State Of Washington, V. Ryan Benjamin Rickert

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: April 13, 2026
• Docket: 87130-7
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 87130-7-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION RYAN BENJAMIN RICKERT,

Appellant.

DÍAZ, J. — A jury convicted Ryan Benjamin Rickert of assault, criminal

trespass, and resisting arrest. He argues the court impermissibly coerced a juror

to find him guilty on the assault charge. He also avers his convictions for assault

and resisting arrest violate double jeopardy. His arguments are unavailing, so we

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2024, Rickert filled out a job application at a Safeway. An

employee then called the police when Rickert did not leave after repeatedly being

asked to. Based on his conduct with law enforcement when they arrived, the State

charged him with assault in the third degree (RCW 9A.36.031(1)(g)), criminal

trespass in the first degree (RCW 9A.52.070), and resisting arrest (RCW No. 87130-7-I/2

9A.76.040). A jury ultimately returned guilty verdicts on all counts after a trial that

July.

When the jury initially informed the court that it had reached its verdicts, the

presiding juror reported they found Rickert not guilty on count I. However, when

the court proceeded to poll them, not every juror confirmed that outcome

represented their individual vote. Specifically, the court asked the jurors

collectively to raise their hands if they had voted to find him not guilty of assault.

According to the clerk’s minutes, only 1 juror responded affirmatively while 11 did

not. In other words, 11 jurors found Rickert guilty of assaulting a police officer and

1 had not. The presiding juror then confirmed their decision on count I was not

unanimous. But as to the other charges, all of the jurors raised their hands and

thereby demonstrated agreement on his guilt for counts II and III.

The court excused the jurors to confer with counsel on how to proceed. Id.

The court opined that the jury did not “seem to fully understand the need for them

to be unanimous as to the verdict on this count.” The court discussed whether to

give a deadlocked jury instruction. The court decided “without objection and [with]

agreement,” to repeat the last paragraph of the final instruction it had given before

deliberations began. Following that five-minute exchange, it called the jury back

into the courtroom.

The court provided the following instruction, based verbatim on 11A

WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL

151.00 (5th ed. 2024):

Because this is a criminal case, each of you must agree for you to return a verdict. When all of you have so agreed, fill in the verdict

2 No. 87130-7-I/3

forms to express your decision. The presiding juror must sign the verdict forms and notify the bailiff. The bailiff will bring you into court to declare your verdict.

The court concluded by stating, “So with that, I’m going to have you go back to the

jury room with the original instructions and verdict forms and continue deliberations

in relation to what you have with the verdict forms, and we’ll go from there.”

Approximately 40 minutes later, the jury informed the bailiff it had reached

a verdict. Rickert then moved for a mistrial. He expressed concern the jurors “still

don’t fully understand that they are not required to return a verdict of either guilty

or not guilty and the third option is not being able to agree on a verdict.” He

asserted that “the Court has to take great care as to not coerce jurors into giving

their positions” on the split and submitted, when the court sent the jury back to

further deliberate, it may have “signal[ed] to the jury that they should come back

with a verdict.”

The court denied Rickert’s motion. It explained “there [was] no indication”

when the jury first returned “that they were deadlocked,” but that “for some reason”

they were simply not unanimous. And the court stated that re-reading the final

instruction did not “indicate to them that they were any more obligated to reach a

unanimous verdict then, [than] the first time it was read to them.”

When the jury returned, the presiding juror informed the court they had

reached a guilty verdict on the assault count. This time, all jurors raised their hands

to confirm the same.

Rickert timely appeals.

3 No. 87130-7-I/4

II. ANALYSIS

A. Judicial Influence on Jury

Rickert first claims that the court impermissibly coerced the juror who

originally disagreed on count I to change their vote and convict him of assault.

In State v. Watkins, our Supreme Court explained that two sources of law

govern permissible judicial intervention “when a jury declares itself deadlocked or

otherwise appears unable to reach a verdict.” 99 Wn.2d 166, 171, 660 P.2d 1117

(1983). First, to ensure impartiality and prevent coercion from the trial court,

Washington adopted CrR 6.15(f)(2). Id. at 172, 175. The Court interpreted this

rule to prohibit supplemental instructions “which suggest any of three specific

things: the need for agreement, the consequences of no agreement, and the length

of time the jury will be required to deliberate.” Id. But the rule “does not prohibit

all instructions” to a jury once deliberations begin. Id. (emphasis added).

The Court then described a second legal “criterion by which [a court’s]

supplemental instruction must be measured,” which is a broader principle

emanating from the right to a jury trial. Id. at 176. Namely, a juror must be free to

reach her verdict “uninfluenced by factors outside the evidence, the court’s proper

instructions, and the arguments of counsel.” Id. (quoting State v. Boogaard, 90

Wn.2d 733, 736, 585 P.2d 789 (1978)).

Clarifying Boogaard, our Supreme Court held that, to prevail on a claim of

improper judicial interference, an appellant “must provide more than mere

speculation about how the trial court’s intervention might have influenced the jury’s

verdict.” Id. at 177-78. Rather, an appellant “must establish a reasonably

4 No. 87130-7-I/5

substantial probability that the verdict was improperly influenced by the trial court’s

intervention.” Id. at 178; see also State v. Ford, 171 Wn.2d 185, 188-89, 250 P.3d

97 (2011) (requiring an “affirmative showing” beyond speculation.)

