FILED DECEMBER 16, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 40389-1-III ) Respondent, ) ) v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) RYAN LEWIS FARR, ) ) Appellant. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — In 2012, the State charged Ryan Farr with assault in
the first degree. In 2013, after multiple competency evaluations, the trial court accepted
Farr’s plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). In 2015, Farr filed a motion to
vacate his NGRI plea, asserting he was incompetent when he entered his plea. During
the resulting hearing, Farr expressed displeasure with his counsel and asked to continue
the hearing. The trial court granted his request and stated that Farr could renote it in the
future.
Several years later, Farr renewed his motion to vacate his NGRI plea and added a
new argument—that his plea was not voluntary because he was not fully advised of his
constitutional rights. The trial court, in denying his CrR 7.8 motion, found that Farr was No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
competent at the time he entered his plea, and that Farr knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entered his plea. Farr appealed the trial court’s ruling.
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Farr was
competent when he entered his NGRI plea. We further conclude that Farr’s new
argument, asserted years after filing his CrR 7.8 motion, was timely. Even assuming his
plea was not voluntary, Farr fails to show that the claimed constitutional violation
resulted in actual and substantial prejudice to him. We affirm the trial court.
FACTS
In 2012, Farr punched and repeatedly stabbed a woman outside a restaurant. The
attack was recorded on a nearby security video camera. The State charged Farr with
assault in the first degree. The information accompanying the charge contained the
elements of first degree assault: “RYAN LEWIS FARR, in the County of Walla Walla,
State of Washington, on or about the 21st day of September, 2012, with intent to inflict
great bodily harm upon the person of VENITA JACKSON, did assault such person with
a firearm or any deadly weapon or by any force or means likely to produce great bodily
harm or death.” Clerks Papers (CP) at 6.
First competency evaluation
On October 8, 2012, the trial court, upon a motion by Farr’s counsel, ordered
Eastern State Hospital (ESH) to conduct a sanity and competency evaluation. Dr. Nathan
2 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
Henry, on behalf of ESH, performed the evaluation two weeks later. During the
interview, Farr informed Dr. Henry he had a history of auditory hallucinations. Dr.
Henry noted there were a couple of instances when it appeared that Farr may have been
distracted by auditory hallucinations. Farr also alluded to possible paranoid delusions
about continued persecution experiences.
During the competency portion of the interview, Dr. Henry evaluated Farr on four
factors: his ability to consult with counsel, his factual understanding of the courtroom
proceedings, his rational understanding of the courtroom proceedings, and his overall
rational ability. Dr. Henry found Farr’s capacity to establish and maintain a working
relationship with his attorney was normal and evidenced little competency-related
impairment. Farr also responded positively to interactions with his attorney.
Dr. Henry believed Farr had an adequate understanding of courtroom procedures
and elements of a pending trial even though he had antisocial attitudes about the legal
system and possible delusional beliefs. “Farr knew that he [was] being charged with . . .
First Degree Assault, . . . knew that his charge[ was a felony] and knew that a felony
[was] more serious than a misdemeanor. Mr. Farr knew that he could potentially spend
the rest of his life in prison if convicted of [the charge].” CP at 269-70.
During the rational understanding of courtroom procedures portion, Dr. Henry
found Farr’s capacity to make decisions was only in the moderately impaired range and
3 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
noted most individuals in this range are competent to stand trial. However, Farr exhibited
paranoid delusions related to his perceptions of the possible outcomes of his case that
negatively impacted his perception of the legal proceedings, his legal decision making,
and the possible outcomes of his case.
While Dr. Henry believed that Farr had an overall capacity for rational thinking in
court-related proceedings, when combined with Dr. Henry’s observations, he found Farr
not competent and requested an order of 90 days of competency restoration. Dr. Henry
diagnosed Farr with a psychotic disorder and a history of polysubstance dependence.
Because of changes to chapter 10.77 RCW, Dr. Henry did not address the sanity question.
Based on this report, the trial court stayed proceedings for 90 days and committed
Farr to ESH for competency restoration treatment.
Second competency evaluation
Dr. Henry reevaluated Farr and issued a report on March 5, 2013 finding him
competent after restoration. Dr. Henry opined that Farr’s personality traits were the
primary issues contributing to his behavior and emotional instability. Dr. Henry also
believed that Farr’s psychotic symptoms were possibly linked with his substance abuse.
Dr. Henry remarked on Farr’s problematic behaviors at ESH during his stay though the
severity had lessened in recent weeks, possibly due to his prescribed psychiatric
medications. Before the interview, Dr. Henry observed a nurse give Farr an antipsychotic
4 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
medication with significant sedating effects. Farr became increasingly heavy-eyed
during the interview and slurred some of his words.
