IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 86046-1-I
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION SHAQUILLE CAPONE JONES,
Appellant.
SMITH, J. — In 2016, a jury convicted Shaquille Jones of three counts of
assault, each with a firearm enhancement; one count of unlawful possession of a
firearm; one count of possession of a stolen firearm; and one count of witness
tampering. Upon resentencing under State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d
521 (2021), in 2023, the court granted Jones’s request for an exceptional
sentence below the standard range. The court declined to run his firearm
enhancements concurrently. Jones appeals, asserting that the trial court should
have discretion to impose concurrent firearm enhancements and that the
Supreme Court should overrule State v. Brown, 139 Wn. 2d 20, 983 P.2d 608
(1999) overruled on other grounds, State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391
P.3d 409 (2017), to that effect.1
In a provisional supplemental brief, Jones claims that mandatory stacking
weapon enhancements are cruel as applied to 21-year-old offenders, that he
1The Washington State Supreme Court’s recent opinion in State v. Kelly, 4 Wn.3d 170, 561 P.3d 246 (2024), did not overrule Brown. No. 86046-1-I/2
may raise this claim for the first time on appeal under RAP 2.5(a)(3), that
resentencing is required based on Houston-Sconiers protections, that
resentencing is required because the trial court found the sentence
disproportionate to his culpability, and that the sentence is cruel under
Monschke. We affirm and decline to consider Jones’ supplemental briefing.
FACTS
Background
In 2016, a jury convicted Shaquille Jones of three counts of assault in the
first degree with firearm enhancements, one count of possession of a stolen
firearm, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, and one count of witness
tampering. Jones was 21 years old when he committed the offenses and had no
prior felony convictions. Based on the three consecutive firearm enhancements
and the multiple offense policy under RCW 9.94A.589, the court sentenced
Jones within the standard sentencing range of 477 to 573 months.
Resentencing Request
In 2021, the Washington State Supreme Court decided Blake, which
overturned Washington’s drug possession statute. Following Blake, Jones
brought a personal restraint petition requesting resentencing. In re Pers.
Restraint of Jones, No. 83076-7-I (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2022) (unpublished)
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/830767.pdf. Noting that Jones’s unlawful
possession of a firearm charge rested on a conviction now constitutionally invalid
under Blake, this court determined that Jones was entitled to resentencing.
Jones, No. 83076-7-I, slip op. at 1-2.
2 No. 86046-1-I/3
Before the resentencing hearing, Jones submitted significant evidence to
support the mitigation of his sentence. This evidence included his own writings
to the resentencing judge, letters of support from his family and community
members, and proof of his completion of a variety of educational and self-
improvement focused programs while incarcerated.
Jones also submitted an expert evaluation prepared by Dr. Marnee Milner,
documenting the typical immaturity and cognitive brain development of a
21-year-old man, as well as the specific trauma Jones suffered as a young
person. Dr. Milner concluded that “aside from the normative adolescent and
brain development, [Jones] experienced multiple adverse childhood events that
contributed to cognitive, emotional, social psychological, and behavioral
dysfunction leading up to his behavior and psychological state on or before the
time of the criminal incident.” This resulted in impulsivity issues, hyperactivity,
and inattention, all of which interfered with Jones’s ability to analyze the risks and
consequences of his behavior.
Resentencing Hearing
At the 2023 resentencing hearing, Jones requested an exceptional
sentence below the standard range based on his youthfulness and particular
neurodivergent circumstances. Believing the initial sentence to be “clearly
excessive,” Jones requested a range of 171 to 207 months. Concerning the
firearm enhancements specifically, Jones asked that the trial court impose an
exceptional downward sentence of 111 months on the first degree assault
convictions, concurrent with the other convictions, and a consecutive 60-month
3 No. 86046-1-I/4
firearm enhancement, with each enhancement running concurrently. The State
primarily agreed with Jones’s recommendation, but asked the court to
resentence Jones to the higher end of the 171 to 207 range.
Commending Jones for his progress while incarcerated, his thoughtful
reflection, and his community support, the trial court imposed a 240-month
sentence in line with Sentencing Reform Act requirements. The court imposed
60 months of confinement on each assault count to run concurrently, with an
additional 60-month firearm enhancement for each assault count to run
consecutively. In doing so, the court imposed the lowest possible sentence for
the assault in the first degree conviction and repeatedly stated it did not have the
authority or discretion to run the firearm enhancements concurrently for an
offender over 18 years old. The court did note, however, that “had [it] determined
that it did have the discretion, the court would have imposed a sentence within
the range as requested.”
Appeal
Jones appealed, asserting that the sentencing court did have the authority
to order the mandatory firearm enhancements to run concurrently as part of an
exceptionally mitigated sentence. This court stayed the appeal pending the
Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Kelly, 4 Wn.3d 170, 561 P.3d 246 (2024),
heard in February 2024.
Jones then filed a supplemental brief, including a supplemental
assignment of error. The court commissioner provisionally granted the motion to
4 No. 86046-1-I/5
allow the supplemental brief, referring it to the panel to decide whether to
consider the briefing.
ANALYSIS
Concurrent Firearm Enhancements
Jones asserts that the trial court erred in failing to recognize its discretion
to run firearm enhancements concurrently as part of an exceptional sentence.
Because RCW 9.94A.533(a)(3) precludes a trial court from exercising such
discretion, we disagree.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Kelly, 4 Wn.3d
at 191. The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and implement the
legislature’s intent. Thurman v. Cowles Company, 4 Wn.3d 291, 296, 562 P.3d
777 (2025). This includes examining the plain language of the specific statutory
provision, as well as the meaning of that language in the context of the whole
statute and related statutes. Thurman, 4 Wn.3d at 296.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 86046-1-I
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION SHAQUILLE CAPONE JONES,
Appellant.
SMITH, J. — In 2016, a jury convicted Shaquille Jones of three counts of
assault, each with a firearm enhancement; one count of unlawful possession of a
firearm; one count of possession of a stolen firearm; and one count of witness
tampering. Upon resentencing under State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d
521 (2021), in 2023, the court granted Jones’s request for an exceptional
sentence below the standard range. The court declined to run his firearm
enhancements concurrently. Jones appeals, asserting that the trial court should
have discretion to impose concurrent firearm enhancements and that the
Supreme Court should overrule State v. Brown, 139 Wn. 2d 20, 983 P.2d 608
(1999) overruled on other grounds, State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391
P.3d 409 (2017), to that effect.1
In a provisional supplemental brief, Jones claims that mandatory stacking
weapon enhancements are cruel as applied to 21-year-old offenders, that he
1The Washington State Supreme Court’s recent opinion in State v. Kelly, 4 Wn.3d 170, 561 P.3d 246 (2024), did not overrule Brown. No. 86046-1-I/2
may raise this claim for the first time on appeal under RAP 2.5(a)(3), that
resentencing is required based on Houston-Sconiers protections, that
resentencing is required because the trial court found the sentence
disproportionate to his culpability, and that the sentence is cruel under
Monschke. We affirm and decline to consider Jones’ supplemental briefing.
FACTS
Background
In 2016, a jury convicted Shaquille Jones of three counts of assault in the
first degree with firearm enhancements, one count of possession of a stolen
firearm, one count of unlawful possession of a firearm, and one count of witness
tampering. Jones was 21 years old when he committed the offenses and had no
prior felony convictions. Based on the three consecutive firearm enhancements
and the multiple offense policy under RCW 9.94A.589, the court sentenced
Jones within the standard sentencing range of 477 to 573 months.
Resentencing Request
In 2021, the Washington State Supreme Court decided Blake, which
overturned Washington’s drug possession statute. Following Blake, Jones
brought a personal restraint petition requesting resentencing. In re Pers.
Restraint of Jones, No. 83076-7-I (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2022) (unpublished)
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/830767.pdf. Noting that Jones’s unlawful
possession of a firearm charge rested on a conviction now constitutionally invalid
under Blake, this court determined that Jones was entitled to resentencing.
Jones, No. 83076-7-I, slip op. at 1-2.
2 No. 86046-1-I/3
Before the resentencing hearing, Jones submitted significant evidence to
support the mitigation of his sentence. This evidence included his own writings
to the resentencing judge, letters of support from his family and community
members, and proof of his completion of a variety of educational and self-
improvement focused programs while incarcerated.
Jones also submitted an expert evaluation prepared by Dr. Marnee Milner,
documenting the typical immaturity and cognitive brain development of a
21-year-old man, as well as the specific trauma Jones suffered as a young
person. Dr. Milner concluded that “aside from the normative adolescent and
brain development, [Jones] experienced multiple adverse childhood events that
contributed to cognitive, emotional, social psychological, and behavioral
dysfunction leading up to his behavior and psychological state on or before the
time of the criminal incident.” This resulted in impulsivity issues, hyperactivity,
and inattention, all of which interfered with Jones’s ability to analyze the risks and
consequences of his behavior.
Resentencing Hearing
At the 2023 resentencing hearing, Jones requested an exceptional
sentence below the standard range based on his youthfulness and particular
neurodivergent circumstances. Believing the initial sentence to be “clearly
excessive,” Jones requested a range of 171 to 207 months. Concerning the
firearm enhancements specifically, Jones asked that the trial court impose an
exceptional downward sentence of 111 months on the first degree assault
convictions, concurrent with the other convictions, and a consecutive 60-month
3 No. 86046-1-I/4
firearm enhancement, with each enhancement running concurrently. The State
primarily agreed with Jones’s recommendation, but asked the court to
resentence Jones to the higher end of the 171 to 207 range.
