FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2021 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 37169-7-III Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) SHANE MICHAEL CURTISS, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. )
STAAB, J. — A jury found Shane Curtiss guilty of possessing a stolen motor
vehicle and driving while license suspended in the second degree, and acquitted him of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, Mr. Curtiss argues that the
trial court violated his right to a speedy trial under CrR 3.3. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
Shane Curtiss was arrested on several criminal charges and made his first court
appearance on June 10, 2019. He remained in custody in lieu of bail, and was arraigned
on June 24, 2019. At the omnibus hearing on July 25, the trial court calculated his 60- No. 37169-7-III State v. Curtiss
day “time for trial” expiration date to be August 23, 2019, and set trial for August 12,
2019.
At the readiness hearing on August 9, the State moved for a continuance of the
August 12 trial because the prosecutor had a scheduling conflict and the crime lab had
not finished testing the evidence. The prosecutor explained that he was already
scheduled for two trials with higher priority, a pretrial hearing on a significant case, and
then a preplanned vacation from August 21 to 28.
Mr. Curtiss objected to the continuance. Defense counsel questioned, rhetorically,
when the substances were sent to the lab, but noted that delay by a crime lab did not
constitute good cause for a continuance. Mr. Curtiss did not raise an objection based on
the prosecutor’s scheduling conflict, but did concede that there was no prejudice to the
defendant’s case, other than continued confinement, if the trial were continued. The trial
court continued the trial to September 30, finding good cause for the continuance and no
prejudice to the defendant.
Mr. Curtiss filed a 10-day written objection to the new trial date, arguing, “[t]he
sole issue is whether routine and foreseeable congestion at the Laboratory is good cause.”
His written objection did not contest the concurrent finding of good cause based on the
prosecutor’s scheduling conflict. The motion was heard on August 16. After the court
overruled Mr. Curtiss’s objection, counsel commented that the case could be reassigned
to another prosecutor. The court did not respond to or consider this interjection.
2 No. 37169-7-III State v. Curtiss
At the next hearing, held on September 27, the court granted the State’s request
for a one-week continuance over Mr. Curtiss’s objection. Mr. Curtiss filed another 10-
day written objection to this new trial date raising the same objection based on crime lab
congestion, essentially arguing that since the first continuance was erroneous, any
subsequent continuance was also erroneous. The court denied the written motion at a
hearing on October 4.
At that same hearing, the Court granted, over objection, the State’s motion to
continue the trial to October 21 due to unavailability of the crime lab analyst. This
continuance was within the speedy trial period, which the court calculated as October 30,
2019, based on the 30-day buffer in CrR 3.3(b)(5) and the first continued trial date of
September 30.
Mr. Curtiss filed another written objection to this new trial date within 10 days of
it being set, again incorporating the arguments made previously. The court addressed this
objection on October 21, the morning of trial. At this hearing, counsel also argued that
the first continuance was improper because the prosecutor failed to show why the case
could not have been reassigned to another prosecutor, thus allowing trial to proceed
within the original speedy trial period expiring on August 23.
Mr. Curtiss’s objections were overruled and the trial began on October 21. A jury
found Mr. Curtiss guilty of unlawful possession of a motor vehicle and driving while
3 No. 37169-7-III State v. Curtiss
license suspended in the second degree, but acquitted him on the charge of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Mr. Curtiss asks this court to reverse his convictions, contending that the
trial court violated his speedy trial rights under CrR 3.3. A defendant held in custody shall
be brought to trial within 60 days of arraignment. CrR 3.3(b)(1)(i). A court may grant a
continuance of the trial beyond the “time for trial” expiration date, and over a defendant’s
objection, “when such continuance is required in the administration of justice and the
defendant will not be prejudiced in the presentation of his or her defense.” CrR 3.3(f)(2).
This court reviews a decision to grant or deny a continuance under CrR 3.3(f) for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Flinn, 154 Wn.2d 193, 199, 110 P.3d 748 (2005). A
court abuses its discretion when its decision is “manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on
untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.” State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d
12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).
On appeal, Mr. Curtiss is not challenging the general rule that a prosecutor’s
unavailability due to a scheduling conflict constitutes good cause to continue a trial. See
State v. Raper, 47 Wn. App. 530, 539, 736 P.2d 680 (1987); State v. Palmer, 38 Wn.
App. 160, 684 P.2d 787 (1984); State v. Brown, 40 Wn. App. 91, 697 P.2d 583 (1985);
State v. Cannon, 130 Wn.2d 313, 326-27, 922 P.2d 1293 (1996); State v. Stock, 44 Wn.
App. 467, 722 P.2d 1330 (1986); State v. Williams, 104 Wn. App. 516, 524, 17 P.3d 648
4 No. 37169-7-III State v. Curtiss
(2001); State v. Jones, 117 Wn. App. 721, 72 P.3d 1110 (2003); State v. Heredia-Juarez,
119 Wn. App. 150, 155, 79 P.3d 987 (2003). 1 Instead, he argues that before the court can
grant a continuance based on a prosecutor’s scheduling conflict, the prosecutor has the
burden of demonstrating that the case cannot be reassigned to another prosecutor in order
to proceed to trial within the speedy trial period.
