IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 88022-5-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION SEAN ROBERT HIGGINS,
Appellant.
MANN, J. — Sean Higgins was convicted of two counts of aggravated first degree
murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. Higgins appeals his life
sentence without the possibility of parole. He argues that the trial court failed to
properly consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor during sentencing. Because
Higgins was 23 years old at the time he committed his crimes, he is not a youthful
offender. The trial court did not have the authority under the aggravated murder statute
to impose a sentence other than life without the possibility of parole. We affirm.
I
Higgins was born in 1996. He was bullied as a child and struggled to make
friends. In January 2019, Higgins joined the Navy with the goal of being in the
submarine electronics computer field. But Higgins suffered a severe panic attack during No. 88022-5-I/2
a wet chamber training exercise. Higgins later experienced trouble sleeping, anxiety,
and suicidal ideation. Higgins was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with mixed
anxiety and depressed mood and was disqualified from submarine duty. Less than a
year after enlisting, he was found unfit for service and recommended for administrative
separation. By 2020, Higgins was living with his parents in Roy, Washington, and
working at a lumber yard.
Ezra Fleming Ralston lived in Vaughn, Washington at the home of his
grandparents. Fleming Ralston was in a relationship with Rebecka Neubauer.
Neubauer knew Spencer Kleine from high school and Kleine was friends with Higgins.
Fleming Ralston had ideas of a “movement” to dismantle capitalism and live off the grid.
In 2019, he began plotting to kill his grandparents so he and Neubauer could live
together on his grandparents’ property.
Fleming Ralston shared this plan with Kleine and, over the following months, the
two discussed plans on the online social platform, Discord. Kleine told Higgins about
the plan and Higgins agreed to help. Higgins, Kleine, and Fleming Ralston discussed
specifics of the plan such as dates and weapons.
In the early morning of May 17, 2020, Higgins procured knives and a tarp and
drove Kleine to the Fleming Ralston home. Fleming Ralston waited until his
grandparents were asleep and then let Higgins and Kleine inside. The group entered
the bedroom where Fleming Ralston’s grandmother was sleeping. Fleming Ralston
restrained his grandmother while Higgins strangled her and stabbed her twice in the
neck. The group proceeded to another bedroom where Fleming Ralston restrained his
grandfather while Kleine and Higgins stabbed him. They then used the tarp to move the
-2- No. 88022-5-I/3
bodies to the basement. Afterward, Higgins and Kleine drove home. Fleming Ralston
later lit the home on fire which led to discovery of the bodies and the arrest of the
Fleming Ralston, Kleine, and Neubauer.
Higgins was arrested on May 29 and when confronted with cell phone location
data and messages from Discord, Higgins confessed to his involvement.
A jury convicted Higgins of two counts of aggravated murder in the first degree
and one count of conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree. Accordingly, Higgins
faced a life sentence without the possibility of parole (LWOP). RCW 10.95.030(1). 1
During sentencing Higgins argued for an exceptional sentence below the
standard range. He argued that the mitigating factor of youthfulness applied and
warranted a sentence of no more than 500 months. Higgins asserted that a lower
sentence was appropriate in light of his youthfulness and that he was not involved in
planning the murders and was simply there as the “operative that engaged the plan that
was concocted by [Kleine and Fleming Ralston].”
The trial court considered Higgins’s youthfulness without objection from the
State.
Mr. Higgins was involved in the planning and participated in more than just showing up and doing some things. He drove. He brought the weapons that were used. He brought the tarp that was utilized. So I mean I think that it is disingenuous—it would be disingenuous for me to consider Mr. Higgins to have been youthful when this thing occurred, given I think the way the court looks at why we take into account youth. Not just that someone is young, but that their behavior is such that it can’t be explained in any way other than they were young and had no idea what they were getting themselves into.
1 “[A]ny person convicted of the crime of aggravated first degree murder shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment without possibility of release or parole.” RCW 10.95.030(1).
