Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
May 28, 2025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 58297-0-II
Respondent,
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION RYAN MCKENNA HALL,
Appellant.
MAXA, P.J. – Ryan Hall appeals his convictions of felony harassment and misdemeanor
harassment and his sentence. After his arrest for an unrelated incident, Hall used threatening
language against both his arresting officer and a nurse at the hospital where he received
treatment.
The jury was instructed on the definition of “threat” based on existing Washington law
that subsequently was rendered erroneous by a United States Supreme Court case, Counterman
v. Colorado, 600 U.S. 66, 143 S. Ct. 2106, 216 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2023). Hall appeared at pretrial
hearings and at sentencing from an in-court holding cell in a jail courtroom. At sentencing, the
trial court determined without a jury finding that Hall was on community custody when he
committed the offenses, adding one point to his offender score.
We hold that (1) the State provided sufficient evidence to convict Hall for felony
harassment and misdemeanor harassment under the trial court’s jury instructions; (2) the court’s No. 58297-0-II
harassment jury instructions were rendered erroneous by Counterman, but the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) we decline to consider for the first time on appeal Hall’s
argument that the trial court violated his due process rights under State v. Luthi, 3 Wn.3d 249,
256, 549 P.3d 712 (2024), when it restrained him in an in-court holding cell during pretrial
hearings and sentencing because Hall cannot show manifest error; (4) the trial court’s finding at
sentencing that Hall was on community custody when he committed his offenses was
permissible despite the holding in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821, 144 S. Ct. 1840, 219
L. Ed. 2d 451 (2024); (5) Hall’s statement of additional grounds (SAG) claims are based on
evidence outside the record and are unreviewable; and (6) as the State concedes, the crime victim
penalty assessment (VPA) and the jury demand fee must be stricken from the judgment and
sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm Hall’s convictions and sentence, but we remand for the trial court
to strike the VPA and the jury demand fee from the judgment and sentence.
FACTS
Background
On February 5, 2023, the Kelso Police Department took Ryan Hall into custody on an
unrelated charge.1 While he was being transported to jail, Hall told Officer Ralph Hines he had
ingested fentanyl pills. He then was rerouted to a hospital. Hines was assigned to guard Hall as
he was checked out medically.
During Hall’s examination, nurse Brittany Lealao cut off his shirt to allow the doctor to
conduct an ultrasound of his chest. This agitated Hall and he proceeded to repeatedly berate
1 The State initially charged Hall with fourth degree assault – domestic violence. The State eventually decided to not pursue this charge because the victim was uncooperative.
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Lealao, insulting her, calling her offensive names, and referring to her using racial slurs. Hall
continued to yell at other hospital staff and told another nurse that when he got out the next day
he would “see them on the streets.” Report of Proceedings (RP) at 188. After Lealao left the
room, Hannah Cathcart, an emergency room technician, heard Hall say, “I will slit her throat, the
one that cut my shirt off.” RP at 160. Nurse Joshua Bockman heard Hall make a similar threat
about Lealao: “I’ll cut your throat, you n***** bitch.” RP at 178. Cathcart later told Lealao
about the threat Hall had made. Further, Hall threatened to knock out both Hines and Bockman.
Hines, Cathcart, and Lealao all testified that they did not believe Hall was intoxicated.
Hall denied drinking anything. The doctor discharged him and stated in his evaluation that he
did not see any mental issues.
Once Hall was released, Hines transported him to the Cowlitz County Jail. According to
Hines, Hall guaranteed that Hines would be dead in 14 days. The State played the video from
Hines’s body camera, but some of the words Hall said were indiscernible. Hines recounted the
following in his report:
[Hall] said, “You will take your last breath within two weeks. In 14 days, you will no longer be on this Earth.” When I asked Hall what he meant by that, he said, “You will be deceased in 14 days. Guaranteed.”
RP at 144.
After they arrived at the jail, Hall again threatened Hines, stating, “You’re going to be
dead within two weeks . . . I swear to God.” RP at 145. Following this second incident, Hines
told Hall that he would charge him for the threats.
The State charged Hall with felony harassment – criminal justice participant for his
statements to Hines, felony harassment – threat to kill for his statements toward Lealao, and
interference with health care facility.
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Pretrial Proceedings
At Hall’s first appearance, he appeared from an in-court holding cell in a jail courtroom
inside of the Cowlitz County Jail. The trial court did not undertake an individualized inquiry
into the necessity of the holding cell. But Hall did not object to appearing in the holding cell.
The prosecutor informed the court of the alleged death threats and the fact that Hall had 18 prior
warrants, nine prior felonies, and 17 prior misdemeanors. Hall requested bail be set at $5,000,
but the court set bail at $40,000.
Hall appeared from the in-court holding cell again at an arraignment on new information
and at a trial readiness hearing. The trial court again did not conduct an individualized inquiry
into the necessity of the holding cell on either occasion. Hall did not object to either of these
appearances.
Trial and Sentencing
At trial in April 2023, Hines, Lealao, Cathcart, and Bockman testified to the facts stated
above.
Hines testified that he was placed in reasonable fear that Hall’s threats would be carried
out because Hall would be getting out of jail. Hines stated that although he had been threatened
before, this instance stood out because Hall repeated the threat more than once and swore to God
about it.
Lealao testified that Hall’s threat that he was going to slit her throat left her “[f]earful,
terrified, traumatized.” RP at 190. She stated that she was in reasonable fear that Hall would
carry out the threat.
The trial court instructed the jury that a person commits the crime of felony harassment
when they “threaten[] to cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to another person,” the
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person is placed “in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out,” and the threat involves a
threat to kill the person. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 72. The court gave jury instruction 10 regarding
the legal definition of a threat:
To be a threat, a statement or act must occur in a context or under such circumstances where a reasonable person, in the position of the speaker, would foresee that the statement or act would be interpreted as a serious expression of intention to carry out the threat rather than as something said in jest or idle talk.
CP at 75 (emphasis added).
The jury found Hall guilty of felony harassment involving Hines, guilty of the lesser
offense of misdemeanor harassment involving Lealao, and guilty of interference with a health
care facility.
At his sentencing hearing, Hall again appeared from an in-court holding cell and the trial
court did not conduct an individualized inquiry into the necessity of the holding cell. Hall did
not object.
Hall’s attorney stipulated to an offender score of 9, made up of eight points for prior
felony convictions and an additional point for being on community custody when he committed
the present offenses. The standard sentencing range for felony harassment given Hall’s offender
score was 51-60 months, and the State asked the trial court to impose the maximum sentence.
Hall requested a 55.5 month prison based drug offender sentencing alternative (DOSA) sentence.
The trial court stated,
[W]hen watching that video and listening to it at the hospital, and in the police vehicle, that one thing was very clear: that those people were there, especially at the hospital, to help you and to serve you. And instead, they were treated with absolute worst behavior.
What you called people, what you said to people, and what you threatened to do -- I apologize, I don't recall her name -- the victim, that was nothing -- doing nothing but her job.
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And then Officer Hines, again, doing his job. He’s there to protect the community, serve the community, and he has a right to do that, free from having his life threatened. .... But what I listened to and what I heard were clear threats. And it’s for that reason that in Count II of the felony harassment I am going to impose the 60 months. I am not giving the prison based DOSA.
RP at 310-11.
The trial court sentenced Hall to 60 months for the felony harassment conviction and 364
days for the other two convictions, all to be served concurrently. The court waived most
discretionary legal financial obligations, but imposed the $500 VPA and the $250 jury demand
fee.
Hines appeals his felony harassment and misdemeanor harassment convictions and his
ANALYSIS
A. HARASSMENT CONVICTIONS
Hall argues that under Counterman, 600 U.S. 66, his harassment convictions must be
reversed because (1) the State did not present sufficient evidence that his speech was a “true
threat” and (2) the jury instruction defining a “threat” was erroneous. We disagree regarding
sufficiency of the evidence. We agree that jury instruction 10 was erroneous, but we conclude
that the error was harmless.
1. Sufficiency of Evidence
Hall argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of harassment in
light of the new “true threat” standard announced in Counterman. We disagree.
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a. Standard of Review
The test for determining sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the
fact at issue beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bergstrom, 199 Wn.2d 23, 40-41, 502 P.3d 837
(2022). In a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the defendant admits the truth of the evidence,
and we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in the light
most favorable to the State. State v. Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d 243, 265, 401 P.3d 19 (2017).
We defer to the trier of fact’s resolution of conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and the
persuasiveness of the evidence. Bergstrom, 199 Wn.2d at 41.
b. Legal Principles
RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i) states that a person is guilty of harassment if they knowingly
threaten to cause bodily injury. Because this statute criminalizes pure speech, to avoid violating
the First Amendment Washington courts have interpreted RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i) as prohibiting
only “true threats.” State v. Allen, 176 Wn.2d 611, 626, 294 P.3d 679 (2013).
Under Washington law existing at the time of trial, a true threat was a “ ‘statement made
in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the
statement would be interpreted . . . as a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm
upon or to take the life’ of another person.” State v. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d 36, 43, 84 P.3d 1215
(2004) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Williams, 144
Wn.2d 197, 207-08, 26 P.3d 890 (2001)). A true threat is one that arouses fear in the person
threatened, and that fear does not depend on the speaker’s intent. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 43.
Therefore, a statement will be considered a true threat if a “reasonable speaker would foresee
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that the threat would be considered serious.” State v. Schaler, 169 Wn.2d 274, 283, 236 P.3d
858 (2010). Under this standard, the mens rea of harassment is simple negligence. Id. at 287.
After Hall was convicted but during this appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided
Counterman, 600 U.S. 66. The Court held that the First Amendment requires that the true threat
determination must include a “subjective mental-state requirement.” Id. at 75. The State must
prove the defendant made the threat at least recklessly. Id. at 69, 79. Specifically, “[t]he State
must show that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that [their]
communications would be viewed as threatening violence.” Id. at 69. The defendant must be
“aware ‘that others could regard [their] statements as’ threatening violence and ‘deliver[ed] them
anyway.’ ” Id. at 79 (quoting Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 746, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 192 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
c. Analysis
Hall argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of both counts of
harassment because the State did not prove that his speech was a true threat under the
recklessness standard imposed in Counterman.
Hall is mistaken that Counterman applies to his sufficiency challenge. Sufficiency of the
evidence regarding a true threat necessarily must be determined based on the trial court’s
instruction 10, which defined “threat” under existing Washington law: whether “a reasonable
person, in the position of the speaker, would foresee that the statement or act would be
interpreted as a serious expression of intention to carry out the threat.” CP at 75. The trial court
did not require the State to prove recklessness, and therefore the State had no reason to present
evidence of recklessness.
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Under the reasonable person standard in instruction 10, the State clearly presented
sufficient evidence of a true threat. Hall conceded as much at oral argument. Hall threatened to
slit Lealao’s throat. Hines testified that Hall guaranteed that Hines would be dead within 14
days. Hall later swore to God that Hines would be dead in two weeks. No witness testified that
Hall used any humorous language or that his threats were in jest.
Viewing the evidence in this case in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that
a reasonable person would foresee that the statement or act would be interpreted as a serious
expression of intention to carry out these threats. Therefore, we hold that sufficient evidence
supported both of Hall’s harassment convictions under the trial court’s instructions.
2. True Threat Jury Instruction
Hall argues that jury instruction 10 – which defined a threat – was erroneous under
Counterman. The State concedes that the jury instruction was erroneous, but argues that the
error was harmless. We agree with the State.
a. Erroneous Instruction
The trial court instructed the jury that to be a threat,
[A] statement or act must occur in a context or under such circumstances where a reasonable person, in the position of the speaker, would foresee that the statement or act would be interpreted as a serious expression of intention to carry out the threat rather than as something said in jest or idle talk.
