Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
February 17, 2021 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 52091-5-II
Respondent,
v.
RONALD WILLIAM MCNEAL, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
WORSWICK, J. — Ronald McNeal appeals his amended judgment and sentence for
unlawful possession of a controlled substance—methamphetamine, and unlawful delivery of a
controlled substance—methamphetamine. In 2016, we considered McNeal’s prior CrR 7.8
motion as a personal restraint petition (PRP) and remanded the case for correction of scrivener’s
errors. The trial court issued an order correcting those errors, but left intact previously imposed
discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs). McNeal now argues, and the State concedes,
that these discretionary LFOs are no longer authorized. In a Statement of Additional Grounds
(SAG) for Review, McNeal also argues that he was denied due process when the trial court
denied him a hearing to review his offender score and criminal history at the hearing to correct
the scrivener’s errors. We hold that McNeal’s due process rights were not violated. We affirm
McNeal’s sentence, but remand to the trial court to strike the discretionary LFOs.
FACTS
In 2012, Ronald McNeal was convicted of one count of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance—methamphetamine, and one count of unlawful delivery of a controlled No. 52091-5-II
substance—methamphetamine. At the time of his conviction, McNeal’s criminal history
included second degree theft, three felony violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act
(UCSA),1 unlawful possession of a firearm, and three counts of driving with license suspended in
the third degree (DWLS). The judgment and sentence form listed Lewis County as the
sentencing court for all three DWLS convictions.
McNeal’s offender score was calculated as an 8, based on his criminal history and that he
committed a current conviction while on community custody. The trial court sentenced him to a
total of 144 months of confinement.
At the time of McNeal’s first sentencing, the trial court found him indigent for the
purposes of seeking review at public expense and providing an attorney for his appeal.
Nonetheless, the trial court imposed the following LFOs: $200 criminal filing fee, $2,400 court
appointed attorney fees, $3,000 for violating the UCSA, $500 for the Lewis County drug
enforcement fund, and a $500 mandatory crime victim assessment, for a total of $6,600.
Approximately three weeks later, the trial court entered an order amending McNeal’s judgment
and sentence to add an additional $883 for court appointed investigative services.
McNeal filed a direct appeal in 2012, and we affirmed his conviction. State v. McNeal,
No. 43290-1-II, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2043290-1-
II%20%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. After we affirmed McNeal’s conviction and mandated
the case, the trial court entered an order imposing additional LFOs of $72 .00 “to the Lewis
1 Ch. 69.50 RCW.
2 No. 52091-5-II
County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office” and $3,680.59 “to Office of Public Defense Appellate
Indigent Defense Fund.” Clerk’s Papers at 49.
In 2016 McNeal filed a CrR 7.8(b) motion to correct the judgment and sentence. The
trial court found McNeal’s motion time-barred under RCW 10.73.090(1),2 and transferred
McNeal’s motion to this court for consideration as a personal restraint petition (PRP). McNeal
argued that the trial court improperly calculated his offender score and that the convictions listed
for DWLS in Lewis County did not exist. He argued that because the convictions for DWLS did
not exist, his offender score was invalid on its face because it erroneously included washed-out
offenses.
We issued an order dismissing the petition, but remanded the case for correction of
scrivener’s errors in September 2017. We held that McNeal’s PRP was time-barred under RCW
10.73.090(1) because it was filed more than one year after his judgment and sentence became
final, explaining that the State had demonstrated that McNeal’s DWLS convictions did exist, just
not in Lewis County.3 The State conceded that McNeal’s original judgment and sentence
contained scrivener’s errors, which listed two of his DWLS convictions as arising from Lewis
County, when in fact they were Thurston County convictions. Thus, we remanded McNeal’s
judgment and sentence to the trial court for correction of these scrivener’s errors on the DWLS
convictions.
2 RCW 10.73.090(1) provides, “No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.” 3 McNeal’s judgment and sentence became final on January 15, 2014, following the resolution of his direct appeal. He filed his last PRP in December of 2016.
3 No. 52091-5-II
The State filed a motion and affidavit to amend the judgment and sentence for the
scrivener’s errors, asking the trial court to change “Lewis” to “Thurston” on two of McNeal’s
DWLS convictions. The motion came before the trial court in February 2018. After the court
made its decision, McNeal declined to sign the order amending the judgment and sentence.
McNeal argued he had not seen proof that the discrepancies were scrivener’s errors or that the
cases were from Thurston County. The court explained that it had no discretion over the matter,
that it had to follow the order to amend as instructed by the Court of Appeals, and that McNeal
was not entitled to an attorney for the motion proceedings.