Here, Rickert avers the court “instructed the jury in a manner that did far

more than ‘suggest’ the need for agreement.” He claims it “explicitly instructed the

jurors” that they “must” reach a verdict, violating both CrR 6.15 and his right to a

jury free from improper judicial influence. This is wrong on the facts and the twin

governing legal principles.

As a preliminary matter, Rickert does not cite to any opinion which has

found such a violation based on comparable facts to the particular ones in this

case. That is, he provides no authority for the proposition a court violates CrR

6.15(f)(2) by merely repeating a previously given, lawful instruction after a jury

mistakenly returns a verdict without unanimous agreement. DeHeer v. Seattle

Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962) (“Where no authorities

are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out

authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.”).

Instead, Rickert’s argument relies on that instruction’s use of the words

“must” and “when” in isolation. But that is not how we must review the instruction;

we must consider the totality of the circumstances regarding the court’s

intervention. Ford, 171 Wn.2d at 189. When considered in context of the complete

instructions and the court’s comments in full, Rickert has not shown the instruction

suggested the jury had to agree to return a verdict of any kind, let alone a verdict

of guilt, in particular. Instead, that instruction correctly advised the jury that

5 No. 87130-7-I/6

acquittals or verdicts of guilt must be unanimous and otherwise reminded the jury

of the totality of its obligations. 1 Rickert is wrong about the facts.

Moreover, Rickert does not establish the court improperly influenced the

verdict as a constitutional matter because he does not “show more than a mere

tendency to influence the jury.” Watkins, 99 Wn.2d at 177. Unlike in Boogaard,

90.Wn.2d at 178, or Ford, 171 Wn.2d at 188-89, he has not shown how the lawful

instruction itself, or surrounding circumstances, establish “a reasonably substantial

possibility,” let alone a “probability that minority jurors actually were persuaded to

change their votes.” Watkins, 99 Wn.2d at 177-78. Instead, as in Watkins, the

instruction given here may be readily construed as a “carefully neutral explanation

of the earlier instructions,” clarifying an apparent misunderstanding. 99 Wn.2d at

178.

At best, the only affirmative circumstance Rickert references to suggest

improper influence is that the jury reached its verdict after only 40 minutes of

additional deliberation. It is true that, as a general matter, a shorter timeframe can

suggest the possibility of coercion. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231,

240, 108 S. Ct. 546, 552 (1988). However, the facts in the opinions he relies upon

involve more suggestive circumstances overall and even shorter periods of

1 As to the latter, the court specifically reminded the jury it had a set of the complete

instructions in the jury room before it repeated the unanimity instruction. In relevant part, the complete instructions stated the jury must “consider the instructions as a whole” as they were “all important.” Those instructions also cautioned the jurors not to change their mind just for the purpose of reaching a verdict. And the court simply told the jury to “continue deliberations” and then stated “. . . and we’ll go from there.” 6 No. 87130-7-I/7

deliberation. 2

In short, there is here no “affirmative showing,” beyond speculation, about

what occurred before the jury returned with the deficient verdict, why they returned

a verdict non-unanimously, nor what occurred after the jury was sent back to

deliberate further. Ford, 171 Wn.2d at 188-89. Thus, this assignment of error fails.

B. Double Jeopardy

Rickert next claims his convictions for assault and resisting arrest violate

the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Specifically, he asserts he

was punished twice for the same offense because his counts for resisting arrest

and assault required the same evidence, as they were charged and proven. We

disagree.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment offers several

constitutional protections coextensive with Washington’s constitution. State v.

Godsey, 131 Wn. App. 278, 289, 127 P.3d 11 (2006). One aspect of double

jeopardy protects a defendant from being punished multiple times for the same

offense. Id. Even where offenses require no legally distinct elements, double

jeopardy principles are not offended as long as the same evidence is not used to

establish both charges. Id. at 290.

Rickert claims the State relied on the same evidence to prove both offenses.

2 The Court in Boogaard concluded a judge’s inquiry, at 9:30 p.m., had amounted

to impermissible coercion where it “unavoidably tended to suggest” minority jurors, whom the bailiff had identified, should acquiesce for the sake of returning a verdict within a half hour, specifically right before the start of a holiday-weekend court closure. 90 Wn.2d at 735, 739-40. And in Iverson v. Pac. Am. Fisheries, the jury returned a verdict just 10 minutes after the court gave the challenged instruction. 73 Wn.2d 973, 975, 442 P.2d 243 (1968). 7 No. 87130-7-I/8

To the contrary, in its closing argument, the State referenced facts to prove the

resisting arrest charge beyond the fact that he attempted to punch one of the

officers, which was the premise for the assault charge. It also argued he resisted

arrest by refusing to comply with officers’ orders over multiple minutes and

engaged in actions to evade being handcuffed such that they decided to use a

taser.

Moreover, the holding in Godsey undermines Rickert’s position. There, we

specifically declined to find a double jeopardy violation because we concluded the

State had argued the facts of the case—which like here, involved evading arrest

and an alleged physical altercation—as two separate offenses, even though it had

also recognized “some overlap” between them. 131 Wn. App. at 290. That is

precisely analogous to the State’s framing of the case here. Thus, Rickert fails to

show his convictions relied on the same facts such that they offend double

jeopardy principles. 3

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

3 We need not and do not reach Rickert’s interpretation of legislative intent.