When Dr. Henry evaluated Farr on the same factors as discussed above, he
believed that Farr would be able to adequately assist his attorney in his own defense.
He based this on Farr’s positive attitudes toward his attorney and an appropriate tendency
to rely on his attorney’s advice. Farr still had negative and antisocial attitudes toward the
legal process, but Dr. Henry did not believe his attitudes were reflective of psychosis.
Dr. Henry also believed that Farr had a good understanding of courtroom
proceedings. Farr was able to correctly identify the primary figures in the courtroom and
their respective roles. Farr knew he was charged with assault in the first degree. Farr
knew that his charges were felonies, knew that a felony is more serious than a
misdemeanor, and knew that a defendant could spend time in jail or prison if convicted of
these charges. “He described Assault as ‘hurting somebody I guess’” and “knew that a
jury determines the verdict in a jury trial.” CP at 278.
On Farr’s rational understanding of courtroom proceedings, Dr. Henry noted that
Farr still made statements reflecting persecutory delusions that impacted his perception of
whether he could get a fair trial. However, other statements appeared derivative of his
“negative attitudes towards authority figures; emotional reactivity; and anxiety associated
with [ ] trauma.” CP at 278. Farr also “reflected [a] rational understanding of a plea
5 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
bargain and reasonable factors a defendant might consider in deciding whether or not to
accept an offer from the prosecuting attorney.” CP at 278. Based on the above, Dr.
Henry believed that Farr had the “capacity to understand the proceedings against him and
to participate in his own defense.” CP at 279.
On April 8, 2013, having reviewed Dr. Henry’s report, the trial court entered an
order of competency. On the same day, Farr entered a plea of not guilty. He confirmed
that the information of the charge had been read to him and that he had been provided
with a copy of the information.
Appointing the guardian ad litem
Following the entry of Farr’s plea of not guilty, his counsel filed a motion asking
the trial court to appoint Mark Farr, Farr’s father, as a guardian ad litem (GAL) pursuant
to RCW 4.08.060. In the declaration accompanying the motion, Farr’s counsel stated he
had reviewed the charges with Farr, including the elements of each charge, and had read
the discovery information to him. However, counsel was uncertain if Farr understood the
magnitude of the charges even when the information was explained on a weekly basis.
Counsel attributed this to Farr’s heavy medication, part of his restoration treatment.
Because counsel was concerned about Farr’s ability to retain and understand information,
he thought it best to appoint a GAL.
6 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
The trial court granted the motion and ordered the appointment of Mark Farr as a
GAL. The trial court found that Farr “was determined to be incompetent to stand trial;
that [his] competency has been restored through medication therapy; that [he] does not
appear to understand the ramifications of the crimes charged; and that [his] interests can
be protected by a Guardian Ad Litem.” CP at 253.
Third competency evaluation
On May 17, 2013, Farr’s counsel moved for a sanity evaluation by Dr. Philip
Barnard, a forensic psychologist, noting that ESH had declined to determine Farr’s sanity
when he committed the assault. The trial court granted the motion and ordered Dr.
Barnard to evaluate Farr’s competency and sanity.
Dr. Barnard made his report on June 11, 2013. During the interview, Farr reported
his recurrent auditory hallucinations had lessened since taking antipsychotic medication.
Dr. Barnard also agreed with ESH’s prior assessment that Farr’s delusions stemmed from
his paranoid nature. When speaking with Farr about the night of the incident, Farr stated
he drank a fifth of Black Velvet, blacked out, did not remember anything from that night,
and strongly asserted he was not guilty of the charge. When Dr. Barnard asked if it was
possible that he assaulted the woman but did not remember it, (and alluding to the video
showing that Farr did indeed stab her), Farr became defensive and then confused.
7 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
During the competency assessment portion, Farr was able to articulate the charges
against him. But Dr. Barnard believed that Farr was severely incapacitated in his
knowledge of available legal defenses. He based this on the following answers:
[T]o the question “How do you think you can best be defended against these charges?” Mr. Farr replied “Forensic.” To the question “How can you explain your way out of these charges?” Mr. Farr replied “It was not me.” To the question “What do you think your lawyer should concentrate on to best defend you?” Mr. Farr replied “It was not me.”
CP (No. 33327-2-III)1 at 47.