McNeal appeals the amended judgment and sentence.
ANALYSIS
I. LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
McNeal argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court erroneously imposed
discretionary legal financial obligations despite McNeal’s indigency. We agree.
McNeal’s judgment and sentence was final in 2014. However, here the State makes no
timeliness argument and concedes that we should remand to strike McNeal’s discretionary legal
financial obligations. The State notes that we should not remove McNeal’s $500 mandatory
crime victim assessment.
Discretionary LFOs may be waived by the court. Accordingly, we accept the State’s
concession and remand to the trial court to strike the discretionary LFOs.
II. STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS
McNeal filed a SAG in which he makes additional claims. He claims that he was denied
due process when the trial court refused to hold a hearing to examine the scrivener’s errors, that
4 No. 52091-5-II
such a hearing would reveal some of his convictions washed out, and that his offender score was
calculated incorrectly because his DWLS convictions were unconstitutional. Each claim fails.
Generally, where a trial court has no discretion as to the actions it can take on remand,
there is nothing for us to review on appeal. In re Pers. Restraint of Sorenson, 200 Wn. App. 692,
699, 403 P.3d 109 (2017).
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Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
February 17, 2021 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 52091-5-II
Respondent,
v.
RONALD WILLIAM MCNEAL, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
WORSWICK, J. — Ronald McNeal appeals his amended judgment and sentence for
unlawful possession of a controlled substance—methamphetamine, and unlawful delivery of a
controlled substance—methamphetamine. In 2016, we considered McNeal’s prior CrR 7.8
motion as a personal restraint petition (PRP) and remanded the case for correction of scrivener’s
errors. The trial court issued an order correcting those errors, but left intact previously imposed
discretionary legal financial obligations (LFOs). McNeal now argues, and the State concedes,
that these discretionary LFOs are no longer authorized. In a Statement of Additional Grounds
(SAG) for Review, McNeal also argues that he was denied due process when the trial court
denied him a hearing to review his offender score and criminal history at the hearing to correct
the scrivener’s errors. We hold that McNeal’s due process rights were not violated. We affirm
McNeal’s sentence, but remand to the trial court to strike the discretionary LFOs.
FACTS
In 2012, Ronald McNeal was convicted of one count of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance—methamphetamine, and one count of unlawful delivery of a controlled No. 52091-5-II
substance—methamphetamine. At the time of his conviction, McNeal’s criminal history
included second degree theft, three felony violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act
(UCSA),1 unlawful possession of a firearm, and three counts of driving with license suspended in
the third degree (DWLS). The judgment and sentence form listed Lewis County as the
sentencing court for all three DWLS convictions.
McNeal’s offender score was calculated as an 8, based on his criminal history and that he
committed a current conviction while on community custody. The trial court sentenced him to a
total of 144 months of confinement.
At the time of McNeal’s first sentencing, the trial court found him indigent for the
purposes of seeking review at public expense and providing an attorney for his appeal.
Nonetheless, the trial court imposed the following LFOs: $200 criminal filing fee, $2,400 court
appointed attorney fees, $3,000 for violating the UCSA, $500 for the Lewis County drug
enforcement fund, and a $500 mandatory crime victim assessment, for a total of $6,600.
Approximately three weeks later, the trial court entered an order amending McNeal’s judgment
and sentence to add an additional $883 for court appointed investigative services.
McNeal filed a direct appeal in 2012, and we affirmed his conviction. State v. McNeal,
No. 43290-1-II, slip op. at 1 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/D2%2043290-1-
II%20%20Unpublished%20Opinion.pdf. After we affirmed McNeal’s conviction and mandated
the case, the trial court entered an order imposing additional LFOs of $72 .00 “to the Lewis
1 Ch. 69.50 RCW.
2 No. 52091-5-II
County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office” and $3,680.59 “to Office of Public Defense Appellate
Indigent Defense Fund.” Clerk’s Papers at 49.
In 2016 McNeal filed a CrR 7.8(b) motion to correct the judgment and sentence. The
trial court found McNeal’s motion time-barred under RCW 10.73.090(1),2 and transferred
McNeal’s motion to this court for consideration as a personal restraint petition (PRP). McNeal
argued that the trial court improperly calculated his offender score and that the convictions listed
for DWLS in Lewis County did not exist. He argued that because the convictions for DWLS did
not exist, his offender score was invalid on its face because it erroneously included washed-out
offenses.
We issued an order dismissing the petition, but remanded the case for correction of
scrivener’s errors in September 2017. We held that McNeal’s PRP was time-barred under RCW
10.73.090(1) because it was filed more than one year after his judgment and sentence became
final, explaining that the State had demonstrated that McNeal’s DWLS convictions did exist, just
not in Lewis County.3 The State conceded that McNeal’s original judgment and sentence
contained scrivener’s errors, which listed two of his DWLS convictions as arising from Lewis
County, when in fact they were Thurston County convictions. Thus, we remanded McNeal’s
judgment and sentence to the trial court for correction of these scrivener’s errors on the DWLS
convictions.
2 RCW 10.73.090(1) provides, “No petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.” 3 McNeal’s judgment and sentence became final on January 15, 2014, following the resolution of his direct appeal. He filed his last PRP in December of 2016.
3 No. 52091-5-II
The State filed a motion and affidavit to amend the judgment and sentence for the
scrivener’s errors, asking the trial court to change “Lewis” to “Thurston” on two of McNeal’s
DWLS convictions. The motion came before the trial court in February 2018. After the court
made its decision, McNeal declined to sign the order amending the judgment and sentence.
McNeal argued he had not seen proof that the discrepancies were scrivener’s errors or that the
cases were from Thurston County. The court explained that it had no discretion over the matter,
that it had to follow the order to amend as instructed by the Court of Appeals, and that McNeal
was not entitled to an attorney for the motion proceedings.
McNeal appeals the amended judgment and sentence.
ANALYSIS
I. LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
McNeal argues, and the State concedes, that the trial court erroneously imposed
discretionary legal financial obligations despite McNeal’s indigency. We agree.
McNeal’s judgment and sentence was final in 2014. However, here the State makes no
timeliness argument and concedes that we should remand to strike McNeal’s discretionary legal
financial obligations. The State notes that we should not remove McNeal’s $500 mandatory
crime victim assessment.
Discretionary LFOs may be waived by the court. Accordingly, we accept the State’s
concession and remand to the trial court to strike the discretionary LFOs.
II. STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS
McNeal filed a SAG in which he makes additional claims. He claims that he was denied
due process when the trial court refused to hold a hearing to examine the scrivener’s errors, that
4 No. 52091-5-II
such a hearing would reveal some of his convictions washed out, and that his offender score was
calculated incorrectly because his DWLS convictions were unconstitutional. Each claim fails.
Generally, where a trial court has no discretion as to the actions it can take on remand,
there is nothing for us to review on appeal. In re Pers. Restraint of Sorenson, 200 Wn. App. 692,
699, 403 P.3d 109 (2017). If a judgment and sentence is remanded for a scrivener’s error but not
otherwise reversed, then an appeal from the amended judgment and sentence is time-barred when
filed more than one year after the original judgment and sentence is final. Sorenson, 200 Wn.
App. at 699-700; RCW 10.73.090(1), (3)(b).
A collateral attack on a judgment and sentence is time-barred one year after the judgment
becomes final unless an exception applies, or the sentence is invalid on its face. RCW
10.73.090(1); 10.73.100; In re Pers. Restraint of Hemenway, 147 Wn.2d 529, 532-33, 55 P.3d
615 (2002). Additionally, as explained in Sorenson, a judgment and sentence that is remanded
for a scrivener’s error but not otherwise reversed is not reviewable on appeal if filed more than
one year after judgment becomes final. 200 Wn. App. at 699-700. Finally, a SAG may not
contain or refer to documents outside the record on appeal. RAP 10.10(c).
McNeal’s arguments are barred for timeliness and no exception applies. His judgment
and sentence became final in 2014. This appeal was filed in March 2018, well after the one-year
mark. He makes no showing that any exception under RCW 10.73.100 applies. Although
McNeal does argue that his judgment and sentence is invalid on its face, he reaches outside the
record on appeal.4 Finally, McNeal is barred from raising these arguments here because the
4 Generally, a PRP is the proper vehicle for claims arising out of facts not in the appellate record. See RAP 16.4.
5 No. 52091-5-II
previous remand was only for scrivener’s errors and the court below had no discretion over the
amended judgment and sentence. Accordingly, the claims in McNeal’s SAG fail.
We affirm McNeal’s sentence, but remand to the trial court to strike the discretionary
LFOs.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
___________________________ Worswick, J. We concur:
_____________________________ Lee, C.J.
_____________________________ Glasgow, J.