State Of Washington, V. Ricky Anthony Jackson

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: April 14, 2025
• Docket: 85650-2
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 85650-2-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION RICKY ANTHONY JACKSON,

Appellant.

HAZELRIGG, C.J. — Ricky Anthony Jackson appeals from his convictions after

a jury trial for unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree and attempting to

elude a pursuing police vehicle. He asserts that there was insufficient evidence to

sustain these convictions and the trial court erred in imposing the victim penalty

assessment (VPA). We affirm his convictions, but reverse in part and remand to

strike the VPA.

FACTS

In the early morning hours of August 5, 2018, Porsha Lester and a friend

were in the Capitol Hill neighborhood of Seattle. Lester came into contact with Ricky

Jackson near the intersection of 10th Avenue and East Pike Street while she and a

friend were in line at a food cart. Jackson and Lester had dated for two months, but

had ended their relationship not long before the August 2018 incident. The record

offers divergent accounts about precisely who initiated the communication on that

night, but the parties agree that Lester asked Jackson to return of some of her No. 85650-2-I/2

personal items that were still in his possession. Lester further alleged that Jackson

escalated the situation by making several verbal threats. Lester then called 911 and

reported that Jackson had threatened her with a pistol by lifting up his shirt to show

the firearm tucked into his waistband. In the call, Lester described Jackson as

wearing a red shirt and a red baseball hat. She also told the operator that Jackson

had been following her during the call but that he stopped once he realized she was

on the phone with 911. Still on the phone, Lester said that Jackson got into a gray

Dodge Charger and left the area. She also supplied the license plate number for

the Charger and stated that Jackson was alone in the vehicle.

Seattle Police Department (SPD) Sergeant Michael Tietjen and Officers

Matthew Blackburn and Nicholas Evans were in the area and, when they spotted

the Charger, Tietjen attempted to initiate a traffic stop by activating the lights and

siren on his patrol vehicle. The Charger did not comply and SPD engaged in pursuit.

The pursuit ended when the Charger crashed at the intersection of Madison Street

and 6th Avenue near the William Kenzo Nakamura United States Courthouse.

Security cameras in the area captured much of what happened next; some in black

and white and other recordings in color. Footage introduced at trial showed the

collision and a figure exiting the Charger who then threw what appeared to be a

firearm on the ground before running west along Madison Street. One recording

showed a figure wearing a red hat and red shirt, consistent with Lester’s description

to the 911 operator, while another black and white recording showed that a similar

figure removed and discarded a hat and shirt.

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Grant Morozoff, one of a group of off-duty Canadian law enforcement officers

who were visiting on vacation, saw a man hide behind some bushes in the plaza

next to the courthouse and pointed him out to pursuing SPD officers. Ultimately,

Jackson was discovered in the bushes and arrested. Officers including Tietjen,

Blackburn, and Evans searched the area and recovered a short-barreled rifle, a red

shirt, and a red baseball hat. Tietjen, Blackburn, and Evans continued to search

along the route of pursuit and discovered a pistol. SPD Detective Jennifer Samson

later searched the gray Charger pursuant to a search warrant and seized various

documents and other evidence that suggested the vehicle belonged to Jackson. 1

The State charged Jackson with unlawful possession of a firearm in the first

degree (UPF1), attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, and felony

harassment, the latter of which was designated as crime of domestic violence based

on Lester and Jackson’s prior relationship and carried a special allegation that it was

committed with a firearm. At trial, the State introduced the testimony of Lester and

several SPD officers involved in the pursuit and apprehension of Jackson. The jury

convicted Jackson of UPF1 and attempt to elude, but acquitted him on the felony

harassment charge.

Jackson timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Jackson’s primary contention on appeal is that his convictions were not

supported by sufficient evidence. First, he alleges that the State “failed to prove

1 By the time of trial, Samson had been promoted to Detective Sergeant.

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Jackson knowingly possessed a firearm.” Second, in a pro se statement of

additional grounds for review (SAG), Jackson argues that his conviction for attempt

to elude was similarly not supported by sufficient evidence.

Due process requires the State to prove every element of a charged crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61

L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3. “Sufficiency

of the evidence is a question of constitutional law that we review de novo.” State v.

Melland, 9 Wn. App. 2d 786, 801, 452 P.3d 562 (2019).