Of particular importance to this appeal, Dr. Barnard noted that Farr “would be
interested in a plea bargain if it meant that he could be sent to a mental hospital rather
than to prison.” CP (No. 33327-2-III) at 47. Dr. Barnard diagnosed Farr with a psychotic
disorder, cognitive disorder, learning disorder, polysubstance abuse, mild mental
retardation, and a personality disorder. Dr. Barnard’s opinion was that Farr was legally
insane at the time of the incident because his impaired reality, defects in judgment and
reasoning, and mental defects “grossly impaired his ability to tell right from wrong and
be aware of the nature and consequences of his actions.” CP (No. 33327-2-III) at 48.
1 Reports of proceedings and clerk’s papers for cause no. 33327-2-III have been transferred into the record for cause no. 40388-2-III. We will include that cause number in those citations to differentiate from the reports of proceedings and clerk’s papers for cause no. 40388-2-III.
8 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
Fourth competency evaluation
On July 5, 2013, the State moved for an additional sanity and competency
evaluation by ESH, which the court granted. However, after the trial court reviewed Dr.
Barnard’s report a couple of days later, it found that Farr’s competency needed to be
restored and amended the order to include a 90-day restoration period.
On October 8, 2013, after Farr’s second restoration period, Dr. Randall
Strandquist, on behalf of ESH, evaluated Farr for the fourth time and submitted a report
finding Farr had the capacity to assist his attorney and was sane during the incident. Of
particular importance to this appeal, Dr. Strandquist, when reviewing Farr’s time at ESH,
highlighted a progress note that he believed showed Farr’s “accurate understanding of
court proceedings.” CP at 313. Farr was quoted as saying:
“‘I was found competent before and as soon as I’m found competent again my attorney will file the paperwork for NGRI. We paid $3000 for a private investigator/evaluator who said I’m competent but was crazy at the time I committed my crimes. The prosecutor will sign off and I’ll do 10 years upstairs compared to 30 years in prison. I’ll be safer here too, since I’m a gang member.’”
CP at 313.
During the competency portion of the interview, Farr was able to explain the roles
and responsibilities of the judge, defense attorney, prosecuting attorney, witnesses, and
jury. He was able to identify his attorney and how to contact him. He knew and could
9 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
explain the concept of a plea bargain and was aware of his plea options regarding the
charges. Farr also knew that a sentencing follows a guilty plea and a trial follows a not
guilty plea and could correctly identify the crimes for which he was charged.
The NGRI plea
On November 1, 2013, Farr filed a motion for judgment acquitting him of
assault by reason of insanity and a written NGRI plea signed by Farr and his counsel. In
his plea, Farr stated:
It is my belief that at the time of committing this offense I was legally insane. It is further my belief that since being committed to State Hospital subsequent to being arrested on these charges, I am now competent to stand trial and to appreciate the quality of my acts although I am still suffering from Psychotic Disorder not otherwise specified and cognitive disorder, not otherwise specified. In making this plea I understand that if the court accepts my plea and my motion for acquittal by reason of insanity that I am admitting that I committed the acts charged in the information, and if the court finds that I was not responsible by reason of my mental condition I am waiving my constitutional right to a jury trial on that issue. I also understand that I may not later contest the validity of my detention on the ground that I did not commit the acts charged. Furthermore, if the court accepts the motion, I waive my constitutional right to have a jury determine whether I am dangerous to others or likely to commit felonious acts jeopardizing public safety or security, and I give up the right to confront my accusers. I understand that I may be subject to commitment as criminally insane for as long as the maximum penal sentence for the offenses charged, which is life. My attorney has explained to me, and we have fully discussed, the above consequences of this plea. I understand the nature and consequences of this plea and have no questions of the court.
10 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
CP (No. 33327-2-III) at 8-9.
On the same day, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether to accept
Farr’s plea. Although Dr. Strandquist had recently found that Farr was sane at the time of
the offense, the State stipulated to Dr. Barnard’s differing opinion.
In support of the plea, Farr’s counsel noted that each time Farr went to ESH he
came back a little better and counsel believed that an NGRI plea was the best alternative
for Farr. Farr’s counsel confirmed that he discussed the plea with Farr a few days before.
Mark Farr, in his capacity as GAL, also attended the discussion between his son and his
attorney.
At the plea hearing, Mark Farr spoke to the court:
The thing is that [my son] doesn’t need prison. He doesn’t do well in prison. He didn’t get treated in prison. He doesn’t need to be locked in a room 23 hours a day and isolated from everybody. My son needs treatment. And we believe this is the best—the best thing for him. Whether it takes seven, ten, twenty years, I don’t care. I just want him to get better and have that chance. So I’m asking you to agree with this motion.
Report of Proceedings (RP) (No. 33327-2-III) (Nov. 1, 2013) at 5.