We disagree with Mr. Curtiss’s argument for two reasons. First, Mr. Curtiss did
not raise this objection at a time and in a manner that would allow the trial court to
address it. Mr. Curtiss did not include this argument in any of his written objections, and
he did not present it to the court in a manner that gave sufficient notice that the trial court
should have developed the issue on the record. Instead, at the hearing on August 16, after
the court had overruled the “sole issue” raised in the written objection, defense counsel
interjected that “there’s no reason this trial can’t be reassigned so my client could have
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FILED FEBRUARY 18, 2021 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 37169-7-III Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) SHANE MICHAEL CURTISS, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. )
STAAB, J. — A jury found Shane Curtiss guilty of possessing a stolen motor
vehicle and driving while license suspended in the second degree, and acquitted him of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance. On appeal, Mr. Curtiss argues that the
trial court violated his right to a speedy trial under CrR 3.3. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
Shane Curtiss was arrested on several criminal charges and made his first court
appearance on June 10, 2019. He remained in custody in lieu of bail, and was arraigned
on June 24, 2019. At the omnibus hearing on July 25, the trial court calculated his 60- No. 37169-7-III State v. Curtiss
day “time for trial” expiration date to be August 23, 2019, and set trial for August 12,
2019.
At the readiness hearing on August 9, the State moved for a continuance of the
August 12 trial because the prosecutor had a scheduling conflict and the crime lab had
not finished testing the evidence. The prosecutor explained that he was already
scheduled for two trials with higher priority, a pretrial hearing on a significant case, and
then a preplanned vacation from August 21 to 28.
Mr. Curtiss objected to the continuance. Defense counsel questioned, rhetorically,
when the substances were sent to the lab, but noted that delay by a crime lab did not
constitute good cause for a continuance. Mr. Curtiss did not raise an objection based on
the prosecutor’s scheduling conflict, but did concede that there was no prejudice to the
defendant’s case, other than continued confinement, if the trial were continued. The trial
court continued the trial to September 30, finding good cause for the continuance and no
prejudice to the defendant.
Mr. Curtiss filed a 10-day written objection to the new trial date, arguing, “[t]he
sole issue is whether routine and foreseeable congestion at the Laboratory is good cause.”
His written objection did not contest the concurrent finding of good cause based on the
prosecutor’s scheduling conflict. The motion was heard on August 16. After the court
overruled Mr. Curtiss’s objection, counsel commented that the case could be reassigned
to another prosecutor. The court did not respond to or consider this interjection.
2 No. 37169-7-III State v. Curtiss
At the next hearing, held on September 27, the court granted the State’s request
for a one-week continuance over Mr. Curtiss’s objection. Mr. Curtiss filed another 10-
day written objection to this new trial date raising the same objection based on crime lab
congestion, essentially arguing that since the first continuance was erroneous, any
subsequent continuance was also erroneous. The court denied the written motion at a
hearing on October 4.
At that same hearing, the Court granted, over objection, the State’s motion to
continue the trial to October 21 due to unavailability of the crime lab analyst. This
continuance was within the speedy trial period, which the court calculated as October 30,
2019, based on the 30-day buffer in CrR 3.3(b)(5) and the first continued trial date of
September 30.
Mr. Curtiss filed another written objection to this new trial date within 10 days of
it being set, again incorporating the arguments made previously. The court addressed this
objection on October 21, the morning of trial. At this hearing, counsel also argued that
the first continuance was improper because the prosecutor failed to show why the case
could not have been reassigned to another prosecutor, thus allowing trial to proceed
within the original speedy trial period expiring on August 23.
Mr. Curtiss’s objections were overruled and the trial began on October 21. A jury
found Mr. Curtiss guilty of unlawful possession of a motor vehicle and driving while
3 No. 37169-7-III State v. Curtiss
license suspended in the second degree, but acquitted him on the charge of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Mr. Curtiss asks this court to reverse his convictions, contending that the
trial court violated his speedy trial rights under CrR 3.3. A defendant held in custody shall
be brought to trial within 60 days of arraignment. CrR 3.3(b)(1)(i). A court may grant a
continuance of the trial beyond the “time for trial” expiration date, and over a defendant’s
objection, “when such continuance is required in the administration of justice and the
defendant will not be prejudiced in the presentation of his or her defense.” CrR 3.3(f)(2).
This court reviews a decision to grant or deny a continuance under CrR 3.3(f) for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Flinn, 154 Wn.2d 193, 199, 110 P.3d 748 (2005). A
court abuses its discretion when its decision is “manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on
untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.” State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d
12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).
On appeal, Mr. Curtiss is not challenging the general rule that a prosecutor’s
unavailability due to a scheduling conflict constitutes good cause to continue a trial. See
State v. Raper, 47 Wn. App. 530, 539, 736 P.2d 680 (1987); State v. Palmer, 38 Wn.
