State Of Washington, V Phylece M. Wooddell

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: 59392-1
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two

October 28, 2025

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 59392-1-II

Respondent,

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

PHYLECE M. WOODDELL,

Appellant.

CHE, J. — Phylece May Wooddell appeals her standard range sentence for vehicular

homicide.

Wooddell, at 22 years old and with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.19, crashed

her vehicle into D. Saylor’s oncoming vehicle at a high rate of speed. Saylor died at the scene

due to the injuries he sustained. Wooddell pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide. She requested a

mitigated sentence based on her youth, developmental and emotional immaturity, and inability to

conform her conduct with the requirements of the law due to untreated mental health conditions.

The trial court imposed a standard range sentence. No. 59392-1-II

Wooddell argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request for a

mitigated sentence because adultification bias1 impacted its sentencing decision.

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it properly considered her

request for a mitigated sentence and adultification bias did not impact the trial court’s standard

range sentencing decision.

Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTS

BACKGROUND

In 2023, 22-year-old Wooddell crashed her car into an oncoming truck while traveling at a

high rate of speed. Police pronounced the driver of the truck, D. Saylor, deceased at the scene.

Wooddell’s BAC measured 0.19.

PROCEDURAL FACTS

The State charged Wooddell with vehicular homicide. Wooddell pleaded guilty by

admitting to operating a motor vehicle “while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (my

driving was affected to an appreciable degree due to my intoxication) and as a proximate cause of

my conduct, I did cause injuries to Mr. Saylor, who died . . . as a proximate result of the injuries

he received in the motor vehicle collision.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 253. The trial court accepted

her guilty plea after finding that it was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given.

1 Adultification is “the tendency of society to view Black children as older than similarly aged youths” and the assertion that this tendency “may detrimentally affect children of color at criminal sentencings.” In re Pers. Restraint of Miller, 21 Wn. App. 2d 257, 265, 266, 505 P.3d 585 (2022). Indeed, this court “recognize[s] that adultification is real and can lead to harsher sentences for children of color if care is not taken to consciously avoid biased outcomes.” Id. at 267.

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The parties did not agree on a joint sentencing recommendation. Wooddell had a standard

sentencing range of 78-102 months, followed by 18 months of community custody. The State

indicated it would seek 88 months and Wooddell indicated she would seek an exceptional

downward sentence of 33 months.

Sentencing Materials

The State’s sentencing memorandum recommended that the court should impose 88

months because Wooddell caused Saylor’s death by driving impaired and by driving in a reckless

manner at an extremely high rate of speed. The State acknowledged Wooddell’s age but argued

“that a mid-point sentence is appropriate given the egregiousness of her choices . . . and the risk to

community safety she poses.” CP at 8.

Wooddell’s sentencing memorandum requested an exceptional downward sentence of 33

months. Wooddell relied on (1) State v. O’Dell—that her “youth, and developmental and

emotional immaturity at the time of the incident” made her less culpable than an average adult,

and (2) RCW 9.94A.535(1)—that, as a mitigating factor, her capacity to conform her conduct to

the requirements of the law were significantly impaired, but excluding voluntary use of alcohol or

drugs. 183 Wn.2d 680, 695, 358 P.3d 359 (2015), CP at 18. In the over 200-page memorandum,

Wooddell included a forensic psychological report, proof of participation in mental health

treatment, numerous letters of support from community members, a mitigation report, school

records, and Child Protective Services records, among other materials.

In her materials, Wooddell described her youth, developmental and emotional immaturity,

and “her inability to conform her conduct with the requirements of the law due to untreated

mental health conditions.” CP at 10. Specifically, Wooddell detailed her traumatic childhood,

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her mental health diagnoses of major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder, substance abuse

and post-traumatic stress disorder, becoming a mother at a young age, and domestic violence she

experienced. Wooddell also described her progress since the incident, including treatment to

process her trauma and to address her mental health conditions, her weekly attendance at

treatment sessions with her therapist, regular participation in visitations with her children, and

positive reports from her case workers and social worker.

Sentencing Hearing

At sentencing, Jamie Saylor, the daughter of Saylor, spoke on behalf of her family. Jamie2

described Saylor’s truck as “unrecognizable. . . . [it was] bent up like an accordion,” and that he

“died immediately on impact due to blunt force trauma to the head.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 15-16.

She called Wooddell’s decision to get behind the wheel while intoxicated “irresponsible and

selfish.” RP at 16. She continued, “[t]his is just a careless act, in a race to get weed before the

store closed, that resulted in taking the life of a man who people called their dad, grandpa, great-

grandpa, brother, uncle, and friend.” RP at 17. And “[Wooddell] had no business being on the

road in the first place, with a suspended license, let alone after alcohol consumption and substance

in her body.” RP at 17. She also said that her father’s death impacted her life and her health “in a

major way.” RP at 18.

But Jamie also recognized that her life and Wooddell’s life “ha[d] quite a few similarities,

including both having our first child at 17.” RP at 19. She acknowledged that “while out on bail”

Wooddell had “her ducks in a row” and had not missed any visits with her children. RP at 19.

2 For clarity, this opinion uses Jamie Saylor’s first name, no disrespect is intended.

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She also said that Wooddell “taking accountability for her actions and pleading guilty . . . needs to

count for something” before stating: “I don’t think giving her the maximum sentence will do

anything to benefit her or her kids, and it won’t bring my dad back . . . I leave the sentencing up

to the judge.” RP at 20-21.

The State recommended 88 months, which recognized Wooddell’s decision to plead

guilty, forego trial, and any pain a trial would cause Saylor’s family. The State argued that age

should not play a factor in sentencing because Wooddell’s age was “already accounted for in the

88 months recommendation.” RP at 24. The State went on to say that the [driving under the

influence (DUI)] prong of vehicular homicide is a strict liability crime and “everyone understands

that the inherent danger to driving DUI. . . . You don’t have to be told, ‘Don’t drive impaired.

That’s dangerous.’ We all know that. . . . [H]er age matters very little here.” RP at 24-25.

Wooddell requested an exceptional downward sentence of 33 months based on O’Dell and

RCW 9.94A.535. 183 Wn.2d 680. Wooddell highlighted the legal bases for her sentencing

request, the psychologist’s report, her rehabilitation efforts, and her sincere apology.

The trial court had reviewed Wooddell’s dependency files “because I really wanted to get

an understanding . . . where your client’s been and what she’s been doing.” RP at 37. The trial

court recognized that Wooddell did not initially engage in services and “she was making no

progress and there was no compliance.” RP at 37. Then, after the car accident, Wooddell had a

mental health evaluation, received a diagnosis and an aftercare plan, and started engaging in that

plan. From that point, Wooddell completed 30 days of [urinalysis tests], remained clean, and had

positive interactions with her children.

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The trial court stated that, to depart from the standard range, it must apply a two-part test

to determine whether the asserted factor—in this case youthfulness—can be used. First, the

factor, youthfulness, cannot support the imposition of an exceptional sentence if the legislature

“necessarily considered” it when it established the standard sentence range. RP at 49. However,

the trial court said, “that’s not the case here” “because age has nothing to do with the crime of

vehicular homicide or the range itself.” RP at 50. Second, “the factor must be sufficiently

substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.”

RP at 50.

The trial court then discussed three relevant U.S. Supreme Court cases, Miller v. Alabama,

567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.

Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L.

Ed. 2d 825 (2010), recognizing that there are neurological differences in young offenders and

generally, they are less culpable for their crimes. Thereafter, the court distinguished O’Dell,

[he] was 18 at the time of his crime, there was quite a bit of factual testimony and evidence in his sentencing hearing that he acted as a juvenile. . . . He did things juveniles would do, and one of the things . . . is he had a Lego collection. He had a poster of Daffy Duck on his [motorcycle] in his room. He played video games. His maturity was called into question by, you know, every adult there. They just essentially referred to him as a kid, you know, a young kid. He’s a boy. . . .

I don’t have that type of evidence. What I have is an expert psychologist who says, yes, Ms. Wooddell’s executive function has been interfered with as a result of the trauma that she suffered throughout her life, from the time she was growing up into as a young woman.

The Court is not required to take that into account and it’s—because it only provides the Court with authority to depart on that basis, depart meaning sentence her under the standard range. And the Court is not persuaded that’s a substantial and compelling reason to do so in this case.

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RP at 51-52. In discussing O’Dell, the court also said, “I’m not disputing your client has had a

very tough go of it, a lot of trauma in her life. You know, she’s a mother. She was raising three

children . . . but [she] doesn’t seem to have those youthful characteristics at this point as opposed

to O’Dell.” RP at 34. It went on to say:

Wooddell is surrounded by people that have her interests at heart and want her to succeed and they mentor her and they partner with her, she does well . . . [but] prior to that . . . she was not doing well and that’s really evidenced by the fact that she was so intoxicated on the night that this happened. . . .

But here’s the gist of it. Ms. Wooddell was being offered these services prior to the accident. . . .

[D]id this accident turn on the light for her and say, you know, I really need to straighten my life out? It may well be. I mean, one could look at it and surmise that’s the case. That’s probably what happened. But if that were the case, the Court does not find that there are substantial and compelling reasons based on a mental health, mental disease, or defect that went significantly untreated for the majority of Ms. Wooddell’s life.

The Court’s going to decline to depart from the standard range.

RP at 53-54.

The trial court sentenced Wooddell to 78 months of confinement—the low end of

the standard range and less than the State’s request of 88 months. It explained that it

sentenced Wooddell to the low end of the standard sentence range because of her zero

offender score and because she demonstrated that she could conform to the court’s

requirements for counseling and mental health treatment.

Wooddell appeals her judgment and sentence.

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ANALYSIS

I. REQUEST FOR AN EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE

Wooddell argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider her request for

an exceptional downward sentence. Specifically, Wooddell argues that the sentencing court’s

disregard of evidence establishing her developmental immaturity and mitigating youthfulness

demonstrates adultification bias and gender bias by the court and that these biases impacted the

trial court’s sentencing decision. We disagree.

A. Legal Principles

Standard range sentences “shall not be appealed.” RCW 9.94A.585(1). But this

prohibition does not prohibit a party’s right to challenge the underlying legal conclusions and

determinations by which a trial court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision. State v.

Mandefero, 14 Wn. App. 2d 825, 833, 473 P.3d 1239 (2020).

We review a trial court’s decision to deny an exceptional sentence for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 116, 456 P.3d 806, 812 (2020). “A trial court

errs when ‘it refuses categorically to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range

under any circumstances’ or when it operates under the ‘mistaken belief that it did not have the

discretion to impose a mitigated exceptional sentence for which [a defendant] may have been

eligible.’” State v. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d 47, 56, 399 P.3d 1006 (2017) (alteration in original)

(quoting State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. 322, 330, 944 P.2d 1104 (1997).

When a party requests the trial court to make a discretionary sentencing decision, the court

“must meaningfully consider the request in accordance with the applicable law.” Id. (citing State

v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342, 111 P.3d 1183 (2005)). A trial court may depart from the

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sentencing guidelines and impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range if it finds that

there are substantial and compelling reasons to justify an exceptional sentence. RCW 9.94A.535.

Before a court may impose an exceptional downward sentence, it must find that the mitigating

circumstance is established by a preponderance of the evidence. RCW 9.94A.535(1). RCW

9.94A.535(1) provides a non-exclusive list of mitigating circumstances.

In determining “whether a factor legally supports departure from the standard sentence

range,” courts apply a two-part test:

First, a factor cannot support the imposition of an exceptional sentence if the legislature necessarily considered that factor when it established the standard sentence range. Second, in order to justify an exceptional sentence, a factor must be “sufficiently substantial and compelling to distinguish the crime in question from others in the same category.”

O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 690 (internal citations omitted) (citing State v. Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d 834, 840,

940 P.2d 633 (1997)).

A sentencing court may consider youth as a mitigating factor when determining whether

to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range. Id. at 695-96. Age may mitigate a

defendant’s culpability, even if the defendant is over 18 years old. Id. The court may consider

whether youth diminished the defendant’s capacity to “appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her

conduct, or to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of the law.” RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e);

O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 689.

When a trial court “has considered the facts and has concluded that there is no basis for an

exceptional sentence [it] has exercised its discretion, and the defendant may not appeal that ruling.”

Mandefero, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 833 (quoting Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. at 330).

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B. The Trial Court Exercised Its Sentencing Discretion

Here, the trial court acknowledged Wooddell’s request for a mitigated sentence, and

applied the correct two-part test to determine whether Wooddell’s youthfulness provided a

“sufficiently substantial and compelling” reason to depart from the standard range. O’Dell, 183

Wn.2d at 690. The trial court determined Wooddell’s youthfulness and circumstances did not

provide a basis for a mitigated sentence, in part by contrasting the behaviors of the defendant in

O’Dell with Wooddell’s own behavior.

To be sure, age may mitigate a defendant’s culpability, and failure to “meaningfully

consider youth as a possible mitigating circumstance” is an abuse of discretion subject to reversal.

O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 697 (citing Grayson, 154 Wn.2d at 342 (the trial court’s failure to consider

an exceptional sentence authorized by statute is reversible error)). But “age is not a per se

mitigating factor automatically entitling every youthful defendant to an exceptional sentence.” Id.

at 695.

The record demonstrates that the trial court understood its ability to consider Wooddell’s

youth, brain development, and personal circumstances. The trial court thoroughly engaged with

the information provided and determined that Wooddell’s youthfulness was not sufficiently

“substantial and compelling” to distinguish her crime from others in the same category. RP at 52.

In addition, the trial court expressly acknowledged case law in which “the Court recognizes that

there are neurological differences between young offenders . . . and that they are less culpable for

their crimes.” RP at 50. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (holding “the Eighth Amendment forbids a

sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile

offenders”), Graham, 560 U.S. at 72 (holding “[t]he Constitution prohibits the imposition of a life

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without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide . . . if [a State]

imposes a sentence of life it must provide . . . some realistic opportunity to obtain release”), and

Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (holding “The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of

the death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were

committed.”).

Despite that, Wooddell contends that the “judge’s failure to recognize Wooddell’s

youthful qualities suggests his evaluation of the evidence was impacted by bias,” because the

court focused on “kid-like behaviors [in distinguishing O’Dell]. . . . It’s hard to believe

Wooddell’s race and gender did not impact the court’s distinction.” Br. of Appellant at 23.

Wooddell acknowledges, “There is no indication the judge knowingly or intentionally

discriminated against Wooddell on the basis of race or gender. . . . But implicit racial bias is so

common and pervasive that it inevitably exists ‘at the unconscious level, where it can influence

our decisions without our awareness.’” Br. of Appellant at 23 (quoting State v. Berhe, 193 Wn.2d

647, 657, 444 P.3d 1172 (2019)). Wooddell further argues “Courts must conscientiously consider

whether adultification bias has affected the outcome of a sentencing decision. In this case it has.

The court’s decision, impacted by such bias, constitutes an abuse of discretion.” Br. of Appellant

at 24.

Wooddell essentially asks this court to rely solely on an assumption that because implicit

bias exists it must have occurred here, without providing any basis or evidence of any bias.

Although this court recognizes that “implicit racial bias can be particularly difficult to identify

and address,” and that all courts must be vigilant against it, this court declines to adopt the

standard Wooddell suggests and we will not presume bias where the trial court reviewed all of

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Wooddell’s tendered evidence, acknowledged her difficult circumstances, addressed and

distinguished the relevant caselaw regarding sentencing youthful offenders, and sentenced

Wooddell to the low end of the standard range. Berhe, 193 Wn.2d at 663. Furthermore,

Wooddell presents no authority where prior courts have assumed implicit bias in similar

circumstances. Gosney v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 3 Wn. App. 2d 828, 872-73, 419 P.3d 447

(2018) (quoting State v. Logan, 102 Wn. App. 907, 911 n.1, 10 P.3d 504 (2000)) (“Where no

authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities,

but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.”).

The trial court neither categorically refused to impose an exceptional sentence below the

standard range under any circumstances nor operated under a mistaken belief that it did not have

the discretion to impose a mitigated exceptional sentence for which Wooddell may have been

eligible. See McFarland, 189 Wn.2d at 56. Instead, the trial court considered the law and facts

presented and concluded that Wooddell’s circumstances did not provide a substantial and

compelling basis for an exceptional sentence below the standard range. Moreover, Wooddell fails

to show that any adultification bias impacted the trial court’s decision where it considered

thoroughly the sentencing materials and the relevant case law, and then imposed a low end

standard range sentence. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

declined to depart from the sentencing guidelines and imposed a standard range sentence.

Mandefero, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 833.

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CONCLUSION

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because it properly considered

Wooddell’s request for a mitigated sentence. Additionally, we hold that adultification bias did

not impact the trial court’s low end standard range sentencing decision. Accordingly, we affirm

Wooddell’s sentence.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

Che, J. We concur:

Cruser, C.J.

Veljacic, J.