Although this true threat instruction was correct under the existing law, under
Counterman the instruction is erroneous. State v. Calloway, 31 Wn. App. 2d. 405, 421-22, 550
P.3d 77, review granted, 3 Wn.3d 1031 (2024). The instruction omitted the constitutional
requirement that Hall – not just a reasonable person – “ ‘consciously disregarded a substantial
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risk that [their] communications would be viewed as threatening violence.’ ” Id. at 421 (quoting
Counterman, 600 U.S. at 69).
Accordingly, we agree that jury instruction 10 was erroneous.
b. Harmless Error
We review an error in the harassment jury instructions relating to the true threat
requirement under a constitutional harmless error standard. Calloway, 31 Wn. App. 2d. at 423-
24. We presume prejudice, and the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
was harmless. Id at 424. An error is harmless if we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury would have reached the same verdict without the error. Id.
Omitting the required mens rea from the jury instructions “ ‘may be harmless when it is
clear that the omission did not contribute to the verdict,’ for example, when ‘uncontroverted
evidence supports the omitted element.’ ” Id. (quoting Schaler, 169 Wn.2d at 288). However,
“an ‘error is not harmless when the evidence and instructions leave it ambiguous as to whether
the jury could have convicted on improper grounds.’ ” Id. (quoting Schaler, 169 Wn.2d at 288).
Here, Hall made unambiguous threats to both Hines and Lealao. Hines testified that Hall
told him he would be dead within 14 days, guaranteed. Hall then said that Hines would be dead
in two weeks, “I swear to God.” RP at 145. Hall said that he would slit Lealao’s throat after
telling a nurse that he would see them on the streets when he got out the next day.
In concluding that harmless error applied in that case, the court in Calloway noted that no
witnesses testified that “[the defendant’s] statements were hyperbolic, that [the defendant] had a
longstanding pattern of saying similar things without meaning them, or that intoxication or
symptoms of a mental illness affected [the defendant’s] state of mind on the day of the incident.”
31 Wn. App. 2d at 425. The same is true here. Multiple witnesses testified that they did not
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believe Hall was intoxicated, and Hall himself denied drinking. The doctor found no signs of
mental illness during Hall’s examination.
Given the repeated and adamant threats to kill Hines and the very specific threat to slit
Lealao’s throat, no reasonable jury would find that Hall did not consciously disregard a
substantial risk that his statements would be viewed as threatening violence. Therefore, we hold
that the jury instruction error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. COURT APPEARANCE IN AN IN-COURT HOLDING CELL
Hall argues that the trial court forcing him to appear at multiple pretrial hearings and at
sentencing in an in-court holding cell violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington
Constitution. The State does not dispute Hall’s claim on the merits, but argues that Hall’s claim
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because the claim does not constitute a manifest
error affecting a constitutional right under RAP 2.5(a)(3). We agree with the State.
1. Applicable Law
After Hall was convicted but during this appeal, our Supreme Court decided Luthi, 3
Wn.3d 249. In Luthi, the court addressed whether a criminal defendant can be required to appear
at court proceedings from the same Cowlitz County in-court holding cell used in this case. Id. at
251.
In a matter of first impression, the court concluded that the in-court holding cell was a
“restraint” on defendants that implicated due process protections. Id. at 260-61. The court
emphasized that the in-court holding cell was a restraint on defendants because it “undermines
the presumption of innocence, the ability to consult with counsel, and the dignity of the
proceedings.” Id. at 261. Therefore, the court held that the routine practice of requiring
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defendants to appear from an in-court holding cell violates due process unless the trial court
makes an “individualized finding that such a restraint is necessary for courtroom security
reasons.” Id. at 263.
The State does not argue that Hall’s appearances from the in-court holding cell were
lawful under Luthi.