“To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and determine whether any rational

fact finder could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

State v. Stewart, 12 Wn. App. 2d 236, 239, 457 P.3d 1213 (2020). Challenges to

the sufficiency of the evidence concede the truth of the State’s evidence and require

that we draw reasonable inferences in the State’s favor. State v. Cardenas-Flores,

189 Wn.2d 243, 265-66, 401 P.3d 19 (2017). “Credibility determinations are made

by the trier of fact and are not subject to review.” State v. Smith, 13 Wn. App. 2d

420, 426, 464 P.3d 554 (2020).

A. Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the First Degree

RCW 9.41.040(1)(a) defines the crime of UPF1 as follows:

A person, whether an adult or juvenile, is guilty of the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm in the first degree, if the person owns, accesses, has in the person’s custody, control, or possession, or receives any firearm after having previously been convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity in this state or elsewhere of any serious offense.

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Notably, with regard to the specifics of Jackson’s sufficiency challenge, the statute

does not contain a knowledge element. Possession can be actual or constructive.

State v. Reichert, 158 Wn. App 374, 390, 242 P.3d 44 (2010). Constructive

possession may “‘be established by showing the defendant had dominion or control

over the firearm.’” State v. Manion, 173 Wn. App. 610, 634, 295 P.3d 270 (2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Lee, 158 Wn. App. 513, 517,

243 P.3d 929 (2010)). We consider the totality of the circumstances when assessing

whether there is substantial evidence of dominion or control to support a conviction.

State v. Lakotiy, 151 Wn. App. 699, 714, 214 P.3d 181 (2009).

Jackson stipulated to a prior disqualifying conviction so the jury only needed

to find the first element, possession. The State presented only one UPF1 charge,

despite its allegation that Jackson actually possessed two different firearms during

the incident at issue. The jury instructions reflected this posture and expressly

stated,

The State alleges that the defendant committed the act of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the First Degree two different ways. To convict the defendant on any count of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the First Degree, one particular act of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the First Degree must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and you must unanimously agree as to which act has been proved. You need not unanimously agree that the defendant committed all the acts of Unlawful Possession of a Firearm in the First Degree.

Thus, either instance of possession could be sufficient to support the conviction and

both must be considered.

1. Short-Barreled Rifle

There was ample evidence presented to the jury to support its conclusion that

Jackson possessed the short-barreled rifle that night. The cameras on the

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courthouse grounds captured someone discarding a firearm after exiting from the

driver’s seat of the crashed Charger. Blackburn, Evans and SPD Officer Kristofer

Safranek 2 all testified to recovering a firearm that was leaning against the

courthouse. The location of its recovery was consistent with where the firearm

appeared to have been discarded on the video and the jury could reasonably infer

it was the same weapon. The jury was also provided with evidence from which it

could conclude that Jackson was the driver and sole passenger of the Charger, such

as Lester’s description of the car during the 911 call as belonging to Jackson, her

testimony at trial, and the evidence of ownership seized during the execution of the

search warrant. Viewed as a whole, a finder of fact could infer that it was Jackson

who discarded the rifle on the video footage. Contrary to Jackson’s framing of this

sufficiency challenge, the plain language of the statute makes clear that there is no

knowledge element for this crime. While Jackson may have rid himself of the

weapon by the time he was apprehended by SPD, there was sufficient evidence

presented at trial to establish that it was nonetheless in his possession on the night

in question.

2. Pistol

Shortly after Jackson was arrested, responding SPD officers retraced the

route of the pursuit to determine whether anything had been thrown from the vehicle

when pursuing officers lost sight of it. The officers recovered a Springfield XD .40

By the time of trial, Safranek had left the SPD and held the rank of detective with the 2

Kennewick Police Department.

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caliber pistol from the sidewalk on Summit Avenue, in the area where SPD had lost

sight of the vehicle during the pursuit.

Safranek testified that he believed it was unlikely it has been there for long

because someone would either have taken it or would have called in to report finding

it. A holster suitable for the pistol was also recovered near the courthouse by SPD

Officer T.J. San Miguel and a search dog. Safranek handled the pistol after its

recovery and testified that it had “slide damage” which he said would be consistent

with the weapon being thrown from a vehicle and sliding along the pavement. When

Samson searched the Charger, a loaded .40 caliber magazine was recovered from

the center console, and Safranek testified that the magazine would fit the pistol

recovered on Summit Avenue. From this evidence, the jury could conclude that

Jackson had discarded the pistol while evading SPD in the Charger and later

discarded holster for the pistol while eluding them on foot. Again, while there is no

evidence that Jackson was in possession of the pistol at the time of his arrest,

testimony of the officers supports a conclusion that it was in his possession on the

date alleged by the State and, under the plain language of the statute, the State was

not required to prove knowledge.

