Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
December 22, 2015
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 46825-5-II
Respondent,
v.
SAMUEL J. FLETCHER, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
WORSWICK, J. — A jury returned a verdict finding Samuel Fletcher guilty of failure to
register as a sex offender. Fletcher appeals his conviction, asserting that the State failed to
present sufficient evidence in support of the conviction. Fletcher also appeals his sentence,
asserting that the sentencing court erred by concluding that his failure to register as a sex
offender conviction constituted a class C felony. We affirm.
FACTS
Fletcher has previously been convicted of a felony sex offense, which conviction required
him to register as a sex offender under former RCW 9A.44.130 (2011). On August 8, 2013,
Fletcher registered his address as unit 1 of an apartment complex in Aberdeen, Washington. On
that same date, Fletcher signed a document informing him of his registration obligations.
On February 11, 2014, Fletcher sent a letter to the Grays Harbor County Sheriff’s Office
that stated he was being released from custody and would be returning to his registered address
in Aberdeen. On March 27, 2014, community corrections officer Curtis Perry went to Fletcher’s
registered address to verify that he was residing there. When Perry went to the registered No. 46825-5-II
address and could not locate Fletcher, he looked through a window and saw that the apartment
was empty.
On March 31, 2014, Aberdeen police officer Steve Timmons went to Fletcher’s
registered address to verify that he was residing there. When Timmons arrived at the residence,
he saw that the front door was open and that there were several documents posted on the outside
of the door. Timmons entered the apartment and saw that the refrigerator was open and empty.
Timmons also saw garbage on the floor, scattered clothing, and a mattress leaning up against a
wall. Timmons did not see any food, toiletries, or other items indicating that someone was
currently residing at the apartment.
The State charged Fletcher with failure to register as a sex offender, alleging that he
committed the offense on or about March 31, 2014. At trial, Perry and Timmons testified
consistently with the facts as stated above. During Timmons’s testimony, the trial court admitted
photographs showing the condition of the apartment when Timmons had entered it.
Frederick Voosen testified that he owned the apartment complex where Fletcher had
registered his address. Voosen stated that Fletcher moved away from the apartment at the
beginning of March, 2014. Voosen said that he had issued an eviction notice to Fletcher dated
February 11, 2014 and had his property manager post the notice on Fletcher’s door. Voosen also
said that he issued an abandonment notice dated March 4, 2014 that the property manager posted
on Fletcher’s door.
The jury returned a verdict finding Fletcher guilty of failure to register as a sex offender.
The sentencing court classified Fletcher’s failure to register conviction as a non-sex offense class
C felony. Fletcher appeals his judgment and sentence.
2 No. 46825-5-II
ANALYSIS
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Fletcher first contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his
failure to register as a sex offender conviction. We disagree.
Evidence is sufficient to support a guilty verdict if any rational trier of fact, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the elements of the charged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Longshore, 141 Wn.2d 414, 420-21, 5 P.3d 1256 (2000).
We interpret all reasonable inferences in the State’s favor. State v. Hosier, 157 Wn.2d 1, 8, 133
P.3d 936 (2006). Direct and circumstantial evidence carry the same weight. State v. Varga, 151
Wn.2d 179, 201, 86 P.3d 139 (2004). Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and are
not subject to review. State v. Cantu, 156 Wn.2d 819, 831, 132 P.3d 725 (2006).
To convict Fletcher of failure to register as a sex offender as charged here, the State had
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) had a duty to register under RCW 9A.44.130 for a
felony sex offense and (2) knowingly failed to register within three business days of either (a)
changing his residence or (b) ceasing to have a fixed residence. Former RCW 9A.44.130(4)-(5)
(2011); former RCW 9A.44.132 (2011). Fletcher challenges only the second element, arguing
that sufficient evidence did not support his conviction because the State failed to present any
evidence that he had moved to a new address. But the State was not required to present evidence
that Fletcher had moved to a new residence address to prove he violated former RCW
9A.44.130’s registration requirements. Rather, because former RCW 9A.44.130 required
Fletcher to register within three business days of either (1) changing his residence or (2) ceasing
to have a fixed residence, the State needed only to present sufficient evidence that he did not
3 No. 46825-5-II
intend to return to his registered address and thereafter knowingly failed to comply with former
RCW 9A.44.130’s registration requirements. See State v. Pickett, 95 Wn. App. 475, 478, 975
P.2d 584 (1999) (Defining “residence” as “either a temporary or permanent dwelling . . . to
which one intends to return.”); see also State v. Drake, 149 Wn. App. 88, 94-95, 201 P.3d 1093
(2009) (Where defendant maintains a residence and intends to return to the residence, the
defendant is “under no duty to change his registration to another residence or declare that he had
no fixed residence.”). Thus, we examine only whether the State presented sufficient evidence
that Fletcher knowingly failed to register within three business days of the date that he did not
intend to return to his registered address.