The trial court addressed Farr.
THE COURT: . . . Mr. Ryan Farr, I have in front of me your plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. And I just want to go through a few items with you. Does that make sense? [MR. FARR]: Yeah.
11 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
THE COURT: Okay. You are alleging that at the time of the offense, you were legally insane; correct? [MR. FARR]: Yes. THE COURT: And you are at this time competent to stand trial and that you appreciate the quality of the acts, even though you suffer from a psychotic disorder? [MR. FARR]: Yes. THE COURT: Do you understand that if the Court accepts this motion, you waive your right to have a jury determine whether you are dangerous to others or not? [MR. FARR]: Yeah. THE COURT: And that by entering this plea, you are waiving your constitutional right to a jury trial? .... [MR. FARR]: Yes. THE COURT: And in addition, you give up the right to confront any accusers in this matter? [MR. FARR]: Yeah. THE COURT: And most importantly, you understand that you may be subject to commitment as criminally insane for as long as the maximum penalty sentence for the offense charged, which could be life; do you understand that? [MR. FARR]: Yeah. THE COURT: I believe that the Defendant is competent and understands the plea statement.
RP (No. 33327-2-III) (Nov. 1, 2013) at 5-6.
The court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. The Defendant committed the act alleged in Count 1 of the information; 2. The defendant was legally insane at the time of the commission of the act alleged in the information and is not legally responsible for said acts;
12 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
3. There is a substantial danger that the defendant may injure other persons or himself unless kept under further control by the court or other appropriate institutions; 4. There is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may commit felonious acts jeopardizing the public safety or security unless kept under further control by the court or other appropriate institutions; 5. It is in the best interests of the defendant and the public that the defendant, Ryan Lewis Farr be placed in treatment at the state mental hospital at Eastern State Hospital . . . . .... 1. That the court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this cause. 2. That an order should be entered remanding the defendant to the jurisdiction of Eastern State Hospital for the appropriate treatment as being criminally insane, pursuant to RCW chapter 10.77.
CP at 21-22.
The trial court also entered an order of commitment consistent with the findings
and conclusions and committed Farr to ESH, subject to conditional release or final
discharge.
Postconviction proceedings
Starting on October 7, 2014, Farr sent three letters to the trial court, each a few
months apart. The letters asked the court to vacate his NGRI plea because Farr believed
he was incompetent at the time of the hearing, he could not remember the hearing, and
there was a conflict between him and his counsel. On April 24, 2015, Farr filed a
personal restraint petition (PRP) in this court. A few days later, Farr’s counsel filed a
13 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
notice of (direct) appeal with this court seeking review of the trial court’s findings of fact
and conclusions of law entered relating to his NGRI plea.
Soon after, this court ruled that the PRP was technically untimely but found it
related back to Farr’s first letter to the trial court, thus rendering it timely. The PRP
matter was referred back to the trial court because no action had been taken by the trial
court on his request to vacate his plea, and it remained “the role of that court to determine
[the] appropriate disposition of the matter under CrR 7.8(c).” CP at 334.
In June 2015, Farr filed in the trial court a CrR 7.8 motion to vacate his NGRI
plea. In March 2016, the trial court heard Farr’s motion to vacate his NGRI plea. Farr’s
counsel called Dr. Barnard as an expert witness. Dr. Barnard testified he found Farr
incompetent in June 2013 because Farr failed to understand courtroom procedure and
charges and penalties, and because Farr’s ability to cooperate with his lawyer was
borderline marginal. In preparation for the hearing, Dr. Barnard had reexamined Farr to
determine his competency and reviewed the ESH report finding Farr competent in 2013
after his second restoration. After the reexamination, Dr. Barnard believed Farr was now
competent. However, although Dr. Barnard had not seen Farr between his second
restoration in October 2013 and Farr’s November 1, 2013, NGRI plea, Dr. Barnard
disagreed with ESH’s October 2013 report finding Farr competent near the time of that
plea.
14 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
The court recessed for the morning. When the court reconvened, Farr asked to
speak directly with the court. Farr expressed dissatisfaction with his counsel’s
questioning of Dr. Barnard, wanted to retain a new attorney, and asked that the hearing be
continued. The court responded:
I am not appointing a new attorney. He is your appointed counsel and he [will] continue. Having said that, if you are wanting to continue this hearing for whatever reason and schedule it down the road, that’s up to you. [MR. FARR]: I would like to do that. THE COURT: Okay. The matter can be renoted at some point in the future, but [your attorney] continues to be your counsel.
RP (No. 33327-2-III) (Mar. 3, 2016) at 27-28.