2. Manifest Error
RAP 2.5(a) states that the “appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which
was not raised in the trial court.” Here, Hall did not object to appearing from the in-court
holding cell. Therefore, he did not preserve the error. However, a party may raise a manifest
error affecting a constitutional right for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(3).
There is no question that Hall’s claimed error under Luthi is constitutional in nature. The
question is whether the claimed error is manifest.
An error is manifest if the appellant shows actual prejudice. State v. J.W.M., 1 Wn.3d 58,
91, 524 P.3d 596 (2023). The appellant must make a plausible showing that the claimed error
had practical and identifiable consequences. Id.
Here, Hall argues manifest error regarding only his appearances when the trial court set
bail and when the trial court sentenced him. Regarding bail, Hall notes that he requested bail of
$5,000 but the court imposed a $40,000 bail. But Hall has not shown how appearing in an in-
court holding cell made any difference. The court knew that Hall had been detained in jail on as-
yet unproven charges, and the prosecutor informed the court of the alleged death threats and the
fact that Hall had 18 prior warrants, nine prior felonies, and 17 prior misdemeanors. So it is hard
to see how appearing in an in-court holding cell could have affected the court. And there is no
indication that Hall needed to talk to his attorney during the bail hearing.
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Regarding sentencing, Hall notes that he requested a court-based DOSA but the trial
court imposed the maximum 60 month sentence. But at that point, Hall had been convicted, so
there was no concern about presumption of innocence. And there is no indication that Hall
needed to talk to his attorney during sentencing. Finally, the court explained in detail why it
imposed the 60 month sentence rather than a DOSA.
Hall argues that under State v. O’Hara, actual prejudice refers to “whether the error is so
obvious on the record that the error warrants appellate review.” 167 Wn.2d 91, 99-100, 217 P.3d
756 (2009). And “to determine whether an error is practical and identifiable, the appellate court
must place itself in the shoes of the trial court to ascertain whether, given what the trial court
knew at that time, the court could have corrected the error.” Id. at 100.
But the error was not manifest under this standard as well. At the time of Hall’s pretrial
hearings, trial and sentencing, Luthi had not yet been decided. No Washington court had held
that a defendant’s appearance at nonjury proceedings in an in-court holding cell constituted a
restraint subject to due process protections. See Luthi, 3 Wn.2d at 258-61. Therefore, the trial
court’s error was not obvious on the record. In addition, the trial court could not have corrected
the error given what the court knew pre-Luthi.
Hall also argues that this court should consider this issue under the rule set forth in State
v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 253 P.3d 84 (2011). In that case, the Supreme Court stated,
[P]rinciples of issue preservation do not apply where the following four conditions are met: (1) a court issues a new controlling constitutional interpretation material to the defendant’s case, (2) that interpretation overrules an existing controlling interpretation, (3) the new interpretation applies retroactively to the defendant, and (4) the defendant’s trial was completed prior to the new interpretation. A contrary rule would reward the criminal defendant bringing a meritless motion to suppress evidence that is clearly barred by binding precedent while punishing the criminal defendant who, in reliance on that binding precedent, declined to bring the meritless motion.
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Id. at 305.
However, the second requirement is not satisfied here. There was no binding precedent
holding that having a defendant appear in an in-court holding cell did not violate due process.
Hall was free to object – as the defendant did in Luthi – without being “clearly barred by binding
precedent.” Id. Therefore, the rule in Robinson does not apply.
We conclude that Hall cannot show manifest error. Therefore, we decline to consider
Hall’s argument regarding the in-court holding cell.
C. TRIAL COURT FINDING ON COMMUNITY CUSTODY
Hall argues that the trial court impermissibly found that he was on community custody at
the time of his offenses, which added a point to his offender score. Hall claims that under
Erlinger, 602 U.S. 821, the fact that he was on community custody was required to be found by a
jury, not by the court. The State argues that the trial court properly considered Hall’s placement
on community custody and that Erlinger is not applicable to this case. We agree with the State.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that no person should
“be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Sixth Amendment
guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of their peers. The
United States Supreme Court has interpreted these Amendments to generally require “any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 490, 120 S. Ct 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d, 435. There is a narrow exception to this rule: the trial
court may “undertake the job of finding the fact of a prior conviction – and that job alone.”
Erlinger, 602 U.S. at 837.
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Our Supreme Court has long adopted the prior conviction exception and held that
sentence enhancements based on judicial findings of prior convictions are constitutional. State v.
Wheeler, 145 Wn.2d 116, 123-24, 34 P.3d 799 (2001). Specific to this case, the Supreme Court
in State v. Jones held that “[t]o give effect to the prior conviction exception, Washington’s
sentencing courts must be allowed as a matter of law to determine not only the fact of a prior
conviction but also those facts ‘intimately related to [the] prior conviction’ such as the
defendant’s community custody status.” 159 Wn.2d 231, 241, 149 P.3d 636 (2006) (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2005)). “[B]ecause
community custody is directly related to and follows from the fact of a prior conviction and
because the attendant factual determinations involve nothing more than a review of the nature of
the defendant’s criminal history and the defendant’s offender characteristics, such a
determination is properly made by the sentencing judge.” Id. at 234.
Hall argues that we should disregard Jones in light of Erlinger. In Erlinger, the Court
held that the fact determination of whether qualifying convictions were part of different
occasions under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(1), was a question
that must be sent to the jury. 602 U.S. at. 821. But the Court expressly limited its ruling to the
ACCA. Id. at 835. The Court noted that there had been criticism of the prior conviction
exception, but it did not revisit that rule. Id. at 837-38.
Both this court and Division One of this court have decided that the holding in Erlinger is
limited to the “different occasions” inquiry under the ACCA and does not overrule existing
Washington precedent. State v. Frieday, ___ Wn. App. 2d ___, 565 P.3d 139, 155 (2025); State
v. Anderson, 31 Wn. App. 2d 668, 681, 552 P.3d 803, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1034 (2024). We
agree with these cases, and we conclude that Erlinger does not overrule Jones. Therefore, we
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hold that the trial court did not err in finding that Hall was on community custody when he
committed his offenses.2
D. SAG CLAIMS
In his SAG, Hall argues that the State’s witnesses lied during trial and that the State’s use
of false testimony was unfair. But these assertions rely entirely on matters outside the record.
As a result, we cannot consider them on direct appeal. State v. Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d 556, 569,
192 P.3d 345 (2008). These assertions are more properly raised in a personal restraint petition.
Id.
E. LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
Hall argues, and the State concedes, the VPA and jury demand fee should be stricken.
We agree.
Effective July 1, 2023, RCW 7.68.035(4) prohibits courts from imposing the VPA on
indigent defendants as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3). See State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16,
530 P.3d 1048 (2023), review granted, 4 Wn.2d 1009 (2025). For purposes of RCW
10.01.160(3), a defendant is indigent if they meet the criteria in RCW 10.101.010(3)(a)-(c).
Although this amendment took effect after Hall’s sentencing, it applies to cases pending on
appeal. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d at 16. The trial court found Hall was indigent under RCW
10.101.010(3)(a)-(c), and therefore the VPA must be stricken.
2 Hall also argues that the State was required to allege in the information that he was on community custody when he committed his offenses for the court to add a point to his offender score based on that fact. However, he cites no specific authority for this proposition. In light of our holding above, we reject this argument.
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The trial court imposed the jury demand fee on Hall after finding him indigent. The jury
demand fee may not be imposed on indigent defendants. RCW 10.46.190. Therefore, the jury
demand fee must be stricken.
CONCLUSION
We affirm Hall’s convictions and sentence, but we remand for the trial court to strike the
VPA and the jury demand fee from the judgment and sentence.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
MAXA, P.J.
We concur:
PRICE, J.
CHE, J.