaga stipulated to the

certification of probable cause, but did not attest to causing Lynch’s death. He

was not charged with controlled substances homicide.

At sentencing, Lynch’s family requested that the court sentence Talaga as

if he had been convicted of causing Lynch’s death. The court denied this

request, specifically noting that it was bound by the crime of conviction and could

not sentence for controlled substances homicide.

At the restitution hearing, the State acknowledged that no nexus existed

between Talaga’s crime and Lynch’s death but still sought restitution for burial

costs incurred by Lynch’s family. Relying on the plea agreement language, the

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State claimed that Talaga expressly agreed to pay all damages resulting from his

conduct, including Lynch’s death. Talaga objected, asserting that he did not

expressly agree to pay restitution for damages resulting from a crime with which

he was not charged.

The court ordered Talaga to pay $28,519.22 to Lynch’s mother and

$6,620.00 to the Crime Victim’s Compensation Program (CVCP), which had

already reimbursed some of Lynch’s family’s costs.

Talaga appeals.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

We will not disturb a trial court’s entry of a restitution order on appeal

absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Tobin, 161 Wn.2d 517, 523, 166 P.3d

1167 (2007). A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly

unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons.

State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 283-84, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007). Application of an

incorrect legal analysis or other error of law can constitute an abuse of discretion.

Tobin, 161 Wn.2d at 523.

Restitution Order

Talaga asserts that the trial court lacked the authority to order him to pay

restitution for burial costs because he did not expressly agree to do so and

because no causal connection exists between his charged crime and Lynch’s

death. The State no longer asserts an express agreement but counters that

there is no need for causal connection because a sentencing court is not

3 No. 85451-8-I/4

required to independently find a direct causal connection when the Department of

Labor and Industries has determined a victim should be reimbursed for losses

under the Crime Victim’s Compensation Act (CVCA), chapter 7.78 RCW. We

find the State’s argument unpersuasive. The trial court lacked authority to

require Talaga to pay restitution for those damages, and abused its discretion in

doing so, because there is neither a proven causal connection between Talaga’s

crime of conviction and the losses resulting from Lynch’s death nor an express

agreement by Talaga to pay restitution for those damages.

“A court’s authority to impose restitution is statutory.” State v. Griffith, 164

Wn.2d 960, 965, 195 P.3d 506 (2008). Under RCW 9.94A.753(5), restitution

shall be ordered whenever a defendant is convicted of an offense that results in

injury or damage to or loss of property unless extraordinary circumstances exist.

Further, the court “shall order restitution in all cases where the victim is entitled to

benefits under the crime victim’s compensation act.” RCW 9.94A.753(7). But

restitution is limited to damages or losses causally connected to the crime. State

v. Kinneman, 155 Wn.2d 272, 286, 119 P.3d 350 (2005). The general rule is that

a defendant “may not be required to pay restitution beyond the crime charged or

for other uncharged offenses.” State v. Johnson, 69 Wn. App. 189, 191, 847

P.2d 960 (1993).

“An exception to this general rule exists where the defendant pleads guilty

and expressly agrees to pay restitution for crimes for which the defendant was

not convicted.” Johnson, 69 Wn. App. at 191. When a defendant “pleads guilty

to a lesser offense or fewer offenses and agrees with the prosecutor’s

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recommendation,” the court may order the defendant to “pay restitution to a

victim of an offense or offenses which are not prosecuted pursuant to a plea

agreement.” RCW 9.94A.753(5).

1. Causal Connection

Talaga first asserts that the record before the trial court did not establish a

causal connection between Talaga’s conviction for delivery of a controlled

substance and damages stemming from Lynch’s death. We agree.

Losses are causally connected to a crime if, but for the charged offense,

the victim would not have incurred the loss. Griffith, 164 Wn.2d at 965-67.

Where contested, the State must prove causation by a preponderance of the

evidence. Kinneman, 122 Wn. App. at 860. “In determining any sentence,

including restitution, the sentencing court may rely on no more information than is

admitted by the plea agreement, or admitted, acknowledged, or proved in a trial

or at the time of sentencing.” State v. Dedonado, 99 Wn. App. 251, 256, 991

P.2d 1216 (2000).

Here, although Talaga’s plea agreement does admit delivery of a

controlled substance to Lynch, no admission, acknowledgment, or proof exists

that the admitted delivery resulted in Lynch’s death. In fact, the State did not

attempt to prove causation at the restitution hearing, instead relying on what it

purported to be Talaga’s express agreement. At the restitution hearing, the State

conceded the lack of causation, stating:

I can see that there’s two ways that restitution would be applicable here. One is if there was a nexus between the crime that Mr. Talaga pled to and the harm caused. I agree with [Talaga’s counsel] that there isn’t a nexus here, specifically on delivery, but

5 No. 85451-8-I/6

the exception to the general rule is if the defendant expressly agrees to pay restitution for damages that are not directly related. And the State’s position is that he did make an express agreement.

Because Talaga did not admit or acknowledge causing Lynch’s death, and the

State provided no evidence that he had, we cannot conclude that but for Talaga’s

charged crime of delivery of a controlled substance, the losses resulting from

Lynch’s death would not have occurred.

Still, the State contends that, given the language of Talaga’s plea

agreement, it does not need to demonstrate that Talaga’s delivery of the drug

was the but-for cause of Lynch’s death. Instead, it need only demonstrate that

the need for burial costs resulted from Talaga’s conduct as noted in discovery.

As such, the State asserts, the phone location data and messages between

Talaga and Lynch detailing the existence of the sale are sufficient to establish a

causal connection. But the State has not provided evidence that the burial

expenses were the result of Talaga’s conduct. Burial expenses only result from

Talaga’s conduct if he were at fault for Lynch’s death. The fact that Talaga sold

pills to Lynch three days prior to her death, alone, is not enough to establish fault

for her death.

The State also contends that there is no need for a causal connection

between Talaga’s crime and the burial costs incurred by Lynch’s family because

a sentencing court is not required to independently find a direct causal

connection when the Department of Labor and Industries has determined a

victim should be reimbursed for losses under the CVCA. We disagree.

6 No. 85451-8-I/7

Under RCW 9.94A.753(7), “the court shall order restitution in all cases

where the victim is entitled to benefits under the [CVCA].” The court does this,

“upon receipt of a petition from the department of labor and industries.” RCW

9.94A.753(7). Under the CVCA, the Crime Victim Compensation Program

(CVCP) reimburses victims for their losses or damages. RCW 7.68.020(16).

“[E]ach victim injured as a result of a criminal act . . . or the victim’s family or

beneficiary in the case of death of the victim, [is] eligible for benefits” subject to

certain limitations. RCW 7.68.020(1). RCW 9.94A.753(7) incorporates this

standard but leaves the determination of causation to the Department of Labor

and Industries. Although a court may rely on a less strict standard of causation

in ordering restitution paid to the CVCP, a showing of causation made by the

State is still required. State v. McCarthy, 178 Wn. App. 290, 301, 313 P.3d 1247

(2013).

Talaga’s restitution hearing centered on whether he would have to pay

restitution for the costs related to Lynch’s death based on his conviction of

delivery of a controlled substance, regardless of the lack of casual connection

between his crime and the State’s restitution request. The State conceded this

lack of causal connection, focusing instead on what it purported to be Talaga’s

express agreement to pay restitution. As a result, the court did not address the

Department of Labor and Industries’s determination of cause, which in turn

meant that Talaga had no opportunity to respond to or refute that determination.

The record is inadequate to resolve whether the court was required to order

restitution based on the CVCA.

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The record neither establishes what the CVCP is claiming reimbursement

for nor provides evidence of any Department of Labor and Industries

determination showing that Lynch’s family was entitled to burial costs under the

CVCA. Accordingly, the record is insufficient for the trial court to have made a

determination based on the State’s request for restitution that Lynch’s family was

entitled to benefits and repayment from Talaga, pursuant to RCW 9.94A.753(7).

The court entered its restitution order based on its determination that Talaga

expressly agreed to pay restitution, not on any causal connection or CVCA

determination. Therefore, the fact that the court ordered restitution to the CVCP

does not mean that the court found that the CVCA’s requirements were properly

met. The State cannot rely on an absent determination to provide a basis for the

entirety of the requested restitution.

We conclude that the trial court lacked authority to impose restitution

based on a causal connection between Talaga’s guilty plea and losses resulting

from Lynch’s death.

2. Express Agreement

Lastly, Talaga maintains that he did not expressly agree to pay for the

burial costs because these were losses stemming from a crime with which he

was not charged. Although the State relied exclusively on Talaga’s supposed

express agreement below, it does not address this argument on appeal. We

agree with Talaga.

“ ‘[R]estitution for loss beyond the scope of the crime charged is properly

awardable only when the defendant enters into an express agreement to make

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such restitution as part of the plea bargain process.’ ” State v. Woods, 90 Wn.

App. 904, 908, 953 P.2d 834 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

State v. Miszak, 69 Wn. App. 426, 429, 848 P.2d 1329 (1993)).

Here, no evidence exists that Talaga expressly agreed to pay restitution

outside of his charged offenses. The State did not even request fees beyond the

scope of the charged crime until the restitution hearing. In Talaga’s initial plea

statement, the only reference to restitution was that the prosecutor would provide

a restitution recommendation at a later date. At Talaga’s plea hearing, the

prosecutor again recommended that the restitution be “determined at a later

date.” The judgment and sentence also noted that restitution would be

determined at a future hearing. Given the charges, Talaga had no reason to

anticipate that the State would request restitution for burial costs and the

language providing that he would pay restitution for damages resulting from his

conduct was not an express agreement to do so.

Moreover, Talaga had no reason to agree to pay restitution beyond his

charges. Generally, a defendant will make an express agreement to pay

restitution for an uncharged crime if he pleads guilty to a lesser offense to avoid

prosecution for a greater one. That did not occur in the present case. Because

Talaga did not plead guilty to a lesser degree or included charge, there is no

reason that he would expressly agree to pay restitution for damages resulting

from a greater charge.

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Because the trial court lacked the statutory authority to require Talaga to

pay burial expenses, it abused its discretion by doing so. We remand for the

court to strike the burial costs from the restitution order.

WE CONCUR: