State Of Washington, V. Shawn M. Casey

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: May 20, 2025
• Docket: 59930-9
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two

May 20, 2025

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59930-9-II

Respondent,

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION SHAWN MICHAEL CASEY,

Appellant.

PRICE, J. — Shawn M. Casey appeals his convictions for two counts of second degree

possession of stolen property. Casey argues that the State’s information was deficient because, by

not explicitly alleging that Casey knew that the property was stolen, it did not contain all the

essential elements of the crime.

We disagree and affirm.

FACTS

In June 2020, a Walmart employee observed Casey shoplift some clothing. As Casey was

exiting the store, the employee confronted Casey, detained him, and contacted law enforcement.

Law enforcement arrested Casey and found that Casey possessed several debit cards belonging to

different individuals. Two of the debit cards belonged to individuals who did not know Casey.

Following its investigation, the State charged Casey with one count of second degree

burglary and two counts of second degree possession of stolen property. With respect to the second

degree possession of stolen property charges, the information stated in relevant part, No. 59930-9-II

That SHAWN MICHAEL CASEY, in the State of Washington, on or about the 20th day of June, 2020, did unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly possess a stolen access device, to-wit: a debit card, issued to [victim], and withheld or appropriated said access device to the use of any person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto, contrary to RCW 9A.56.140(1) and 9A.56.160(1)(c), and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 4 (emphasis added). Casey did not object to the form of the information.

Prior to trial, Casey was accepted into a drug court program. Casey agreed, as part of his

acceptance into drug court, that if he violated the program’s rules and conditions, his case would

proceed to a stipulated-facts bench trial—meaning that Casey would stipulate to the admission of

the police and lab reports and that the evidence would be sufficient to support a finding of guilt.

Shortly after his admission into the program, Casey failed to appear, and a bench warrant was

issued for his arrest.

Approximately two years later, Casey was arrested on the bench warrant. As a result,

Casey was terminated from drug court and his case proceeded to the stipulated-facts bench trial.

After reviewing the proposed findings of fact with his attorney, Casey informed the trial court that

he agreed with them. Casey further stipulated that he “did not have permission to possess [the

victims’] debit card[s].” CP at 20.

The trial court found Casey guilty as charged and entered written findings of fact and

conclusions of law. At sentencing, the trial court sentenced Casey to 68 months of confinement.

Casey appeals.1

1 Casey solely appeals his two convictions for second degree possession of stolen property. He does not appeal his second degree burglary conviction.

2 No. 59930-9-II

ANALYSIS

Casey argues that the information charging him with the two counts of second degree

possession of stolen property was constitutionally deficient because it omitted an essential element

of the offense. We disagree.

Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of

the Washington Constitution, charging documents must include all of the essential elements of the

charged crime. State v. Pry, 194 Wn.2d 745, 751, 452 P.3d 536 (2019). “ ‘An essential element

is one whose specification is necessary to establish the very illegality of the behavior charged.’ ”

State v. Zillyette, 178 Wn.2d 153, 158, 307 P.3d 712 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting State v. Ward, 148 Wn.2d 803, 811, 64 P.3d 640 (2003)). The purpose of including all

essential elements in the charging documents is to inform the defendant of the nature of the alleged

crime that they “ ‘must be prepared to defend against.’ ” Id. at 159 (quoting State v. Kjorsvik, 117

Wn.2d 93, 101, 812 P.2d 86 (1991)).

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the charging document at or before his

trial, we construe its language strictly. State v. Phillips, 98 Wn. App. 936, 940, 991 P.2d 1195

(2000). But if the defendant challenges the charging document for the first time on appeal, we

construe it liberally in favor of validity. Zillyette, 178 Wn.2d at 161. In liberally construing the

charging document, we use the two-prong standard developed in Kjorsvik. 117 Wn.2d at 105-106.

Under this standard, we determine (1) whether the necessary elements appear in any form, or by

fair construction, on the face of the document and, if so, (2) whether the defendant can still show

prejudice from the inartful language. Id. Under this standard, the appellate court has “considerable

3 No. 59930-9-II

leeway to imply the necessary allegations from the language of the charging document.” Id. at

104.

Second degree possession of stolen property includes a knowledge component that is an

essential element of the crime. State v. Porter, 186 Wn.2d 85, 93, 375 P.3d 664 (2016). The

statute states in relevant part that a person is guilty of “possessing stolen property” in the second

degree if the person “possesses a stolen access device.” RCW 9A.56.160(1)(c). “ ‘Possessing

stolen property’ ” means “knowingly to receive, retain, possess, conceal, or dispose of stolen

property knowing that it has been stolen and to withhold or appropriate the same to the use of any

person other than the true owner or person entitled thereto.” RCW 9A.56.140(1).

The type of knowledge required for a possession of stolen property conviction has two

aspects. See RCW 9A.56.140(1); 11A WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY

INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 77.06 (5th ed. 2019) (WPIC). The defendant must (1) knowingly

possess stolen property and (2) act with knowledge that the property was stolen. See RCW

9A.56.140(1). Thus, as relevant here, Casey must have knowingly possessed a stolen debit card

and known that the debit card was stolen. See RCW 9A.56.140(1), .160(1)(c); WPIC 77.06.

Casey argues that the information violated his constitutional rights because it did not

expressly allege that he knew the debit cards were stolen. According to Casey, although the

information stated that Casey did “ ‘unlawfully, feloniously[,] and knowingly’ possessed a stolen

access device,” it is not apparent from the information that the State alleged that Casey knew that

the property was stolen. Br. of Appellant at 3. The State responds that when viewing the

information in a common sense manner, the necessary element of knowledge appears in the

information. We agree with the State.

4 No. 59930-9-II

Because Casey is challenging the sufficiency of the information for the first time on appeal,

we liberally construe the information in favor of validity with the use of Kjorsvik’s two-pronged

standard of review. 117 Wn.2d at 105-106. We begin with the first prong and ask whether the

necessary element (knowledge that the property was stolen) appears in any form, or by fair

construction, on the face of the charging document. Id. The information must be read as a whole

and in a common sense manner. Id. at 110-11.

Again, Casey’s information alleged that he “unlawfully, feloniously, and knowingly

possess[ed] a stolen access device” for each count. CP at 4 (emphasis added). Casey is correct

that the information did not explicitly tie Casey’s knowledge to specifically knowing the debit

cards were stolen. It stands to reason that a better drafted information would have clarified any

ambiguity and alleged both that Casey knowingly possessed stolen property and that he knew that

the property was stolen.

Nevertheless, under a liberal construction, the allegation that Casey knew that the property

was stolen, can be fairly implied from the information’s sentence structure. See State v. Simon,

120 Wn.2d 196, 199, 840 P.2d 172 (1992) (demonstrating that sentence structure is relevant to

whether a charging document conveys the essential elements of the charged crime). In Simon, our

Supreme Court considered an information that charged the defendant with first degree prostitution,

a crime that requires that the defendant know the victim is under the age of 18. Id. at 197-98. The

information provided that the defendant

did knowingly advance and profit by compelling [the victim] by threat and force to engage in prostitution; and did advance and profit from the prostitution of [the victim], a person who was less than 18 years old; . . .

5 No. 59930-9-II

Id. When the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the information for the first time on appeal,

our Supreme Court agreed that it was deficient. Id. at 199. The court concluded that based on

sentence structure and punctuation rules, no one of common understanding reading the information

would understand that the defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s age was an element of the

charged crime. Id. Yet, the court implied that the information would not be defective if the concept

of the defendant’s knowledge had been repeated at the beginning of the second clause of the

information. See id.; State v. Tunney, 129 Wn.2d 336, 341-42, 917 P.2d 95 (1996) (further

explaining its previous decision in Simon). In other words, if the Simon information had instead

provided that the defendant,

did knowingly advance and profit by compelling [the victim] by threat and force to engage in prostitution; and did knowingly advance and profit from the prostitution of [the victim], a person who was less than 18 years old; . . .

then a person of common understanding would have tied the knowledge element to the age of the

victim. See Tunney, 129 Wn.2d at 341-42.

Our Supreme Court’s decision in Simon (as clarified in Tunney) suggests the correct

resolution here. See 120 Wn.2d at 199. Unlike in Simon, the relevant portion of Casey’s

information is not separated into two separate clauses with “knowingly” absent in one clause. See

id. at 197-98. Instead, the information contained a single clause that alleged that he “unlawfully,

feloniously, and knowingly possess[ed] a stolen access device.” CP at 4 (emphasis added).

Although knowingly appears immediately before the word “possess,” given the close proximity

between “knowingly” and “stolen access device,” a person of common understanding reading the

charging document would understand that knowledge that the property was stolen was an element

of second degree possession of stolen property. CP at 4.

6 No. 59930-9-II

In fact, demanding that “knowingly” be repeated again in front of “access device” would

be akin to if Simon had required that the concept of “knowingly” be repeated immediately in front

of the age of the victim. In such a case, the Simon language would have been required to be,

and did knowingly advance and profit . . . from the prostitution of [the victim], a person who the defendant knew was less than 18 years old; . . .

See 120 Wn.2d at 197-98. But, according to Tunney, this double-repetition is not what would have

been required to fix the defect in Simon, at least when the language is construed liberally in favor

of validity. See 129 Wn.2d at 341-42. It would have been enough if, like here, the concept of

“knowingly” appeared once at the beginning of the clause. See id.

Further support for the sufficiency of this information comes from the particular facts of

this case. When assessing an information, we may infer the requisite mental state when the alleged

facts would be hard to accomplish without the defendant holding the required mental state. State

v. Level, 19 Wn. App. 2d 56, 61-62, 493 P.3d 1230 (2021). Here, as a practical matter, it is difficult

to imagine a set of circumstances in which Casey could have “unlawfully, feloniously, and

knowingly” possessed the debit cards without also knowing they were stolen. CP at 4.

Accordingly, we conclude that even though Casey’s information may have been in a

“vague or inartful” form, it nevertheless sufficiently informed Casey of all the essential elements

of second degree possession of stolen property. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 111.

Having concluded the information’s reference to Casey’s knowledge of stolen property

was sufficient, we move briefly to the second prong—whether Casey can show prejudice from the

arguable vagueness of the information. Id. at 106, 111. Casey has not attempted to show any

prejudice. Indeed, Casey presented no defense and stipulated that he did not have permission to

7 No. 59930-9-II

possess the debit cards of either victim. Under these facts, Casey cannot demonstrate that the

information’s form impacted the verdict. Thus, Casey cannot show prejudice under the second

prong of the Kjorsvik standard.

CONCLUSION

Under a liberal construction, the information sufficiently charged the essential elements of

the crime of second degree possession of stolen property. We affirm.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

PRICE, J. We concur:

CRUSER, C.J.

CHE, J.