State of Washington v. Parker M. Bachtold

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: November 25, 2025
• Docket: 40311-4
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED NOVEMBER 25, 2025 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) ) No. 40311-4-III Respondent, ) ) v. ) ) PARKER M. BACHTOLD, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) Appellant. ) )

COONEY, J. — Parker Bachtold pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree,

robbery in the first degree, theft of a motor vehicle, juvenile in possession of a firearm,

and two counts of theft of a firearm. Mr. Bachtold appeals, arguing (1) his guilty plea to

robbery in the first degree should be vacated because there was an insufficient factual

basis to support the plea and his attorney was ineffective in stipulating to an insufficient

factual basis for the plea; (2) his guilty pleas to the remaining charges were not entered

into knowingly and voluntarily due to the invalidity of the robbery plea and an incorrect

offender score; and (3) the victim penalty assessment (VPA) and DNA collection fee

were erroneously imposed. We disagree with Mr. Bachtold’s first two arguments, agree No. 40311-4-III State v. Bachtold

with his third argument, and remand for the limited purpose of striking the VPA and

DNA collection fee from the judgment and sentence.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the “Statement of Arresting Officer and

Preliminary Finding of Probable Cause” (probable cause affidavit). Clerk’s Papers (CP)

at 18-25.

On October 5, 2014, Patrick Altus was found “dead on the floor inside his

residence.” CP at 18. Mr. Bachtold and Mr. Altus’ niece, S.E.A., 1 for whom Mr. Altus

had custody, resided with Mr. Altus. When Mr. Altus was found, Mr. Bachtold’s and

S.E.A.’s “whereabouts” were “unknown,” and the truck Mr. Altus had recently purchased

was missing. CP at 19. The next day, Mr. Altus’ truck was located at a motel in Oregon.

Mr. Bachtold was arrested on his departure from a motel room. Two firearms were later

discovered in the motel room.

S.E.A. told law enforcement that “[Mr. Bachtold] shot [Mr. Altus] on Tuesday

(09/30/2014) night at about 22:00.” CP at 22. S.E.A. reported hearing a second gunshot,

before Mr. Bachtold “came into her room holding a pistol and told her he had just shot

1 To protect the privacy interests of S.E.A., we use initials throughout this opinion. Gen. Order of Division III, In re the Use of Initials or Pseudonyms for Child Victims or Child Witnesses, (Wash. Ct. App. June 18, 2012), https://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/?fa=atc.genorders_orddisp&ordnumber =2012_001&div=III

2 No. 40311-4-III State v. Bachtold

[Mr. Altus] and that he had it coming.” CP at 22. S.E.A. stated Mr. Bachtold told her to

get her stuff, and they loaded clothes, camping gear, fishing poles, and a “bunch of stuff”

in the truck. CP at 22. S.E.A. stated she told Mr. Bachtold “they should call the police,”

and he “told her no and pointed [the] pistol at her.” CP at 22. They departed for Oregon

the next morning.

Mr. Bachtold told law enforcement that he “had been asleep for several hours” in

his bedroom while S.E.A. and Mr. Altus “were watching [TV] in the living room.” CP at

23. Mr. Bachtold stated, “[h]e heard a ‘pop,’ which sounded like a .22 magnum

gunshot.” CP at 23. He went to the living room where “he saw [S.E.A.] holding the .22

magnum rifle and she had just shot [Mr. Altus].” CP at 23. Mr. Bachtold claimed,

“[S.E.A.] was backing up and [Mr. Altus] was coming at her and yelling that she had just

shot him.” CP at 23. “[S.E.A.] continued to back up around the end of the couch and

[Mr. Altus] followed her and [Mr. Altus] and [S.E.A.] were then fighting over the gun.”

CP at 23. Mr. Bachtold specified that he retrieved the “.410 shotgun” and “went back to

where [Mr. Altus] was standing.” CP at 23. Mr. Bachtold claimed Mr. Altus then “got

down on his knees” and “was asking for help and then said just to shoot him.” CP at 23.

Mr. Bachtold admitted he “shot [Mr. Altus] in the face with the .410 shotgun. He

said [Mr. Altus] was still alive when he shot him.” CP at 23. The next morning,

Mr. Bachtold detailed how he and S.E.A. “loaded up” Mr. Altus’ truck, taking Mr. Altus’

3 No. 40311-4-III State v. Bachtold

guns, cellphone, and identification, and drove to Oregon where Mr. Bachtold’s father

resided. CP at 23.

Mr. Bachtold explained “that he shot [Mr. Altus] because [Mr. Altus] was raping

[S.E.A.] and had been for a longtime. [Mr. Altus] had also been raping other kids.”

CP at 23. Mr. Bachtold stated he believed Mr. Altus had raped S.E.A. the morning

before the shooting. He declared, “[S.E.A.] was in the bathroom getting ready for school.

[Mr. Bachtold] was outside and heard [S.E.A.] screaming. He went in the house and

[Mr. Altus] had raped [S.E.A.].” CP at 23. S.E.A. denied being raped by Mr. Altus but

claimed he had inappropriately touched her.

The State charged Mr. Bachtold with aggravated murder in the first degree,

robbery in the first degree, theft of a motor vehicle, two counts of theft of a firearm, and

two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree. On May 10, 2016,

Mr. Bachtold and the State entered into a written “Plea Agreement.” CP at 44-51. In

the Plea Agreement, Mr. Bachtold stipulated to his offender score and standard range

of confinement for each count. On August 16, 2016, the State filed an amended

information, in accordance with the plea agreement, with the only notable modification

being an amendment of the charge of aggravated murder in the first degree to murder in

the first degree. Mr. Bachtold pleaded guilty to all but the final count of unlawful

possession of a firearm in the second degree that was dismissed at sentencing.

4 No. 40311-4-III State v. Bachtold

Mr. Bachtold agreed in his statement on plea of guilty that “[i]nstead of making a

statement, [he] agree[s] that the court may review the police reports and/or a statement

of probable cause supplied by the prosecution to establish a factual basis for the plea.”

CP at 61. The judge noted in the statement on plea of guilty “[probable cause] est.

10/16/2024 [Judge Henry Rawson].” CP at 61. The court confirmed this stipulation with

Mr. Bachtold and his attorney:

[COURT:] In Section 11 on page 10, you’re asked to make a statement in your own words as to why you’re guilty. But instead the box has been checked right here that I might review a police report or a statement of probable cause to establish a factual basis for the plea. And it’s your understanding that probable cause has been established in this matter?

[MR. BACHTOLD:] It is.

[DEFENSE:] We would stipulate the probable cause for those charges, Your Honor.

[COURT:] Thank you.

It appears that probable cause was established on October 16th, 2014, is that your understanding?

Rep. of Proc. at 29-30.

After accepting Mr. Bachtold’s guilty pleas, the court sentenced Mr. Bachtold to

360 months of incarceration on the murder in the first degree conviction. The sentences

on the remaining five counts were ordered to run concurrent to the murder sentence. Mr.

Bachtold was ordered to pay a VPA and DNA collection fee, among other sanctions.

5 No. 40311-4-III State v. Bachtold

Mr. Bachtold appeals.

ANALYSIS

VALIDITY OF PLEA TO ROBBERY IN THE FIRST DEGREE

Mr. Bachtold argues his conviction for robbery in the first degree should be

vacated because there was an insufficient factual basis to support the charge. He asserts

this deficiency constitutes a manifest constitutional error, and his attorney was ineffective

for stipulating to an insufficient factual basis.

Under RAP 2.5(a), this court may “refuse to review any claim of error which was

not raised in the trial court.” However, a party may raise a manifest error affecting a

constitutional right for the first time on appeal. RAP 2.5(a)(3). For us to accept review

under RAP 2.5(a)(3), Mr. Bachtold must demonstrate that the error is manifest and that

the error is truly of constitutional dimension. State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 926, 155

P.3d 125 (2007).

Mr. Bachtold presents two constitutional issues for the first time on appeal. First,

Mr. Bachtold argues his plea was not entered into knowingly and voluntarily because

there was an insufficient factual basis for the robbery charge, thereby depriving him of

his right to due process. Secondly, Mr. Bachtold claims he was deprived of his Sixth

Amendment right to counsel under the United States Constitution when his attorney

stipulated to an insufficient factual basis for the robbery charge.

6 No. 40311-4-III State v. Bachtold

Mr. Bachtold contends the errors are manifest because he was convicted of a crime

for which sufficient proof did not exist and the conviction inflated his offender scores on

the concurrent offenses. Our analysis of whether the error is manifest necessarily invokes

an assessment of the facts. We therefore proceed to the merits of Mr. Bachtold’s

constitutional challenges.

Due Process

The issue of whether a guilty plea is constitutionally valid is reviewed de novo.

State v. Snider, 199 Wn.2d 435, 444, 508 P.3d 1014 (2022). “Due process requires that a

guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” State v. Olsen, 3 Wn.3d 689,

698, 555 P.3d 868 (2024). In determining whether a plea is made knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily, the court conducts a totality of the circumstances analysis.

Snider, 199 Wn.2d at 444. “When a defendant pleads guilty after receiving a charging

document that accurately describes the elements of the offense charged, their plea is

presumed to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Id. at 445. A plea is not knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary unless the defendant understands the nature of the charge. State

v. Osborne, 102 Wn.2d 87, 92-93, 684 P.2d 683 (1984).

Mr. Bachtold argues his conviction for robbery in the first degree should be

vacated and dismissed because “[t]here are no facts . . . which suggests he used force

against Mr. Altus to obtain his property.” Appellant’s Op. Br. at 14. Specifically, Mr.

Bachtold claims the probable cause affidavit stated that Mr. Bachtold employed force

7 No. 40311-4-III State v. Bachtold

against Mr. Altus because of his belief that Mr. Altus had engaged in sexual conduct with

S.E.A., not to obtain or retain Mr. Altus’ property.

For a guilty plea to be valid, CrR 4.2(d) mandates the judge accepting a guilty plea

be satisfied there exists a factual basis for the plea, among other factors. A judge does

not have to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty for a

sufficient factual basis to exist. State v. Arnold, 81 Wn. App. 379, 382, 914 P.2d 762

(1996). Rather, “a factual basis exists if the evidence is sufficient for a jury to conclude

that the defendant is guilty.” Id. The factual basis does not need to be derived from the

defendant’s admissions so long as the material relied on by the court is part of the record.

Osborne, 102 Wn.2d at 95.

“Robbery” is defined as:

A person commits robbery when he or she unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his or her presence against his or her will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or his or her property or the person or property of anyone. Such force or fear must be used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking; in either of which cases the degree of force is immaterial. Such taking constitutes robbery whenever it appears that, although the taking was fully completed without the knowledge of the person from whom taken, such knowledge was prevented by the use of force or fear.

RCW 9A.56.190. A person commits robbery in the first degree if during the

“commission of a robbery or of immediate flight therefrom, he . . . is armed with a deadly

weapon . . . or inflicts bodily injury.” RCW 9A.56.200(a)(i), (iii).

8 No. 40311-4-III State v. Bachtold

As a preliminary matter, the purpose behind Mr. Bachtold’s use of force against

Mr. Altus need not be exclusive. Alternatively stated, Mr. Bachtold may have used force

against Mr. Altus due to his belief that Mr. Altus had engaged in sexual conduct with

S.E.A. as well as to retain Mr. Altus’ property.

In State v. Handburgh, the Supreme Court held that “the force necessary to

support a robbery conviction need not be used in the initial acquisition of the property.

Rather, the retention, via force against the property owner, of property initially taken

peaceably or outside the presence of the property owner, is robbery.” 119 Wn.2d 284,

293, 830 P.2d 641 (1992).

Assuming Mr. Bachtold’s stated purpose for the use of force against Mr. Altus is

accurate, the affidavit of probable cause also stated that Mr. Bachtold obtained Mr. Altus’

firearm, used the firearm to shoot Mr. Altus, and later departed Mr. Altus’ home in

possession of the firearm. Thus, at minimum, facts exist demonstrating that Mr.

Bachtold’s use of force against Mr. Altus was employed to retain possession of the

firearm he earlier took from Mr. Altus and later used to kill him. The probable cause

affidavit contained a sufficient factual basis to support the elements of robbery in the first

degree. Mr. Bachtold knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently pleaded guilty to robbery

in the first degree.

9 No. 40311-4-III State v. Bachtold

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Mr. Bachtold next contends that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel

when his attorney stipulated to an insufficient factual basis for the charge of robbery in

the first degree.

Defendants have a constitutionally guaranteed right to effective assistance of

counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22; State v. Lopez, 190 Wn.2d

104, 115, 410 P.3d 1117 (2018). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is an issue

of constitutional magnitude that may be considered for the first time on appeal. State v.

Nichols, 161 Wn.2d 1, 9, 162 P.3d 1122 (2007). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims

are reviewed de novo. State v. White, 80 Wn. App. 406, 410, 907 P.2d 310 (1995).

The appellant bears the burden of showing that his attorney’s performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the

circumstances and, if so, that there is a reasonable probability that but for his attorney’s

poor performance, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. State v.

McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). If either element is not

satisfied, the inquiry ends. State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215 P.3d 177 (2009).

Here, because we conclude the probable cause affidavit contained a sufficient

factual basis to support the charge of robbery in the first degree, Mr. Bachtold’s attorney

was not ineffective in stipulating to the court relying on the affidavit of probable cause as

a factual basis for the plea.

