State of Washington v. Sean Kyle Martin

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: December 5, 2024
• Docket: 39429-8
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED DECEMBER 5, 2024 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 39429-8-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) SEAN KYLE MARTIN, ) ) Appellant. )

LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Sean Martin appeals his standard range sentence and

asks us to direct the trial court to strike various legal financial obligations (LFOs). We

conclude that Martin waived his right to appeal a standard range sentence, but remand for

the trial court to strike the challenged LFOs.

FACTS

In 2014, Sean Martin pleaded guilty to four counts of first degree robbery,

including three firearm enhancements. He committed the robberies when he was 22 to 23

years old. Martin completed a statement on plea of guilty that included a waiver of his

right to appeal his sentence if the trial court sentenced him within the standard range.

The sentencing judge, however, incorrectly stated that if Martin pleaded guilty he had no

right to appeal. No. 39429-8-III State v. Martin

At sentencing, the State informed the trial court that the parties had reached a joint

recommendation for a low-end standard range sentence, which, after adding 60 months

for each of the three firearm enhancements, totaled 257 months. The State also

mentioned that Martin had confessed to “using a firearm in 17 different felonies, which

resulted in a minimum of 85 years just in weapons enhancements alone.” Rep. of Proc.

(May 21, 2014) (RP) at 12. Defense counsel, in asking for the court to accept the joint

recommendation, acknowledged that the 257-month (or 21-year, 5 month) sentence was

substantial, but emphasized that the plea allowed Martin to avoid the risk of a sentence

between 65 and 85 years. The trial court asked Martin if he had anything to say before it

imposed sentence. Martin said he “was hoping [he] could get maybe under ten years.”

RP at 38.

The trial court imposed the jointly recommended sentence of 257 months, and also

ordered Martin to pay a $500.00 victim penalty assessment (VPA), a $200.00 criminal

filing fee, a $100.00 DNA collection fee, and $11,072.61 in restitution.

In late 2022, Martin filed this appeal. Because the trial court had misinformed

Martin of his limited right to appeal, we enlarged the time so to consider this appeal.

2 No. 39429-8-III State v. Martin

ANALYSIS

Martin argues the trial court erred by failing to exercise its discretion to consider

an exceptional sentence below the standard range. The State responds that Martin waived

his right to appeal from a standard range sentence. We agree with the State.

Plea agreements are treated as contracts binding on both the State and the

defendant, with a “strong public interest in enforcing the terms of plea agreements which

are voluntarily and intelligently made.” In re Pers. Restraint of Breedlove, 138 Wn.2d

298, 309, 979 P.2d 417 (1999). Where a defendant agrees to plead guilty to avoid a

potentially more severe sentence, “[h]e must be held to his bargain, just as the State is

bound by the plea agreement.” State v. Hilyard, 63 Wn. App. 413, 420, 819 P.2d 809

(1991). “The benefits of plea bargains include finality, acceptance of responsibility,

preservation of resources, and the exercise of mercy.” State v. Westwood, 10 Wn. App.

2d 543, 549, 448 P.3d 771 (2019). A defendant who enters into a negotiated plea

agreement that specifically waives the right to appeal a standard range sentence cannot

raise nonjurisdictional challenges to the constitutionality of a standard range sentence.

State v. Moten, 95 Wn. App. 927, 929-34, 976 P.2d 1286 (1999).

Martin, citing State v. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d 47, 399 P.3d 1106 (2017), argues

that his waived right to appeal does not foreclose him from arguing that the trial court

3 No. 39429-8-III State v. Martin

erred by failing to exercise its discretion to impose an exceptional sentence below the

standard range. We disagree.

In McFarland, the court held that RCW 9.94A.535(1)(g) gives sentencing courts

discretion to impose concurrent firearm-related sentences when multiple firearm-related

convictions result in a presumptive sentence that is clearly excessive in light of the

purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW. Id. at 55. The

court further held, even though RCW 9.94A.585(1) generally prohibits a defendant from

appealing a standard range sentence, a defendant may appeal such a sentence when a

“‘court has refused to exercise discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for

refusing to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range.’” Id. at 56 (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. McGill, 112 Wn. App. 95, 100, 47 P.3d 173

(2002)).

McFarland is distinguishable. The defendant in McFarland did not waive his

right to appeal a standard range sentence.

As mentioned previously, plea bargains are contracts. In general, a waiver of

rights is enforceable. Here, in the plea agreement, Martin waived numerous rights—the

right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, the right to remain silent, the right

to hear and question witnesses, the right to testify, the right to be presumed innocent, and

4 No. 39429-8-III State v. Martin

the right to appeal a finding of guilt. These rights are constitutionally based. These

constitutional rights are waivable. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S. Ct. 1709,

23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969); State v. Branch, 129 Wn.2d 635, 642, 919 P.2d 1228 (1996).

Because constitutional rights are waivable in a plea agreement, it follows that statutory

rights are also waivable.

Here, Martin does not contest that his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

In exchange for his plea and waiver of right to appeal a standard range sentence, Martin

received a sentence of 21 years, 5 months, and avoided a sentence that could have been

several times longer. We conclude that Martin waived his right to appeal the standard

range sentence he received, and with it, any argument that his three firearm convictions

should have been sentenced concurrently rather than consecutively.

LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS

Martin requests that we direct the trial court to strike three LFOs imposed in his

judgment—the criminal filing fee, the DNA collection fee, and the VPA.

In 2018, the legislature prohibited courts from imposing the criminal filing fee on

indigent defendants. LAWS OF 2018, ch. 269, § 17(2)(h). In 2023, the legislature

eliminated DNA collection fees and prohibited courts from imposing victim penalty

assessments on indigent defendants. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, §§ 1, 4.

5 No. 39429-8-111 State v. Martin

Statutory changes to cost statutes apply prospectively. State v. Ramirez, 191

Wn.2d 732, 748-49, 426 P.3d 714 (2018). A statute operates prospectively when the

precipitating event for its application occurs after the effective date of the statute. Id. at

749. The precipitating event of the statute is the termination of the case. Id. Because

Martin's case is on appeal, it has not yet terminated and the challenged LFOs must be

struck, subject to a showing that he is indigent.

The State asks, if we agree with Martin, that we remand without resentencing. We

agree with Martin, yet Martin's presence in court could be required for him to establish

his indigency. Rather than requiring the State to incur this expense, we simply direct the

trial court to find that Martin is indigent and strike the challenged LFOs.

Affirm sentence, but remand to strike criminal filing fee, DNA collection fee, and

VPA.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

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Cooney, J.