Commending Jones for his progress while incarcerated, his thoughtful
reflection, and his community support, the trial court imposed a 240-month
sentence in line with Sentencing Reform Act requirements. The court imposed
60 months of confinement on each assault count to run concurrently, with an
additional 60-month firearm enhancement for each assault count to run
consecutively. In doing so, the court imposed the lowest possible sentence for
the assault in the first degree conviction and repeatedly stated it did not have the
authority or discretion to run the firearm enhancements concurrently for an
offender over 18 years old. The court did note, however, that “had [it] determined
that it did have the discretion, the court would have imposed a sentence within
the range as requested.”
Appeal
Jones appealed, asserting that the sentencing court did have the authority
to order the mandatory firearm enhancements to run concurrently as part of an
exceptionally mitigated sentence. This court stayed the appeal pending the
Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Kelly, 4 Wn.3d 170, 561 P.3d 246 (2024),
heard in February 2024.
Jones then filed a supplemental brief, including a supplemental
assignment of error. The court commissioner provisionally granted the motion to
4 No. 86046-1-I/5
allow the supplemental brief, referring it to the panel to decide whether to
consider the briefing.
ANALYSIS
Concurrent Firearm Enhancements
Jones asserts that the trial court erred in failing to recognize its discretion
to run firearm enhancements concurrently as part of an exceptional sentence.
Because RCW 9.94A.533(a)(3) precludes a trial court from exercising such
discretion, we disagree.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Kelly, 4 Wn.3d
at 191. The goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and implement the
legislature’s intent. Thurman v. Cowles Company, 4 Wn.3d 291, 296, 562 P.3d
777 (2025). This includes examining the plain language of the specific statutory
provision, as well as the meaning of that language in the context of the whole
statute and related statutes. Thurman, 4 Wn.3d at 296.
Under RCW 9.94A.535, a court may impose an exceptional sentence
below the standard range if it finds substantial and compelling reasons justifying
an exceptional sentence. RCW 9.94A.533(3)(e) clarifies, however, that all
firearm enhancement sentences are mandatory and shall run consecutively to all
other sentencing provisions.
In Brown, the Washington Supreme Court interpreted RCW
9.94A.533(a)(3) to clearly indicate that the “judicial discretion to impose an
exceptional sentence does not extend to a deadly weapon enhancement.” 139
Wn.2d at 28. Partially overruling Brown, the Supreme Court then extended
5 No. 86046-1-I/6
judicial discretion regarding weapon enhancements only for juveniles within the
adult justice system. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 at 9. The Supreme Court
affirmed both interpretations in Kelly, determining that a sentencing court
exceeds its authority in ordering firearm enhancements to run concurrently for an
adult offender. 4 Wn.3d at 195.
Here, the trial court concluded that it did not have the authority to order
Jones’s firearm enhancement sentences to run concurrently. Because RCW
9.94A.533(a)(3) expressly requires firearm enhancements to run consecutively,
precluding any trial court discretion, the court did not err in imposing the 240-
month sentence.
Supplemental Briefing
Following the Supreme Court’s holding in Kelly, Jones filed a
supplemental appeal raising four issues not asserted in the initial appeal.
Because we generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in
supplemental briefing and caselaw specifically precludes Jones’s requested
analysis, we decline to address Jones’s additional claims.
Generally, this court will not consider arguments raised for the first time in
supplemental briefing. State v. Delbosque, 6 Wn. App. 2d 407, 413 n.3, 430
P.3d 1153 (2018), reversed in part on different grounds, 195 Wn.2d 106 (2020).
This includes constitutional challenges. State v. Krajeski, 104 Wn. App. 377,
387, 16 P.3d 69 (2001).
Jones contends that this court should address the added claims because
newly appointed counsel determined that constitutional issues arise from the
6 No. 86046-1-I/7
same facts and RAP 2.5(a)(3) allows consideration of new constitutional claims.
But Krajeski specifically precludes the analysis Jones requests. 104 Wn. App. at
387.
The court in Krajeski determined that, “[a]s a general rule, a court is
precluded from considering a Gunwall[2] analysis when raised for the first time in
a supplemental brief. A more liberal rule would encourage appellants to untimely
raise issues, leading to unbalanced and incomplete development of issues.” 104
Wn. App. at 387 (citation omitted). Jones specifically requests a Gunwall
analysis, addressing cruel punishments as applied to youthful offenders, for the
first time in a provisional supplemental brief. Accordingly, we decline to address
Jones’s supplemental appeal.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
2 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).