-3- No. 88022-5-I/4
These people understood what they were getting themselves into, and, in fact, seemed to have some—Mr. Higgins seemed to have some desire along with Mr. Kleine to make sure that it happened that night. They showed up in the middle of the night and waited for several hours outside before they moved in and commenced the attack, so I don’t think that this was youthful indiscretion. This was an incredibly unfortunate set of choices made by a group of young adults who were operating in a way that not many people can understand.
The trial court determined it would not deviate down from the LWOP sentence:
I guess, Mr. Higgins, I will tell you that it appears to me as though in this state it’s entirely possible that you will have the opportunity to address this matter with someone at some point in time and have this very issue whether 23 is the magic number or whether 23 is—given the facts of this case, whether 23 is a disqualifying number for you to get any kind of relief. But as I sit here now looking at the report that was prepared on your behalf that discusses your schooling, your life, your attempt at the military, you know, it appears to me as though you tried on a variety of levels not to end up like this. In fact, I suspect that ending up like this was not at all part of your thought process.
The trial court sentenced Higgins to two LWOP terms of confinement plus 240
months for the conspiracy conviction and 72 months for the deadly weapon
enhancement.
The trial court set restitution in the amount of $10,988.04 to be paid joint and
several with Neubauer, Kleine, and Fleming Ralston.
Higgins appeals.
II
Higgins argues that he is entitled to the individualized sentencing for youthful
offenders as outlined in In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 311 n.6,
482 P.3d 276 (2021). Higgins asserts that Monschke set a floor, not a ceiling, and
allows the trial court to consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor for a 23-year-old
offender. We disagree.
-4- No. 88022-5-I/5
It is constitutionally impermissible to impose mandatory life sentences without
parole on persons who committed crimes under the age of 18. Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 472, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). In Monschke, our Supreme
Court concluded that our sentencing statute for aggravated murder in the first degree,
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 88022-5-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION SEAN ROBERT HIGGINS,
Appellant.
MANN, J. — Sean Higgins was convicted of two counts of aggravated first degree
murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder. Higgins appeals his life
sentence without the possibility of parole. He argues that the trial court failed to
properly consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor during sentencing. Because
Higgins was 23 years old at the time he committed his crimes, he is not a youthful
offender. The trial court did not have the authority under the aggravated murder statute
to impose a sentence other than life without the possibility of parole. We affirm.
I
Higgins was born in 1996. He was bullied as a child and struggled to make
friends. In January 2019, Higgins joined the Navy with the goal of being in the
submarine electronics computer field. But Higgins suffered a severe panic attack during No. 88022-5-I/2
a wet chamber training exercise. Higgins later experienced trouble sleeping, anxiety,
and suicidal ideation. Higgins was diagnosed with adjustment disorder with mixed
anxiety and depressed mood and was disqualified from submarine duty. Less than a
year after enlisting, he was found unfit for service and recommended for administrative
separation. By 2020, Higgins was living with his parents in Roy, Washington, and
working at a lumber yard.
Ezra Fleming Ralston lived in Vaughn, Washington at the home of his
grandparents. Fleming Ralston was in a relationship with Rebecka Neubauer.
Neubauer knew Spencer Kleine from high school and Kleine was friends with Higgins.
Fleming Ralston had ideas of a “movement” to dismantle capitalism and live off the grid.
In 2019, he began plotting to kill his grandparents so he and Neubauer could live
together on his grandparents’ property.
Fleming Ralston shared this plan with Kleine and, over the following months, the
two discussed plans on the online social platform, Discord. Kleine told Higgins about
the plan and Higgins agreed to help. Higgins, Kleine, and Fleming Ralston discussed
specifics of the plan such as dates and weapons.