Over the next several years, Farr had multiple review hearings to determine the
appropriateness for being conditionally released from ESH. In December 2022, ESH
granted him conditional release. While on release, Farr violated his conditional release
terms by not attending treatment programs, refusing to provide urine samples, not
following house rules at his assisted living facility, and consuming nonprescribed
substances, including methamphetamine. In October 2023, the trial court revoked his
conditional release and ordered him returned to ESH. The trial court concluded
revocation of conditional release was appropriate because Farr continued to be a threat to
public safety given Farr’s index offense of assault in the first degree was committed
while under the influence of illegal controlled substances.
15 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
In November 2023, Farr filed a renewed CrR 7.8 motion in the trial court to vacate
his NGRI plea. On April 18, 2024, the motion came before the trial court. Farr asserted
he was not told the essential elements of the offense, he was not told that he had a right to
remain silent, and he was not told of possible sentencing alternatives. He also renewed
his argument that he was not competent at the plea hearing. After hearing arguments, the
court denied Farr’s motion to vacate his NGRI plea. The court found that Farr’s “plea
was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made” based on
reports from both [ESH] and from [Mr. Farr]’s expert considered at the time of the plea, [Mr. Farr]’s motion and the stipulation which he had signed certifying to his complete understanding of all aspects of his plea . . ., his counsel’s indication that he felt [Mr. Farr] was competent and fully understood the plea, the lack of any evidence that Mr. Farr did not understand the consequences of his plea, and the fact that his responses to the court at the plea hearing were coherent.
CP at 236-37.
Farr appeals the trial court’s denial of his CrR 7.8 motion.
ANALYSIS
Standard of review
A motion to withdraw a plea after a judgment is entered is governed by CrR 7.8.
CrR 7.8(b) allows a court to grant relief from a final judgment for mistakes, for newly
discovered evidence, for fraud, where a judgment is void, or for any other reason
justifying relief. Judgments resulting from pleas that violate due process are void and
16 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
subject to collateral attack pursuant to CrR 7.8(b)(4). State v. Olivera-Avila, 89 Wn.
App. 313, 319, 949 P.2d 824 (1997).
We review a trial court’s ruling on a CrR 7.8 motion for an abuse of discretion.
State v. Lamb, 175 Wn.2d 121, 127, 285 P.3d 27 (2012). A trial court abuses its
discretion if the decision “is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or
reasons.” State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995). “A court’s
decision ‘is based on untenable reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard or the facts
do not meet the requirements of the correct standard.’” Lamb, 175 Wn.2d at 127
(quoting In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997)).
Scope of CrR 7.8 motion to be reviewed
When Farr first filed his CrR 7.8 motion in 2015, it did not identify under
which basis of CrR 7.8(b) he sought relief. In his 2023 renewed motion, he identified
CrR 7.8(b)(5) as the basis of relief: “[a]ny other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.” It was under this basis that the trial court heard and denied
Farr’s motion to vacate his NGRI plea.
On appeal, Farr identifies CrR 7.8(b)(4) as his basis for relief: “[t]he judgment is
void.” Because we are reviewing the trial court’s order denying Farr’s motion to vacate
his plea and because Farr did not present CrR 7.8(b)(4) as his basis for relief, we will not
consider his new argument under CrR 7.8(b)(4); rather, we will confine our analysis to
17 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
the theory argued to the trial court. Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 117 Wn.2d 772, 780,
819 P.2d 370 (1991) (appellate courts will not consider theories not presented below).
“‘Relief under CrR 7.8(b)(5) is limited to extraordinary circumstances not covered
by any other section of the rule.’” State v. Williams, 15 Wn. App. 2d 841, 847, 480 P.3d
1145 (2020) (quoting State v. Smith, 159 Wn. App. 694, 700, 247 P.3d 775 (2011))
“‘Extraordinary circumstances include fundamental and substantial irregularities in the
court’s proceedings or irregularities extraneous to the court’s action.’” Id. (quoting
Smith, 159 Wn. App. at 700). “A violation of a fundamental constitutional right . . .
would be a reason to justify relief.” State v. McGuire, 12 Wn. App. 2d 88, 94, 456 P.3d
1193 (2020).
A. FARR WAS COMPETENT WHEN HE ENTERED THE NGRI PLEA
Farr argues he was not competent to enter an NGRI plea, which invalidates it and
any order from it. We disagree.