Here, Voosen testified that Fletcher moved away from his registered address at the
beginning of March. Perry testified that he went to Fletcher’s registered address on March 27
and saw that his apartment was empty. Timmons testified that he went to Fletcher’s registered
address three days later and saw that the front door was open and that eviction and abandonment
notices were posted on the door. Timmons also testified that he went inside the apartment and
did not see any items inside indicating that someone was currently residing there. Additionally,
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Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
December 22, 2015
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 46825-5-II
Respondent,
v.
SAMUEL J. FLETCHER, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
WORSWICK, J. — A jury returned a verdict finding Samuel Fletcher guilty of failure to
register as a sex offender. Fletcher appeals his conviction, asserting that the State failed to
present sufficient evidence in support of the conviction. Fletcher also appeals his sentence,
asserting that the sentencing court erred by concluding that his failure to register as a sex
offender conviction constituted a class C felony. We affirm.
FACTS
Fletcher has previously been convicted of a felony sex offense, which conviction required
him to register as a sex offender under former RCW 9A.44.130 (2011). On August 8, 2013,
Fletcher registered his address as unit 1 of an apartment complex in Aberdeen, Washington. On
that same date, Fletcher signed a document informing him of his registration obligations.
On February 11, 2014, Fletcher sent a letter to the Grays Harbor County Sheriff’s Office
that stated he was being released from custody and would be returning to his registered address
in Aberdeen. On March 27, 2014, community corrections officer Curtis Perry went to Fletcher’s
registered address to verify that he was residing there. When Perry went to the registered No. 46825-5-II
address and could not locate Fletcher, he looked through a window and saw that the apartment
was empty.
On March 31, 2014, Aberdeen police officer Steve Timmons went to Fletcher’s
registered address to verify that he was residing there. When Timmons arrived at the residence,
he saw that the front door was open and that there were several documents posted on the outside
of the door. Timmons entered the apartment and saw that the refrigerator was open and empty.
Timmons also saw garbage on the floor, scattered clothing, and a mattress leaning up against a
wall. Timmons did not see any food, toiletries, or other items indicating that someone was
currently residing at the apartment.
The State charged Fletcher with failure to register as a sex offender, alleging that he
committed the offense on or about March 31, 2014. At trial, Perry and Timmons testified
consistently with the facts as stated above. During Timmons’s testimony, the trial court admitted
photographs showing the condition of the apartment when Timmons had entered it.
Frederick Voosen testified that he owned the apartment complex where Fletcher had
registered his address. Voosen stated that Fletcher moved away from the apartment at the
beginning of March, 2014. Voosen said that he had issued an eviction notice to Fletcher dated
February 11, 2014 and had his property manager post the notice on Fletcher’s door. Voosen also
said that he issued an abandonment notice dated March 4, 2014 that the property manager posted
on Fletcher’s door.
The jury returned a verdict finding Fletcher guilty of failure to register as a sex offender.
The sentencing court classified Fletcher’s failure to register conviction as a non-sex offense class
C felony. Fletcher appeals his judgment and sentence.
2 No. 46825-5-II
ANALYSIS
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Fletcher first contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence in support of his
failure to register as a sex offender conviction. We disagree.
Evidence is sufficient to support a guilty verdict if any rational trier of fact, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could find the elements of the charged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Longshore, 141 Wn.2d 414, 420-21, 5 P.3d 1256 (2000).
We interpret all reasonable inferences in the State’s favor. State v. Hosier, 157 Wn.2d 1, 8, 133
P.3d 936 (2006). Direct and circumstantial evidence carry the same weight. State v. Varga, 151
Wn.2d 179, 201, 86 P.3d 139 (2004). Credibility determinations are for the trier of fact and are
not subject to review. State v. Cantu, 156 Wn.2d 819, 831, 132 P.3d 725 (2006).
To convict Fletcher of failure to register as a sex offender as charged here, the State had
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he (1) had a duty to register under RCW 9A.44.130 for a
felony sex offense and (2) knowingly failed to register within three business days of either (a)
changing his residence or (b) ceasing to have a fixed residence. Former RCW 9A.44.130(4)-(5)
(2011); former RCW 9A.44.132 (2011). Fletcher challenges only the second element, arguing
that sufficient evidence did not support his conviction because the State failed to present any
evidence that he had moved to a new address. But the State was not required to present evidence
that Fletcher had moved to a new residence address to prove he violated former RCW
9A.44.130’s registration requirements. Rather, because former RCW 9A.44.130 required
Fletcher to register within three business days of either (1) changing his residence or (2) ceasing
to have a fixed residence, the State needed only to present sufficient evidence that he did not
3 No. 46825-5-II
intend to return to his registered address and thereafter knowingly failed to comply with former
RCW 9A.44.130’s registration requirements. See State v. Pickett, 95 Wn. App. 475, 478, 975
P.2d 584 (1999) (Defining “residence” as “either a temporary or permanent dwelling . . . to
which one intends to return.”); see also State v. Drake, 149 Wn. App. 88, 94-95, 201 P.3d 1093
(2009) (Where defendant maintains a residence and intends to return to the residence, the
defendant is “under no duty to change his registration to another residence or declare that he had
no fixed residence.”). Thus, we examine only whether the State presented sufficient evidence
that Fletcher knowingly failed to register within three business days of the date that he did not
intend to return to his registered address.
Here, Voosen testified that Fletcher moved away from his registered address at the
beginning of March. Perry testified that he went to Fletcher’s registered address on March 27
and saw that his apartment was empty. Timmons testified that he went to Fletcher’s registered
address three days later and saw that the front door was open and that eviction and abandonment
notices were posted on the door. Timmons also testified that he went inside the apartment and
did not see any items inside indicating that someone was currently residing there. Additionally,
the jury was presented with photographs showing the condition of Fletcher’s apartment on
March 31. We hold that this was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer
that Fletcher did not intend to return to his registered address. The jury could also reasonably
infer that Fletcher’s failure to register was knowing based on his conduct in previously
registering under the statute. See, e.g., State v. Castillo, 144 Wn. App. 584, 589-90, 183 P.3d
355 (2008) (Jury could reasonably infer that defendant’s failure to register was knowing where
4 No. 46825-5-II
State presented evidence of defendant’s prior registrations.); State v. Vanderpool, 99 Wn. App.
709, 713-14, 995 P.2d 104 (2000) (same).
Fletcher argues that Drake commands a different result. In Drake, Division Three of this
court held that the defendant’s eviction from his registered address, absent any “evidence from
which it could be inferred that [the defendant] did not intend to return to his apartment,” was
insufficient to prove a violation of RCW 9A.44.130. 149 Wn. App. at 94. This case is
distinguishable from Drake because, in addition to evidence that Fletcher was evicted from his
registered address in early February, the State presented evidence from which the jury could
infer that he did not intend to return to his registered address. Accordingly, we affirm Fletcher’s
conviction for failure to register as a sex offender.
II. SENTENCING
Next, Fletcher asserts that the sentencing court erred by concluding that his conviction
was a class C felony. Specifically, Fletcher appears to argue that because this was his first
conviction for failure to register as a sex offender under former RCW 9A.44.132, his conviction
was not a sex offense and, thus, did not constitute a class C felony. We disagree.
Former RCW 9A.44.132’s offense classification scheme does not depend on whether a
defendant’s failure to register conviction is considered a sex offense. Rather, former RCW
9A.44.132 provides that a conviction for failure to register as a sex offender is (1) a gross
misdemeanor if the defendant failed to register after committing a non-felony sex offense,1 (2) a
class C felony if it is the defendant’s first or subsequent felony conviction for failure to register
1 Because Fletcher stipulated at trial that he had a duty to register after previously being convicted of a “felony sex offense,” this sentencing classification provision clearly did not apply. Clerk’s Papers at 17.
5 No. 46825-5-II
as a sex offender, and (3) a class B felony if the defendant has two or more previous felony
convictions for failure to register as a sex offender. Under this classification scheme, Fletcher’s
assertion that the trial court erred by classifying his conviction as a class C felony is meritless.
Accordingly, we affirm Fletcher’s conviction and sentence.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Worswick, J. We concur:
Johanson, C.J.
Maxa, J.