In the early morning of May 17, 2020, Higgins procured knives and a tarp and
drove Kleine to the Fleming Ralston home. Fleming Ralston waited until his
grandparents were asleep and then let Higgins and Kleine inside. The group entered
the bedroom where Fleming Ralston’s grandmother was sleeping. Fleming Ralston
restrained his grandmother while Higgins strangled her and stabbed her twice in the
neck. The group proceeded to another bedroom where Fleming Ralston restrained his
grandfather while Kleine and Higgins stabbed him. They then used the tarp to move the
-2- No. 88022-5-I/3
bodies to the basement. Afterward, Higgins and Kleine drove home. Fleming Ralston
later lit the home on fire which led to discovery of the bodies and the arrest of the
Fleming Ralston, Kleine, and Neubauer.
Higgins was arrested on May 29 and when confronted with cell phone location
data and messages from Discord, Higgins confessed to his involvement.
A jury convicted Higgins of two counts of aggravated murder in the first degree
and one count of conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree. Accordingly, Higgins
faced a life sentence without the possibility of parole (LWOP). RCW 10.95.030(1). 1
During sentencing Higgins argued for an exceptional sentence below the
standard range. He argued that the mitigating factor of youthfulness applied and
warranted a sentence of no more than 500 months. Higgins asserted that a lower
sentence was appropriate in light of his youthfulness and that he was not involved in
planning the murders and was simply there as the “operative that engaged the plan that
was concocted by [Kleine and Fleming Ralston].”
The trial court considered Higgins’s youthfulness without objection from the
State.
Mr. Higgins was involved in the planning and participated in more than just showing up and doing some things. He drove. He brought the weapons that were used. He brought the tarp that was utilized. So I mean I think that it is disingenuous—it would be disingenuous for me to consider Mr. Higgins to have been youthful when this thing occurred, given I think the way the court looks at why we take into account youth. Not just that someone is young, but that their behavior is such that it can’t be explained in any way other than they were young and had no idea what they were getting themselves into.
1 “[A]ny person convicted of the crime of aggravated first degree murder shall be sentenced to life
imprisonment without possibility of release or parole.” RCW 10.95.030(1).
-3- No. 88022-5-I/4
These people understood what they were getting themselves into, and, in fact, seemed to have some—Mr. Higgins seemed to have some desire along with Mr. Kleine to make sure that it happened that night. They showed up in the middle of the night and waited for several hours outside before they moved in and commenced the attack, so I don’t think that this was youthful indiscretion. This was an incredibly unfortunate set of choices made by a group of young adults who were operating in a way that not many people can understand.
The trial court determined it would not deviate down from the LWOP sentence:
I guess, Mr. Higgins, I will tell you that it appears to me as though in this state it’s entirely possible that you will have the opportunity to address this matter with someone at some point in time and have this very issue whether 23 is the magic number or whether 23 is—given the facts of this case, whether 23 is a disqualifying number for you to get any kind of relief. But as I sit here now looking at the report that was prepared on your behalf that discusses your schooling, your life, your attempt at the military, you know, it appears to me as though you tried on a variety of levels not to end up like this. In fact, I suspect that ending up like this was not at all part of your thought process.
The trial court sentenced Higgins to two LWOP terms of confinement plus 240
months for the conspiracy conviction and 72 months for the deadly weapon
enhancement.
The trial court set restitution in the amount of $10,988.04 to be paid joint and
several with Neubauer, Kleine, and Fleming Ralston.
Higgins appeals.
II
Higgins argues that he is entitled to the individualized sentencing for youthful
offenders as outlined in In re Personal Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 311 n.6,
482 P.3d 276 (2021). Higgins asserts that Monschke set a floor, not a ceiling, and
allows the trial court to consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor for a 23-year-old
offender. We disagree.
-4- No. 88022-5-I/5
It is constitutionally impermissible to impose mandatory life sentences without
parole on persons who committed crimes under the age of 18. Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 472, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). In Monschke, our Supreme
Court concluded that our sentencing statute for aggravated murder in the first degree,
RCW 10.95.030, was unconstitutional as applied to 19- and 20-year-old defendants.
