IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 79781-6-I ) Respondent, ) ) DIVISION ONE v. ) ) RYAN JAMES TERRONES, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. ) )
MANN, C.J. — Ryan Terrones pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of rape of a
child in the second degree. Terrones appeals a community custody condition requiring
him to avoid areas where children’s activities regularly occur. Terrones argues the
condition is unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and not crime related. We disagree,
and affirm.
I.
In 2016, Terrones was charged with rape of a child in the second degree after
he raped his 13-year-old adopted sister in the family home. In September 2016,
Terrones pleaded guilty as charged. The State and Terrones agreed to a special sex
offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA), which provided that Terrones would serve six
months in jail, followed by five years of sex-offender treatment.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. No. 79781-6-I/2
Terrones’s psychosexual evaluation and treatment plan recommended that
Terrones “should not work, recreate or socialize in situations where he might have
unsupervised contact with children.” As part of the plea agreement, the court imposed
numerous community custody conditions. Some of the conditions imposed were
specific to offenses involving minors, including condition 18:
Stay out of areas where children’s activities regularly occur or are occurring. This includes parks used for youth activities, schools, daycare facilities, playgrounds, wading pools, swimming pools being used for youth activities, play areas (indoor or outdoor), sports fields being used for youth sports, arcades, and any specific location identified in advance by DOC[1] or CCO.[2]
In March 2019, the court revoked Terrones’s SSOSA, finding that Terrones failed
to make reasonable progress in a sexual deviancy program and that he failed to find a
treatment provider due to his lack of amenability to treatment. The court imposed the
standard range prison term of 90 months to life and re-imposed the community custody
conditions, including condition 18.
Terrones appeals.
II.
Terrones argues that community custody condition 18 is unconstitutionally
vague, overbroad, and not crime related.
Community custody conditions may be challenged for the first time on appeal,
and where the challenge involves a legal question, the conditions may be challenged
preenforcement. State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d 234, 238, 449 P.3d 619 (2019). We
review community custody conditions for an abuse of discretion. The imposition of a
1 Washington Department of Corrections (DOC). 2 Community Corrections Officer (CCO).
2 No. 79781-6-I/3
condition that violates the constitution is manifestly unreasonable. Wallmuller, 194
Wn.2d at 238. We review constitutional questions de novo. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at
238.
A.
Terrones first argues that condition 18 is unconstitutionally vague. The
Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution requires
citizens to have a fair warning of proscribed conduct. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Wash.
Const. art. I, §3. To determine if a community custody condition is unconstitutionally
vague, we consider if the condition (1) does not define the criminal offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed
or (2) does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary
enforcement. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at 239.
Our Supreme Court recently reviewed and affirmed a community custody
condition similar to condition 18 in Wallmuller. The court considered a vagueness
challenge to a condition requiring that “the defendant shall not loiter in nor frequent
places where children congregate such as parks, video arcades, campgrounds, and
shopping malls.” Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at 237. The court conducted a detailed review
of state and federal appellate decisions reviewing similar community custody conditions
to determine whether a vague definition of “places where children congregate” can be
cured by including a nonexclusive list of illustrative examples. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at
239-245. But see State v. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 644, 652-55, 364 P.3d 830 (2015). 3
3 In Irwin, this court held that a condition which stated “do not frequent areas where minor children are known to congregate as defined by the supervising community corrections officer” was unconstitutionally vague without some clarifying language or an illustrative list of prohibited locations.
3 No. 79781-6-I/4
The Wallmuller court determined that the challenged condition was not vague
because “reading this condition in a commonsense way and in the context of the other
conditions, an ordinary person can understand the scope of the prohibited conduct.”
Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at 245. The court further provided that the vagueness doctrine
does not require impossible precision in listing every possible prohibited place.
Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at 245. The court concluded: “the condition challenged here,
including its nonexclusive list of ‘places where children congregate,’ satisfies due
process. It puts an ordinary person on notice that they must avoid places where one
can expect to encounter children, and it does not invite arbitrary enforcement.”
Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at 245.
As in Wallmuller, condition 18 includes a lengthy nonexclusive list of examples,
including “parks used for youth activities, schools, daycare facilities, playgrounds,
wading pools, swimming pools being used for youth activities, play areas (indoor or
outdoor), sports fields being used for youth sports, arcades.” Based on Wallmuller,
Terrones concedes that condition 18 meets the first prong of the vagueness test
because it defines prohibited conduct with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is proscribed.