The State presented sufficient evidence to support a conclusion by the jury

that Jackson was in possession of the rifle and the pistol on August 5, 2018, either

of which could independently satisfy the government’s burden of proof beyond a

reasonable doubt as to the UPF1 charge. 3

3 The jury was properly provided a unanimity instruction in light of the evidentiary options offered by the State as to the single count of UPF1, thus, the jury was required to unanimously agree upon one instance of possession in order to convict Jackson of that charge.

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B. Attempting to Elude Pursuing Police Vehicle

In his SAG, Jackson further asserts that his conviction for attempt to elude

was not supported by sufficient evidence. He specifically avers that the State did

not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the driver of the vehicle the police

pursued and focuses on the lack of video evidence showing him behind the wheel.

RCW 46.61.024(1) establishes the essential elements for attempt to elude as

follows:

Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully fails or refuses to immediately bring [their] vehicle to a stop and who drives [their] vehicle in a reckless manner while attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, after being given a visual or audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, shall be guilty of a class C felony. The signal given by the police officer may be by hand, voice, emergency light, or siren. The officer giving such a signal shall be in uniform and the vehicle shall be equipped with lights and sirens.

“In criminal trials, the State generally has the burden of establishing, beyond a

reasonable doubt, the identity of the accused as the person who committed the

offense.” State v. Anderson, 31 Wn. App. 2d 668, 683, 552 P.3d 803, review denied,

3 Wn.3d 1034 (2024).

Contrary to Jackson’s contention in his SAG, there was ample evidence

adduced at trial that could support the jury’s conclusion that he was the driver of the

Charger pursued by SPD. Lester identified him and the vehicle to the 911 operator,

providing the make, model, and license plate number, and confirmed this at trial

when a recording of the 911 call was played for the jury. She also told the operator

Jackson was wearing a red shirt and hat, which was consistent with security footage

of the incident introduced at trial, and items matching her description were recovered

from the courthouse sidewalk near the site where the vehicle pursuit ended. Other

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security cameras captured an individual discarding items in that location. Evidence

recovered from the Charger after the crash further linked it to Jackson; there were

several documents bearing Jackson’s name, including the title that listed him as the

registered owner, a souvenir license plate that read “Ricky,” and a loaded magazine

that could have fit the pistol recovered along the route of the vehicle pursuit. Only

one person was recorded by the security cameras at the courthouse following the

crash and responding officers testified they did not encounter anyone else on the

courthouse grounds that night. The footage was played for the jurors, who would

have also had the opportunity to observe Jackson in the courtroom during the trial

to determine if he was the person captured by the security cameras. Further,

Morozoff observed a man hiding the bushes near the courthouse and pointed him

out to officers on the scene. SPD Officer Paul Simbeck testified that the man was

lying in the landscaping of the courthouse grounds a few feet below the level of the

sidewalk, near the corner of Madison Street and Fifth Avenue, and officers ordered

the man, later identified as Jackson, out of the bushes and placed him in handcuffs.

While Jackson is correct that the State did not introduce video evidence that

definitively established that he was the one operating the Charger during the police

pursuit, the test for a sufficiency challenge does not mandate particular types of

evidence in order for a reviewing court to conclude that a conviction is properly

supported. Again, our review for sufficiency of the evidence assumes the truth of

the State’s evidence and expressly requires us to draw all reasonable inferences in

the State’s favor. See Cardenas-Flores, 189 Wn.2d at 265-66. Given this

deferential posture, testimony from Lester, the numerous responding officers, and

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civilian witnesses like Morozoff, as well as the physical evidence linking Jackson

and the pistol to the gray Charger, taken together, was sufficient to support the jury’s

determination that the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson

operated the vehicle and failed to stop when ordered to do so by SPD.

II. Legal Financial Obligations

Jackson avers, and the State concedes, that the VPA imposed at sentencing

should be stricken due to changes in the underlying law and the court’s finding

regarding Jackson’s indigency. We agree with the parties’ characterization of the

applicability of the statutory amendments to Jackson’s case, accept the State’s

concession, and, thus, remand for the trial court to strike the VPA from Jackson’s

judgment and sentence.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to strike the VPA.

WE CONCUR:

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