State of Washington v. Patrick Jeramy Lyons

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: January 6, 2026
• Docket: 40444-7
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED JANUARY 6, 2026 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 40444-7-III Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) PATRICK JERAMY LYONS, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. )

COONEY, J. — Patrick Lyons was convicted of assault in the fourth degree with a

finding that he and the victim were members of the same family or household. Mr.

Lyons appeals, arguing the trial court erred in admitting child hearsay because the State

failed to present sufficient evidence that the physical abuse resulted in substantial bodily

harm to the child. We disagree and affirm. No. 40444-7-III State v. Lyons

BACKGROUND

C.L. 1 is the daughter of Mr. Lyons and the granddaughter of Marcia Gunkel. On

April 9, 2023, Mr. Lyons approached Ms. Gunkel in the bathroom of his residence while

Ms. Gunkel was bathing then six-year-old C.L. Mr. Lyons was “still angry and upset”

about an earlier dispute between he and Ms. Gunkel and directed Ms. Gunkel to leave his

residence. Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 97. Ms. Gunkel complied and exited Mr. Lyons’ house

while crying. Though Ms. Gunkel typically assisted C.L. in getting ready for school, she

did not do so on April 10 at Mr. Lyons’ request. However, Ms. Gunkel traveled to C.L.’s

school at the end of the school day after being notified that Mr. Lyons had not picked up

C.L.

Ms. Gunkel noticed that C.L.’s “face was swollen and discolored” on her arrival at

the school. RP at 102. Ms. Gunkel described C.L.’s nose as discolored, “wider and it

had a little bump.” RP at 112. Ms. Gunkel transported C.L. to the hospital and made a

report to law enforcement. After being evaluated and tested, hospital staff found no

indication of broken bones. C.L. was interviewed at the hospital by Officer Kevin

1 To protect the privacy interests of C.L., we use her initials throughout this opinion. Gen. Order of Division III, In re the Matter of Victims, (Wash. Ct. App. September 22, 2023), https://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/?fa=atc.genorders_orddisp& ordnumber=2023_3&div=III.

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Hernandez of the East Wenatchee Police Department. The next day, April 11, C.L.

participated in a child forensic interview through “SAGE,” a local domestic violence

advocacy group. RP at 496. During the interview, C.L. indicated Mr. Lyons had struck

her in the face.

Mr. Lyons was charged with assault of a child in the third degree, with a special

allegation of domestic violence. The State later amended the information to add one

count of assault in the fourth degree.

The court conducted a child hearsay hearing in advance of trial as the State sought

to introduce statements made by C.L. to Ms. Gunkel, Officer Hernandez, and Stacy Speer

at SAGE.

Ms. Gunkel testified that when she asked C.L. about her “swollen” face and the

“discoloration,” C.L. said, “Daddy” and put her open hand up to her face. RP at 102-03.

Ms. Gunkel testified that C.L. had a medical condition called Trisomy 12 that caused

physical abnormalities to C.L. The State played excerpts from the recorded forensic

interview with Ms. Speer at the hearing. In the recorded interview, C.L. indicated that

Mr. Lyons “slapped” her face. RP at 278.

At the child hearsay hearing, Officer Hernandez testified that he responded to the

Central Washington Hospital and interviewed C.L. with Ms. Gunkel present. Officer

Hernandez stated that he asked C.L. what caused her “booboos,” and C.L. responded by

motioning with “her palm” “towards her face” to demonstrate “how she was hit.” RP at

3 No. 40444-7-III State v. Lyons

247. Officer Hernandez testified that C.L. was indicating that she was hit with “an open

palm.” RP at 248. Officer Hernandez confirmed that C.L. had a “swollen left eye,” and

“bruising to the bottom of [her] eye.” RP at 251.

The State argued for the admission of C.L’s out-of-court statements under the

child hearsay statute. Mr. Lyons argued C.L.’s out-of-court statements were not

admissible under the child hearsay statute because her injuries did not rise to the level of

substantial bodily harm. The trial court found there was sufficient evidence of substantial

bodily harm and concluded C.L.’s out-of-court statements to Ms. Gunkel, Officer

Hernandez, and Ms. Speer were admissible.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. Consistent with the court’s pretrial ruling,

C.L.’s statements to Ms. Gunkel, Officer Hernandez, and Ms. Speer were presented to the

jury. Ms. Gunkel testified that “[C.L.’s] face didn’t look normal to [her]” when she

picked up C.L. and that “[C.L.’s] nose was not right, and she had swelling above her eye,

and—on her face.” RP at 545. Ms. Gunkel stated that when she asked C.L. about the

injuries, C.L. said, “Daddy” and held her hand up to her face. RP at 545. Officer

Hernandez testified that he observed at the hospital that C.L. had “swelling below her left

eye. And there was—light bruising across the bridge of her nose.” RP at 644. The State

played excerpts of Officer Hernandez’s body camera recording where Officer Hernandez

asks, “Is that what caused your booboos? Dad hitting you?” RP at 648. The State also

played an excerpt from Ms. Speer’s interview with C.L. where C.L. indicated that Mr.

4 No. 40444-7-III State v. Lyons

Lyons “slapped” her “on [her] eye.” RP at 670-71. C.L. can be seen in the recording

pointing to her eyes, and she indicated that Mr. Lyons “slapped” her “really hard” and

that she had an “owee” on her eye. Ex. 1, clip 2.

The jury ultimately found Mr. Lyons not guilty of assault of a child in the third

degree and guilty of assault in the fourth degree. The jury also returned a special verdict,

finding Mr. Lyons and C.L. were members of the same family or household. Mr. Lyons

was later sentenced.

Mr. Lyons timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

Mr. Lyons contends the trial court erred in admitting C.L.’s out-of-court

statements because the State presented insufficient evidence of substantial bodily harm

for purposes of the child hearsay statute. We disagree.

We review a trial court’s decision to admit child hearsay statements for an abuse

of discretion. State v. Beadle, 173 Wn.2d 97, 112, 265 P.3d 863 (2011). The court

abuses its discretion when it rests its decision on unreasonable or untenable grounds.

State v. C.J., 148 Wn.2d 672, 686, 63 P.3d 765 (2003). A court’s “decision is based on

‘untenable grounds’ or made ‘for untenable reasons’ if it rests on facts unsupported in the

record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard.” State v. Rohrich, 149

Wn.2d 647, 654, 71 P.3d 638 (2003) (quoting State v. Rundquist, 79 Wn. App. 786, 793,

905 P.2d 922 (1995)).

5 No. 40444-7-III State v. Lyons

RCW 9A.44.120 allows hearsay, not otherwise admissible under a statute or court

rule, to be admitted in a criminal case provided “[i]t is made by a child when under the

age of ten,” and they are “describing any act of physical abuse of the child by another that

results in substantial bodily harm.” RCW 9A.44.120(1)(a)(i) (emphasis added). For a

child’s out-of-court statement to be admissible, the court must also find that “the time,

content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.”

RCW 9A.44.120(b). In determining the reliability of the child hearsay, the court

evaluates nine factors, commonly referred to as the “Ryan factors.” State v. Ryan, 103

Wn.2d 165, 175-76, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).

Mr. Lyons does not argue the court improperly applied the Ryan factors. Rather,

he contends the trial court failed to distinguish between “substantial bodily harm” and

mere “bodily harm,” resulting in an error of law. The State responds that the trial court

properly interpreted the meaning of “substantial bodily harm” based on the plain reading

of the statute, legislative intent, and relevant case law. Thus, the State argues the issue

before us is the meaning of “substantial bodily harm” within the child hearsay statute,

RCW 9A.44.120 and as defined by RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b). Because “substantial bodily

harm” as used in the statute has already been defined by our Supreme Court, we need not

determine the proper definition. Instead, we need only determine whether the court

properly found C.L.’s injuries rose to the level of “substantial bodily harm.”

6 No. 40444-7-III State v. Lyons

Preliminary questions of fact concerning the admissibility of evidence “shall be

determined by the court.” ER 104(a). In making such determinations, the trial court “is

not bound by the Rules of Evidence except those with respect to privileges.” ER 104(a).

A preponderance of the evidence standard is applied to questions of preliminary fact in

determining the applicability of hearsay exceptions. State v. Guloy, 104 Wn.2d 412, 420,

705 P.2d 1182 (1985).

RCW 9A.04.110(4)(b) defines “substantial bodily harm” as “a temporary but

substantial disfigurement, or which causes a temporary but substantial loss or impairment

of the function of any bodily part or organ, or which causes a fracture of any bodily part.”

Under RCW 9A.04.110(4)(a), “bodily harm” is defined as “physical pain or injury,

illness, or an impairment of physical condition.”

In State v. McKague, our Supreme Court held that “substantial” within the

meaning of the statute for assault in the second degree, “signifies a degree of harm that is

considerable and necessarily requires a showing greater than an injury merely having

some existence.” 172 Wn.2d 802, 805-06, 262 P.3d 1225 (2011). The court clarified,

“While we do not limit the meaning of ‘substantial’ to any particular dictionary

definition, we approve of the definition . . . ‘considerable in amount, value, or worth.’”

Id. at 806 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (2002)). In

applying that definition, the court noted that the victim’s “resulting facial bruising and

swelling lasting several days, and the lacerations to his face, the back of his head, and his

7 No. 40444-7-III State v. Lyons

arm” were enough “to find that the injuries constituted substantial but temporary

disfigurement.” Id.

Similarly, in State v. Ashcraft, this court found there was sufficient evidence of

substantial bodily harm in a child abuse case where doctors observed bruises on the

victim that were consistent with being hit by a shoe and that “[t]he presence of the bruise

marks indicate temporary but substantial disfigurement.” 71 Wn. App. 444, 455, 859

P.2d 60 (1993). In State v. Hovig, this court relied on the reasoning and holding in

Ashcraft and agreed that “serious bruising can rise to the level of ‘substantial bodily

injury.’” 149 Wn. App. 1, 13, 202 P.3d 318 (2009). The court determined that there was

enough to constitute substantial bodily harm when photographs taken hours after the

child was bitten showed visible bruising to his cheek. Id. at 5-6, 13

Here, Mr. Lyons argues the trial court should have declined admission of C.L.’s

out-of-court statements because the State failed to present sufficient evidence of C.L.

suffering substantial bodily harm. We are unpersuaded by Mr. Lyons’ argument since

the trial court only had to determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether C.L.

incurred substantial bodily harm.

In support of its contention that C.L. suffered substantial bodily harm, the State

presented evidence that C.L.’s “face was swollen and discolored,” and her nose “was

wider and it had a little bump.” RP at 102, 112. Officer Hernandez testified that C.L.

had a “swollen left eye” and “bruising to the bottom of [her] eye.” RP at 250-51.

8 No. 40444-7-III State v. Lyons

Consistent with Hovig and McKague, C.L.’s visible bruises, swelling, and discoloration

were inflicted on her face rather than another area of her anatomy, such as her buttocks or

extremities.

The presence of C.L.’s visible bruises, swelling, and discoloration of her face

sufficiently supports the trial court’s finding that she suffered temporary but substantial

disfigurement for purposes of RCW 9A.44.120. Because C.L.’s injuries fall within the

meaning of substantial bodily harm, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting C.L.’s out-of-court statements.

Affirmed.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in

the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

Cooney, J.

WE CONCUR:

Lawrence-Berrey, C.J.

Murphy, J.