Terrones instead challenges the portion of the illustrative list that allows DOC or
a CCO to add specific locations to the examples of places to stay out of, contending that
it invites arbitrary enforcement. In making this argument, Terrones relies on Irwin,
where the very definition of areas where children congregate was set by the CCO. This
court held that the defendant would have sufficient notice of prohibited conduct once the
CCO set locations “where children are known to congregate,” however, this broad
4 No. 79781-6-I/5
discretion of the CCO left the condition vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement. Irwin, 191
Wn. App. at 655. Unlike in Irwin, the CCO here is permitted only to clarify the definition
by providing additional examples of locations in advance. Condition 18 provides further
clarity of the condition and prevents arbitrary enforcement because the CCO is required
to provide advance notice of additional specific locations to Terrones, and does not
have the unlimited discretion to define prohibited areas as in Irwin. Condition 18 is not
unconstitutionally vague because it provides fair notice and is not subject to arbitrary
enforcement.
B.
Terrones also argues that the condition is overbroad. He argues the condition
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 79781-6-I ) Respondent, ) ) DIVISION ONE v. ) ) RYAN JAMES TERRONES, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. ) )
MANN, C.J. — Ryan Terrones pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of rape of a
child in the second degree. Terrones appeals a community custody condition requiring
him to avoid areas where children’s activities regularly occur. Terrones argues the
condition is unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and not crime related. We disagree,
and affirm.
I.
In 2016, Terrones was charged with rape of a child in the second degree after
he raped his 13-year-old adopted sister in the family home. In September 2016,
Terrones pleaded guilty as charged. The State and Terrones agreed to a special sex
offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA), which provided that Terrones would serve six
months in jail, followed by five years of sex-offender treatment.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material. No. 79781-6-I/2
Terrones’s psychosexual evaluation and treatment plan recommended that
Terrones “should not work, recreate or socialize in situations where he might have
unsupervised contact with children.” As part of the plea agreement, the court imposed
numerous community custody conditions. Some of the conditions imposed were
specific to offenses involving minors, including condition 18:
Stay out of areas where children’s activities regularly occur or are occurring. This includes parks used for youth activities, schools, daycare facilities, playgrounds, wading pools, swimming pools being used for youth activities, play areas (indoor or outdoor), sports fields being used for youth sports, arcades, and any specific location identified in advance by DOC[1] or CCO.[2]
In March 2019, the court revoked Terrones’s SSOSA, finding that Terrones failed
to make reasonable progress in a sexual deviancy program and that he failed to find a
treatment provider due to his lack of amenability to treatment. The court imposed the
standard range prison term of 90 months to life and re-imposed the community custody
conditions, including condition 18.
Terrones appeals.
II.
Terrones argues that community custody condition 18 is unconstitutionally
vague, overbroad, and not crime related.
Community custody conditions may be challenged for the first time on appeal,
and where the challenge involves a legal question, the conditions may be challenged
preenforcement. State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d 234, 238, 449 P.3d 619 (2019). We
review community custody conditions for an abuse of discretion. The imposition of a
1 Washington Department of Corrections (DOC). 2 Community Corrections Officer (CCO).
2 No. 79781-6-I/3
condition that violates the constitution is manifestly unreasonable. Wallmuller, 194
Wn.2d at 238. We review constitutional questions de novo. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at
238.
A.
Terrones first argues that condition 18 is unconstitutionally vague. The
Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 3 of the Washington Constitution requires
citizens to have a fair warning of proscribed conduct. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Wash.
Const. art. I, §3. To determine if a community custody condition is unconstitutionally
vague, we consider if the condition (1) does not define the criminal offense with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed
or (2) does not provide ascertainable standards of guilt to protect against arbitrary
enforcement. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at 239.
Our Supreme Court recently reviewed and affirmed a community custody
condition similar to condition 18 in Wallmuller. The court considered a vagueness
challenge to a condition requiring that “the defendant shall not loiter in nor frequent
places where children congregate such as parks, video arcades, campgrounds, and
shopping malls.” Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at 237. The court conducted a detailed review
of state and federal appellate decisions reviewing similar community custody conditions
to determine whether a vague definition of “places where children congregate” can be
cured by including a nonexclusive list of illustrative examples. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at
239-245. But see State v. Irwin, 191 Wn. App. 644, 652-55, 364 P.3d 830 (2015). 3
3 In Irwin, this court held that a condition which stated “do not frequent areas where minor children are known to congregate as defined by the supervising community corrections officer” was unconstitutionally vague without some clarifying language or an illustrative list of prohibited locations.