Special standard of review for mental competency
“Reviewing courts in Washington customarily defer to the trial court’s judgment
of a defendant’s mental competency.” State v. Coley, 180 Wn.2d 543, 551, 326 P.3d 702
(2014). Appellate courts “will reverse a trial court’s competency decision only upon
finding an abuse of discretion.” Id. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it relies ‘on
facts unsupported in the record,’ applies ‘the wrong legal standard,’ or ‘adopts a view that
18 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
no reasonable person would take.’” Doe v. Thurston County, 4 Wn.3d 906, 915,
569 P.3d 1101 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Rohrich, 149
Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003)).
Competency
The party challenging competency has the burden “to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant [was] incompetent.” Coley, 180 Wn.2d at 555. Farr is
challenging his competency when he entered the NGRI plea. Thus, he has the burden to
prove he was incompetent.
In Washington, incompetent defendants may not be “tried, convicted, or
sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity continues.”
Former RCW 10.77.050 (1974), recodified as RCW 10.77.600 (LAWS OF 2025, ch. 358,
§ 2, effective July 27, 2025). The policy of this statute is simple, it “‘seeks to ensure that
[the defendant] has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.’”
In re Pers. Restraint of Fleming, 142 Wn.2d 853, 862, 16 P.3d 610 (2001) (quoting
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402, 113 S. Ct. 2680, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993)). If
there is a reason to doubt a defendant’s competency to stand trial, the court must order an
expert to evaluate the defendant’s mental condition. Former RCW 10.77.060(1)(a)
(2012), recodified as RCW 10.77.400(1)(a) (LAWS OF 2025, ch. 358, § 2, effective
July 27, 2025). Upon the motion of any party, the court may order an evaluation and
19 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
report on the defendant’s mental condition. Former RCW 10.77.060(1)(a). If the court
finds the defendant incompetent following an evaluation, it must stay the proceedings and
may commit the defendant for treatment. Former RCW 10.77.084(1)(a) (2012),
recodified as RCW 10.77.635(1)(a) (LAWS OF 2025, ch. 358, § 2, effective July 27,
2025). At a competency hearing following restoration treatment in a felony case, the
court must determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendant is
incompetent. Former RCW 10.77.086(3) (2012), recodified as RCW 10.77.645(3)
(LAWS OF 2025, ch. 358, § 2, effective July 27, 2025).
The legal competency test for a criminal defendant in Washington is whether the
defendant understands the nature of the charges and whether he can assist in his defense.
Fleming, 142 Wn.2d at 862. When determining whether a competency hearing is
necessary, the trial court may consider “the defendant’s behavior, demeanor, appearance,
personal and family history, and psychiatric reports.” State v. McCarthy, 193 Wn.2d 792,
801, 446 P.3d 167 (2019). Credibility of the competency evaluators is for the trial court
to determine. State v. Benn, 120 Wn.2d 631, 662, 845 P.2d 289 (1993).
If the trial court decides that a defendant is competent, it need not reconsider
competency unless there is evidence that the defendant’s condition has changed since
their prior competency hearings. State v. Oritz, 119 Wn.2d 294, 300-01, 831 P.2d 1060
20 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
(1992) (plurality opinion), overruled on other grounds by State v. Condon, 182 Wn.2d
307, 323, 343 P.3d 357 (2015).
Here, Farr’s competency to assist in his defense was evaluated three times prior to
the entry of his plea. The first evaluation by ESH found him incompetent and the trial
court ordered a 90-day competency restoration. Several months later, the trial court
questioned Farr’s competency to assist in his defense and again ordered a period of
competency restoration. After that period, ESH evaluated him and found him competent.
Two weeks later, he entered his NGRI plea.
Farr contends that the appointment and retention of his father as GAL shows that
he still was incompetent when he entered his NGRI plea. We disagree.
Washington criminal statutes do not address the appointment of a GAL for
someone believed to be incompetent. Instead, proper procedure under such
circumstances is to have the defendant evaluated and treated for restoration if found
incompetent. Former RCW 10.77.060(1)(a); former RCW 10.77.084(1)(a). That was
done here multiple times.
Instead, defense counsel out of concern for Farr turned to our civil statutes.
RCW 4.08.060(2) provides the court shall appoint a GAL to an incapacitated defendant
upon application of a relative or friend, or any party to the action. The role of a GAL is
to act “for the benefit of and to protect the rights and best interests of the alleged
21 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
incompetent to whom [they are] assigned.” In re Quesnell, 83 Wn.2d 224, 235, 517 P.2d
568 (1973). Notably, defense counsel believed that appointment of Farr’s father as GAL
was appropriate not because Farr was incompetent but because Farr’s court-ordered
medication affected his ability to remember their discussions.