197 Wn.2d at 306-07. Our Supreme Court explained that our state constitutional
prohibition against “cruel punishment” forbids mandatory life without the possibility of
parole sentences for youthful offenders because such sentences deny trial judges the
discretion to consider the mitigating qualities of youth and engage in individualized
sentencing. Monschke, 197 Wn.2d at 311-12. As the court clarified, “the variability in
individual attributes of youthfulness are exactly why courts must have discretion to
consider those attributes as they apply to each individual youthful offender.” Monschke,
197 Wn.2d at 323. The court also emphasized that because “no meaningful
neurological bright line exists between age 17 and age 18,” sentencing courts must be
able to consider the mitigating qualities of youth for defendants younger and older than
18. Monschke, 197 Wn.2d at 326.
Higgins contends that Monschke did not announce a bright line rule for
youthfulness at 20, but recognized that individualized sentences that consider the
mitigating qualities of youth are required for individuals “at least as old” as 19 and 20
years old. Monschke, 197 Wn.2d at 306-07. Higgins argues that “[t]his leaves the door
open for an argument that an emerging adult,” including Higgins who was 23 at the time
he committed his crime, “is likewise entitled to constitutional protection.”
-5- No. 88022-5-I/6
But this court, and our Supreme Court have declined to extend the holding in
Monschke, to 21-year-old offenders. See, e.g., In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 200
Wn.2d 75, 83-84, 514 P.3d 653 (2022) (holding that Monschke did not extend to a 21-
year-old sentenced under a different statute); State v. Meza, 22 Wn. App. 2d 514, 545,
512 P.3d 608 (2022) (holding that Monschke did not categorically extend leniency
based on mitigating factors of youth to 21-year-old defendants). 2 And in In re Personal
Restraint of Kennedy, 200 Wn.2d 1, 23, 513 P.3d 769 (2022), our Supreme Court
explained that the lead opinion in Monschke “was careful to note it was not concluding
that [life without parole] is categorically barred for young adults.” As an intermediate
appellate court, we decline here to extend the temporal bounds of Monschke to include
23-year-olds.
Higgins was charged with aggravated first degree murder under RCW
10.95.030(1). RCW 10.95.030(1) mandates that “any person convicted of aggravated
first degree murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release
or parole.” The statute does not allow a sentencing court to exercise discretion and
impose a lesser sentence. Higgins was 23 years old at the time he committed his
crimes and that age does not fall within the 18 to 20-year-old range discussed in
Monschke. Because Higgins was not a juvenile or youthful offender, the trial court did
not have discretion to consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor during sentencing.
Under the aggravated first degree murder statute, the trial court was required to
impose the mandatory LWOP sentence and it did so here.
2 Higgins contends that our decision in Meza left it to the discretion of the sentencing court to
apply youthful principles on a “case by case basis.” 22 Wn. App. 2d at 545. But Higgins ignores that Meza addressed a 21-year-old defendant and did not consider extending Monschke to 23-year-olds.
-6- No. 88022-5-I/7
III
Higgins argues remand is necessary to determine whether restitution interest
should be waived under a recent change in the law which allows courts to choose not to
impose restitution interest. 3 We disagree.
Higgins did not object to the imposition of restitution interest even though the
change in the law went into effect well before he was sentenced. 4 Higgins also did not
ask the sentencing court to exercise its discretion and fails to argue that the trial court
abused its discretion by imposing restitution interest. We will not disturb a restitution
award “‘absent an abuse of discretion.’” State v. Keigan C., 120 Wn. App. 604, 609, 86
P.3d 798 (2004) (quoting State v. Donahoe, 105 Wn. App. 97, 100, 18 P.3d 618
(2001)), aff’d sub nom. State v. Hiett, 154 Wn.2d 560, 115 P.3d 274 (2005).
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
3 Former RCW 10.82.090 required interest to be imposed on restitution. In 2022, the legislature
added a subsection to RCW 10.82.090 granting courts the discretion not to impose interest on restitution after considers several factors including indigency. LAWS OF 2022, ch. 260, § 12. 4 The provision went into effect on January 1, 2023. LAWS OF 2022, ch. 260, § 26. Higgins was
sentenced in August 2023.
-7-