App. 160, 684 P.2d 787 (1984); State v. Brown, 40 Wn. App. 91, 697 P.2d 583 (1985);
State v. Cannon, 130 Wn.2d 313, 326-27, 922 P.2d 1293 (1996); State v. Stock, 44 Wn.
App. 467, 722 P.2d 1330 (1986); State v. Williams, 104 Wn. App. 516, 524, 17 P.3d 648
4 No. 37169-7-III State v. Curtiss
(2001); State v. Jones, 117 Wn. App. 721, 72 P.3d 1110 (2003); State v. Heredia-Juarez,
119 Wn. App. 150, 155, 79 P.3d 987 (2003). 1 Instead, he argues that before the court can
grant a continuance based on a prosecutor’s scheduling conflict, the prosecutor has the
burden of demonstrating that the case cannot be reassigned to another prosecutor in order
to proceed to trial within the speedy trial period.
We disagree with Mr. Curtiss’s argument for two reasons. First, Mr. Curtiss did
not raise this objection at a time and in a manner that would allow the trial court to
address it. Mr. Curtiss did not include this argument in any of his written objections, and
he did not present it to the court in a manner that gave sufficient notice that the trial court
should have developed the issue on the record. Instead, at the hearing on August 16, after
the court had overruled the “sole issue” raised in the written objection, defense counsel
interjected that “there’s no reason this trial can’t be reassigned so my client could have
his trial on or before August 23rd.” Report of Proceedings at 15.
Mr. Curtiss did not raise the issue again until October 21, when counsel argued to
the trial judge that the first continuance should not have been granted without a showing
1 When reviewing case law discussing CrR 3.3, this court consults pre-2003 case law with caution. “CrR 3.3 was completely rewritten in 2003. Because of the wholesale nature of the changes, the large body of case law that developed under the pre-2003 version of the rule must now be consulted with caution. (Indeed, according to the drafting history of the new rule, some of that case law was the reason for the changes.)” 4A ELIZABETH A. TURNER, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: RULES PRACTICE CrR 3.3 cmt. 1, at 253 (8th ed. 2020) (citations omitted). Because the 2003 amendments maintained the pre-2003 language for granting a continuance, pre-2003 case law is instructive.
5 No. 37169-7-III State v. Curtiss
that the case could be reassigned to a different prosecutor. By this time however, the
original speedy trial period had passed and there was no way for the trial court to cure any
defect, even assuming it found that the case could have been reassigned to another
prosecutor. CrR 3.3(d)(3).
In order for an objection to have meaning under the rule, the nature of the
objection needs to be articulated so that the trial court can develop the record and cure
any defects. State v. Frankenfield, 112 Wn. App. 472, 475, 49 P.3d 921 (2002); see also
King County v. Boundary Review Bd., 122 Wn.2d 648, 670, 860 P.2d 1024 (1993) (“In
order for an issue to be properly raised . . . there must be more than simply a hint or a
slight reference to the issue in the record.”). Ruling on a motion to continue is
discretionary with a judge because it involves “such disparate elements as surprise,
diligence, materiality, redundancy, due process, and the maintenance of orderly
procedures.” State v. Eller, 84 Wn.2d 90, 95, 524 P.2d 242 (1974). In this case, had the
specific objection been raised in a timely and sufficient manner, the court could have
determined whether reassignment was feasible. Failure to do so waives the objection.
CrR 3.3(d)(3).
Even assuming that the objection was not waived, it would not be an abuse of
discretion to continue the case due to the prosecutor’s scheduling conflict. As noted
above, our courts have repeatedly held that a prosecutor’s unavailability because of a
scheduling conflict provides good cause for a trial continuance. Raper, 47 Wn. App. at
6 No. 37169-7-III State v. Curtiss
539. There is no requirement for the court to consider reassignment before continuing
the case. Heredia-Juarez, 119 Wn. App. at 155. Instead, reassignment is an option
within the trial court’s discretion when it is properly raised and considered.
Mr. Curtiss relies primarily on State v. Chichester, 141 Wn. App. 446, 170 P.3d
583 (2007). In that case, a district court dismissed a DUI prosecution under CrR 3.3,
despite a claim of prosecutor unavailability. But in Chichester, the court had itself raised
the question of prosecutor reassignment, and put the State on notice that it would be an
issue. Nevertheless, on the morning of trial, the State sought a continuance and failed to
demonstrate why the case could not be reassigned. The court’s discretionary decision to
deny a continuance was supported by the record. The trial court noted that DUI cases are
some of the easiest to reassign and there were two prosecutors available to conduct the
trial. Id. at 454.
Rather than supporting Mr. Curtiss’s position, Chichester reaffirms that the
decision to continue a trial is discretionary so long as the trial court’s decision is
reasonable in light of the information available. Since the court is not required to
consider reassignment, and the defendant failed to put this issue before the court, it was
not an abuse of discretion for the court to continue the trial beyond the original speedy
trial period.
7 No. 37169-7-III State v. Curtiss
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
_________________________________ Staab, J. WE CONCUR:
_________________________________ Lawrence-Berrey, J.
_________________________________ Siddoway, A.C.J.