There is no evidence suggesting that the last ESH physician who found him
competent did not carefully evaluate Farr’s ability to understand the nature of his charge
and his ability to assist in his defense. Additionally, there is no evidence between the last
evaluation and the plea hearing suggesting that Farr’s behavior, demeanor, and
appearance should have alerted the trial court that a competency evaluation was
warranted. As later found by the trial court, Farr’s behavior was rational during the plea
hearing. Farr’s replies were not disjointed or incoherent. His counsel did not raise any
concerns as to his competency and counsel also commented that Farr was better each
time he returned from ESH. We conclude that the trial court, at the renewed CrR 7.8
hearing, did not abuse its discretion by finding Farr competent at the time he entered his
NGRI plea.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT THAT NGRI PLEA BE VOLUNTARY
Farr argues that his NGRI plea was not voluntary because he was not fully advised
of his constitutional rights.
22 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
Upon the accused’s motion, a trial court may acquit a defendant on the grounds of
insanity and enter an order of commitment. Former RCW 10.77.110(1) (2000),
recodified as RCW 10.77.530(1) (LAWS OF 2025, ch. 358, § 2, effective July 27, 2025);
former RCW 10.77.080 (1998), recodified as RCW 10.77.515 (LAWS OF 2025, ch. 358,
§ 2, effective July 27, 2025). Washington courts recognize that the acceptance of a
motion for acquittal on the grounds of insanity and a related plea must satisfy due
process. State v. Brasel, 28 Wn. App. 303, 312, 623 P.2d 696 (1981). To satisfy due
process, the defendant must enter the plea voluntarily and intelligently, i.e., understand
both the “nature of the charges against him and the consequences of the motion.” Id.
Before we discuss this issue further, we first address the State’s argument that
Farr’s challenge to the voluntariness of his plea is time barred.
1. Timeliness of raising the voluntariness issue
The State argues Farr’s motion to vacate his NGRI plea based on the plea not
being voluntary is untimely because it was not asserted until several years after Farr’s
NGRI order of acquittal and commitment became final. We disagree.
As noted previously, we are reviewing a collateral attack to Farr’s NGRI order of
acquittal. RCW 10.73.090(1). Generally, a collateral attack may not be filed more than
one year after the judgment becomes final. RCW 10.73.090(1). Amendments to a
collateral attack generally also must be made within this one-year limitation. In re Pers.
23 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
Restraint of Benn, 134 Wn.2d 868, 938-39, 952 P.2d 116 (1998). The NGRI order
became final on April 14, 2017, when this court issued its mandate dismissing Farr’s first
appeal.
The one-year time bar applies to NGRI judgments. In re Pers. Restraint of Well,
133 Wn.2d 433, 441, 946 P.2d 750 (1997). Courts do not have discretion to waive or
alter the limitation period in RCW 10.73.090, and the petitioner carries the burden to
prove the applicability of an exception to the statute of limitations. Shumway v. Payne,
136 Wn.2d 383, 400, 964 P.2d 349 (1998).
If a court acquits a defendant by reason of insanity, the court must advise the
defendant “of the time limits on the right to collateral attack imposed by RCW 10.73.090
and .100.” CrR 6.16(d)(1)(ii). Specifically, the court must advise such a defendant:
You are further advised that if you wish to petition or move for collateral attack on any order of hospitalization or order mandating alternative treatment less restrictive than detention in a state hospital, including but not limited to any personal restraint petition, state habeas corpus petition, motion to vacate judgment, motion to withdraw guilty plea, motion for new trial or motion to arrest judgment, you must do so within one year of the final judgment in this matter, except as provided for in RCW 10.73.100.
CrR 6.16(d)(2).
When a statute requires a court to notify a defendant of a time bar and the
notice is not given, this omission creates an exemption to the time bar, and a court
24 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
must treat the defendant’s petition for collateral review as timely. In re Pers.
Restraint of Vega, 118 Wn.2d 449, 450-51, 823 P.2d 1111 (1992) (applying
rule to RCW 10.73.120); State v. Schwab, 141 Wn. App. 85, 91, 167 P.3d 1225
(2007) (applying rule to RCW 10.73.090).
Here, Farr’s amendment to his collateral attack was made in November 2023.
This was six years after we issued the mandate in Farr’s first direct appeal. But the State
fails to cite any record of the trial court having advised Farr of his right to collaterally
attack the NGRI order within one year of it becoming final. Because the trial court failed
to advise Farr of this right, the one-year time bar does not apply.
2. Voluntariness of Farr’s NGRI plea
Because an NGRI plea has many of the same consequences as a plea of guilty,
Washington courts equate the two for due process purposes. Brasel, 28 Wn. App. at 312.
Therefore, a defendant entering an NGRI plea must have been informed of and
understood “(1) the essential elements of the offense charged; (2) that by making the
motion he admitted to committing the acts charged and that, if acquitted, he might not
later contest the validity of his detention on the ground that he did not commit the acts
charged; (3) that by making the motion he waived his rights to remain silent, to confront
his accusers, and to be tried by a jury; and (4) that, if acquitted, he could be committed to
25 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
a state hospital for the criminally insane for a term up to the maximum possible penal
sentence for the offense charged.” Id. at 313.
The trial court has a duty to ensure the defendant is sufficiently informed and thus
capable of entering a constitutional plea. State v. Holsworth, 93 Wn.2d 148, 155, 607
P.2d 845 (1980). If “the record of a plea-taking procedure fails to demonstrate that
constitutional standards were satisfied, but the procedure conformed to all applicable
statutes and court rules, the State must make ‘a clear and convincing showing that the
plea was in fact knowingly and understandably entered,’ but may introduce evidence
extrinsic to the plea hearing record in making this showing.” Brasel, 28 Wn. App. at
312-13 (quoting Wood v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 501, 507, 554 P.2d 1032 (1976)).
Farr contends that his NGRI plea violated his right to due process because neither
the trial court nor his counsel advised him of (a) the elements of the charge against him,
(b) the possible sentencing alternatives, and (c) that he would be waiving his right to
remain silent. For now, we accept Farr’s argument that his NGRI plea was not voluntary
for one or more of the above reasons. But because Farr’s challenge is a collateral attack
on a final order, he must show more than constitutional error.
Obtaining relief from a conviction based on a collateral attack is “extraordinary.”
In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 132, 267 P.3d 324 (2011). This is
because a collateral attack “‘undermines the principles of finality of litigation, degrades
26 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
the prominence of trial, and sometimes deprives society of the right to punish admitted
offenders.’” In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 152 Wn.2d 647, 670, 101 P.3d 1 (2004)
(quoting In re Pers. Restraint of St. Pierre, 118 Wn.2d 321, 329, 823 P.2d 492 (1992)).
Final judgments will be upheld unless the petitioner demonstrates a constitutional error
that resulted in actual and substantial prejudice or a nonconstitutional error that
constitutes a fundamental defect that inherently resulted in a complete miscarriage of
justice. Coats, 173 Wn.2d at 132. The petitioner bears the burden of showing prejudicial
error by a preponderance of evidence. In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 152 Wn.2d 182, 188,
94 P.3d 952 (2004). Bare assertions unsupported by the record, citation to authority, or
persuasive reasoning cannot sustain the petitioner’s burden of proof. State v. Brune, 45
Wn. App. 354, 363, 725 P.2d 454 (1986).
Here, the record shows that Farr embraced the State’s offer of an NGRI plea.
First, from an evidentiary perspective, Farr’s knife attack on the woman was recorded on
security video. His best hope for avoiding a lengthy prison sentence was an NGRI plea.
Second, one month before Farr’s plea, Dr. Strandquist found a progress note in Farr’s
ESH file that quoted him as saying:
27 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr
“‘I was found competent before and as soon as I’m found competent again my attorney will file the paperwork for NGRI. We paid $3000 for a private investigator/evaluator who said I’m competent but was crazy at the time I committed my crimes. The prosecutor will sign off and I’ll do 10 years upstairs compared to 30 years in prison. I’ll be safer here too, since I’m a gang member.’”
Third, Farr’s father, the appointed GAL, supported the State’s generous offer:
The thing is that [my son] doesn’t need prison. He doesn’t do well in prison. He didn’t get treated in prison. He doesn’t need to be locked in a room 23 hours a day and isolated from everybody. My son needs treatment. And we believe this is the best—the best thing for him. Whether it takes seven, ten, twenty years, I don’t care. I just want him to get better and have that chance. So I’m asking you to agree with this motion.
RP (No. 33327-2-III) (Nov. 1, 2013) at 5.
Fourth, Farr’s hired expert confirmed that Farr “would be interested in a
plea bargain if it meant that he could be sent to a mental hospital rather than to prison.”
CP (No. 33327-2-III) at 47.
The record could not be more clear. Even had the trial court fully advised Farr of
his constitutional rights before his NGRI plea, Farr would have entered his NGRI plea.
Farr fails to satisfy his burden of showing that the claimed constitutional errors resulted
in actual and substantial prejudice.
28 No. 40389-1-III State v. Farr -
We affirm the trial court's order denying Farr's CrR 7.8 motion.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Cooney, J. Murphy, J.