10 No. 40311-4-III State v. Bachtold

Mr. Bachtold’s plea of guilty to the charge of robbery in the first degree is not

invalid.

VALIDITY OF GUILTY PLEAS TO THE REMAINING COUNTS

Mr. Bachtold next raises a two-fold argument to the validity of his remaining

guilty pleas, contending he did not enter into the pleas knowingly, voluntarily, or

intelligently. First, Mr. Bachtold claims the invalid robbery conviction improperly

inflated his offender score. Secondly, he asserts that the theft of a motor vehicle

conviction should have counted as the same course of conduct as the two convictions for

theft of a firearm for purposes of his offender score calculation. We disagree with his

first contention and decline review of the second.

Validity of Robbery in the First Degree Conviction

Mr. Bachtold argues that because the robbery conviction was invalid for a want of

a factual basis, his guilty pleas to the remaining counts were not made knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently. Specifically, Mr. Bachtold claims that since the robbery

charge was invalid, his offender score on the remaining counts was lower. Thus, “[h]e

was wrongly informed about the possible criminal penalties which could be imposed for

convictions on the other offenses.” Appellant’s Op. Br. at 20.

As discussed above, because a sufficient factual basis existed to support Mr.

Bachtold’s guilty plea to robbery, the conviction is valid. Thus, the robbery conviction

11 No. 40311-4-III State v. Bachtold

was correctly included in his offender scores on the remaining counts. Mr. Bachtold’s

convictions on the remaining counts are therefore valid.

Same Criminal Conduct

Although Mr. Bachtold does not assign error to the court’s calculation of his

offender score, he asserts for the first time on appeal that his offender score was

improperly inflated because the theft of a motor vehicle conviction should have counted

as the same course of conduct as the two convictions for theft of a firearm.

The burden is on the defendant at sentencing to establish that the current offenses

encompass the same criminal conduct. State v. Jackson, 28 Wn. App. 2d 654, 664, 538

P.2d 284 (2023), review denied, 2 Wn.3d 1027, 544 P.3d 34 (2024). Illegal or erroneous

computations of an offender score may generally be raised for the first time on appeal,

unless the argument involves a factual or discretionary determination. State v. Nitsch,

100 Wn. App. 512, 520, 997 P.2d 1000 (2000). Nevertheless, an appellant waives a

challenge to his offender score when he affirmatively agrees to his offender score and

standard range sentences. Id.

Here, Mr. Bachtold affirmatively agreed to his offender scores and corresponding

standard range sentences in a written plea agreement. Consequently, Mr. Bachtold has

waived a same course of conduct challenge on appeal.

We decline to review Mr. Bachtold’s challenge to his offender score.

12 No. 40311-4-III State v. Bachtold

VICTIM PENALTY ASSESSMENT AND DNA COLLECTION FEE

Mr. Bachtold argues the VPA and the DNA collection fee should be struck from

his sentence due to his indigency. The State concedes. We accept the State’s concession

and remand for the trial court to strike the VPA and DNA collection fee.

Where the legislature changes the law after sentencing, the court will review a

claim of error that relates to the changes. State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 17-18, 530

P.3d 1048 (2023), review granted, 4 Wn.3d 1009, 564 P.3d 547 (2025). Formerly, RCW

7.68.035(1)(a) imposed a $500 VPA on any adult found guilty of a crime in superior

court. On July 1, 2023, an amendment to RCW 7.68.035 went into effect, requiring trial

courts to refrain from imposing a penalty assessment if, at the time of sentencing, the

defendant was found to be indigent as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3). See LAWS OF 2023,

ch. 449, §§ 1, 4. Statutory changes to cost statutes apply retroactively. State v. Ramirez,

191 Wn.2d 732, 748-49, 426 P.3d 714 (2018). The court explicitly found Mr. Bachtold is

indigent under RCW 10.01.160(3), therefore we remand for the trial court to strike the

VPA as it should not have been imposed.

Additionally, under the former RCW 43.43.7541, a $100 DNA collection fee was

required to be imposed. Effective July 1, 2023, the legislature amended the statute and

eliminated the mandatory imposition of the DNA collection fee. See LAWS OF 2023, ch.

449, § 4. Therefore, the DNA collection fee was wrongfully imposed, and because

13 No. 40311-4-III State v. Bachtold

statutory changes apply retroactively, we remand for the trial court to strike the DNA

collection fee.

CONCLUSION

We affirm Mr. Bachtold’s convictions and remand for the limited purpose of

striking the VPA and DNA collection fee from his judgment and sentence.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

Cooney, J.

WE CONCUR:

Staab, A.C.J.

Fearing, J.