3 No. 79781-6-I/4
The Wallmuller court determined that the challenged condition was not vague
because “reading this condition in a commonsense way and in the context of the other
conditions, an ordinary person can understand the scope of the prohibited conduct.”
Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at 245. The court further provided that the vagueness doctrine
does not require impossible precision in listing every possible prohibited place.
Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at 245. The court concluded: “the condition challenged here,
including its nonexclusive list of ‘places where children congregate,’ satisfies due
process. It puts an ordinary person on notice that they must avoid places where one
can expect to encounter children, and it does not invite arbitrary enforcement.”
Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d at 245.
As in Wallmuller, condition 18 includes a lengthy nonexclusive list of examples,
including “parks used for youth activities, schools, daycare facilities, playgrounds,
wading pools, swimming pools being used for youth activities, play areas (indoor or
outdoor), sports fields being used for youth sports, arcades.” Based on Wallmuller,
Terrones concedes that condition 18 meets the first prong of the vagueness test
because it defines prohibited conduct with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people
can understand what conduct is proscribed.
Terrones instead challenges the portion of the illustrative list that allows DOC or
a CCO to add specific locations to the examples of places to stay out of, contending that
it invites arbitrary enforcement. In making this argument, Terrones relies on Irwin,
where the very definition of areas where children congregate was set by the CCO. This
court held that the defendant would have sufficient notice of prohibited conduct once the
CCO set locations “where children are known to congregate,” however, this broad
4 No. 79781-6-I/5
discretion of the CCO left the condition vulnerable to arbitrary enforcement. Irwin, 191
Wn. App. at 655. Unlike in Irwin, the CCO here is permitted only to clarify the definition
by providing additional examples of locations in advance. Condition 18 provides further
clarity of the condition and prevents arbitrary enforcement because the CCO is required
to provide advance notice of additional specific locations to Terrones, and does not
have the unlimited discretion to define prohibited areas as in Irwin. Condition 18 is not
unconstitutionally vague because it provides fair notice and is not subject to arbitrary
enforcement.
B.
Terrones also argues that the condition is overbroad. He argues the condition
potentially restricts his right to travel, and that the condition does not serve the
government’s interest in protecting children when Terrones is already prohibited from
having contact with minors.
A convict’s First Amendment rights may be restricted if the condition is
reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state and public order,
but the condition must be sensitively imposed. State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 757, 193
P.3d 678 (2008).
Terrones argues that condition 18 is overbroad and might be read to limit his
access to colleges or universities, or “adult daycares” or adult play areas including bars
with pool tables or video games. The State has a reasonable need to protect children
from convicted sexual offenders of children, and here, the nonexhaustive list is
sensitively imposed to keep children safe. Terrones is not prohibited from traveling to
public places generally, only those areas that are regularly used for youth activities.
5 No. 79781-6-I/6
Terrones’s argument that he is restricted from going to universities, bars, and adult care
centers is unpersuasive because condition 18 provides that he is only prohibited from
areas where children’s areas regularly occur. Children do not typically attend
universities, go out to bars, or spend time in senior centers. Condition 18 is sensitively
imposed based on the State’s need to keep children safe from a convicted child rapist
and is not overbroad.
C.
Terrones finally contends that condition 18 is not crime related. We review the
court’s factual basis of a crime related finding for substantial supporting evidence. Irwin,
191 Wn. App. at 656. Crime-related prohibitions are discretionary conditions that are
directly related to the circumstances of the crime but need not be causally related to the
crime. RCW 9.94A.030(10); State v. Zimmer, 146 Wn. App. 405, 413, 190 P.3d 121
(2008). “So long as it is reasonable to conclude that there is a sufficient connection
between the prohibition and the crime of conviction, we will not disturb the sentencing
court’s community custody conditions.” State v. Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d 671, 685-86, 425
P.3d 847 (2018).
Terrones argues that condition 18 is not crime related because his criminal
conduct occurred inside the family home. Terrones’s underlying crime was the rape of
child. Terrones was not amenable to treatment and he previously had prohibited
contact with a minor while still in treatment. His evaluator recommended that Terrones
should not socialize in areas where he could have unsupervised contact with children.
Terrones’s actions and revocation from SSOSA demonstrates that he continues to pose
a risk to minor children. Keeping a convicted sexual offender of children away from
6 No. 79781-6-I/7
areas where children’s activities occur is reasonably related to the crime. For these
reasons, condition 18 is reasonably related to Terrones’s underlying crime.
Because condition 18 is not vague, not overbroad, and is reasonably related to
Terrones’s underlying crime, the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
condition.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR: